Not much of interest at the Cabinet. Seward, Blair, and
Bates absent from Washington. The capture of Fort Morgan is confirmed by
accounts from Sherman.
Am trying to arrange for changes in command of our squadrons
and of our navy yards. Something must be done to close the entrance to Cape
Fear River and port of Wilmington. I give no credit to the newspaper gossip of
connivance on the part of our naval officers with blockade-runners which many
good men believe; but there is a want of effective action. Admiral Lee is true
and loyal, careful, and circumspect almost to a fault, but, while vigilant, he
has not dash and impetuous daring, and there seems some defect in the blockade
which makes Wilmington appear an almost open port. It is true that
blockade-running has become systematized into a business, and the ingenuity and
skill of Englishmen and the resources of English capital are used without stint
in assisting the Rebels.
I have been urging a conjoint attack upon Wilmington for
months. Could we seize the forts at the entrance of Cape Fear and close the
illicit traffic, it would be almost as important as the capture of Richmond on
the fate of the Rebels, and an important step in that direction. But the War
Department hangs fire, and the President, whilst agreeing with me, dislikes to
press matters when the military leaders are reluctant to move.
Fox urges the immediate recall of Farragut and giving him
the North Atlantic Squadron. But to withdraw Farragut from Mobile suddenly will
give cause for censure. The country is expecting the capture of the city of
Mobile. I do not think it an important object at this moment. We have the bay
and have closed all communication from abroad. To capture the city will be
difficult, very difficult if the army does not take the principal work in hand.
If Farragut is recalled, the failure or omission to take the city will be
imputed to the Navy Department. Besides, to withdraw Farragut and place him in
the North Atlantic Squadron will be to advertise our object, and cause the
Rebels to prepare for the work of defense. These and other considerations have
weight, and prevent me from acting. It is important, however, that the port of Wilmington
should be closed, and no effort should be spared to secure that object. Stanton
expressed himself willing in our last conversation but doubted if General Grant
could be brought into the movement just now, and was, I saw, disinclined
himself to advise or recommend the measure. Have had some talk with Fox and
sent him to urge Halleck and Stanton. He had an errand to perform with the
President and proposed to open the subject to him also. As I had done so
several times, and always found the President willing, and on the last two or
three occasions solicitous, yet, like Stanton, deferring to Grant, I thought
well of the proposition. It was suggested that Gillmore was at leisure or would
be a good officer to command in such an expedition. I have a good opinion of
Gillmore as a second officer and as an engineer or artillery officer, but his
skill and strength in other respects and particularly in organizing and
controlling men and planning and carrying out details of an important movement
as chief are questionable, and therefore, I should, unless satisfied by
competent men who know him better than I do, hesitate in regard to his
selection. This is pretty plain and direct work, and he may succeed. Stanton
has agreed to send for Gillmore and get his views. In some proposed changes of
our squadron commands I find embarrassments. This one of taking Farragut from
the West Gulf and transferring him to the North Atlantic is one. It will be a
right and proper measure at the right time. But who shall succeed him? Dahlgren
has asked to be relieved of his present command, which he earnestly sought, but
I am doubtful about giving him the Western Gulf. Though I do not question his
courage, which, however, is artificial, he evades responsibility, is craving in
his demands, and profuse in expenditure. Fox has advised his transfer to the
Mississippi, and that Porter should take Dahlgren's command. But this change
does not suit me nor would it gratify either of those admirals. A second
suggestion from Fox is that Porter should have command of a flying squadron for
the defense of the coast and the West Indies which it is proposed to raise.
This strikes me more favorably, provided he is to leave the Mississippi.
SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the
Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866,
p. 127-9
