Gideon Welles to William H. Seward, March 31, 1863

Navy Department.

31 Mar., 1863.

Sir,

When discussing the regulations concerning “Letters of Marque,” &c a few days since, I made certain suggestions, and you invited me to communicate any views I might entertain, in writing.

I have felt some delicacy, I may say disinclination, to take any active part in this matter, because I have from the beginning of our difficulties discouraged the policy of privateering in such a war as this we are now waging. The rebels have no commercial marine to entice and stimulate private enterprise and capital in such undertakings, provided the policy were desirable. We, however, have a commerce that invites the cupidity, zeal and spirit of adventure, which, once commenced, will be difficult to regulate or suppress. A few privateers let loose among our shipping, like wolves among sheep, would make sad havoc, as the Alabama and the Florida bear witness.

It is proposed to encourage private enterprize to embark in undertaking to capture the two wolves or privateers that are abroad devastating the seas, and it is said, in addition to the wolves they may be authorized to catch blockade runners. The inducement, I apprehend, will not meet a favorable response. There may be vessels fitted out to capture unarmed prizes, but not of sufficient force to meet and overcome the Alabama; if not, the great end and purpose of the scheme will fail of accomplishment.

To clothe private armed vessels with governmental power and authority, including the belligerent right of search, will be likely to beget trouble, and the tendency must unavoidably be to abuse. Clothed with these powers reckless men will be likely to involve the Government in difficulty, and it was in apprehension of that fact, and to avoid it, I encountered much obloquy and reproach at the beginning of the rebellion, and labored to institute a less objectionable policy.

Propositions for privateers, for yacht squadrons, for naval brigades, volunteer navy, &c., &c. were, with the best intentions in most instances, pressed upon the Dep't, regardless of the consequences that might follow from these rude schemes of private warfare. It was to relieve us of the necessity of going into these schemes of private adventure, that the “Act to provide for the temporary increase of the Navy,” approved July 24, 1861, was so framed as to give authority to take vessels into the Naval service and appoint officers for them, temporarily, to any extent which the President may deem expedient. Under other laws, seamen may be enlisted and their wages fixed by executive authority; and the officers and men so taken temporarily into the Naval service are subject to the laws for the government of the Navy. An “Act for the better government of the Navy,” approved July 17,1862, grants prize money to “any armed vessel in the service of the United States,” in the same manner as to vessels of the Navy.

These laws, therefore, seem, and were intended to provide all the advantages of letters of marque, and yet prevent in a great measure the abuses liable to spring from them. Private armed vessels, adopted temporarily into the Naval service, would be more certainly and immediately under the control of the government, than if acting only under a general responsibility to law.

It will be necessary to establish strict rules for the government of private armed vessels, as to some extent they will be likely to be officered and manned by persons of rude notions and free habits. Congress after authorizing Letters of Marque in the War of 1812, adopted the necessary legislation for the vessels bearing them, by the Act of June 26th of that year. This act has not been revived. The recent “Act concerning letters of marquee” &c. &c. authorizes the President to “make all needful rules and regulations for the government and conduct of private armed vessels, furnished with letters of marque.” In pursuance of this authorization, the “regulations” have been prepared, embracing the provisions of the statute enacted during the War of 1812. These regulations establish, as the statute did, a penal code. They impose fines and assume to authorize punishments, including even capital punishment.

As suggested in our interview, I question the validity of such proceedings. Can Congress delegate this power of penal legislation to the President? and if to the President, why may it not to any branch of the Executive?

If it can be granted for this special purpose — the government of private armed vessels — why not for any other purpose? And if it can delegate the power of penal legislation, why could it not delegate any other power, or powers, to the President, to Commissioners, or even to a Committee of its own body, to sit during the recess? Why could it not delegate to the Secretary of the Treasury to legislate respecting imports and foreign trade, or to the Post-Master General full power of legislation respecting post offices and post routes?

The power of imposing penalties and inflicting punishments is the essence of legislative power, for it is the penalty of transgression that gives force to law. These regulations also establish rewards as well as penalties. They provide that a large bounty shall be paid to private armed vessels in certain cases. But no fund is appropriated for the purpose by the Act, nor has any provision elsewhere been made for it. Can Congress delegate to the President the power to appropriate the public moneys, or to take them without specific appropriation, or pledge the public faith at his discretion for an indefinite amount?

As I have already said, I have doubts in these particulars. They are expressed with some reluctance, because in the uneasy condition of the public mind, growing out of the lawless depredations of the semi-piratical cruisers that are abroad, I am unwilling to interpose anything which may be construed into an obstacle, to repress public indignation, which is so justly excited. I did not regret that Congress enacted a law authorizing letters of marque; because I verily believe that, with it, England can be made to prevent her mercenary citizens from making war on our commerce under a flag that has no recognized nationality. If the police of the sea is to be surrendered, and rovers built by English capital and manned by Englishmen are to be let loose to plunder our commerce, let England understand that her ships will suffer, and her commerce also be annoyed and injured by private armed ships. With her distant and dependent colonies, no nation has greater cause to oppose maritime robbery and plunder, such as is being inflicted on us by Englishmen and English capital, than Great Britain.

The West Indies are, notoriously, harbors of refuge for the corsairs that are plundering our merchants, as well as for the infamous and demoralizing business of running our blockade, to encourage the insurgents who are waging war on our government. Of these ports, those of England are the worst, and a vast amount of English capital is engaged in illicit traffic, and her people and authorities exhibit sympathy for, and afford aid to, the insurgents and their abettors, and corresponding opposition to this Government.

The English ship-yards are filled with vessels built and building for the rebel service, and if measures are not taken to prevent, these will soon swarm the seas to capture, condemn and destroy American property, without a port into which they can send their captures for adjudication. Enjoying greater advantages than the corsairs and sea-rovers that once infested the ocean, because protected, harbored, & sheltered by governments in alliance with, and professedly friendly to us, while ordinary pirates are outlaws, this species of lawless outrage cannot be permitted to go on.

England should be warned that we cannot permit this indirect war to continue with impunity — that it will provoke and justify retaliation, and that if her people and government make war upon our commerce, by sending abroad rovers with no nationality, to prey upon the property of our citizens, it will be impossible to restrain our people from retaliatory measures.

I am, respectfully,

Your Obdt. Servt.

Gideon Welles,

Secty. of Navy.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward,

Secty. of State.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 252-6

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, March 17, 1863

Returned last evening from strictly confidential visit to New York.

Some discussion in Cabinet-meeting to-day on letters of marque. Seward and Chase are both strong advocates of the measure. Am surprised that Chase should favor it, for he must be sensible of the consequences. He has, I think, committed himself somewhat hastily to some of the indignant but inconsiderate men in the shipping interest who are sufferers. Seward has no knowledge on the subject, nor any conception of the effect of letting loose these depredators under government sanction. There is such a general feeling against the English, who are conniving with and aiding the Rebels, that privateering is becoming popular with the Administration and country. Statesmen who should check and restrain the excited, erring popular current are carried along with it. I suggested some doubts of the expediency of the proposed proceedings, and the principles involved. In the first place I queried whether Congress could depute legislative power to the Executive, as was assumed. I asked Seward if he had any money to pay the promised bounties, and if he was of opinion there could be fines and criminal punishment inflicted by Executive regulations merely. Seward said he had no money; knew not whether there was any appropriation from which funds could be taken; if not, he must pledge the Government. This I opposed, and no one sustained Seward or expressed an opinion on the subject. As regarded penal inflictions, fines, criminal punishment by regulation he had no doubt whatever, should not hesitate in the least. I could admit no such power on the part of the Executive. My doubts and suggestions, I perceived, set others thinking. Chase became silent.

These notions in regard to privateers and letters of marque, though crude, erroneous, and fraught with evil, have been maturing for some time, and I do not mistake in placing much of the mischief to the State Department, which would be irresponsible for Navy transgressions. The Times of New York and the Chronicle of this city and papers of that particular phase of partyism, which never [act] without prompting from a certain quarter, have been writing up the matter and getting the public mind excited. The Chronicle pronounces the privateers to be a volunteer navy like volunteer forces on land. The Times mixes up letters of marque with the Navy Department, which it blames for delaying to issue the necessary authority, innocently unaware that it is a subject pertaining to that Department of the Government whose head it would never intentionally injure.

Conflicting accounts concerning Farragut's command on the lower Mississippi. The Rebel accounts state he passed Port Hudson with his vessel, the others being driven back, with the exception of the steamer Mississippi, which all say was grounded and blown up. Our account represents that all the fleet passed up except the Mississippi.

The accounts from Porter, above Vicksburg, are not satisfactory. He is fertile in expedients, some of which are costly without adequate results. His dispatches are full of verbosity of promises, and the mail which brings them also brings ludicrous letters and caricatures to Heap, a clerk who is his brother-in-law, filled with laughable and burlesque accounts of amusing and ridiculous proceedings. These may be excusable as a means of amusement to keep up his spirits and those of his men, but I should be glad to witness, or hear of something more substantial and of energies employed in what is really useful. Porter has capabilities and I am expecting much of him, but he is by no means an Admiral Foote.

The progress of the squadron and troops at Charleston is slow and unsatisfactory. I apprehend the defenses are being strengthened much faster than the assailants. Du Pont has attacked Fort McAllister and satisfied himself that the turret vessels are strong and capable of great endurance, but at the same time he doubtless made the Rebels aware of these facts.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 247-9

Charles Francis Adams to John M. Forbes, August 30, 1861

London, 30 August, 1861.

I do not know that I violate any confidence by telling you that the hope expressed in yours to me has been thus far verified. What the future may bring forth, no man can tell, — but the fact is certain that, now, negotiation is at a standstill.

I hear excellent accounts of your patriotic labors in the cause, and hope the best results from them. The great point now is the blockade. Privateering will come to nothing if that be made effective. If not, I see no end to it. For some of our own people would be as likely to go into it as to carry on the slave trade. The English must abide by the blockade, if it really be one. They will set it aside if they can pick a good flaw in it.

The course of events as seen from here is towards one termination of the struggle, and one only. We cannot afford to go over this ground more than once. The slave question must be settled this time once for all. It is surprising to see the efforts made here to create the belief that our struggle has nothing to do with slavery, but that it is all about a tariff. Even the anti-slavery people have been more or less inclined to give in to this notion.

Of course the measure of emancipation is a most grave one. It must task the capacity of the wisest heads among us. But there is no alternative in my mind between taking it up and absolute submission.

I cannot conceal from myself the fact that as a whole the English are pleased with our misfortunes. There never was any real good will towards us — and the appearance of it of late years was only the effect of their fears of our prosperity and our growing strength. Of course, you will keep these views to yourself. It is not advisable in these days for ministers abroad to be quoted. With best regards for Mrs. F. and your family, I am

Very truly yours,

C. F. Adams.

SOURCE: Sarah Forbes Hughes, Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes, Volume 1, p. 234-5

John M. Forbes to Charles Francis Adams, August 12, 1861

Boston, August 12, 1861.

My Dear Sir, — I have been hard at work for some weeks upon the organization of the new volunteer navy, and although it will be made an auxiliary, and a very useful one, to the navy, I regret to say I find great difficulties in giving it that efficiency which it ought to have, as a substitute for privateering. I am of course not going to give it up, and am looking to such changes in our law as will doubtless be adopted whenever an emergency really puts us to our trumps; but while it is yet an experiment, I am satisfied that we ought not to give up our right to issue letters of marque unless accompanied by Mr. Marcy's broader principle of exempting all private property on the sea from capture.

Even then I consider the time an unlucky one, and hope that some happy accident or some unreasonable demands on the part of the European powers may enable us to postpone the whole question. I need not, I hope, assure you that I have no disposition to interfere with your duties beyond giving you at the earliest moment the result of my personal observation upon the experiments we are trying now, and which of course has a direct bearing upon the questions which you are perhaps now discussing.

Pray make my best regards to Mrs. Adams and the rest of your family, and believe me,

Truly yours with high respect,

J. M. Foebes.

N. B. — Our hope was (and still is) to make the volunteer navy equally strong for attack — without the barbarism of privateering, but it is by no means so easy a task as we had supposed.

SOURCE: Sarah Forbes Hughes, Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes, Volume 1, p. 233-4

John M. Forbes to Congressman Thomas Dawes Eliot*, July 4, 1861

Boston, July 4,1861.

My Dear Mr. Eliot, — I have yours of 2d, and note the doubts of Mr. Welles as to the safety of intrusting commissions to our merchant sailors. This is natural at first sight, but a little reflection must convince him that it is entirely unfounded.

During our two wars with England, when most of our merchant ships were of 200 to 400 tons and none above 700, our best commodores and captains came from the merchant service, and showed no inaptitude for carrying frigates into action. Look over Cooper's “Naval History” and see who won the laurels then!

If history were wanting as a guide, we should on general principles come to the same confidence in the skill and gallantry of our merchant sailors. I would make no invidious comparisons with our navy; but the crisis is a great one, and the navy can well afford to face the truth. It has glorious men and glorious memories, but they are so closely interwoven with those of our merchant marine that to lower the one it is almost inevitable that you lower the other. If I make a comparison, it is partly in the hope of making suggestions that will tend to raise the navy to its highest point of efficiency.

Let us for a moment examine the training of the two services now. Leaving out the Annapolis school as only just beginning to act upon the very youngest grade of commissioned officers, the youths intended for the navy have been selected at a very early age, with generally very insufficient education, from those families who have political influence, and from those young men who have a prejudice against rough sailor life. Under our system of promotion by seniority these young men live an easy life in the midshipman's mess, the wardroom, or on shore, with little responsibility and little actual work until, at the age of from forty to sixty, they get command of a vessel; they feel that they are in the public service for life, and that the ones that take the best care of their lives and healths are the most sure of the high honors of their profession! Considering their want of early training, of active experience, and of stimulus, it is only surprising that they are on the whole so fine a body of men.

Compare this training with that of our merchant officers. Taken from a class of young men, with somewhat fewer advantages and education, but all having access to our public schools, they are sent to sea to fight their own way up. Those who are capable soon emerge from the mass of common sailors (most of them common sailors for life), and are tried as mates, etc. They are chosen for their daring, their vigilance, their faculty for commanding; and those who prove to have these qualities soon get into command. In nine cases out of ten, the young American-born sailor who is fit for it gets command of a vessel by the time he is twenty-five years old, an age when our naval officers have, as a rule, had but little experience in navigating vessels, and but little responsibility put upon them.

Instead of the little vessels which our heroes of the old wars commanded, you will find these same merchant captains in command of vessels ranging from 700 tons (a small ship now), up to 1500 and 2000 tons, some as large as our seventy-fours, many as large as our first-class frigates! It is idle to talk of such men not being able to manœuvre sloops-of-war or frigates, either in action or in any circumstances where seamanship and daring are needed.

So much for a comparison of the training of the two services; now for one or two suggestions for raising the navy. First, let us go on with the naval school and carry its scientific requirements and rigid discipline as high as West Point. To go further back still; I would have the candidates for the school recommended, not by members of Congress, but by the boards of education of the different States, and taken from those who have proved themselves the best scholars in our public, schools, — at least a majority of them; leaving the minority to come from those more favored by fortune who use the private schools.

Once in service, I would have our navy actively employed in surveying foreign seas and making charts, as the English navy is doing to a considerable extent. Then let the President have some discretion to promote those who by gallantry or science distinguish themselves. Finally, a more liberal retiring list, and if possible some higher honors in the way of titles as a stimulus to our officers.

Perhaps there is not time for the reform of the service, but it is the time for beginning the organization of our volunteer navy. Do you note that the only privateer that we know has been taken has been by sailing brig Perry, though another is reported by the Niagara? I could say almost or quite as much in favor of half clipper ships, in comparison with the ordinary sloop-of-war, as I have said of our merchant sailors. Until we become converted to European ideas upon standing armies and navies, we cannot think of giving up our land or sea militia, and, if we give up privateering, we must have a substitute with all its strength and more.

Yours truly,

J. M. Forbes.

_______________

* Chairman of the Naval Committee of the House of Representatives.— Ed.

SOURCE: Sarah Forbes Hughes, Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes, Volume 1, p. 221-4

Rebel Privateering

A new steamer, called the Oveito, sailed from Liverpool on the 22d March, and , according to rumor, she is intended for the service of the Rebels in destroying Northern commerce on the Atlantic. The Oveito was built at Liverpool, ostensibly for the Italian Government, and is, consequently, adapted for warlike purposes. She measures seven hundred and fifty tons, is capable of carrying several guns of the largest caliber on a draft of twelve feet, and is represented as one of the finest and fastest vessels of her class afloat. The vessel was regularly cleared at Liverpool for Palermo, in ballast, and a crew of about fifty men on board. Very contradictory statements were current as to the real destination of the vessel, her armament, &c., &c.

– Published in The Burlington Weekly Hawk-Eye, Burlington, Iowa, Saturday, May 3, 1862, p. 4

Resolutions Adopted by the Congress of the Confederate States, Aug. 13, 1861

The "Confederate" Congress in session at Richmond, Va., adopted the following resolution this day:—

Whereas it has been found that the uncertainty of maritime law in time of war has given rise to differences of opinion between neutrals and belligerents, which may occasion serious misunderstandings, and even conflicts; and whereas the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, and Russia, at the Congress of Paris of 1856, established a uniform doctrine on this subject, to which they invited the adherence of the nations of the world, which is as follows:

1. That privateering is and remains abolished.

2. That the neutral flag covers the enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war.

3. That neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag, and

4. That blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.

And whereas it is desirable that the Confederate States of America shall assume a definite position on so important a point; now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Congress of the Confederate States of America accept the second, third, and fourth clauses of the above-cited declaration, and decline to assent to the first clause thereof.

SOURCE: Frank Moore, Editor, The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events, Vol. 2, p. 60