PROCLAMATION,
BY ANDREW JACKSON,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.
TUESDAY, DECEMBER
10, 1832.
Whereas a
convention, assembled in the State of South Carolina, have passed an ordinance,
by which they declare, "that the several acts and parts of acts of the
Congress of the United States, purporting to be laws for the imposing of duties
and imposts on the importation of foreign commodities, and now having actual
operation and effect within the United States, and, more especially" two
acts for the same purposes, passed on the twenty-ninth of May, 1828, and
on the fourteenth of July, 1832, "are unauthorized by the
Constitution of the United States, and violate the true meaning and intent
thereof, and are null and void, and no law," nor binding on the citizens
of that State or its officers: and, by the said ordinance, it is further
declared to be unlawful for any of the constituted authorities of the State, or
of the United States, to enforce the payment of the duties imposed by the said
acts within the same State, and that it is the duty of the legislature to pass
such laws as may be necessary to give full effect to the said ordinance:
And, whereas, by the
said ordinance, it is further ordained, that in no case of law or equity,
decided in the courts of said State, wherein shall be drawn in question the
validity of the said ordinance, or of the acts of the legislature that may be
passed to give it effect, or of the said laws of the United States, no appeal
shall be allowed to the Supreme Court of the United States, nor shall any copy
of the record be permitted or allowed for that purpose; and that any person
attempting to take such appeal, shall be punished as for a contempt of court:
And, finally, the
said ordinance declares that the people of South Carolina will maintain the
said ordinance at every hazard; and that they will consider the passage of any
act by Congress, abolishing or closing the ports of said State, or otherwise
obstructing the free ingress or egress of vessels to and from the said ports,
or any other act of the Federal Government to coerce the State, shut up her
ports, destroy or harass her commerce, or to enforce the said acts, otherwise
than through the civil tribunals of the country, as inconsistent with the
longer continuance of South Carolina in the Union; and that the people of the
said State will thenceforth hold themselves absolved from all further
obligation to maintain or preserve their political connection with the people
of the other States, and will, forth with, proceed to organize a separate
government, and do all other acts and things which sovereign and independent
States may of right do:
And, whereas, the
said ordinance prescribes to the people of South Carolina a course of conduct,
in direct violation of their duty, as citizens of the United States, contrary
to the laws of their country, subversive of its Constitution, and having for
its object the destruction of the Union—that Union, which, coeval with our
political existence, led our fathers, without any other ties to unite them,
than those of patriotism and a common cause, through a sanguinary struggle to a
glorious independence-that sacred Union, hitherto inviolate, which, perfected
by our happy Constitution, has brought us, by the favor of Heaven, to a State
of prosperity at home and high consideration abroad, rarely, if ever, equalled
in the history of nations. To preserve this bond of our political existence
from destruction, to maintain, inviolate, this state of national honor and
prosperity, and to justify the confidence my fellow-citizens have reposed in
me, I, ANDREW JACKSON, President of the United States, have thought proper to
issue this, my PROCLAMATION, stating my views of the Constitution and laws,
applicable to the measures adopted by the Convention of South Carolina, and to
the reasons they have put forth to sustain them, declaring the course which
duty will require me to pursue, and, appealing to the understanding and
patriotism of the people, warn them of the consequences that must inevitably
result from an observance of the dictates of the convention.
Strict duty would
require of me nothing more than the exercise of those powers with which I am
now, or may hereafter be invested, for preserving the peace of the Union, and
for the execution of the laws. But the imposing aspect which opposition has
assumed in this case, by clothing itself with State Authority, and the deep
interest which the people of the United States must all feel, in preventing a
resort to stronger measures, while there is a hope that any thing will be
yielded to reasoning and remonstrance, perhaps demand, and will certainly
justify, a full exposition to South Carolina and the nation, of the views I
entertain of this important question, as well as a distinct enunciation of the
course which my sense of duty will require me to pursue.
The ordinance is
founded, not on the indefeasible right of resisting acts which are plainly
unconstitutional, and too oppressive to be endured, but on the strange position
that any one State may not only declare an Act of Congress void, but prohibit
its execution—that they may do this consistently with the Constitution—that the
true construction of that instrument permits a State to retain its place in the
Union, and yet be bound by no other of its laws than those it may chose to
consider as constitutional. It is true, they add, that, to justify this
abrogation of a law, it must be palpably contrary to the Constitution; but it
is evident that, to give the right of resisting laws of that description,
coupled with the uncontrolled right to decide what laws deserve that character,
is to give the power of resisting all laws. For, as by the theory, there is no
appeal, the reasons alleged by the State, good or bad, must prevail. If it
should be said that public opinion is a sufficient check against the abuse of
this power, it may asked why it is not deemed a sufficient guard against the
passage of an unconstitutional Act by Congress. There is, however, a restraint
in this last case, which makes the assumed power of a State more indefensible,
and which does not exist in the other. There are two appeals from an
unconstitutional act passed by Congress one to the judiciary, the other to the
people and the States. There is no appeal from the State decision in theory:
and the practical illustration shows that the courts are closed against an
application to review it, both judges and jurors being sworn to decide in its
favor, But reasoning on this subject is superfluous when our social compact in
express terms declares, that the laws of the United States, its Constitution, and
treaties made under it, are the Supreme Law of the Land: and, for greater
caution, adds, “that the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding." And it may be asserted, without fear of refutation, that
no federative government could exist without a similar provision. Look for a
moment to the consequence. If South Carolina considers the revenue laws
unconstitutional, and has a right to prevent their execution in the port of
Charleston, there would be a clear constitutional objection to their collection
in every other port, and no revenue could be collected any where; for all
imposts must be equal. It is no answer to repeat that an unconstitutional law
is no law, so long as the question of its legality is to be decided by the
State itself; for every law operating injuriously upon any local interest will
be perhaps thought, and certainly represented, as unconstitutional, and, as has
been shown, there is no appeal.
If this doctrine had
been established at an earlier day, the Union would have been dissolved in its
infancy. The excise law in Pennsylvania, the embargo and non-intercourse law in
the eastern States, the carriage tax in Virginia, were all deemed
unconstitutional, and were more unequal in their operation than any of the laws
now complained of; but, fortunately, none of those States discovered that they
had the right now claimed by South Carolina. The war into which we were forced,
to support the dignity of the nation and the rights of our citizens, might have
ended in defeat and disgrace, instead of victory and honor, if the States, who
supposed it a ruinous and unconstitutional measure, had thought they possessed
the right of nullifying the act by which it was declared, and denying supplies
for its prosecution. Hardly and unequally as those measures bore upon several
members of the Union, to the legislatures of none did this efficient and
peaceable remedy, as it is called, suggest itself. The discovery of this important
feature in our Constitution was reserved to the present day. To the statesmen
of South Carolina belongs the invention, and upon the citizens of that State
will unfortunately fall the evils of reducing it to practice.
If the doctrine of a
State veto upon the laws of the Union carries with it internal evidence of its
impracticable absurdity, our constitutional history will also afford abundant
proof that it would have been repudiated with indignation, had it been proposed
to form a feature in our government.
In our colonial
State, although dependent on another power, we very early considered ourselves
as connected by common interest with each other. Leagues were formed for common
defence, and before the Declaration
of Independence, we were known in our aggregate character as THE UNITED
COLONIES OF AMERICA. That decisive and important step was taken jointly. We
declared ourselves a nation by a joint, not by several acts; and when the terms
of our confederation were reduced to form, it was in that of a solemn league of
several States, by which they agreed that they would, collectively, form one
nation for the purpose of conducting some certain domestic concerns, and all
foreign relations. In the instrument forming that Union, is found an article
which declares that "every State shall abide by the determinations of
Congress on all questions which by that confederation should be submitted to
them."
Under the
confederation, then, no State could legally annul a decision of the Congress,
or refuse to submit to its execution; but no provision was made to enforce
these decisions. Congress made requisitions, but they were not complied with.
The government could not operate on individuals. They had no judiciary, no
means of collecting revenue.
But the defects of
the confederation need not be detailed. Under its operation, we could scarcely
be called a nation. We had neither prosperity at home nor consideration abroad.
This state of things could not be endured, and our present happy Constitution
was formed; but formed in vain, if this fatal doctrine prevails. It was formed
for important objects that are announced in the preamble made in the name and
by the authority of the people of the United States, whose delegates framed,
and whose conventions approved it. The most important among these objects, that
which is placed first in rank, on which all the others rest, is "to from a
more perfect Union" Now, is it possible that, even if there were no
express provision giving supremacy to the Constitution and Laws of the United
States over those of the States, it can be conceived, that an instrument made
for the purpose of "forming a more perfect Union" than that of the
confederation, could be so constructed by the assembled wisdom of our country
as to substitute for that confederation a form of government dependent for its
existence on the local interest, the party spirit of a State, or of a
prevailing faction in a State? Every man of plain unsophisticated
understanding, who hears the question, will give such an answer as will preserve
the Union. Metaphysical subtlety, in pursuit of an impracticable theory, could
alone have devised one that is calculated to destroy it.
I consider, then,
the power to annual a law of the United States, assumed by one State,
INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE EXISTENCE OF THE UNION, CONTRADICTED EXPRESSLY BY THE
LETTER OF THE CONSTITUTION, UNAUTHORIZED BY ITS SPIRIT, INCONSISTENT WITH EVERY
PRINCIPLE ON WHICH IT WAS FOUNDED, AND DESTRUCTIVE OF THE GREAT OBJECT FOR
WHICH IT WAS FORMED.
After this general
view of the leading principle, we must examine the particular application of it
which is made in the ordinance.
The preamble rests
its justification on these grounds: It assumes, as a fact, that the obnoxious
laws, although they purport to be laws for raising revenue, were, in reality,
intended for the protection of manufactures, which purpose it asserts to be
unconstitutional—that the operation of these laws is unequal—that the amount
raised by them is greater than is required by the wants of the government—and,
finally, that the proceeds are to be applied to objects unauthorized by the
Constitution. These are the only causes alleged to justify an open opposition
to the laws of the country, and a threat of seceding from the Union, if any
attempt should be made to enforce them. The first virtually acknowledges that
the law in question was passed under a power expressly given by the
Constitution, to lay and collect imposts; but its constitutionality is drawn in
question from the motives of those who passed it. However apparent this purpose
may be in the present case, nothing can be more dangerous than to admit the
position that an unconstitutional purpose, entertained by the members who
assent to a law enacted under a constitutional power, shall make that law void;
for how is that purpose to be ascertained? Who is to make the scrutiny? How
often may bad purposes be falsely imputed? in how many cases are they concealed
by false professions? in how many is no declaration of motive made? Admit this
doctrine, and you give to the States an uncontrolled right to decide, and every
law may be annulled under this pretext. If, therefore, the absurd and dangerous
doctrine should be admitted, that a State may annul an unconstitutional law, or
one that it deems such, it will not apply to the present case.
The next objection
is, that the laws in question operate unequally. This objection may be made
with truth, to every law that has been or can be passed. The wisdom of man
never yet contrived a system of taxation that would operate with perfect
equality. If the unequal operation of a law makes it unconstitutional, and if
all laws of that description may be abrogated by any State for that cause, then
indeed is the Federal Constitution unworthy of the slightest effort for its
preservation. We have hitherto relied on it as the perpetual bond of our Union.
We have received it
as the work of the assembled wisdom of the nation, have trusted to it as to the
sheet anchor of our safety, in the stormy times of conflict with a foreign or
domestic foe. We have looked to it with sacred awe, as the palladium of our
liberties; and, with all the solemnities of religion, have pledged to each
other, our lives and fortunes here, and our hopes of happiness hereafter, in
its defence and support. Were we mistaken, my countrymen, in attaching this
importance to the Constitution of our country? Was our devotion paid to the
wretched, inefficient, clumsy contrivance, which this new doctrine would make
it? Did we pledge ourselves to the support of an airy nothing—a bubble that
must be blown away by the first breath of disaffection? Was this self-destroying,
visionary theory, the work of the profound statesmen, the exalted patriots, to
whom the task of constitutional reform was entrusted? Did the name of
Washington sanction, did the States deliberately ratify, such an anomaly in the
history of fundamental legislation? No. We were not mistaken! The letter of
this great instrument is free from this radical fault: its language directly
contradicts the imputation: its spirit—its evident intent, contradicts it. No,
we did not err! Our Constitution does not contain the absurdity of giving power
to make laws, and another power to resist them. The sages, whose memory will
always be reverenced, have given us a practical, and, as they hoped, a
permanent constitutional compact. The father of his country did not affix his
revered name to so palpable and absurdity. Nor did the States, when they
severally ratified it, do so under the impression that a veto on the laws of
the United States was reserved to them, or that they could exercise it by
application. Search the debates in all their conventions—examine the speeches
of the most zealous opposers of federal authority—look at the amendments that
were proposed. They are all silent—not a syllable uttered, not a vote given,
not a motion made to correct the explicit supremacy given to the laws of the
Union over those of the States—or to show that implication, as is now
contended, could defeat it. No, we have not erred! The Constitution is still
the object of our reverence, the bond of our Union, our defence in danger, the
source of our prosperity in peace. It shall descend, as we have received it,
uncorrupted by sophistical construction, to our posterity; and the sacrifices
of local interests, of State prejudices, of personal animosities, that were
made to bring it into existence, will again be patriotically offered for its
support.
The two remaining
objections, made by the ordinance to these laws, are, that the sums intended to
be raised by them are greater than are required, and that the proceeds will be
unconstitutionally employed. The Constitution has given expressly to Congress
the right of raising revenue, and of determining the sum the public exigencies
will require. The States have no control over the exercise of this right, other
than that which results from the power of changing the representatives who
abuse it, and thus procure redress.
Congress may, undoubtedly,
abuse this discretionary power, but the same may be said of others with which
they are vested. Yet the discretion must exist somewhere. The Constitution has
given it to the representatives of the people, checked by the representatives
of the States, and by the executive power. The South Carolina construction
gives it to the legislature or the convention of a single State, where neither
the people of the different States, nor the States in their separate capacity,
nor the Chief Magistrate, elected by the people, have any representation. Which
is the most discreet disposition of the power? I do not ask you,
fellow-citizens, which is the constitutional disposition—that instrument speaks
a language not to be misunderstood. But if you were assembled in general
convention, which would you think the safest depository of this discretionary
power, in the last resort? Would you add a clause, giving it to each of the
States; or would you sanction the wise provisions already made by your
Constitution? If this should be the result of your deliberations, when
providing for the future, are you—can
you be—ready to risk all that we hold dear, to establish, for a temporary and a
local purpose, that which you must acknowledge to be destructive, and even
absurd, as a general provision? Carry out the consequences of this right vested
in the different States, and you must perceive that the crisis your conduct
presents at this day, would recur whenever any law of the United States
displeased any of the States, and that we should soon cease to be a nation.
The ordinance, with
the same knowledge of the future that characterizes a former objection, tells
you that the proceeds of the tax will be unconstitutionally applied. If this
could be ascertained with certainty, the objection would, with more propriety,
be reserved for the law so applying the proceeds, but surely cannot be urged
against the laws levying the duty.
These are the
allegations contained in the ordinance. Examine them seriously, my
fellow-citizens—judge for yourselves. I appeal to you to determine whether they
are so clear, so convincing, as to leave no doubt of their correctness: and
even if you should come to this conclusion, how far they justify the reckless,
destructive course, which you are directed to pursue. Review these objections,
and the conclusions drawn from them, once more. What are they? Every law, then,
for raising revenue, according to the South Carolina ordinance, may be
rightfully annulled, unless it be so framed as no law ever will or can be framed.
Congress have a right to pass laws for raising revenue, and each State has a
right to oppose their execution—two rights directly opposed to each other; and
yet is this absurdity supposed to be contained in an instrument drawn for the
express purpose of avoiding collisions between the States and the General
Government, by an assembly of the most enlightened statesmen and purest
patriots ever embodied for a similar purpose.
In vain have these
sages declared that Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises—in vain have they provided that they shall have power to
pass laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry those powers into
execution; that those laws and that Constitution shall be the "supreme law
of the land; and that the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding." In vain have the people of the several States solemnly
sanctioned these provisions, made them their paramount law, and individually
sworn to support them whenever they were called on to execute any office. Vain
provisions! ineffectual restrictions! vile profanation of oaths! miserable
mockery of legislation! If a bare majority of the voters in any one State may,
on a real or supposed knowledge of the intent with which a law has been passed,
declare themselves free from its operation—say here it gives too little, there
too much, and operates unequally—here it suffers articles to be free that ought
to be taxed, there it taxes those that ought to be free—in this case the
proceeds are intended to be applied to purposes which we do not approve—in that
the amount raised is more than is wanted. Congress, it is true, are invested by
the Constitution with the right of deciding these questions according to their
sound discretion. Congress is composed of the representatives of all the States
and of all the people of all the States; but we, part of the people of one
State, to whom the Constitution has given no power on the subject, from whom it
has expressly taken it away—we, who have solemnly agreed that this Constitution
shall be our law—we, most of whom have sworn to support it—we, now abrogate
this law, and swear, and force others to swear, that it shall not be obeyed—and
we do this, not because Congress have no right to pass such laws; this we do
not allege; but because they have passed them with improper views. They are
unconstitutional from the motives of those who passed them, which we can never
with certainty know, from their unequal operation; although it is impossible
from the nature of things that they should be equal—and from the disposition
which we presume may be made of their proceeds, although that disposition has
not been declared. This is the plain meaning of the ordinance in relation to
laws which it abrogates for alleged unconstitutionality. But it does not stop
there. It repeals, in express terms, an important part of the Constitution
itself, and of laws passed to give it effect, which have never been alleged to
be unconstitutional. The Constitution declares that the judicial powers of the
United States extend to cases arising under the laws of the United States, and
that such laws, the Constitution and treaties shall be paramount to the State
constitutions and laws. The judiciary act prescribes the mode by which the case
may be brought before a court of the United States, by appeal, when a State
tribunal shall decide against this provision of the Constitution. The ordinance
declares there shall be no appeal; makes the State law paramount to the
Constitution and laws of the United States; forces judges and jurors to swear
that they will disregard their provisions; and even makes it penal in a suitor
to attempt relief by appeal. It further declares that it shall not be lawful
for the authorities of the United States, or of that State, to enforce the
payment of duties imposed by the revenue laws within its limits.
Here is a law of the
United States, not even pretended to be unconstitutional, repealed by the
authority of a small majority of the voters of a single State. Here is a
provision of the Constitution which is solemnly abrogated by the same
authority.
On such expositions
and reasonings, the ordinance grounds not only an assertion of the right to
annul the laws of which it complains, but to enforce it by a threat of seceding
from the Union, if any attempt is made to execute them.
This right to secede
is deduced from the nature of the Constitution, which, they say, is a compact
between sovereign States, who have preserved their whole sovereignty, and,
therefore, are subject to no superior; that, because they made the compact,
they can break it when, in their opinion, it has been departed from by the
other States. Fallacious as this course of reasoning is, it enlists State
pride, and finds advocates in the honest prejudices of those who have not
studied the nature of our government sufficiently to see the radical error on
which it rests.
The people of the
United States formed the Constitution, acting through the State Legislatures in
making the compact, to meet and discuss its provisions, and acting in separate
conventions when they ratified those provisions; but the terms used in its
construction, show it to be a government in which the people of all the States
collectively are represented. We are ONE PEOPLE in the choice of the President
and Vice President. Here the States have no other agency than to direct the
mode in which the votes shall be given. The candidates having the majority of
all the votes, are chosen. The electors of a majority of States may have given
their votes for one candidate, and yet another may be chosen. The People, then,
and not the States, are represented in the executive branch.
In the House of
Representatives there is this difference, that the people of one State do not,
as in the case of President and Vice President, all vote for the same officers.
The people of all the States do not vote for all the members, each State electing
only its own representatives. But this creates no material distinction. When
chosen, they are all representatives of the United States, not representatives
of the particular State from which they come. They are paid by the United
States, not by the State; nor are they accountable to it for any act done in
the performance of their legislative functions; and, however they may in
practice, as it is their duty to do, consult and prefer the interests of their
particular constituents when they come in conflict with any other partial or
local interest, yet it is their first and highest duty, as representatives of
the United States, to promote the general good.
The Constitution of
the United States, then, forms a government, not a league; and whether it be
formed by compact between the States, or in any other manner, its character is
the same. It is a government in which all the people are represented, which
operates directly on the people individually, not upon the States: they
retained all the power they did not grant. But each State having expressly
parted with so many powers as to constitute, jointly with the other States a
single nation, cannot from that period possess any right to secede, because
such secession does not break a league, but destroys the unity of a nation; and
any injury to that unity is not only a breach which would result from the
contravention of a compact, but it is an offence against the whole Union. To
say that any State may at pleasure secede from the Union, is to say that the
United States are not a nation; because it would be a solecism to contend that
any part of a nation might dissolve its connexion with the other parts, to
their injury or ruin, without committing any offence. Secession, like any other
revolutionary act, may be morally justified by the extremity of oppression; but
to call it a constitutional right is confounding the meaning of terms; and can
only be done through gross error, or to deceive those who are willing to assert
a right, but would pause before they made a revolution, or incur the penalties
consequent on a failure.
Because the Union
was formed by a compact, it is said the parties to that compact may, when they
feel themselves aggrieved, depart from it: but it is precisely because it is a
compact that they cannot. A compact is an agreement or binding obligation. It
may, by its terms, have a sanction or penalty for its breach, or it may not. If
it contains no sanction, it may be broken with no other consequence than moral
guilt: if it have a sanction, then the breach incurs the designated or implied
penalty. A league between independent nations, generally, has no sanction other
than a moral one; or, if it should contain a penalty, as there is no common
superior, it cannot be enforced. A government, on the contrary, always has a
sanction, expressed or implied; and, in our case, it is both necessarily
implied and expressly given. An attempt by force of arms to destroy a
government, is an offence, by whatever means the constitutional compact may
have been formed; and such government has the right, by the law of self
defence, to pass acts for punishing the offender, unless that right is
modified, restrained, or resumed, by the constitutional act. In our system,
although it is modified in the case of treason, yet authority is expressly
given to pass all laws necessary to carry its powers into effect, and under
this grant provision has been made for punishing acts which obstruct the due
administration of the laws.
It would seem
superfluous to add any thing to show the nature of that union which connects
us; but as erroneous opinions on this subject are the foundation of doctrines
the most destructive to our peace, I must give some further development to my
views on this subject. No one, fellow-citizens, has a higher reverence for the
reserved rights of the States, than the magistrate who now addresses you. No
one would make greater personal sacrifices, or official exertions, to defend them
from violation; but equal care must be taken to prevent on their part an
improper interference with, or resumption of, the rights they have vested in
the nation. The line has not been so distinctly drawn as to avoid doubts in
some cases of the exercise of power. Men of the best intentions and soundest
views may differ in their construction of some parts of the Constitution: but
there are others on which dispassionate reflection can leave no doubt. Of this
nature appears to be the assumed right of secession. It rests, as we have seen,
on the alleged, undivided sovereignty of the States, and on their having formed
in this sovereign capacity a compact which is called the Constitution, from
which, because they made it, they have the right to secede. Both of these
positions are erroneous, and some of the arguments to prove them so have been
anticipated.
The States severally
have not retained their entire sovereignty. It has been shown that in becoming
parts of a nation, not members of a league, they surrendered many of their
essential parts of sovereignty. The right to make treaties, declare war, levy
taxes, exercise exclusive judicial and legislative powers, were all of them
functions of sovereign power. The States, then, for all these important
purposes, were no longer sovereign. The allegiance of their citizens was
transferred, in the first instance, to the government of the United States—they
became American citizens, and owed obedience to the Constitution of the United
States, and to laws made in conformity with the powers it vested in Congress. This
last position has not been, and cannot be denied. How then can that State be
said to be sovereign and independent, whose citizens owe obedience to laws not
made by it, and whose magistrates are sworn to disregard those laws, when they
come in conflict with those passed by another? What shows conclusively that the
States cannot be said to have reserved an undivided sovereignty, is, that they
expressly ceded the right to punish treason—not treason against their separate
power—but treason against the United States. Treason is an offence against
sovereignty, and sovereignty must reside with the power to punish it. But the
reserved rights of the States are not less sacred, because they have for their
common interest made the General Government the depository of these powers. The
unity of our political character (as has been shown for another purpose)
commenced with its very existence. Under the royal government, we had no
separate character our opposition to its oppression began as UNITED COLONIES.
We were the UNITED STATES under the confederation, and the name was
perpetuated, and the union rendered more perfect, by the Federal Constitution.
In none of these stages did we consider ourselves in any other light than as
forming one nation. Treaties and alliances were made in the name of all. Troops
were raised for the joint defence. How, then, with all these proofs, that under
all changes of our position we had, for designated purposes and with defined
powers, created national governments—how is it, that the most perfect of those
several modes of union should now be considered as a mere league, that may be
dissolved at pleasure? It is from an abuse of terms. Compact is used as
synonymous with league, although the true term is not employed, because it
would at once show the fallacy of the reasoning. It would not do to say that
our Constitution was only a league; but, it is labored to prove it a compact,
(which in one sense it is,) and then to argue that as a league is a compact,
every compact between nations must of course be a league, and that from such an
engagement every sovereign power has a right to recede. But it has been shown,
that in this sense the States are not sovereign, and that even if they were,
and the National Constitution had been formed by compact, there would be no
right in any one State to exonerate itself from its obligations.
So obvious are the
reasons which forbid this secession, that it is necessary only to allude to
them. The Union was formed for the benefit of all. It was produced by mutual
sacrifices of interests and opinions. Can those sacrifices be recalled? Can the
States who magnanimously surrendered their title to the territories of the
west, recall the grant? Will the inhabitants of the inland States agree to pay
the duties that may be imposed without their assent by those on the Atlantic or
the Gulf, for their own benefit? Shall there be a free port in one State, and
onerous duties in another? No one believes that any right exists in a single
State to involve all the others in these and countless other evils, contrary to
the engagements solemnly made. Every one must see that the other States, in
self-defence, must oppose at all hazards.
These are the
alternatives that are presented by the Convention: a repeal of all the acts for
raising revenue, leaving the government without the means of support; or an
acquiescence in the dissolution of the Union by the secession of one of its
members. When the first was proposed, it was known that it could not be
listened to for a moment. It was known if force was applied to oppose the
execution of the laws, that it must be repelled by force—that Congress could
not, without involving itself in disgrace, and the country in ruin, accede to
the proposition; and yet, if this is not done in a given day, or if any attempt
is made to execute the laws, the State is, by the ordinance, declared to be out
of the Union. The majority of a convention assembled for the purpose have
dictated these terms, or rather this rejection of all terms, in the name of the
people of South Carolina, It is true that the Governor of the State speaks of
the submission of their grievances to a convention of all the States; which, he
says, they "sincerely and anxiously seek and desire." Yet this
obvious and constitutional mode of obtaining the sense of the other States on
the construction of the federal compact, and amending it, if necessary, has
never been attempted by those who have urged the State on this destructive
measure. The State might have proposed the call for a general convention to the
other States; and Congress, if a sufficient number of them concurred, must have
called it. But the first magistrate of South Carolina, when he expressed a hope
that, "on a review by Congress and the functionaries of the General
Government of the merits of the controversy," such a convention will be
accorded to them, must have known that neither Congress nor any functionary of
the General Government has authority to call such a convention, unless it be
demanded by two-thirds of the States. This suggestion, then, is another
instance of the reckless inattention to the provisions of the Constitution with
which this crisis has been madly hurried on; or of the attempt to persuade the
people that a constitutional remedy had been sought and refused. If the
Legislature of South Carolina "anxiously desire" a general convention
to consider their complaints, why have they not made application for it in the
way the Constitution points out? The assertion that they "earnestly
seek" it, is completely negatived by the omission.
This, then, is the
position in which we stand. A small majority of the citizens of one State in
the Union have elected delegates to a State convention: that convention has
ordained that all the revenue, laws of the United States, must be repealed, or
that they are no longer a member of the Union. The Governor of that State has
recommended to the Legislature the raising of an army to carry the secession
into effect, and that he may be empowered to give clearances to vessels in the
name of the State. No act of violent opposition to the laws has yet been
committed, but such a state of things is hourly apprehended, and it is the
intent of this instrument to PROCLAIM not only that the duty imposed on me by
the Constitution "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed,"
shall be performed to the extent of the powers already vested in me by law, or
of such other as the wisdom of Congress shall devise and entrust to me for that
purpose; but to warn the citizens of South Carolina, who have been deluded into
an opposition to the laws, of the danger they will incur by obedience to the
illegal and disorganizing ordinance of the convention—to exhort those who have
refused to support it to persevere in their determination to uphold the
Constitution and laws of their country, and to point out to all, the perilous
situation in which the good people of that State have been led—and that the
course they are urged to pursue is one of ruin and disgrace to the very State
whose rights they affect to support.
Fellow-citizens of
my native State!—Let me not only admonish you, as the first magistrate of our
common country, not to incur the penalty of its laws, but use the influence
that a father would over his children, whom he saw rushing to certain ruin. In
that paternal language, with that paternal feeling, let me tell you, my
countrymen, that you are deluded by men who are either deceived themselves, or
wish to deceive you, Mark under what pretences you have been led on to the
brink of insurrection and treason, on which you stand! First, a diminution of
the value of your staple commodity, lowered by over production in other
quarters, and the consequent diminution in the value of your lands, were the
sole effect of the tariff laws. The effect of those laws are confessedly
injurious, but the evil was greatly exaggerated by the unfounded theory you
were taught to believe, that its burdens were in proportion to your exports,
not to your consumption of imported articles. Your pride was roused by the
assertion that a submission to those laws was a state of vassalage, and that
resistance to them was equal, in patriotic merit, to the opposition our fathers
offered to the oppressive laws of Great Britain. You were told that this
opposition might be peaceably—might be constitutionally made—that you might
enjoy all the advantages of the Union and bear none of its burdens.
Eloquent appeals to
your passions, to your state pride, to your native courage, to your sense of
real injury, were used to prepare you for the period when the mask which
concealed the hideous features of DISUNION should be taken off, It fell, and
you were made to look with complacency on objects which, not long since, you
would have regarded with horror. Look back at the arts which have brought you
to this state—look forward to the consequences to which it must inevitably
lead. Look back to what was first told you, as an inducement to enter into this
dangerous course. The great political truth was repeated to you, that you had
the revolutionary right of resisting all laws that were palpably
unconstitutional, and intolerably oppressive—it was added that the right to
nullify a law rested on the same principle, but that it was a peaceable remedy!
This character which was given to it, made you receive, with too much
confidence, the assertions that were made of the unconstitutionality of the
law, and its oppressive effects. Mark, my fellow-citizens, that, by the
admission of your leaders, the unconstitutionality must be palpable, or it will
not justify either resistance or nullification! What is the meaning of the word
palpable, in the sense in which it is here used?—that which is apparent to
every one; that which no man of ordinary intellect will fail to perceive. Is
the unconstitutionality of these laws of that description? Let those among your
leaders who once approved and advocated the principle of protective duties, answer
the question; and let them choose whether they will be considered as incapable,
then, of perceiving that which must have been apparent to every man of common
understanding, or as imposing upon your confidence, and endeavoring to mislead
you now.
In either case, they
are unsafe guides in the perilous path they urge you to tread. Ponder well on
this circumstance, and you will know how to appreciate the exaggerated language
they address to you. They are not champions of liberty, emulating the fame of our
revolutionary fathers; nor are you an oppressed people, contending, as they
repeat to you, against worse than colonial vassalage. You are free members of a
flourishing and happy Union. There is no settled design to oppress you. You
have indeed felt the unequal operation of laws which may have been unwisely,
not unconstitutionally passed: but that inequality must necessarily be removed.
At the very moment when you were madly urged on the unfortunate course you have
begun, a change in public opinion had commenced. The nearly approaching payment
of the public debt, and the consequent necessity of a diminution of duties, had
already produced a considerable reduction, and that too on some articles of
general consumption in your State. The importance of this change was
understood, and you were authoritatively told, that no further alleviation of
their burdens was to be expected, at the very time when the condition of the
country imperiously demanded such a modification of the duties, as should
reduce them to a just and equitable scale. But, as if apprehensive of the
effect of this change, in allaying your discontents, you were precipitated into
the fearful state in which you now find yourselves.
I have urged you to
look back to the means that were used to hurry you on to the position you have
now assumed; and forward to the consequences it will produce. Something more is
necessary. Contemplate the condition of that country of which you still form an
important part! Consider its government, uniting in one bond of common
interests and general protection, so many different States; giving to all their
inhabitants the proud title of AMERICAN CITIZENS; protecting their commerce,
securing their literature and their arts, facilitating their
intercommunication, defending their frontiers, and making their name respected
in the remotest parts of the earth! Consider the extent of its territory, its
increasing and happy population, its advance in arts, which render life
agreeable, and the sciences, which elevate the mind! See education spreading
the lights of religion, humanity, and general information into every cottage in
the wide extent of our Territories and States! Behold it as the asylum where
the wretched and the oppressed find a refuge and a support! Look on this picture
of happiness and honor, and say WE, TOO, ARE CITIZENS OF AMERICA; Carolina is
one of these proud States: her arms have defended, her best blood has cemented
this happy Union! And then add, if you can, without horror and remorse, this
happy Union we will dissolve this picture of peace and prosperity we will
deface this free intercourse we will interrupt—these fertile fields we will
deluge with blood—the protection of that glorious flag we renounce—the very
names of Americans we discard. And for what, mistaken men!—for what do you
throw away these inestimable blessings—for what would you exchange your share
in the advantages and honor of the Union? For the dream of a separate
independence—a dream interrupted by bloody conflicts with your neighbors, and a
vile dependence on a foreign power. If your leaders could succeed in
establishing a separation, what would be your situation? Are you united at home—are
you free from the apprehension of civil discord, with all its fearful
consequences? Do our neighboring republics, every day suffering some new
revolution or contending with some new insurrection—do they excite your envy?
But the dictates of a high duty oblige me solemnly to announce, that you cannot
succeed.
The laws of the
United States must be executed. I have no discretionary power on the subject—my
duty is emphatically pronounced in the Constitution. Those who told you that
you might peaceably prevent their execution, deceived you they could not have
been deceived themselves. They know that a forcible opposition could alone prevent
the execution of the laws, and they know that such opposition must be repelled.
Their object is disunion; but be not deceived by names; disunion by armed
force, is TREASON. Are you really ready to incur its guilt? If you are, on the
heads of the instigators of the act be the dreadful consequences—on their heads
be the dishonor, but on yours may fall the punishment—on your unhappy State
will inevitably fall all the evils of the conflict you force upon the
government of your country. It cannot accede to the mad project of disunion of
which you would be the first victims—its first magistrate cannot, if he would,
avoid the performance of his duty—the consequence must be fearful for you,
distressing to your fellow-citizens here, and to the friends of good government
throughout the world. Its enemies have beheld our prosperity with a vexation
they could not conceal—it was a standing refutation of their slavish doctrines,
and they will point to our discord with the triumph of malignant joy. It is yet
in your power to disappoint them. There is yet time to show that the
descendants of the Pinckneys, the Sumpters, the Rutledges, and of the thousand
other names which adorn the pages of your revolutionary history, will not
abandon that Union, to support which so many of them fought and bled and died.
I adjure you, as you honor their memory as you love the cause of freedom, to
which they dedicated their lives—as you prize the peace of your country, the
lives of its best citizens, and your own fair fame, to retrace your steps.
Snatch from the archives of your State the disorganizing edict of its
convention—bid its members to re-assemble and promulgate the decided
expressions of your will to remain in the path which alone can conduct you to
safety, prosperity and honor—tell them that, compared to disunion, all other
evils are light, because that brings with it an accumulation of all—declare
that you will never take the field unless the star spangled banner of your
country shall float over you that you will not be stigmatized when dead, and
dishonored and scorned while you live, as the authors of the first attack on
the Constitution of your country! Its destroyers you cannot be. You may disturb
its peace—you may interrupt the course of its prosperity—you may cloud its
reputation for stability—but its tranquility will be restored, its prosperity
will return, and the stain upon its national character will be transferred, and
remain an eternal blot on the memory of those who caused the disorder.
Fellow-citizens of
the United States! The threat of unhallowed disunion the names of those, once
respected, by whom it is uttered—the array of military force to support it—denote
the approach of a crisis in our affairs on which the continuance of our
unexampled prosperity, our political existence, and perhaps that of all free
governments, may depend. The conjunction demanded a free, a full, and explicit
enunciation, not only of my intentions but of my principles of action; and as
the claim was asserted of a right by a State to annul the laws of the Union and
even to secede from it at pleasure, a frank exposition of my opinions in
relation to the origin and form of our government, and the construction I give
to the instrument by which it was created, seemed to be proper. Having the
fullest confidence in the justness of the legal and constitutional opinion of
my duties which has been expressed, I rely with equal confidence on your
undivided support in my determination to execute the laws—to preserve the Union
by all constitutional means—to arrest, if possible, by moderate but firm
measures, the necessity of a recourse to force; and, if it be the will of
Heaven that the recurrence of its primeval curse on man for the shedding of a
brother's blood should fall upon our land, that it be not called down by any offensive
act on the part of the United States.
Fellow citizens! The
momentous case is before you. On your undivided support of your government
depends the decision of the great question it involves, whether your sacred
Union will be preserved, and the blessings it se cures to us as one people
shall be perpetuated. No one can doubt that the unanimity with which that
decision will be expressed, will be such as to inspire new confidence in
republican institutions, and that the prudence, the wisdom and the courage
which it will bring to their defence, will transmit them unimpaired and
invigorated to our children.
May the Great Ruler
of nations grant that the signal blessings with which He has favored ours, may
not, by the madness of party or personal ambition, be disregarded and lost: and
may His wise Providence bring those who have produced this crisis, to see the
folly, before they feel the misery of civil strife: and inspire a returning
veneration for that Union which, if we may dare to penetrate His designs, He
has chosen as the only means of attaining the high destinies to which we may
reasonably aspire.
In testimony
whereof, I have caused the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed,
having signed the same with my hand.
Done at the city of
Washington this 10th day of December, in the year of our Lord, one thousand
eight hundred and thirty-two, and of the Independence of the United States the
fifty-seventh.
EDW. LIVINGSTON, Secretary of State.
SOURCES: Jonathan
Phillips, Editor, Messages of the
Presidents of the United States, from the Formation of the General Government,
Down to the Close of the Administration of President Van Buren; Concluding with
the Inaugural Address of President William H. Harrison, p. 499-512; The Statutes at Large and Treaties, of the
United States of America, From December 3, 1855 to March 3, 1859, and
Proclamations since 1791, Volume 11 (1856-1857), 34th and 35th Congress. U.S.
Statutes at Large, Volume 11 (1856-1857), p. 771-81
