Diary of Sergeant David L. Day: March 2, 1864

The 11th Connecticut regiment arrived here today, and we are ordered back to the News where we rejoin a part - of our old regiment which has just returned from home. This is good news to our boys who have been impatiently awaiting their return. So far as I am concerned I shall leave here with some regrets. We have been here several weeks and have got used to the officers and the place. The duty is light and somebody has got to stay here; as we have only a few months longer to remain we might as well be here as anywhere; but the orders are to go and orders must be obeyed. I will call on our officers and learn more about it. I am well pleased with these young fellows. They seem to know their business and have a remarkable faculty of attending to it and letting other people attend to theirs. Their business appears to be in their quarters, amusing themselves with their reading, writing and games. They are not at all afflicted with exclusiveness and are not disposed to recline on their dignity. The boys have a standing invitation to call on them any time during office hours, and almost every evening some of them are in there. I called on them and inquired if they were going through to the News with us or stop with their regiment at Yorktown. They said it was not supposed that we knew enough to go from here to Newport News alone, and their orders were to march us down there, but they should try to get transportation from Yorktown. I said I thought that would be the most difficult job they had undertaken recently, that we could get transportation from here just as well as from Yorktown. But the idea was for us to march, as marching 50 or 100 miles a week, carrying heavy knapsacks, was a fine thing for soldiers. It took the kinks out of their legs and prevented them from becoming round shouldered. I inquired if they thought of making the journey on brook water? One of them partly closed his left eye and replied, “Not muchly.” I then said I should like an order on the commissary for a few much-needed supplies. The order was forthcoming, for which I made my best bow, and bidding them good evening took my leave.

SOURCE: David L. Day, My Diary of Rambles with the 25th Mass. Volunteer Infantry, p. 132

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, August 8, 1864

Going into the War Department yesterday morning to inquire if any tidings had been received concerning Colonel Stedman of the 11th Connecticut Infantry, who was wounded, probably mortally, on Friday, I found the President with General Grant, Stanton, and General Halleck in the Secretary's room. I proposed leaving on making the single inquiry, provided they were in secret council, but the President and General Grant declared they were not, for me. Learning that poor Stedman was dead, and that some little intelligence had been received from Mobile, I soon left, for there was, it appeared to me, a little stiffness as if I had interrupted proceedings. General Grant has been to Frederick and placed Sheridan in command of the forces on the upper Potomac instead of Hunter, which is a good change, for H., though violently earnest, is not exactly the man for that command. I think him honest and patriotic, which are virtues in these days, but he has not that discretion and forbearance sufficient to comprehend rightly the position that was given him.

Mr. Seward sent me to-day some strange documents from Raymond, Chairman of the National Executive Committee. I met R. some days since at the President's, with whom he was closeted. At first I did not recognize Raymond, who was sitting near the President conversing in a low tone of voice. Indeed, I did not look at him, supposing he was some ordinary visitor, until the President remarked, “Here he is; it is as good a time as any to bring up the question.” I was sitting on the sofa but then went forward and saw it was Raymond. He said there were complaints in relation to the Brooklyn Navy Yard; that we were having, and to have, a hard political battle the approaching fall, and that the fate of two districts and that of King's County also depended upon the Navy Yard. It was, he said, the desire of our friends that the masters in the yard should have the exclusive selection and dismissal of hands, instead of having them subject to revision by the Commandant of the yard. The Commandant himself they wished to have removed. I told him such changes could not well be made and ought not to be made. The present organization of the yard was in a right way, and if there were any abuses I would have them corrected.

He then told me that in attempting to collect a party assessment at the yard, the Naval Constructor had objected, and on appealing to the Commandant, he had expressly forbidden the collection. This had given great dissatisfaction to our party friends, for these assessments had always been made and collected under preceding administrations. I told him I doubted if it had been done—certainly not in such an offensive and public manner; that I thought it very wrong for a party committee to go into the yard on pay-day and levy a tax on each man as he received his wages for party purposes; that I was aware parties did strange things in New York, but there was no law or justice in it, and the proceeding was, in my view, inexcusable and indefensible; that I could make no record enforcing such assessment; that the matter could not stand investigation. He admitted that the course pursued was not a politic one, but he repeated former administrations had practiced it. I questioned it still, and insisted that it was not right in itself. He said it doubtless might be done in a more quiet manner. I told him if obnoxious men, open and offensive opponents of the Administration, were there, they could be dismissed. If the Commandant interposed to sustain such men, as he suggested might be the case, there was an appeal to the Department; whatever was reasonable and right I was disposed to do. We parted, and I expected to see him again, but, instead of calling himself, he has written Mr. Seward, who sent his son with the papers to me. In these papers a party committee propose to take the organization of the navy yard into their keeping, to name the Commandant, to remove the Naval Constructor, to change the regulations, and make the yard a party machine for the benefit of party, and to employ men to elect candidates instead of building ships. I am amazed that Raymond could debase himself so far as to submit such a proposition, and more that he expects me to enforce it.

The President, in a conversation with Blair and myself on the Wade and Davis protest, remarked that he had not, and probably should not read it. From what was said of it he had no desire to, could himself take no part in such a controversy as they seemed to wish to provoke. Perhaps he is right, provided he has some judicious friend to state to him what there is really substantial in the protest entitled to consideration without the vituperative asperity.

The whole subject of what is called reconstruction is beset with difficulty, and while the executive has indicated one course and Congress another, a better and different one than either may be ultimately pursued. I think the President would have done well to advise with his whole Cabinet in the measures he has adopted, not only as to reconstruction or reëstablishing the Union, but as to this particular bill and the proclamation he has issued in regard to it.

When the Rebellion shall have been effectually suppressed, the Union government will be itself again, union will speedily follow in the natural course of events, - but there are those who do not wish or intend reunion on the principle of political equality of the States. Unless they can furnish the mode and terms, and for fear they may not be successful, various schemes are projected.

The issuing of the proclamation with reasons for not signing the bill, and yet expressing his acquiescence in the policy if any of the States adopt it, is denounced as anomalous; so is the condition of the country, and so will be reunion, whenever and however it may take place. I have never asked who was the adviser and counsellor of the President in issuing the proclamation. It is sufficient that I was not. There is one who was, and how many more is not material. There may have been one, possibly two, but the project is wholly the President's.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 96-9

Official Reports of the Maryland Campaign, September 3-20, 1862: No. 138. – Report of Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, U. S. Army, commanding Ninth Corps, of the Battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS,

Mouth of Antietam, September 23, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the movements of the Ninth Army Corps on the 16th instant, and their part in the battle of Sharpsburg on the 17th:

On the evening of the 15th instant the Ninth Army Corps, having been ordered away from the remainder of the right wing, was encamped in the rear of the extreme left of the whole line of the Army of the Potomac, close to the hills on the southeast side of the valley of the Antietam, and on the left of the road from Rohrersville to Sharpsburg.

On the afternoon of the 16th the whole corps, except Willcox's division, was moved forward and to the left and front, by command of Major-General Burnside, in three columns, and took up a new position upon the rear slope of the ridges on the left bank of the Antietam, the center of the corps being nearly opposite the stone bridge over the stream on the above-mentioned road.

The positions assigned the divisions of the command were as follows: The right front to be occupied by Crook's brigade, of the Kanawha Division, supported in rear by Sturgis' division; a commanding knoll in the center to be occupied by Battery E, Second U.S. Artillery, First Lieut. Samuel N. Benjamin commanding, consisting of 20-pounder Parrott guns: the left front to be occupied by Rodman's division, supported in rear by Ewing's brigade, of the Kanawha Division, the whole of the latter division being under the command of Col E. P. Scammon. The columns were conducted to their positions by staff officers of the personal staff of General Burnside. The artillery of the command, except Benjamin's battery, was held in reserve.

Shortly after daybreak on the 17th the enemy's batteries opened upon the batteries of our line, and a brisk artillery fight began, in which Benjamin's battery and Durell's battery (the latter sent forward a little to the right of our position, under charge of Captain Rawolle, by General Sturgis) took an active part, co-operating with batteries of other corps on our right. Two of the enemy's caissons were exploded, and many of their guns silenced. The shot and shell fell thickly in our bivouac, but little damage was done us.

About 7 o'clock orders were received from General Burnside to move forward the corps to the ridge nearest the Antietam, and hold it, in readiness to cross the stream, carrying the bridge and the heights above it by assault. The command was moved forward in column as it had been formed the previous night, and promptly took position as directed, and the light artillery was ordered to cover the movement; McMullin's, Durell's, Clark's, Muhlenberg's, and Cook's batteries being placed on the heights to right and left and somewhat to the front of Benjamin's battery, to which a section of 20 pounders from Simmonds' battery was also temporarily attached. Willcox's division was also brought up and held as a reserve.

About 9 o'clock the order was received to cross the stream. Immediately the Eleventh Connecticut Infantry, Colonel Kingsbury commanding, was detailed from Rodman's division to deploy as skirmishers and drive the enemy from the head of the bridge. The column on the right Crook's brigade, of the Kanawha Division, supported by Sturgis' division) was ordered to march under cover of the Eleventh Connecticut, and attempt to carry the bridge by assault, deploying to right and left as soon as the bridge should be carried, and taking the heights above it. The column on the left (Rodman's division, supported by Ewing's brigade, of the Kanawha Division) was ordered to cross, if possible, by a ford about one-third of a mile below the bridge, take the heights above it, and join the column crossing the bridge.

The bridge itself is a stone structure of three arches, with stone parapet above, this parapet to some extent flanking the approach to the bridge at either end. The valley in which the stream runs is quite narrow, the steep slope on the right bank approaching quite to the water's edge. On this slope the roadway is scarped, running both ways from the bridge end, and passing to the higher land above by ascending through ravines above and below; the other ravine being some 600 yards above the bridge, the turn about half that distance below. On the hillside immediately above the bridge was a strong stone fence running parallel to the stream. The turns of the roadway were covered by rifle-pits and breastworks, made of rails and stone, all of which defenses, as well as the woods which covered the slope, were filled with the enemy's infantry and sharpshooters. Besides the infantry defenses, batteries were placed to enfilade the bridge and all its approaches. The crest of the first hill above the bridge is curved toward the stream at the extremes, forming a sort of natural tete-de-pont. The next ridge beyond rises somewhat higher, though with less regularity, the depression between the two being but slight, and the distance varying in places from 300 to 700 yards.

In accordance with the order mentioned above, the Eleventh Connecticut advanced to the stream and warmly engaged the enemy across it. Crook's brigade in moving forward was brought under so lively an infantry fire, as well as that of artillery, that it was forced to halt and open fire in return, and Sturgis' division, passing by the rear, came first to the bridge, and was ordered to cross under protection of the artillery fire. General Sturgis ordered forward the Second Maryland and Sixth New Hampshire, which charged at double-quick with fixed bayonets, but the concentrated fire upon the bridge forced them to fall back. After repeated brave efforts these regiments were withdrawn, and the Fifty-first New York and Fifty-first Pennsylvania, from the same division, were ordered up.

About the same time Colonel Crook, of the Second Brigade, Kanawha Division, succeeded in getting a section of Simmonds' battery, supported by the Twenty-eighth Ohio Infantry, in position to bear directly upon the enemy's positions at the farther end of the bridge, and, aided by these guns, the fresh troops charged with great enthusiasm, bearing down all opposition, and, at I o'clock, planted their banner on the opposite bank. In this desperate fight in the valley, Colonel Kingsbury, of the Eleventh Connecticut, fell, cheering his men on to duty.

General Sturgis' division immediately marched over, deploying one brigade to the right and the other to the left of the bridge, and advanced up the slope, driving the enemy before them. This division was followed by Colonel Crook's brigade of the Kanawha Division, which took position on the right.

Meanwhile General Rodman's division and the First Brigade of the Kanawha Division, under Colonel Scammon, had succeeded in crossing at the ford below, after a sharp engagement and under a heavy musketry and artillery fire, and successfully took the position assigned at the left of the line of the crest above the bridge. The three divisions of the corps at this time on the right bank of the Antietam occupied the exact positions assigned them before the commencement, except that on the right the division of Sturgis was in front, and Crook's brigade in support of it, the order being reversed by the causes before stated.

The stubbornly contested fight at the bridge having almost exhausted the ammunition and greatly fatigued the troops engaged, I sent a request to General Burnside that Willcox's division, which had been held in reserve on the left bank, might be sent over and take its place on the right front, putting Sturgis' division in reserve at the head of the bridge. This was immediately ordered by General Burnside, and General Willcox came promptly forward with his command. During the interval the enemy kept up an incessant cannonade, and, having the exact range of the valley and the ravines, his shells came in very fast, annoying us a good deal and causing numerous casualties, notwithstanding the men were kept lying on the ground near the crests of the hill while the changes in the line and the partially new formation after the arrival of Willcox's division were being made.

At about 3 o'clock, the necessary changes in the line having been completed, the order to advance was received from General Burnside, and the whole force, except Sturgis' division, was put in motion. General Willcox on the right, his whole division in line and supported by Colonel Crook, was ordered to move on Sharpsburg, which lay about a mile distant to the right of our front. General Rodman, supported by Colonel Scammon, was ordered to move in the same direction, first dislodging the enemy from his front, and then changing direction to the right, bringing his command en echelon on the left of General Willcox. The advance was partly covered by Simmonds', Muhlenberg's, Clark's, and Cook's batteries, the other batteries of the corps being in part out of ammunition, and part being necessarily kept in position on the commanding ground on the left bank of the stream. The troops moved forward in perfect order and with great enthusiasm. On the right, General Willcox and Colonel Crook quickly repulsed the enemy and drove back their artillery, pushing victoriously forward nearly to the village. On the left, General Rodman and Colonel Scammon likewise advanced rapidly, driving the rebels before them. The enemy, however, were manifestly in much greater force than ours, and massed their troops heavily on the extreme left. This necessarily made the line of march of our left wing diverge from the course intended, and opened a gap between it and the right, which it was necessary to fill up by the troops of the second line. Batteries were accumulated against us upon the semicircular ridge in advance, and the advancing line was subject to a most trying and destructive cross-fire of artillery. The enemy now brought up still more fresh troops upon the left, and while General Rodman was making disposition to meet them by a change of front of a part of his command, he fell, desperately wounded by a ball through his breast. The loss of their commander at a critical period caused confusion in a portion of the division on the extreme left.

The Second Brigade of his division, Colonel Harland commanding, was forced to retire after an obstinate contest, in which they suffered terribly.

Colonel Scammon, of the Kanawha Division, being ordered to make dispositions of the brigade with him to oppose the rebel force on the left, caused the Twelfth and Twenty-third Ohio Regiments to execute a perpendicular change of front, which was done with precision and success, the other regiment of the brigade (Thirtieth Ohio) maintaining its proper front. The whole line was now engaged, the supports being brought to the front, except the reserve division of General Sturgis at the bridge. This was now ordered up, and came promptly, though much exhausted and weakened by its previous exertions during the day.

The mass of the enemy on the left still continued to increase; new batteries were constantly being opened upon us, and it was manifest the corps would, without re-enforcements, be unable to reach the village of Sharpsburg, since the movement could not be made to the right whilst the enemy exhibited such force in front of the extreme left, and the attack both to the right and left at once would necessarily separate the wings to such an extent as to imperil the whole movement unwarrantably.

The attack having already had the effect of a most powerful diversion in favor of the center and right of the army, which by this means had been able to make decided and successful advances, and no supports being at the time available for our exhausted corps, I ordered the troops withdrawn from the exposed ground in front to the cover of the curved hill above the bridge, which had been taken from the enemy earlier in the afternoon. This movement was effected shortly before dark, in perfect order and with admirable coolness and precision on the part of both officers and men.

The line as then constituted was formed by Sturgis' division in front on the left, supported by Fairchild's brigade, of Rodman's division; the Kanawha Division, under Colonel Scammon, in the center, and Willcox's division on the right. The enemy did not venture an attack upon the position, but kept up a brisk artillery fire until night-fall.

The bravery and soldierly conduct of the men was most striking, and becomes still more noticeable when it is considered that for several days they had been marching and fighting, with scarcely any rest, by night or day, and the rapidity of the movement had prevented their having any regular supplies of food, the supply train being delayed at the rear by the advance of other troops.

The batteries on the left bank of the Antietam were used not only to assist in the movement of the corps, but also were most efficiently turned upon the enemy in his attacks on the center and right of the army. They were all very well served, and the 20-pounder battery, under Lieutenant Benjamin, was especially efficient.

In their reports (which are transmitted herewith) the commandants of divisions and separate brigades speak in the highest terms of their troops, and make special mention of numbers of officers and men who distinguished themselves. These are too numerous to be named in this report, but the whole list will very shortly be published in a special order from these headquarters. I must confine myself to the expression of my great satisfaction with the manner in which all the subordinate commands of the corps were handled. The movements were accurate as those of a parade, and the systematic order with which they were executed made the spectacle in the heat of the battle a grand and imposing one. Permit me also to express my obligations to the gentlemen on General Burnside's staff for the intelligence, courage, and unwearied industry they exhibited in the constant communication between him and the headquarters of this corps.

The casualties in the corps during the day were 2,222; of which 357 were killed, 1,742 wounded, and 123 missing.* Among numerous officers killed and wounded we have to mourn the loss of Col. Henry W. Kingsbury, Eleventh Connecticut; Lieut. Col. A. H. Coleman, commanding Eleventh Regiment Ohio Volunteers; Lieut. Col. M. Clarke, commanding Thirty sixth Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, and Lieutenant-Colonel Bell, commanding Fifty-first Pennsylvania. All these gallant officers were killed in the action whilst heroically leading their men, under a terrible fire of shell, canister, and musketry.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. D. COX,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Lieut. Col. LEWIS RICHMOND,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. Right Wing, Maj. Gen. Burnside Comdg.

_______________

* But see revised statement, p. 198.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 19, Part 1 (Serial No. 27), p. 423-7

The Burnside Expedition --- The Actual Facts

To the Editor of the New York Times

Upon my arrival at Fortress Monroe, I gave without any compensation, the facts relating to the Burnside Expedition to the Associated Press.  In that report I nothing extenuated, nor set down aught in malice.  I stated the facts without commentary.  The official dispatch distinctly states that only one vessel was lost and that Gen. Burnside says so.  I know that he did not.  I know that Gen. Burnside freely and openly spoke to the Correspondents of his position, of his misfortunes, and his responsibilities, and that when he was advised to place an espionage over the Press, he said, “I am in the hands of the public.  I have been deceived but I will bear the blame.”  Freely, and with generosity, in the face of counsel opposed to him he allowed the correspondents to send their dispatches.

The facts stated and published by these gentlemen have verified my original statement, but now that some official parties have seen fit to contravene the primary statements which the public received, perhaps it would be well to reiterate and state the facts.

An expedition called the Burnside Expedition which had long been in preparations, and which consisted of one hundred and twenty five vessels of all descriptions sailed on the 4th of January from Fortress Monroe.  Slight storms and head winds retarded us on our progress, but we arrived, either outside or inside the bar, on the 13th or 15th of this month.  Gen. Wool advised the departure, the pilots agreed with him, and thus we saved meeting a storm which would have buried one half of the worthless hulks on the sandy bottom of the sea.  The vessels comprising the expedition were bought under the understanding that they should draw a certain depth of water.  The correspondent of the Evening Post states in one case: At least one steamer was sworn to draw but six feet six inches when laden and actually draws when lightened as near as possible, eight feet.  From the World’s correspondent: ‘I shudder when I look back to a week ago yesterday, and recount the train of casualties which has followed us and were I to present them in the order they occurred your readers would certainly presume this an ill starred expedition.’

All the daily papers add testimony to these statements.  I will not enter into particulars already published.  The terrible storms almost unparalleled, the rapid current sweeping with resistless force from Pamlico sound to the wild ocean at the rate of five miles an hour and returning.  The high tides washing over the sandy beach of Hatteras and preventing the landing of soldiers or the serene quiescent gouty state of the Commodore who lounged on his divan while the whirlwind and the rough ocean tore and shattered the City of New York’s elegant proportions into driftwood and an unseemly object when a hauser from a tug boat might have saved her.

I will sate facts.  The City of New York with 400 kegs of gunpowder, 1,700 Enfield rifles, with bombs &c., was lost through neglect, and her Captain and crew in full sight of the fleet remained in the rigging forty hours exposed to the mercy of the elements.  The Zouave gunboat, armed with one 32 pound Parrott gun, two Wiard guns, rifled, dragged her anchors, stove a hole in her stern and sunk.  The troops were saved and so were the guns.  The vessel is lost.

The Grapeshot bomb-vessel went down at sea.

The Pocahontas, an old steamer, was charted for horses.  The pilot stated to the General on board the Spaulding that her owner was utterly opposed to her going on the expedition. – The pilot also stated that the boilers leaked and they drove wooden plugs in the boiler, that the iron grates fell out (See Times correspondent) and she went ashore because they and no sail!  The Pocahontas lost 80 Rhode Island Battery horses and 15 staff officers’ horses.

The bark Volligeur, with a portion of the Eleventh Connecticut is hard ashore with 500 troops.

The Admiral who carried Gen. Burnside and the Massachusetts Twenty-fourth and which were sent ashore, stuck in the Swash three days but is now over.

The steamer Northerner, the headquarters of Gen. Reno, broke her anchor and was ashore three days.

The Eastern Queen went hard ashore.

The Louisiana, a large paddle-wheel steamer, (Herald correspondent says,) broke her back.

A schooner went ashore near the light-house, with oats for horses, and went to pieces.

Another schooner went ashore with coal, and lost six men, four of whom were buried by Col. Stevenson of the Twenty-fourth Massachusetts, and two by the Eleventh Connecticut.

The ships purchased for the Expedition never could have stood a storm at sea.  Old freight boats from Poughkeepsie and Albany were fitted up as gunboats, painted black to look formidable, two of them, the Lancer and Pioneer, carried 500 troops each.  When in the trough of the sea they rolled fearfully and a Captain in the navy who was on board the Lancer, stated that in case of a storm, nothing could prevent her from bilging and going down.

The contractor who furnished the water casks for the expedition has committed an outrage on our soldiers which should only entitle him to John Brown’s fate.  The casks used to put water in were old whisky, kerosene oil and camphene barrels furnished by the Union city of Baltimore.  The sufferings endured from this source was terrible, men could not drink it, it was too nauseous.

Another contrast.  Ice would have been a luxury to the soldiers – it was only $5 a ton. – Water we were short of.  Coal we were short – it was only $4.50 a ton.  Stone was worth 25 cents.  All of these most excellent ballast.  Yet would it be believed that we took on board pig iron at $20 a ton as ballast, knowing when we started we should have to cast it overboard. – Yes such is the fact.  The gunboat Lancer arrived at Hatteras Inlet short of coal and water, and yet she threw over 75 tons of iron - $1,750 worth.  In all $3,600 worth of iron was cast overboard, yet we were short of water.

The pilots, we are all told, were all Union, Hatteras Inlet was Union, and New York subscribed $8,000 for the inhabitants because they were all Union.  Yet one of the pilots hired by us one went over to the enemy and informed them of everything, and as for the inhabitants of Hatteras Inlet, they are too ignorant to know the difference between Union and Secession.  It is all nonsense, experience teaches us that, there are no Union men there, and that the 3,000 rifles asked for, if they had been granted, would now be on Roanoke Island, and that the $8,000 sent to North Carolina for the benefit of the Union men, was all lost to us.  The south are in earnest and we are at play.  We had to pay $800 in secret service money to those self-same Union men, to know whether Roanoke Island was occupied or not.

Briefly reiterating the facts contained in my first dispatch, and calling attention to the rascalities of the first steamboat contractors, and other contractors, and asking the public to pause in the contemplation of a set of scoundrels who have allowed the lives and health of 15,000 men to be periled by their life boats and their water casks, I will conclude by stating the position of affairs.

The naval gunboats have crossed the “swash.”  One half of Gen. Burnside’s vessels have done likewise.  Seven thousand troops are safely over.  Those vessels which cannot cross will be relieved of their troops, and will cross on other vessels.  Vessels may be injured.  Water was scarce for a time.  The rations were rather slight.  But the whole army of 15,000 men have confidence in their General.  He is ever ready to relieve the wants of a shipwrecked crew or the privations of the soldier.  In the storm in his top boots, his old gray flannel shirt and Kossuth hat, the American Garibaldi is loved by all.  They have faith in his bravery – they have confidence in his judgment – and their experience teaches them that Gen. Burnside will never bring back the star on his shoulder dimmed by defeat, but rather that it will shine resplendent in victory.

W. R.

FIFTH AVENUE HOTEL, Tuesday, January 30th, 1862.

– Published in The Burlington Weekly Hawk-Eye, Burlington, Iowa, Saturday, February 8, 1862, p. 2