Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864 — January 23, 1865: No. 190. — Report of Col. Lewis Johnson, Forty-fourth U. S. Colored Troops, of operations December 2-3, 1864.

No. 190.

Report of Col. Lewis Johnson, Forty-fourth U. S. Colored Troops,

of operations December 2-3, 1864.

HDQRS. FORTY-FOURTH U.S. COLORED INFANTRY,         

Nashville, Tenn., December 4, 1864.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to submit the following report of the affair which occurred on the 2d and 3d instant, at Stockade No. 2, on Mill Creek (Chattanooga and Nashville Railroad), between the troops temporarily under my command and the enemy under General Forrest:

At 8 a.m. the train containing the Forty-fourth U.S. Colored Infantry and Companies A and D of the Fourteenth U.S. Colored Infantry left Murfreesborough and arrived at the bridge over Mill Creek, guarded by Block-house No. 2, at about 11 a.m., when suddenly a battery opened upon the train, nearly all of which was upon the trestle bridge. The locomotive and first car were struck and several of the men injured. I immediately got my command off the train and moved it up to the stockade, which I supposed was evacuated, but, on my arrival there, found it occupied by a detachment of the One hundred and fifteenth Ohio Volunteers, commanded by Lieutenant Harter. As the block-house was full, and three batteries were shelling us terribly, and a heavy musketry fire commenced from all sides, I formed my men around the house and then pushed a portion up a hill on the east side of the fort, which entirely commanded it, and from where the heaviest fire was kept up. Unable to carry the crest of the hill I kept the men on the side of it, and had logs and stumps of trees converted into a breast-work. This position afforded them much shelter, and they held it against several assaults of the enemy. The batteries, which continued their fire, injured the block house constantly; they had to change position a dozen times, being silenced by our musketry. At about 5 p.m. the enemy managed to establish a battery on the hill of which I spoke above, and it was this battery which did more harm than all the rest. It knocked the lookout of the stockade to pieces, and also the roof, which caved in at several places. The shots fired by it struck the house every time, and a number penetrated it; one shell, exploding inside, killed the railroad conductor, who had sought shelter in the house, and wounded several of the garrison. It was now dark and the artillery fire ceased, but musketry was still kept up. I drew the command back to the block-house, and left a strong skirmish line at the position which we had occupied during the day. As my ammunition was nearly exhausted (the men who came off the train only had forty rounds), and I expected an assault, I stopped all firing in order to reserve the tour rounds I had left per man for the last effort. The firing was kept up until 3 a.m. of the 3d, but not answered by my men. My position was quite desperate, and when I took into consideration that my stock of ammunition was almost expended, the stockade so much used up that a few shots would have knocked it down, and having lost one-third of the men, I resolved to abandon the stockade and fight my way to Nashville. I knew that should the place be surrendered or taken by assault a butchery would follow, and I also knew that re-enforcements would have been sent to me if it had been possible to send them. I therefore left the block-house at 3.30 a.m., and, contrary to my expectations, got through the rebel lines without much trouble. I arrived at Nashville about daylight.

In addition to the above I have to state that I left Surg J. T. Strong, Forty-fourth U.S. Colored Infantry, and Chaplain Railsback, Forty-fourth U.S. Colored Infantry, in the block-house to take care of the wounded men.

The soldiers and officers of the different commands behaved well and steady during the entire fight, and especially during the retreat; every man did his duty; not a shot was fired, but silently they marched, determined to die rather than be taken prisoners.

The forces engaged numbered as follows: Forty-fourth U.S. Colored Infantry, 227 muskets; Companies A and D, Fourteenth U.S. Colored Infantry, 80 muskets; detachment One hundred and fifteenth Ohio Volunteers, 25 muskets; total, 332 muskets.

The losses are:

                       

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.		A
	O	M	O	M	O	M	O	M
44th U.S. Colored Infantry	....	8	....	35	2	37	2	80	82
Companies A and D, 14th U.S. Infantry.	....	2	....	5	....	18	....	25	25
Detachment 115th Ohio Volunteers	....	2	....	6	....	....	....	8	8
Total	....	12	....	46	2	55	2	113	115

[O = Officers  M = Men  A = Aggregate]

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. JOHNSON,                       

Colonel, Commanding.

 Lieut. JOHN E. CLELAND,

            Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 540-1

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864 — January 23, 1865: No. 189. — Report of Maj. Lewis D. Joy, Eighteenth U. S. Colored Troops, of operations December 15-16, 1864.

No. 189.

Report of Maj. Lewis D. Joy, Eighteenth U. S. Colored Troops,

of operations December 15-16, 1864.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH U. S. COLORED INFANTRY,                   

Bridgeport, Ala., January 17, 1865.

SIR: I hereby have the honor to make report of the part taken by the detachment of the Eighteenth U.S. Colored Infantry, under my command, at the battles before Nashville, December 15 and 16, 1864.

On the 15th we were ordered by Colonel Morgan, commanding colored brigade, to the support of a section of the Twentieth Indiana Battery, which position we occupied during the day, having one man wounded while changing position from the brick house on the extreme lest of the line. That night 100 men, in charge of First Lieut. George J. Drew, Company B of our regiment, were engaged in throwing; up earth-works at Camp Foster for the protection of the battery. On the morning of the 16th crossed to the west of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad with the battery, and marched out on the pike west of that road until ordered to form connection with the Seventeenth U.S. Colored Infantry. Afterward reported to Colonel Shafter, Seventeenth U.S. Colored Infantry, and then to Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor, Eighteenth Ohio Veteran Volunteer Infantry, by order of Colonel Morgan. When the final charge was ordered on Overton Hill, at 4 p.m., we were ordered to take position on the left of Colonel Thompson's brigade in the first line, but having to pass through a thick mass of brush while the brigade was marching in open ground we failed to make the connection, and as the brigade continued obliquing to the left in our front, we did not regain our position during the charge. After the repulse of the first charge we reformed and took position on the right of the Seventeenth U.S. Colored Infantry, throwing up breast-works of rails for our protection, and there remained until the enemy were driven from the field.

I inclose list of killed, wounded, and missing during the two days' battle.*

Five men of my command who went through the fight in safety have since died from the effects of the severe exposure to which we were subjected, and two of my best officers were not expected to live, but I believe are now recovering.

Very respectfully, yours,

L. D. JOY,                 

Major Eighteenth U.S. Colored Infantry, Comdg. Detachment.

 Lieut. J. E. CLELAND,

            Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, First Colored Brigade,

Major-general Steedman's Division, Army of the Cumberland.

_______________

* Embodied in table, p. 103.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 539-40

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864 — January 23, 1865: No. 188. — Report of Col. William R. Shafter, Seventeenth U. S. Colored Troops, of operations December 15-16, 1864.

No. 188.

Report of Col. William R. Shafter, Seventeenth U. S. Colored Troops,

of operations December 15-16, 1864.

HDQRS. SEVENTEENTH REGT. U.S. COLORED INFANTRY,                      

Nashville, Tenn., January 30, 1865.

COLONEL: In obedience to your instructions, I have the honor to report the part taken by the Seventeenth U.S. Colored Infantry in the battle of Nashville, December 15, 1864, as follows:

On the morning of December 15 I reported to you for duty with my regiment, in pursuance of orders from Brigadier-General Miller, commanding post of Nashville, and was by you assigned to the First Provisional Brigade. At about 7 a.m. I marched out on the Murfreesborough pike about one mile from the city, and formed line of battle to the right of and parallel with the pike, the Forty-fourth U.S. Colored Infantry forming on my left, that regiment being our extreme left. Skirmishers from the Fourteenth U.S. Colored Infantry reporting the enemy as too strong for them, my regiment, with the Forty-fourth U.S. Colored Infantry, was ordered to advance and drive the enemy from his rifle-pits, which was at once done, the two regiments charging to the railroad, but were prevented from going farther by a deep cut, known as Rains' Cut. At that time we were at least 100 yards beyond and to the rear of the enemy's earth-works near Rains' house, and had we been well supported on our right I think the work could have been taken. As it was, we were soon obliged to fall back, which was done in rather a disorderly manner. As soon, however, as we were out of range of the enemy's canister we reformed and were soon afterward moved around to the right of the enemy's earth-work and took a second position near Rains' house, where we kept up a sharp skirmish with the enemy till night, when he withdrew from our immediate front.

The conduct of all my officers was all that I desire, and from the fact that it was the first time the men had ever been under fire I think they, too, did well I am satisfied that with practice they would make good fighters.

My loss was: Commissioned officers, killed, 2; mortally wounded, 1; badly wounded, 3. Enlisted men, killed, 14; wounded, 64; missing, none; many of the wounded have since died.

I inclose complete list of killed and wounded.*

I have the honor to be, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. R. SHAFTER,                  

Colonel Seventeenth U. S. Colored Infantry, Commanding.

Col. THOMAS J. MORGAN,

Fourteenth U. S. Colored Infantry.

_______________

* Embodied in table, p. 103.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 538-9

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864 — January 23, 1865: No. 187.—Report of Capt. Clarence W. Baker, Fourteenth U.S. Colored Troops, of operations December 2, 1864.

No. 187.

Report of Capt. Clarence W. Baker, Fourteenth U.S. Colored Troops,

of operations December 2, 1864.

CAMP FOURTEENTH U.S. COLORED INFANTRY,

Nashville, Tenn., November [December] —, 1864.

LIEUTENANT: I have herewith the honor to submit a report concerning the conduct and loss of Companies A and D, Fourteenth U.S. Colored Infantry, in action at Stockade No. 2, December 2, 1864.

The train was very unexpectedly fired upon by a rebel battery from a commanding position. The men left the cars hastily, were formed in line, and moved upon the hill in rear of the stockade, subsequently deployed as skirmishers, lying exposed to a heavy fire from artillery and musketry from 11 a.m. until about 6 p.m., when the larger part of the command was drawn in, leaving pickets posted upon the skirmish line held during the day, and throwing up a rude breast-work, with traverses, on two sides of the stockade. Upon a due consultation the evacuation of the place was determined upon, whereat the men were much pleased, expressing themselves as ready to cut through the rebel lines, or, failing, die in the attempt. Fortunately we succeeded in passing through the line of rebel pickets without losing a man in killed or wounded.

Our loss was as follows: Company A, Fourteenth U.S. Colored Infantry—killed, 1 private; wounded, 1 corporal, 2 privates; missing, 1 corporal, 7 privates; total, 2 corporals, 10 privates. Company D, Fourteenth U.S. Colored Infantry—killed, 1 private; wounded, 1 corporal, 1 private; missing, 10 privates; total, 1 corporal, 12 privates. One wounded man from A and 2 wounded from D Company were left in the stockade, unable to be moved.

It is no more than simple justice to say for the men and officers under my command that they behaved admirably and did credit to the regiment.

CLARENCE W. BAKER,                

Capt., 14th U. S. Colored Infty., Comdg. Companies A and D. Lieut.

 JOHN E. CLELAND,

Forty-fourth U.S. Colored Infty., Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 538

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864 — January 23, 1865: No. 186. — Report of Col. Thomas J. Morgan, Fourteenth U. S. Colored Troops, commanding First Colored Brigade, of operations November 29, 1864-January 12, 1865.

No. 186.

Report of Col. Thomas J. Morgan, Fourteenth U. S. Colored Troops, commanding

First Colored Brigade, of operations November 29, 1864-January 12, 1865.

CHATTANOOGA, TENN., January 16, 1865.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the forces under my command in the recent campaign:

On November 29, 1864, by order of Major-General Steedman I assumed command of the Fourteenth U.S. Colored Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Corbin, the Sixteenth U.S. Colored Infantry, Col. William B. Gaw, and the Forty-fourth U.S. Colored Infantry, Col. L. Johnson, at Chattanooga, Tenn., and proceeded by railroad to Cowan, Tenn., and thence by railroad to Nashville, Tenn., reaching there with the Sixteenth and the main portion of the Fourteenth Regiments U.S. Colored Infantry on the 1st day of December, 1864. Col. L. Johnson, with the Forty-fourth U.S. Colored Infantry, and Capt. C. W. Baker, with Companies A and D of the Fourteenth U.S. Colored Infantry, occupied the rear section of the train which was transporting General Steedman's command to Nashville, Tenn. Seven miles north of Murfreesborough a train containing artillery and horses ran off the track and stopped the progress of the rear train, which, for some reason unexplained, was taken back to Murfreesborough with troops on board, a guard being left with the wrecked cars. During the night a construction train from Nashville removed the wreck and brought the remaining cars, horses, artillery, and guard, at an early hour on the 2d ultimo, to Nashville. At 8 a.m. 2d ultimo Colonel Johnson again started for Nashville, but when near Mill Creek he was attacked by a rebel cavalry command under General Forrest. The fight that ensued was quite creditable to the forces under Colonel Johnson. Colonel Johnson and Captain Baker are entitled to credit for the skill with which they fought and baffled the enemy and brought out their commands. I append the reports of those officers concerning this affair, marked A, B.¹ During the 2d ultimo the portion of the brigade with me, conforming to the movements of General Cruft, occupied the extreme left of the first line of battle, formed near house of Robert Rains, and constructed in its front, hastily, a line of defense, a breast-work of rails and earth with a light palisade in front. On the 3d this line was abandoned and a new line established nearer the city, where the brigade, increased by the return of Colonel Johnson and Captain Baker and the addition of a battalion of the Eighteenth U.S. Colored Infantry, under Major L. D. Joy, took position near the residence of Maj. William B. Lewis. On December 5 and 7 reconnaissances were made by the brigade, in conjunction with other troops, and the enemy were found to occupy the first line of works built by General Steedman near Rains' house; each day the enemy was driven from the left of their works, with slight loss to us. On the 5th one lieutenant and seven enlisted men of the enemy were captured by this brigade. A citizen living near the Murfreesborough pike was killed by a member of Company B, Sixteenth U.S. Colored Infantry. The report of Colonel Gaw concerning this is inclosed, marked C.² The conduct of officers and men on those occasions, save the misconduct of Colonel Gaw, which was reported at the time, was, so far as came under my observation, good. The coolness of the enlisted men under fire was especially gratifying to me.

On the night of the 14th of December orders were received to move at daybreak to make a demonstration upon the left, to occupy our first line of works, near Rains' house, if practicable, and to strongly menace the enemy's right to prevent the moving of his troops to resist the advance of the right of [the] Federal army when the main attack was to be made. On the evening of the 14th Colonel Gaw, by unsoldierly process, succeeded in getting his regiment taken from the First Brigade and ordered to a safer place in the rear. An excellent regiment, the Seventeenth U.S. Colored Infantry, under a brave and gallant officer, Colonel Shafter, reported to me instead of the Sixteenth. Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor, commanding brigade of white troops, reported to me, and remained with me during the two days’ battle. I inclose Colonel Grosvenor's report of the part taken by his command.³ A section of artillery from Captain Osborne's (Twentieth Indiana) battery likewise was put under my charge. In company with my adjutant-general, during the night of the 14th ultimo, I visited the picket-line near the enemy's work, which it was designed to attack on morning of the 15th. The Murfreesborough pike at this point runs a little east of south, nearly parallel with Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad. The line of works was built almost at right angles with these roads. We ascertained from the pickets that the rebels had been at work actively during the afternoon with the spade, and their line of fires extended well toward the south. I concluded that a curtain had been built to protect the flank of the work, and that a line of rifle-pits had been made on the ground marked by the fires, and that if these rifle-pits could be carried and a column pushed well to the rear, the works near Rains’ house would become untenable and the ground east of Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad be given up to us with little loss. Accordingly, on the morning of the 15th, when the fog, which lay like a winding sheet over the two armies, began to disappear, I moved my command out upon the Murfreesborough pike and disposed it as follows: The Fourteenth Colored Infantry was deployed in front as skirmishers; the Seventeenth and Forty-fourth Colored Infantry were formed in line of battle in rear of Fourteenth, and given in charge of Colonel Shafter, of the Seventeenth; the section of Captain Osborne's (Twentieth Indiana) battery was supported by the battalion Eighteenth U.S. Colored Infantry, Maj. L. D. Joy; Colonel Grosvenor was directed to send one battalion of his command to guard the left flank and to hold the remainder of his command in rear of Colonel Shafter. The artillery then opened upon the enemy, and the lines moved forward. The Fourteenth advanced until they drew a severe fire, when Colonel Shafter was ordered to carry the rifle-pits, which he did handsomely, killing, wounding, capturing, or driving away the enemy from his front. He pushed forward until he reached the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, when he was met by a destructive fire at short range from a battery planted on the opposite side of a deep cut made by railroad. Seeing that Colonel Shafter had carried the line in his front, and that the enemy still held their position on his right, I ordered up to his support the reserve of Colonel Grosvenor. This command carried a portion of the line, but was quickly compelled to return, with severe loss, by reason of musketry fire on its right flank. What I had thought to be a mere curtain, proved to be a rude but strong lunette, with ditch in front and heavy head-logs on top of parapet, forming a very safe cover for Granbury's brigade, which occupied it. About the time of the repulse of Colonel Grosvenor Colonel Shafter was compelled to withdraw his line from the range of the artillery. The entire command was then withdrawn, by order of General Steedman, and moved to the north of Rains' house. A strong skirmish line, connecting on the right, at the railroad, with Colonel Thompson's command, advanced very close to the enemy's line. Sharpshooters loop-holed a dwelling-house and outbuildings and silenced the enemy. Thus the day wore away; the general's purpose, as communicated to me the night previous, had been accomplished; the enemy had been deceived, and, in expectation of a real advance upon his right, had detained his troops there, while his left was being disastrously driven back. The troops under my command have, as a whole, behaved well, and if they failed to accomplish all I expected it was my fault, not theirs; I was deceived as to the character of the work built by the enemy on the 14th. Could I have known the exact nature of the work, the troops would have carried it by a direct assault from the north side, with perhaps less loss than was sustained. During the night of the 15th the enemy retired from our front.

On the 16th my command, by order of General Steedman, crossed the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, the Nolensville pike, and the Tennessee and Alabama Railroad, skirmishing with and driving the enemy. At an early hour in the afternoon the command joined the left of Colonel Thompson and confronted Overton Hill. Colonel Grosvenor was ordered to join the left of Second Colored Brigade and conform to its movements.  He thus took part in the first assault upon Overton Hill. Colonel Shafter, with Seventeenth, was in echelon to rear of Grosvenor; Lieutenant-Colonel Corbin, with Fourteenth, was directed to support and protect the artillery; Colonel Johnson, Forty-fourth, was directed to guard the left. Captain Osborne's (Twentieth Indiana) battery and Captain Aleshire's (Eighteenth Ohio) battery kept up an incessant fire upon the enemy, and did excellent work. Subsequently the Fourteenth U.S. Colored Infantry was deployed as skirmishers in front of the artillery and directly facing the enemy's works, where they kept and received a brisk fire. When the first assault upon the hill failed the assaulting column retired in disorder, passing through my skirmish line without shaking it. At one time I thought and so reported that the line was being forced back, but it was not true. The line remained; did its work amid the confusion that followed the repulse. When the Sixty-eighth Indiana struck this line they asked what regiment. Being answered, Fourteenth, they cried, “Bully for you; we'll stay with you,” and they did. I assisted Colonel Thompson in reforming his broken lines. When the final assault was being made upon Overton Hill the forces under me moved forward and joined in the pursuit of the enemy, which followed as far as Franklin, Tenn. Subsequently the First Colored Brigade, as part of Second Provisional Division, accompanied the expedition toward Tuscumbia, Ala., going as far as Leighton, Ala. On its return it joined General Cruft's forces in the fruitless chase after General Lyon's rebel cavalry. The brigade was disbanded January 12, 1865.

Colonel Shafter, Seventeenth, acquitted himself well, is cool and brave, and a good disciplinarian. Lieutenant-Colonel Corbin, Fourteenth U.S. Colored Infantry, does not possess sufficient courage to command brave men.⁴ Captain Baker in reality commanded the Fourteenth U.S. Colored Infantry in the battle of the 15th and 16th, and acquitted himself with great credit. He is brave, cool, untiring, and deserves promotion. Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor obeyed every order with promptness, and is a good soldier. To each member of my staff, Lieutenants Cleland and Hall, Forty-fourth U.S. Colored Infantry, Wadsworth and Dickinson, Sixteenth U.S. Colored infantry, and Wyrill, Fourteenth U.S. Colored Infantry, I am indebted for the promptness with which they carried out my desires, exposing themselves cheerfully to necessary danger. The wounded of the First Colored Brigade were faithfully cared for by Surgeon Clemons, Seventeenth U.S. Colored Infantry, Surgeon Strong, Forty-fourth U.S. Colored Infantry, and Assistant Surgeon Oleson, Fourteenth U.S. Colored Infantry.

I have as yet received no reports from battalion commanders and no lists of casualties; these will be forwarded as soon as received.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOS. J. MORGAN,            

Colonel Fourteenth U. S. Colored Infantry.

 Maj. S. B. MOE,

            Asst. Adjt. Gen., District of the Etowah.

_______________

¹ See pp. 540, 538.

² Not found.

³ See p. 526.

⁴ Colonel Corbin was subsequently tried before a general court-martial on the charge of “cowardice” and “misbehavior before the enemy,” &c.; was found not guilty, and “most honorably” acquitted.  Vide General Orders, No. 6, headquarters First Separate Divion, Army of the Cumberland, March 14, 1865.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 534-8

Dr. Seth Rogers to his Daughter, January 1, 1863

January 1, 1863

This is the evening of the most eventful day of my life. Our barbecue was a most wonderful success. Two steamboats came loaded with people from Beaufort, St. Helena Island and Hilton Head. Among the visitors were some of my new acquaintances. My friend, Mr. Hall of the voyage on the Delaware. But the dearest friend I found among them was Miss Forten, whom you remember. She is a teacher of the freed children on St. Helena Island. Gen. Saxton and his father and others came from Beaufort, and several cavalry officers hovered around the outskirts of our multitude of black soldiers and civilians, and in the centre of all was the speakers’ stand, where the General and our Colonel and some others, with the band, performed the ceremonies of the day. Several good speeches were made, but the most impressive scene was that which occurred at the presentation of the Dr. Cheever flag to our regiment. After the presentation speech had been made, and just as Col. Higginson advanced to take the flag and respond, a negro woman standing near began to sing “America,” and soon many voices of freedmen and women joined in the beautiful hymn, and sang it so touchingly that every one was thrilled beyond measure. Nothing could have been more unexpected or more inspiring. The President's proclamation and General Saxton's New Year's greeting had been read, and this spontaneous outburst of love and loyalty to a country that has heretofore so terribly wronged these blacks, was the birth of a new hope in the honesty of her intention. I most earnestly trust they may not hope in vain.

Col. Higginson was so much inspired by the remarkable thought of, and singing of, the hymn, that he made one of his most effective speeches. Then came Gen. Saxton with a most earnest and brotherly speech to the blacks and then Mrs. Frances D. Gage, and finally all joined in the John Brown hymn, and then to dinner. A hundred things of interest occurred which I have not time to relate. Everybody was happy in the bright sunshine, and in the great hope. The ten oxen were eaten with hearty relish and barrels of molasses and water and vinegar and ginger were drunk to wash them down. Mr. Hall, Miss Forten and some others took dinner with us.

SOURCE: Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Volume 43, October, 1909—June,1910: February 1910. p. 340-1

Martha Glover to Richard Glover, December 30, 1863

Mexico Mo    Dec 30^th 1863

My Dear Husband   I have received your last kind letter a few days ago and was much pleased to hear from you once more.  It seems like a long time since you left me.  I have had nothing but trouble since you left.  You recollect what I told you how they would do after you was gone.  they abuse me because you went & say they will not take care of our children & do nothing but quarrel with me all the time and beat me scandalously the day before yesterday–  Oh I never thought you would give me so much trouble as I have got to bear now.  You ought not to left me in the fix I am in & all these little helpless children to take care of.  I was invited to a party to night but I could not go   I am in too much trouble to want to go to parties.  the children talk about you all the time.  I wish you could get a furlough & come to see us once more.  We want to see you worse than we ever did before.  Remember all I told you about how they would do me after you left–for they do worse than they ever did & I do not know what will become of me & my poor little children.  Oh I wish you had staid with me & not gone till I could go with you for I do nothing but grieve all the time about you.  write & tell me when you are coming.

Tell Isaac that his mother come & got his clothes   she was so sorry he went.  You need not tell me to beg any more married men to go.  I see too much trouble to try to get any more into trouble too–  Write to me & do not forget me & my children–  farewell my dear husband from your wife

Martha

SOURCE: Ira Berlin & Leslie S. Rowland, Editors, Families and Freedom: A Documentary History of African-American Kinship in the Civil War, p. 97

Captain Charles Francis Adams, Jr., to Charles Francis Adams Sr., August 5, 1864

H.Q. Cav’y Escort, A. of P.               

Before Petersburg, August 5, 1864

*          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *

PHYSICALLY, since I last wrote, I'm glad to say I have picked up amazingly. I have at last shaken off my jaundice and have recovered a white man's looks, my appetite is amazing and I am building up. In fact I have weathered my danger and do not look for any further trouble. Ward Frothingham too has been sent home. His regiment was smashed all to pieces in the assault the other day. The Colonel, Gould, had a thigh shattered, the Lieutenant Colonel killed, and so on. As for Ward, it was the hardest kind of work helping him, for he could n't help himself. Finally however he was sent down to City Point and there gave Dalton my note, and Dalton had him shipped to New York before he could make up his mind as to whether he wanted to go there or not. So he's safe and at home.

Here since I last wrote, too, Burnside has exploded his mine and we have again just failed to take Petersburg. The papers, I see, are full of that mishap and every one is blaming every one, just as though it did any good to cry and quarrel over spilled milk. I did not see the mine exploded, though most of my officers did and they describe it as a most beautiful and striking spectacle — an immense column of debris, mixed with smoke and flame, shooting up in the form of a wheat sheaf some hundred and fifty feet, and then instantly followed by the roar of artillery. At first, and until ten o'clock, rumors came in very favorably — we had carried this and that and were advancing. At about ten I rode out to see what was going on. The fight then was pretty much over. I rode up to the parallels and dismounted and went towards the front. The heat was intense and they were bringing in the wounded, mostly blacks, in great numbers. Very little firing was going on, though occasionally shot went zipping by. Very speedily I began to be suspicious of our success. Our soldiers didn't look or act to my mind like men who had won a victory. There was none of that elation and excitement among the wounded, none of that communicative spirit among the uninjured which always marks a success. I was very soon satisfied of this and so, after walking myself into a tremendous heat and seeing nothing but a train of wounded men, I concluded that I didn't like the sound of bullets and so came home.

My suspicions proved correct. As you know we had been repulsed. How was it? In the papers you'll see all kinds of stories and all descriptions of reasons, but here all seem to have settled down to certain results on which all agree, and certain others on which all quarrel. It is agreed that the thing was a perfect success, except that it did not succeed; and the only reason it did not succeed was that our troops behaved shamefully. They advanced to the crater made by the explosion and rushed into it for cover and nothing could get them out of it. These points being agreed on then begins the bickering. All who dislike black troops shoulder the blame onto them — not that I can find with any show of cause. They seem to have behaved just as well and as badly as the rest and to have suffered more severely. This Division, too, never had really been under fire before, and it was a rough breaking in for green troops of any color. The 9th Corps .and Burnside came in for a good share of hard sayings, and, in fact, all round is heard moaning and wrath, and a scape-goat is wanted.

Meanwhile, as I see it, one person alone has any right to complain and that person is Grant. I should think his heart would break. He had out-generaled Lee so, he so thoroughly deserved success, and then to fail because his soldiers wouldn't fight? It was too bad. All the movements I mentioned in my last turned out to be mere feints and as such completely successful. Deceived by Grant's movement towards Malvern Hill, Lee had massed all his troops in that vicinity, so that when the mine exploded, the rebels had but three Divisions in front of the whole Army of the Potomac. Grant ordered a rapid countermarch of his cavalry from Malvern Hill to the extreme left, to outflank and attack the enemy at daylight, simultaneously with the assault in front. The cavalry did not reach here until the assault had failed. The march was difficult, but it was possible and it was not accomplished. Whose fault was this? Then came the assault, which was no assault, and once more Lee, completely outgeneraled, surprised and nearly lost, was saved by the bad behavior of our troops as in June, and on the same ground and under the same circumstances, he was almost miraculously saved by the stubborn bravery of his own. I find but one satisfaction in the whole thing. Here now, as before in June, whether he got it or no, Grant deserved success, and, where this is the case, in spite of fortune, he must ultimately win it. Twice Lee has been saved in spite of himself. Let him look to it, for men are not always lucky.

If you are curious to know where I myself place the blame, I must freely say on Burnside, and add, that in my own opinion I don't know anything about it. For the whole thing, Burnside's motions and activities deserve great credit. While others were lying idle, he was actively stirring round to see what he could do. The mine was his idea and his work, and he carried it through; no one but himself had any faith in it. So far all was to his credit. Then came the assault. Grant did his part of the work and deceived Lee. Burnside organized his storming column and, apparently, he couldn't have organized it worse. They say the leading brigade was chosen by lot. If so, what greater blunder could have been committed? At any rate a white brigade was put in to lead which could not have been depended on to follow. This being so, the result was what might have been expected. In such a case everything depended on the storming party; for, if they would lead, the column would follow. Volunteers might have been called for, a picked regiment might have been designated; but, no, Burnside sent in a motley crowd of white and black, heavy artillery and dismounted cavalry, and they wouldn't come up to the scratch. So endeth the second lesson before Petersburg.

As to the future, expect no light from me. I do not expect that anything will be done here for six weeks to come. Grant must hold his own, defend Washington and see what Sherman can accomplish, before he really attempts anything heavy here. The news from Sherman is so good, and Hood seems so completely to be playing our game that I think the rebel strength in that region bids fair to be used up. Lee can hold us in check, but, unless we blunder egregiously, he cannot replenish his ranks, and by autumn Grant can resume operations with deadly effect from this base. This I fear is the best view which can be taken of the present attitude of affairs. We have been so unfortunate here and our military lights about Washington — Hunter, Wallace, Halleck, Sigel and the rest — have made such a mess of our affairs in their region, that I don't see but what the army here must, for the present, be reduced to one purely of observation. . . .

As to my new regiment, I see myself gazetted but have as yet received no commission or official announcement. Meanwhile I am maturing my plans for the regiment and shall develop them in a somewhat stately paper distinguished by unusual ability even for me and addressed to Governor Andrew, the which I shall tackle as soon as I have disposed of you. For the rest, I wait here and kill time. There is nothing more for me to do here. This squadron is as contented, as well disciplined and in as good order as I know how to put it, and accordingly I must move or stand still. . . .

SOURCE: Charles Francis Adams, A Cycle of Adams Letters, 1861-1865, Volume 2, p. 170-5

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864 — January 23, 1865: No. 184. Report of Capt. Milton A. Osborne, Twentieth Battery Indiana Light Artillery, of operations December 15-16, 1864.

No. 184.

Report of Capt. Milton A. Osborne, Twentieth Battery Indiana Light Artillery,

of operations December 15-16, 1864.

HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH INDIANA BATTERY,                       

Murfreesborough, Tenn., December 20, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the Twentieth Indiana Battery in the engagement near Nashville, Tenn., on the 15th and 16th of December, 1864:

The battery was engaged from 8 a.m. of the 15th instant throughout the day, both sections having taken position early in the day within 500 yards of the enemy's main line of works, the right section operating with Colonel Morgan's U.S. Colored Brigade, and the left section with Colonel Thompson's U.S. Colored Brigade. The right section changed its position at 10 a.m., and took a position in the open field within 300 yards of the enemy's works, and held the position until the infantry—Colonel Morgan's and Colonel Grosvenor's brigades—had passed to the rear and reformed, in the meantime keeping up a continual fire, which enabled the infantry the more successfully to be withdrawn. This section then retired and took a position northeast of the Rains house, immediately behind the skirmish line of Colonel Morgan's brigade, where the section remained, keeping up a continual fire until night.

Early on the morning of the 16th the two sections of the battery were brought together and moved, with Colonel Morgan's brigade, across the Nolensville pike, to a position on the left of Colonel Thompson's brigade, which was then on the left of the Fourth Corps, shelling the woods as the column advanced, where the battery participated in the general engagement which then took place, and from this position, on the extreme left of the line, kept a constant and terribly effective fire on the enemy's artillery, in position on the Overton Hill, during the charges which were made by the infantry. The enemy's artillery being silenced and captured, and our infantry having possession of the work, at about 5 p.m., I moved the battery in the general pursuit with Colonel Morgan's brigade.

The casualties on the 15th instant were as follows.*

Five horses were killed—3 by musketry, 2 by shell; 9 horses were wounded—2 by shell, 7 by musketry.

The following ammunition was expended:

	Shot.	Shell.	Spherical case.	Total.
First day	272	176	176	624
Second day	160	230	290	580
Total	432	406	466	1,204

No casualties on the 16th instant.

I take pleasure in reporting the good conduct of officers and men of the command throughout the engagement.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

MILTON A. OSBORNE,     

Captain Twentieth Indiana Battery, Commanding.

Maj. S. B. MOE,

Assistant Adjutant-General, District of the Etowah.

_______________

* Nominal list (omitted) shows 2 officers and 6 men wounded.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 531-2

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864 — January 23, 1865: No. 179. Report of Brig. Gen. Charles Cruft, U. S. Army, commanding Provisional Division, of operations November 29, 1864--January 13, 1865.

No. 179.

Report of Brig. Gen. Charles Cruft, U. S. Army, commanding Provisional Division,

of operations November 29, 1864—January 13, 1865.

HEADQUARTERS PROVISIONAL DIVISION,             

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, 

Chattanooga, Tenn., January 20, 1865.

The following report of the recent campaign is respectfully submitted: I had been ordered by Major-General Thomas to organize the troops belonging to Major-General Sherman's field command within this department and report them to Major-General Steedman, commanding District of the Etowah. On the 29th day of November, 1864, while on the above duty at Chattanooga, Tenn., an order was received from Major-General Steedman to move that day by rail all available force. A portion of the garrison at Tunnel Hill was withdrawn, and, with the Eighteenth Ohio Volunteers from this post, was added to my command. The following statement exhibits the number of officers and men comprising the command on leaving Chattanooga, and the formation of battalions and brigades, temporarily made, to wit:

Command.	Officers	Men	Aggregate	Total
FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS. Col. J. G. MITCHELL, commanding.
First Battalion, Lieut. Col. F. W. Lister	8	526	534
Second Battalion, Lieut. Col. William O'Brien	4	256	260	794
TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS. Col. BENJAMIN HARRISON, commanding.
First Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel McManus	8	399	407
Second Battalion, Major Hoskins	6	304	310	717
TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS. Lieutenant-Colonel BANNING, commanding.
Eighteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Captain Henderson.	9	316	325
Third Battalion, Fourteenth Army Corps, Major Roatch	8	311	319	644
SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS. Col. A. G. MALLOY, commanding.
Field and staff	3		3
Twentieth Illinois Battalion, Capt. C. C. Cox	1	126	127
Thirtieth Illinois Battalion, Capt. J. Kemnitzer	1	208	209
Thirteenth Iowa Infantry, Capt. C. H. Haskin	1	186	187
Third Battalion, Twentieth Army Corps, Captain Hulbert	6	290	296	822
Total	55	2,922	2,977

November 30, 1864, reached Cowan Station at 8 a.m., disembarked the command, and bivouacked.

December 1, shipped the command by rail during the night, and left Cowan about daylight. Reached Nashville at 5 p.m. and went into camp in the eastern suburbs of the city. December 2, moved to the hill near Rains' house and built a strong line of fortifications, and a redoubt for the Twentieth Indiana Battery (Captain Osborne commanding), which was upon service with my command this day. December 3, in compliance with orders from Major-General Steedman, abandoned the works built the day previous, and fell back to a line indicated nearer the city. In the new position the right rested at Judge Trimble's house, and the line extending northward across the Murfreesborough pike, the left rested near Major Lewis' house. A substantial line of earth-works, with a protecting line of palisades, and an abatis of brush in front, was speedily constructed. During the day the Eighteenth Ohio Battery (Captain Aleshire commanding) was assigned to me for duty. A strong redoubt was built for the artillery at a point where the line crossed the Murfreesborough turnpike. My command occupied this line until the general assault upon the enemy. The position was materially strengthened from day to day by the construction and raising of a dam across Brown's Creek, at the bridge below, on the Lebanon turnpike. The creek ran nearly parallel to the line of works and about 200 yards in front of the abatis. It became--as the depth of water increased--a material impediment in the way of an assault. My command performed about 4,500 days' work in the construction of this dam. Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor principally superintended its construction, in obedience to orders from district headquarters. Major Roatch, commanding battalion Fourteenth Army Corps, was seriously wounded while superintending a fatigue party at the dam, and the services of this meritorious officer were thereby lost to his command during the residue of the campaign.

December 11. My command was increased on and after the 6th instant by the assignment of recruits arriving from the rear, amounting in the aggregate to 2,327 enlisted men, who were properly armed and distributed to their respective battalions and brigades. The Sixty-eighth Indiana Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Espy commanding, was also added. These re-enforcements brought the effective strength of the division up to 5,249. This day orders were received directing a reconnaissance in force upon the enemy occupying our old line of works, near Rains' house. Col. J. G. Mitchell, commanding the brigade of detachments from Fourteenth Army Corps, was assigned to that duty. He moved his brigade on the Murfreesborough turnpike for about half a mile, then made a detour to the right, where he formed his lines behind a small ridge and sent his skirmishers to the front; drove in the skirmishers of the enemy, advanced upon his works, and thoroughly reconnoitered his position. The casualties of Colonel Mitchell's command were trifling, having none killed and but 3 or 4 slightly wounded.

December 12, the command was put in shape to move at 6 a.m. on the following morning. December 13, in obedience to orders another reconnaissance was made on the enemy's line near Rains' house. This duty was assigned to Col. A. G. Malloy, commanding brigade of detachment of Fifteenth and Seventeenth Army Corps. Colonel Malloy, with 1,200 men of his command, advanced upon the enemy's line at the point indicated. Some sharp skirmishing ensued, but the objects of the reconnaissance were attained. Colonel Malloy's casualties were as follows: Killed, 1; wounded, 6; missing, 1; making a total of 8 enlisted men.

December 14, the effective force of the division was 5,359, as shown by the following statement:

Command.	Officers.	Men.	Aggregate.
Division headquarters :	6	20	26
First Brigade, Colonel Harrison	26	1,033	1,059
Second Brigade, Colonel Mitchell	24	1,104	1,128
Third Brigade, Colonel Grosvenor	39	852	891
Second Brigade (Army of the Tennessee), Colonel Malloy	22	1,925	1,947
Miscellaneous Camp, Captain Eaton	4	304	308
Total	121	5,238	5,359

Orders were again received to be ready to march at 6 a.m. of the next day. Arms were issued to the portion of troops that were unarmed, and command was put in readiness to comply with the order. In the evening orders were received from Major-General Steedman to detail one of the brigades to report for duty to Colonel Morgan, commanding colored brigade, on my left.. Lieut. Col, C. H. Grosvenor (who had succeeded Lieutenant-Colonel Banning in command of the brigade) was ordered to report to Colonel Morgan. This order detached Colonel Grosvenor's brigade from my immediate control during the operations before Nashville, and it did not again rejoin its command until it reached Murfreesborough, marching by way of Franklin, Tenn.

December 15, according to directions from the major-general commanding, the division moved at 4 a.m., and, abandoning its line of defenses, relieved a portion of the troops of the Fourth Army Corps, Brigadier-General Wood commanding, and Twenty-third Army Corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, and held their exterior line of works, picketing also the front from the Acklen place to a point north of Fort Negley, and commanding the approaches to the city by the Granny White, Franklin, Nolensville, and Murfreesborough turnpikes. Details were furnished to support the batteries of artillery in the lines and to garrison Fort Morton, and Redoubt Casino. The brigade of Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor (temporarily reporting to Colonel Morgan) was engaged during the day in the assault on the enemy's works near Rains' house, and was the only portion of the division in the fight. It suffered considerably in killed and wounded, and behaved creditably. The Twenty-fourth [Twenty-fifth?] Indiana Battery (Captain Sturm), in position on the right of the line, near the Acklen place, was ordered by me, near night-fall, to fire upon a retreating line of rebels which came in sight, passing parallel to my right, from left of the Fourth Corps. The fire was opened with good effect (though at long range) and the rebel line was dispersed in great confusion. Captain Sturm and his officers and artillerists deserve great credit for the precision with which they worked their guns and the good results that followed.

December 16, the command remained in position as of yesterday. The brigade commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor was engaged on the left during the day and contributed its share in the work achieved by Major-General Steedman in that quarter. The assault made upon the enemy's lines and works in the afternoon of this day was under the immediate sight and direction of Major-General Steedman, and the brigade will, without doubt, receive due credit from him. All accounts that reach me speak well of the conduct of the troops in this action. During the afternoon Colonel Mitchell's brigade was moved rapidly out from the works and occupied the hills beyond Rains' house, in compliance with orders, pushing a strong line of skirmishers to Riddle's Hill beyond. The brigade held this position firmly and in shape to repel any attack on the part of the enemy's cavalry to turn the left of the general line, and protected all approaches from the east during the residue of the time this command remained at Nashville.

Monday, December 19, received orders to march to Murfreesborough; moved the command at 6.30 a.m., leaving behind those sick and unable to march, in all, say, 500. Reached La Vergne, fifteen miles, and encamped at night-fall. Tuesday, December 20, marched to Murfreesborough and encamped. Wednesday, December 21, shipped the command on cars, without rations, and started on the morning of 22d for Stevenson. Remained on cars four days. Sunday, December 25, reached Limestone Creek, eight miles beyond Huntsville, and bivouacked. Monday, December 26, marched to bayou near mouth of Limestone Creek, say ten miles, and bivouacked; sent back by train those sick and unable to march, say 400 men.

Tuesday, December 27, waded bayou at 4 a.m., and marched down on north side of Tennessee, nearly opposite mouth of Flint River, and awaited orders. The enemy shelled the transports sent to convey my command over, but no casualties resulted therefrom. Signaled General Steedman information of the enemy's strength, &c., at Decatur, obtained from Colonel Prosser and one of my staff officers. Crossed the river and lagoon beyond, and halted to receive rations from the transports at 4 p.m., as directed by Major-General Steedman. Soon received orders from him to move up to support Colonel Thompson's division, which had been advanced toward Decatur and had been engaged during the afternoon in skirmishing with the enemy. The command was brought up as rapidly as possible and formed in line on Colonel Thompson's right. The enemy opened fire with two pieces of artillery. Some of the shots fell near my line, but without damage. An advance was ordered, and both divisions moved rapidly on the town. The enemy ran away before we reached it, taking his two pieces of artillery, and our troops occupied the place. Marched back to the woodland near Decatur, and encamped for the night.

Wednesday, December 28, marched at 5 p.m., on Courtland road, to Moseley's farm, say three miles west of Decatur, and bivouacked, Thursday, December 29, marched thirteen miles and a half, to Swope's place, and bivouacked. Friday, December 30, marched at 7 a.m. to Courtland, four miles, and encamped. Remained at Courtland five days.

Wednesday, January 4, 1865, left Courtland at 2 p.m.; marched back to Swope's, and bivouacked. Thursday, January 5, marched at dawn of day; made thirteen miles and a half, and encamped at Moseley's. Here orders were received from Major-General Steedman, advising of his departure, by transports, with the artillery, and turning over the entire infantry command to me. Friday, January 6, crossed the Tennessee at the Decatur pontoon, and sent forward one division to Huntsville, which arrived about dark, the transportation doubling back for the other. It was designed to remain at Huntsville until 1 p.m. of the next day to bring up the residue of the command and to await transportation and the completion of the Paint Rock bridge, which had been destroyed by the enemy. At an interview with Brigadier-General Wood, commanding Fourth Corps, then at Huntsville, he requested me strongly to press forward a brigade to Larkinsville, apprehending that the rebel General Lyon might be in the vicinity. Colonel Mitchell's brigade was sent forthwith (at 11.30 p.m.), with instructions to get over Paint Rock Creek in some manner, and reach Larkinsville by march, patrol the country thoroughly, and engage Lyon, if he could be found. Colonel Mitchell used every possible effort to carry out his instructions. He reached Larkinsville on the morning of the 7th, and made an extensive patrol of the surrounding country, and reported that he could hear nothing of Lyon. Saturday, January 7, General Wood advised, at an interview during the morning, that I should personally go to Larkinsville, with all the troops for which transportation could be had. The condition of the troops and the orders of General Steedman, &c., were explained to General Wood. In the emergency, however, I followed his advice. There could be but one train made up at Huntsville; on this Colonel Harrison's brigade was loaded at 12 m. and the train run to Paint Rock Station. Here the railway managers kept the troops until, say, 2 a.m., waiting on westward bound trains, and for repairs of the bridge. A telegraphic instrument was put in operation and communication had with Brigadier-General Wood and Major-General Steedman. Here an order from General Wood reached me by telegraph, based upon instructions from the department commander “to stop the return of Major-General Steedman's troops.” The telegraphic message directed me to “disembark the forces that are on the cars immediately, scour the country thoroughly, and find out, if possible, where Lyon is, and get in pursuit of him; he must be found, and either captured or driven across the Tennessee River. General Thomas' orders on this subject are emphatic, and he says you must not go on your way until this work is finished.” Here intelligence was received that all the troops on trains following me—Colonels Thompson's, Morgan's, and Salm's brigades—had been stopped and unloaded at Brownsborough, by orders from Brigadier-General Wood; that a portion of these were ordered to New Market by his direction; and that the arrangements for shipping Colonel Malloy's troops had not been carried out. The men were out of rations, the weather now cold, rainy, and disagreeable, and the roads well-nigh impassable for infantry. On reaching Larkinsville a telegraphic message was sent to Colonel Krzyzanowski, commanding at Stevenson, asking a supply of rations; he promptly promised them. Owing to delays on the railways, however, they did not reach the troops in time. The garrison at Larkinsville consisted of Company M, Eleventh Indiana Cavalry, Captain Givens commanding, numbering probably sixty men, and a sort of amateur gathering of mounted men, who styled themselves “Alabama Scouts,” under Captain Sparks, say thirty or forty in number. At 7 a.m. all the cavalry and the anomalous scouts were sent to patrol the roads in the direction of Winchester, New Nashville, Robinson's farm, &c., with instructions to keep a strong vedette post at Colonel Province's. Infantry patrols were sent out to watch the approaches leading through the coves, in the direction of Bellefonte, Scottsborough, and Larkinsville. The intelligence which reached my headquarters from all these parties, and from citizens during the day, showed that no enemy was in the vicinity, except the “bushwhacking gangs of Russell, Hayes, Mead, and Wilson, which constantly infest the mountains in the vicinity. Lyon could not be heard of. At 2.55 p.m. a dispatch was received from Colonel Krzyzanowski reciting a dispatch from Major-General Milroy, as follows:

General Lyon crossed the mountain last night, going toward Bellefonte. Has 500 men; many of them dressed in Federal overcoats. He has one howitzer.

Colonel Harrison's brigade was immediately loaded on the only train at Larkinsville and started before 4 p.m. to Bellefonte, with instructions to patrol the road from there west to Scottsborough and place a battalion at Bellefonte landing; engage Lyon, if possible, and pursue him at all hazards. He was directed to inform the officer commanding at Scottsborough of the intelligence received; to direct him to make stalwart resistance, and to re-enforce him if he heard firing at Scottsborough. The garrison at Scottsborough consisted of two lieutenants (whose names have been mislaid), and, say, fifty-four colored soldiers of the One hundred and tenth (unorganized) U.S. Colored Volunteers, supposed to be in a substantial earth-work at the place. At about 5.30 p.m. train arrived from the west, the last one bringing Colonel Halley's brigade. This was immediately sent forward to Scottsborough by rail, at, say, 8 p.m., as soon as the road was clear, with proper instructions. Shortly after Colonel Malloy left, a few single discharges of artillery were heard at long intervals in what citizens said was the direction of Bellefonte. It seemed possible that Harrison had fallen in with Lyon, or that the gun-boats were shelling his river detachment; however, as Colonel Malloy was rapidly nearing Scottsborough and the firing soon ceased, it seemed to demand no special attention. The commanding officer at Scottsborough erred in leaving the earth-works and betaking himself and command to the brick depot building; he made, however, from the latter place a sturdy resistance to the attack of the skirmishers and held out well (as the enemy's prisoners admit), and forced Lyon to dismount and form line of battle, bring up his artillery and use it, thus consuming considerable time. In the meanwhile the two sections preceding Colonel Malloy dashed past the troops on the trains, firing on the enemy, confusing him, and stopping his attack on the garrison. In this confusion and cessation of fire the garrison escaped and came to Colonel Malloy, who was unloading and forming his lines at the water-tank in the edge of the town. A re-enforcement from Colonel Harrison, at Bellefonte, arrived at this time on the east of the place, and the enemy ran away rapidly. Colonel Malloy sent back one of his sections, with one of the lieutenants of the colored troops, to report, reaching headquarters about midnight. This lieutenant was badly stampeded; his statements were miserably incongruous, childish, and improbable; a complete physical terror seemed to possess him, and nothing he stated could be relied on. Colonel Mitchell's brigade was immediately ordered from Larkinsville, in the direction of the river, to try and intercept Lyon at Perry's house, the junction of the Larkin's Ferry and Gunter's Landing roads. Colonel Mitchell moved at about 2 a.m. Colonel Thompson, arriving from west with his brigade, was sent forward to join Colonel Malloy and press on in pursuit. Colonel Salm's brigade, arriving in the night, was rationed, and soon after day left to follow up Colonel Mitchell by a line more to the right. At daylight the troops were disposed as follows: Colonel Malloy and Colonel Thompson in direct pursuit of Lyon and close on him; Colonel Harrison to his left, pressing down the river and feeling into Bellefonte, Sublett's, McGinn's, and Larkin's Landings, and preventing retreat up the river; Colonels Mitchell and Salm trying to cut him off, by shorter lines to the river, at Roman's and Law's Landings, and to strike the Gunter's Landing road below him. Colonel Mitchell pushed his column rapidly forward. Soon after dawn of day he came upon a detachment of the enemy attempting to burn the bridge across Santa Creek, while the main portion of his forces had swum the creek some three miles below and were passing the junction of the roads at Perry's, say four miles down the Gunter's Landing road. Colonel Mitchell drove off the enemy, extinguished the fire on the bridge, and pushed on after him. He was only about an hour behind him at Perry's Cross-Roads. Colonel Malloy was compelled to delay his pursuit at the creek below for some three hours to construct a crossing for his men. The streams were all flooded, the mud deep, the rain pouring down, and the men (except Colonels Mitchell's and Salm's commands) without rations. I accompanied Colonel Mitchell's column; Colonel Malloy joined this during the afternoon. Pursuit was made vigorously till near night-fall, when the troops were so exhausted that they were bivouacked as an act of humanity. I rode back to Larkinsville, and during [the] evening informed Brigadier-General Wood and Major-General Steedman by telegraph of the condition of affairs, and tried to get at Colonel Morgan's command, to send it from Woodville to strike the Tennessee at mouth of Paint Rock. It was impossible to reach Colonel Morgan, the telegraphic station having been removed from Brownsborough. He came up during the night with his own regiment and Colonel Shafter's. Colonel Morgan was unloaded at Larkinsville to get rations and rest, and Colonel Shafter sent on to Scottsborough to protect that place from guerrillas, who were reported to have been firing at the small guard there during the afternoon. Efforts were again made to have rations at Gunter's Landing by transport, and a message was received from Major-General Steedman announcing their shipment.

Tuesday, January 10, Colonels Mitchell, Malloy, Salm, and Thompson were in motion at 4.30 a.m., continuing the pursuit. I reached the column of Colonel Mitchell soon after dawn of day. Colonel Thompson's command was thrown off to the left to Law's Landing. About eight miles from Guntersville the head of Colonel Mitchell's column struck quite a force of the enemy; probably 100 were in sight. Two battalions were thrown into line, and with the small cavalry force (which was taken from Larkinsville) was pushed for them. They broke to small squads and ran away to the hills and woods on each side and down the road in great confusion; but few shots were fired. The gunboats on the river were at this time shelling the woods on the north side, near Gunter's Landing, and below. The enemy could be seen running about in small detachments in almost every direction and without any order, but, being well mounted, kept beyond musket-range. The column was pressed steadily toward Gunter's Landing, with patrol parties in every direction on the flanks, and the enemy chased in toward the river. They all, however, that were on the left of the road crossed it in advance of the column, and with those on the right, left rapidly by the roads running down the river. Some were driven into the riverbank, but being mounted could swim the lagoons in the bottom that could not be waded by infantry; here they encountered the gun-boats; a few abandoned their horses, and they were captured by the boats. General Lyon had reached Claysville, opposite Gunter's Landing, the evening before, with the greater portion of his command and the piece of artillery. Citizens reported that he had abandoned his command during the night, and had crossed the river by a scow with the piece of artillery and a portion of his staff. It is probable that about 200 of his command crossed during the night at Law's Landing, and at a point about one mile and a half above Claysville, in canoes and by swimming their horses. The rest of his command at Claysville was collected at the head of the island above on the 11th, attempting to cross, and was alarmed by the coming down of a gun-boat and dispersed; a portion of the command, under Colonel Chenoweth, left Claysville about 12 m. in direction of Deposit. My advance reached Claysville at 2 p.m. Colonel Salm, leaving his men who were barefooted, was sent on immediately toward Deposit, with instructions to make that point or the creek and beyond, if possible, by daylight. He marched his Command vigorously, pursuing the enemy retreating as squads, and making the points ordered. The ambulance wagon and artillery harness which General Lyon had with him were captured, as well as those wounded at Scottsborough, viz, 1 captain and 3 soldiers. Patrol parties were sent from Colonels Mitchell's, Malloy's, and Thompson's commands to scour the woods along the river and to watch the various ferrying places in the vicinity. Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien's battalion of the Fourteenth Corps detachment was placed opposite Gunter's Landing. The few cattle and sheep the country afforded were collected by the commissary and distributed to the command. The gun-boats on the river had no co-operation with me. I was able to get on board but one of them, the U.S. Grant, I think. The commanding officer was informed of the nature of my dispositions and all the intelligence that had been obtained. By some mistake one of the gun-boats (as Colonel Thompson reported) threw some shells into his camp at Law's Landing, fortunately without hurting anybody. The rebels were much alarmed by the shells of the gun-boats, but there were no casualties from them that could be heard of. Being satisfied that none of the rebel squads had gone up the river Colonel Harrison was ordered to march to the railway, at the nearest point, and load his command for Chattanooga.

Wednesday, January 11, no rations arriving by river, Colonel Malloy's and Colonel Thompson's commands were ordered back to the railway at Larkinsville, by different routes, with instructions to subsist on the country. Colonel Mitchell remained at Claysville, patrolling the country in the vicinity. Colonel Salm pushed his march toward mouth of Paint Rock Creek. On arriving at Honey Comb Creek it was found to be impassable. The few mounted men of the Eleventh Indiana with the command swam the creek and patrolled the country to Paint Rock during the day. It was impossible, however, to catch the small parties of rebels to be seen without a cavalry force. The high waters and impossibility of procuring rations rendered it out of the question to push forward infantry farther. The pursuit was abandoned, therefore, toward night-fall, confirming the experience of all time that troops of the line cannot run down cavalry.

Thursday, January 12, orders were issued to Colonel Salm to march to the railway at Woodville by Honey Comb Valley, and to Colonel Mitchell to make the same point by the mountain road from Claysville. They reached Woodville at dark, obtained rations sent there for them, and were shipped in the night to their former camps at Bridgeport and Chattanooga. One captain (Murray) and 2 soldiers were captured, in addition to those mentioned heretofore, making a total of 2 captains and 5 soldiers. Friday, January 14, the residue of the troops along the railway were rationed, provided with transportation, and returned to the places indicated in Major-General Steedman's orders.

The total casualties of the division in battle on the entire campaign cannot be given with exact accuracy as to names and regiments at this time. It was impossible to prepare correct lists of the recruits received during the last few days at Nashville before starting upon the march, and in some instances, in the haste of arming and equipping the men, this important matter was improperly neglected. It is probable that a number of worthy men have fallen in battle and by disease of whom there is no record. The following statement is made up from the reports of commanding officers, to wit:

Command	Killed.			Wounded.			Missing.			Aggregate.
	O	M	T	O	M	T	O	M	T
Colonel Malloy's brigade		4	4		7	7		6	6	17
Colonel Grosvenor's brigade.	3	25	28	5	108	113		33	33	174
Colonel Mitchell's brigade					4	4		3	3	7
Total	3	29	32	5	119	124		42	42	198

[O = Officers     M = Men]

Among the officers killed was Capt. E. Grosvenor and First Lieut. Samuel W. Thomas, Eighteenth Ohio Volunteers. They fell gallantly leading their commands on the 15th of December, in the assault upon the enemy's works; they held high characters in the service for manly and soldierly qualities. A lieutenant of Second Battalion, Fourteenth Corps, was also killed, whose name and regiment have not yet been obtained. Among the officers wounded were Captains Benedict, Eighteenth Ohio Volunteers, Henderson, One hundred and twenty-first Ohio Volunteers, Brown, Twenty-seventh Ohio Volunteers, and J. B. Emery, Eighteenth Ohio Volunteers.

The number of men who were left at Nashville by direction of the surgeon and from various points sent to hospitals in rear was large, owing to the material of the command reached 1,100 during the campaign. Those left at Nashville were reported at 500; the number sent back by trains from Limestone Creek reached 400, and those from Decatur, by transports, say 200. Several officers were sent back also from these points (and among them some of the best officers in the command), suffering from disease and former wounds. In addition to these a few men were left upon the march at houses, sick and unable to be moved. These were as well cared for as possible, and measures have since been taken to bring them up. The number of deaths from disease among the men since leaving Chattanooga is reported at eleven.

In closing this sketch of the late campaign it is due to the officers and troops of my command to bear unequivocal testimony to the patience, cheerfulness, and pluck with which they endured the fatigue of forty-six days continued field service in midwinter. The command was hastily thrown together; it consisted of detachments from more than 200 regiments; it was rapidly armed, and from its very composition could be but illy provided with the ordinary appliances which render field service endurable. About one-fourth of the command consisted of soldiers recently from hospital, scarcely convalescent, another fourth of soldiers returned from furlough, and the remaining half of raw recruits of every nationality, without drill or experience of any kind, but earnest and worthy men. The officers as a class were good, and perhaps superior to the average of the army, but they were separated from their regular commands, without their personal baggage, camp furniture, servants, change of clothing, stationery, &c., and many of them without money or time to procure any supply of these necessities. The command left without ambulances or wagons. The medical department had not adequate supplies. Measles, small-pox, and camp disorders were constantly appearing among the new men, and often at points beyond the reach of hospitals. The weather was bitter cold at times, and during the coldest days there was much suffering by transportation on the railway. In spite of all such difficulties, however, the division performed its share of military and fatigue duty during the campaign; it built its share of defenses at Nashville, and not only held them but participated to some extent in the general assault; it moved by rail 451 miles and marched 155 miles, wading streams and laboring through mud and rain; it was from necessity out of rations sometimes for days. These sufferings are incident to a soldier's life, but they are much lessened by experience and thorough organization, neither of which this division had. It is simple justice to both the soldiers and officers of this provisional division that the services they have rendered should be thoroughly understood, and that their individual reputations shall not suffer in their commands with charges of idleness or shirking during their absence.

The officers necessarily were compelled to become responsible for arms, equipments, ordnance stores, clothing, &c., and to issue them irregularly in the exigency to men of all regiments, and many who did not know their assignments. A liberal course of settlement should be adopted by the supervising authorities of the various departments with regard to these officers.

Hereto are appended the reports of Colonels Harrison, Mitchell, Malloy, and Grosvenor, commanding brigades of this division, also that of Colonel Salm (covering his services in pursuit of Lyon), marked, respectively, A, B, C, D, and E.* Reports from the other brigade commanders of the part taken by their brigades in the “tramp” after Lyon have not been as yet received.

It affords me pleasure to say of Colonels Harrison, Seventieth Indiana Volunteers, Mitchell, One hundred and thirteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, and Malloy, Seventeenth Wisconsin Volunteers, who commanded, each, one of the brigades of the division, that throughout the campaign they performed their duties and handled their commands in a creditable and soldierly manner. They are brigade commanders of much experience and reputation in the army, and deserve well for long and faithful services and for their management of their respective commands on the recent campaign. Col. Felix Prince Salm, commanding Sixty-eighth New York, who served with me in command of a temporary brigade (after leaving Decatur), is an officer of experience in European armies, and is commended for the zeal, energy, and good sense which he brings to the service of the Government. Lieutenant-Colonels Banning, One hundred and twenty-first Ohio, and Grosvenor, of Eighteenth Ohio, each commanded for a short while a brigade of the division; they are good officers, and rendered the country service which should be remembered. Colonels Thompson, Twelfth U.S. Colored Infantry, and Morgan, Fourteenth U.S. Colored Infantry, commanded brigades' of colored soldiers for a short while with me. Their troops were disciplined and behaved uniformly well. These officers are entitled to the consideration of the Government for their personal efforts on the late campaign, and for the good results flowing from their labors in demonstration of the problem that colored men can be made soldiers. It is impossible to note all the deserving officers in command of battalions or companies of the division. The reports of the brigade commanders contain general and special notices of these officers, and the attention of the major-general commanding is directed particularly to them. The cheerful manner in which Captain Givens (Company M, Eleventh Indiana Cavalry)? commanding garrison at Larkinsville, responded to all orders from my headquarters, and the valuable service which his command rendered from thorough knowledge of the surrounding country, is entitled to creditable mention.

My staff consisted of the following officers, viz: Capt. John A. Wright, assistant adjutant-general; Capt. G. W. Marshall, assistant quartermaster; Capt. A. C. Ford (Thirty-first Indiana), acting commissary of subsistence; Capt. A. Vallendar (One hundred and twenty-fifth Ohio Volunteer Infantry), acting assistant inspector-general; Capt. L. S. Windle (One hundred and thirteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry), ordnance officer; Surg. J. D. Cotton (Ninety-second Ohio Volunteer Infantry), medical director; First Lieut. I. N. Leonard (Ninth Indiana Volunteers), acting aide-de-camp. Each of these officers merits my thanks for the satisfactory manner in which he discharged his duties, and they are all worthy of higher positions than they hold.

With my regards to the major-general commanding district, I am, very respectfully, yours, &c.,

CHARLES CRUFT, 

Brigadier-General, U.S. Volunteers.

Maj. S. B. MOE,

Assistant Adjutant-General, District of the Etowah.

______________

* See pp. 519, 524, 532, 532, 526, 801.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 509-19