Camp Near Berlin, Maryland,
July 17, 1863.
My dear Miss Sedgwick:
As you no doubt already know, from newspapers if not from
letters, we have been for the past few weeks having a very active campaign, so
far as marching is concerned at least. It does now and then occur that
well-ordered marches as effectually beat an enemy as the most decisive battle
could do, and something must be set down to the saving of life. There is not
much doubt that some of our marching has been much to Mr. Lee's damage, but
still the battle of Gettysburg had to be fought. No amount of marching with the
forces we then had could have obviated the necessity for a fight like that one
somewhere. It was a terrible fight. The losses show that. The common talk among
the prisoners taken by us is that Lee lost at Gettysburg alone not less than
thirty thousand men. Our own loss is about twenty thousand men. I wish I could
give you an idea of the artillery fire. It was terrific. We at the 6th Corps
headquarters were in a good position to judge of it, for, singular as it may
seem, almost the only spot along the whole line not under fire was that
occupied by us. Although there was only a small portion of the corps engaged,
there is no doubt that the fight was saved by that portion. We had marched from
twilight all night and, with occasional necessary rests, the following day,
till about four o'clock in the afternoon of the day following Reynolds's fight,
i.e., the first day's fight. We were in reserve, which meant upon this occasion
that the whole corps was divided and subdivided until the General had not a man
or a gun under his command, except a few orderlies. One brigade was sent to
report to such a corps commander, another to such a one, another to this
position, and a couple more to that, till there were no more left — till the
General himself said he thought he might as well go home. I cannot tell you
anything of any consequence about the fight. Some of the newspaper accounts
were very good. I saw so little of it that I cannot describe it. Our progress
in pursuit of Lee was necessarily slow and cautious. Two such armies, having
fought each other so often, having known each other so long and intimately,
cannot very well afford to play at fast and loose. At Hagerstown Lee had a very
strong position, which Meade, with his certainly not superior force, could not
with safety attack. He could not be morally certain of success, and dared not
risk a failure which would entail such serious consequences as a defeat would
not have failed to bring about.
The attack was urged by Pleasanton, Howard, and Wadsworth.
Pleasanton commands the cavalry. General Newton, 1st Corps, who was detained
from the council by sickness, was known to be opposed to the attack. On the
other hand, there were also opposed to the attack Sedgwick, Slocum, Sykes,
French, and Hays, to whose reputations I can add nothing, who need to have
nothing said for them.
We are preparing to cross the river into Virginia. I know
nothing at all of the plan of campaign, but I presume that we are to follow Lee
as rapidly as possible.
Now, as I write, a staff-officer from headquarters comes to
bring information which looks to an immediate move — to-day, if possible. We
were to halt here for a day or two to resupply everything — clothing, shoes,
subsistence, ammunition, forage, etc.; but something, doubtless, makes an
earlier movement imperative. The officer does not know the direction in which
we are to go. I wish that one small portion of the 6th Corps might move in the
direction of, and have for its ultimate destination the region known as,
Cornwall Hollow; and I would like to have the selection of that small party.
I must make my letter short. I wish I could have made it
more interesting. I had calculated upon having almost the whole day for it;
but, unfortunately, war admits of no delays. The General writes to you by this
mail.
We are having a rainy day.
Very sincerely yours,
R. F. Halsted.
SOURCE: George William Curtis, Correspondence of
John Sedgwick, Major-General, Volume 2, p. 133-6
