Genl. Shields came
to breakfast and to visit the Ohio men of his command in the Cliffburne
Hospital. He told me he desired greatly to have a command of 5000 men and be
allowed to dash as he could, breaking the lines and communications of the
enemy. My daughters went with him to the Hospital.
Soon after they
left, I received a summons to a Cabinet meeting. The President spoke of the
Treaty said to have been formed between the Cherokees and Confederates, and
suggested the expediency of organizing a force of whites and blacks, in
separate Regiments, to invade and take possession of their country. Statistics
of the Indians were sent for, from which it appeared that the whole fighting
force of the Cherokees could hardly exceed 2500 men. Mr. Usher, Assistant
Secretary of the Interior was not in favor of the expedition. He thought it
better to deal indulgently with deluded Indians, and make their deluders feel the
weight of the Federal authority. Most, on the whole, seemed to concur with him.
Mr. Usher mentioned
a report that the Louisville Democrat had come out openly for disunion, saying
that it was now manifest that the Government was in the hands of the
Abolitionists. The President said, this was equivalent to a declaration of
hostility by the entire Douglas Party of Kentucky, and manifested much
uneasiness.
There was a good
deal of conversation on the connection of the Slavery question with the
rebellion. I expressed my conviction for the tenth or twentieth time, that the
time for the suppression of the rebellion without interference with slavery had
passed; that it was possible, probably, at the outset, by striking the
insurrectionists wherever found, strongly and decisively; but we had elected to
act on the principles of a civil war, in which the whole population of every
seceding state was engaged against the Federal Government, instead of treating
the active secessionists as insurgents and exerting our utmost energies for
their arrest and punishment; — that the bitternesses of the conflict had now
substantially united the white population of the rebel states against us;—that
the loyal whites remaining, if they would not prefer the Union without Slavery,
certainly would not prefer Slavery to the Union; that the blacks were really
the only loyal population worth counting; and that, in the Gulf States at
least, their right to Freedom ought to be at once recognized, while, in the
Border States, the President's plan of Emancipation might be made the basis of
the necessary measures for their ultimate enfranchisement; — that the practical
mode of effecting this seemed to me quite simple; — that the President had
already spoken of the importance of making of the freed blacks on the
Mississippi, below Tennessee, a safeguard to the navigation of the river; — that
Mitchell, with a few thousand soldiers, could take Vicksburgh; — assure the
blacks freedom on condition of loyalty; organize the best of them in companies,
regiments etc. and provide, as far as practicable for the cultivation of the
plantations by the rest; — that Butler should signify to the slaveholders of
Louisiana that they must recognize the freedom of their workpeople by paying
them wages; — and that Hunter should do the same thing in South-Carolina.
Mr. Seward
expressed himself as in favor of any measures likely to accomplish the results
I contemplated, which could be carried into effect without Proclamations; and
the President said he was pretty well cured of objections to any measure except
want of adaptedness to put down the rebellion; but did not seem satisfied that
the time had come for the adoption of such a plan as I proposed.
There was also a
good deal of conversation concerning the merits of Generals. I objected pretty
decidedly to the policy of selecting nearly all the highest officers from among
men hostile to the Administration, and continuing them in office after they had
proved themselves incompetent, or at least not specially competent, and
referred to the needless defeat of McClellan and the slowness of Buell. Seward
asked what I would do. I replied, Remove the men who failed to accomplish
results, and put abler and more active men in their places. He wished to know
whom I would prefer to Buell. I answered that if I were President, or Secretary
of War authorized to act by the President, I would confer with the General in
Chief; require him to name to me the best officers he knew of; talk the matter
over with him; get all the light I could; and then designate my man.
As much as any
thing, the clearing of the Mississippi by the capture of Vicksburgh was
discussed. I reminded the President that after the evacuation of Corinth it
would have been an easy matter to send down a few thousand men and complete our
possession of the river; and of his own plan of putting Genl. Mitchell at the
head of his own division and Curtis' army, and sending him to take Vicksburgh,
almost adopted more than two weeks ago. Mr. Usher suggested that since Genl.
Halleck had decided against this plan, on the ground that Mitchell's division
could not be spared from Buell's command, and Curtis' army was needed to
prevent a foray from Arkansas into Missouri, it might be well to raise a
special force by volunteering for this one object of taking Vicksburgh, opening
the Mississippi and keeping it open. I heartily seconded this idea and it was a
good deal talked over.
At length, the
President determined to send for Genl. Halleck and have the matter discussed
with him. The General came, and the matter was fully stated to him both by Gov.
Seward and myself. He did not absolutely reject the idea, but thought the
object could be better accomplished by hastening the new levies; putting the
new troops in the position now occupied by the old regiments; and setting the
last to the work of opening the Mississippi. He expressed the strongest
convictions as to the importance of the work, and his desire to see it
accomplished at the earliest possible period. At this moment, however, the
necessary troops could not be spared for the purpose. Taking into consideration
the delay incident to raising a special force, equal, perhaps, to that demanded
by Genl. Halleck's plan, and the other disadvantages it was thought best to
drop the idea.
In connection with
this subject, Genl. Halleck spoke of the distribution of troops in the West. He
said that Hardee had broken up his camp south of Corinth, and transferred his
army to Chattanooga, where he now had probably 40 or 50,000 men; that Price had
attempted to cross the river into Arkansas, but had as yet failed to accomplish
his purpose; that a considerable force was, however, advancing northward into
Missouri; and that he had sent a division and brigade, say 7,000 men, to Curtis
(making his whole force about 17,000) and instructed him to prevent the
invasion of Missouri; that he had also detached from Grant about 15,000 men,
say three divisions, to take position at Decatur to support Buell if necessary;
that Grant had still under his command about 43,000, of whom 7,000 under Jackson
had been ordered to the to watch Price; that Buell had 60,000, with which force
he was approaching Chattanooga. These numbers give the whole force in the West,
exclusive of troops occupying St. Louis and various Posts and Camps north of
the Ohio; — Buell, 60,000 — Grant including detachments, except Curtis', 58,000
— Curtis, 17,000 — in all, 135,000 men, excellent troops. He stated McClellan's
army at present and fit for duty at 88,000; absent on leave 33,000; absent
without leave, 3,000; present but sick, 16,000 — in all, say, 140,000. Another
statement makes the number fit for duty 91,000, and the total 143,000.
The President read
a communication from Genl. H. proposing that 200,000 militia should be drafted
for 9 months, and that the 300,000 men to fill old and form new regiments
should be obtained without delay; and to prevent the evil of hasty and improper
appointments and promotions, that a Board of Officers should be organized, to
which all proposed action of that sort should be referred. The General
condemned, respectfully but as decidedly, the inconsideration which has
hitherto marked the action of the Government in this respect, and stated one
case where a Colonel had been tried and convicted of gross misconduct and was
on the point of being dismissed, when he came on to Washington and returned
with a Brigadier's Commission.
The General
commanded my sincere respect by the great intelligence and manliness he
displayed, and excited great hopes by his obvious purpose to allow no lagging
and by his evident mastery of the business he had taken in hand. I cannot agree
with him as to the expediency of retaining Buell and McClellan in their
important commands; and I was sorry to hear him say, in reply to a question of
the President, as to what use could be made of the black population of the
borders of the Mississippi, “I confess, I do not think much of the negro.”
Neither Mr. Stanton
nor Mr. Blair were present at the meeting to-day.
When the Cabinet
Council broke up, I proposed to Mr. Usher, who made a most favorable impression
on me, to ride home in my carriage but he was called back by the President, and
I finding my carriage had not come, rode home with Mr. Bates.
SOURCE: Annual
Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol.
2, p. 53-7
