H.Q. Cav’y Escort,
A. of P.
Before Petersburg,
August 5, 1864
* * * * * * * * * *
PHYSICALLY, since I last wrote, I'm glad to say I have
picked up amazingly. I have at last shaken off my jaundice and have recovered a
white man's looks, my appetite is amazing and I am building up. In fact I have
weathered my danger and do not look for any further trouble. Ward Frothingham
too has been sent home. His regiment was smashed all to pieces in the assault
the other day. The Colonel, Gould, had a thigh shattered, the Lieutenant
Colonel killed, and so on. As for Ward, it was the hardest kind of work helping
him, for he could n't help himself. Finally however he was sent down to City
Point and there gave Dalton my note, and Dalton had him shipped to New York
before he could make up his mind as to whether he wanted to go there or not. So
he's safe and at home.
Here since I last wrote, too, Burnside has exploded his mine
and we have again just failed to take Petersburg. The papers, I see, are full
of that mishap and every one is blaming every one, just as though it did any
good to cry and quarrel over spilled milk. I did not see the mine exploded,
though most of my officers did and they describe it as a most beautiful and
striking spectacle — an immense column of debris, mixed with smoke and flame,
shooting up in the form of a wheat sheaf some hundred and fifty feet, and then
instantly followed by the roar of artillery. At first, and until ten o'clock,
rumors came in very favorably — we had carried this and that and were
advancing. At about ten I rode out to see what was going on. The fight then was
pretty much over. I rode up to the parallels and dismounted and went towards
the front. The heat was intense and they were bringing in the wounded, mostly
blacks, in great numbers. Very little firing was going on, though occasionally
shot went zipping by. Very speedily I began to be suspicious of our success.
Our soldiers didn't look or act to my mind like men who had won a victory.
There was none of that elation and excitement among the wounded, none of that
communicative spirit among the uninjured which always marks a success. I was
very soon satisfied of this and so, after walking myself into a tremendous heat
and seeing nothing but a train of wounded men, I concluded that I didn't like
the sound of bullets and so came home.
My suspicions proved correct. As you know we had been
repulsed. How was it? In the papers you'll see all kinds of stories and all
descriptions of reasons, but here all seem to have settled down to certain
results on which all agree, and certain others on which all quarrel. It is
agreed that the thing was a perfect success, except that it did not succeed;
and the only reason it did not succeed was that our troops behaved shamefully.
They advanced to the crater made by the explosion and rushed into it for cover
and nothing could get them out of it. These points being agreed on then begins
the bickering. All who dislike black troops shoulder the blame onto them — not
that I can find with any show of cause. They seem to have behaved just as well
and as badly as the rest and to have suffered more severely. This Division,
too, never had really been under fire before, and it was a rough breaking in
for green troops of any color. The 9th Corps .and Burnside came in for a good
share of hard sayings, and, in fact, all round is heard moaning and wrath, and
a scape-goat is wanted.
Meanwhile, as I see it, one person alone has any right to
complain and that person is Grant. I should think his heart would break. He had
out-generaled Lee so, he so thoroughly deserved success, and then to fail
because his soldiers wouldn't fight? It was too bad. All the movements I
mentioned in my last turned out to be mere feints and as such completely
successful. Deceived by Grant's movement towards Malvern Hill, Lee had massed
all his troops in that vicinity, so that when the mine exploded, the rebels had
but three Divisions in front of the whole Army of the Potomac. Grant ordered a
rapid countermarch of his cavalry from Malvern Hill to the extreme left, to
outflank and attack the enemy at daylight, simultaneously with the assault in
front. The cavalry did not reach here until the assault had failed. The march
was difficult, but it was possible and it was not accomplished. Whose fault was
this? Then came the assault, which was no assault, and once more Lee,
completely outgeneraled, surprised and nearly lost, was saved by the bad
behavior of our troops as in June, and on the same ground and under the same
circumstances, he was almost miraculously saved by the stubborn bravery of his
own. I find but one satisfaction in the whole thing. Here now, as before in
June, whether he got it or no, Grant deserved success, and, where this is the
case, in spite of fortune, he must ultimately win it. Twice Lee has been saved
in spite of himself. Let him look to it, for men are not always lucky.
If you are curious to know where I myself place the blame, I
must freely say on Burnside, and add, that in my own opinion I don't know
anything about it. For the whole thing, Burnside's motions and activities
deserve great credit. While others were lying idle, he was actively stirring
round to see what he could do. The mine was his idea and his work, and he
carried it through; no one but himself had any faith in it. So far all was to
his credit. Then came the assault. Grant did his part of the work and deceived
Lee. Burnside organized his storming column and, apparently, he couldn't have
organized it worse. They say the leading brigade was chosen by lot. If so, what
greater blunder could have been committed? At any rate a white brigade was put
in to lead which could not have been depended on to follow. This being so, the
result was what might have been expected. In such a case everything depended on
the storming party; for, if they would lead, the column would follow.
Volunteers might have been called for, a picked regiment might have been
designated; but, no, Burnside sent in a motley crowd of white and black, heavy
artillery and dismounted cavalry, and they wouldn't come up to the scratch. So
endeth the second lesson before Petersburg.
As to the future, expect no light from me. I do not expect
that anything will be done here for six weeks to come. Grant must hold his own,
defend Washington and see what Sherman can accomplish, before he really
attempts anything heavy here. The news from Sherman is so good, and Hood seems
so completely to be playing our game that I think the rebel strength in
that region bids fair to be used up. Lee can hold us in check, but, unless we
blunder egregiously, he cannot replenish his ranks, and by autumn Grant can
resume operations with deadly effect from this base. This I fear is the best
view which can be taken of the present attitude of affairs. We have been so
unfortunate here and our military lights about Washington — Hunter, Wallace,
Halleck, Sigel and the rest — have made such a mess of our affairs in their
region, that I don't see but what the army here must, for the present, be
reduced to one purely of observation. . . .
As to my new regiment, I see myself gazetted but have as yet
received no commission or official announcement. Meanwhile I am maturing my
plans for the regiment and shall develop them in a somewhat stately paper
distinguished by unusual ability even for me and addressed to Governor Andrew,
the which I shall tackle as soon as I have disposed of you. For the rest, I
wait here and kill time. There is nothing more for me to do here. This squadron
is as contented, as well disciplined and in as good order as I know how to put
it, and accordingly I must move or stand still. . . .
SOURCE: Charles Francis Adams, A Cycle of Adams Letters, 1861-1865, Volume 2, p. 170-5
