Major Wilder Dwight: August 26, 1861

Washington, August 26th, 1861.

I am probably to leave for home, i. e. camp, to-morrow. Everything has gone quite well with me. I put up with my classmate, A. S. Hill, who is the correspondent of the Tribune. I slept as well as one can in a bed. To-day I have been in the saddle pursuing quartermasters, providing rations, arranging for a departure to-morrow if possible. I dined with William, and this evening we have been out together to see General Couch's camp. William is in fine spirits, full of energy and go. He is making his regiment as perfect as the material will allow, and is full of his work. I should be glad to feel in trim for a letter, but I am too tired for it now; besides, General Heintzelman, who had a brigade, and was wounded at Bull Run, is in the room where I write, and is talking of the fight with one or two newspaper men who are in Hill's room, which is the Tribune head-quarters. The General is an unpretending man, and his conversation is interesting, my letter not. He says that' a sufficient cause for the loss of the battle of Bull Run is, that a regiment appeared in front of Griffin's battery, within one hundred yards. The cannon were loaded with canister, just ready to fire. An officer of our army came up and begged Griffin not to fire, as the troops were our own. They carried no flag; the cannon were turned, and fired to another point, then the regiment opened fire, killed all the cannoneers, and took the battery. The discharge of that canister would have cut that regiment to pieces, and changed the result in that part of the field.' These words are just from his lips. It shows the importance of a uniform uniform, and it shows the folly of States' rights in every shape. But it is not very profitable to speculate upon the various explanations of defeat. I think we are drawing lessons from that battle. I think, too, that McClellan's spirit is a fine one. Certainly there is more vigor, military ardor, and glow here than with our column. Another influence and a stronger spirit is at work here, and I want to get within its range.

SOURCE: Elizabeth Amelia Dwight, Editor, Life and Letters of Wilder Dwight: Lieut.-Col. Second Mass. Inf. Vols., p. 85

Major-General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Mead, July 29, 1864

Headquarters Army Of The Potomac, July 29, 1864.

Your letters of the 24th and 27th arrived this evening. They are written in very bad spirits, and I am tempted to scold you for indulging in such. I want you to recover your original elasticity of spirits which characterized you in the early days of our married life, when you were always sure something was going to turn up. You must now try to look on the bright side and hope for the best. I think we have a great deal to be thankful for, and things might be much worse.

I had a visit yesterday from our old friend the Rev. Mr. Neill. He was very complimentary to me, and promised to call and see you on his return to Philadelphia. He was here as agent of the Christian Commission.

Yesterday I went to see General Grant at City Point. He said he wanted an officer to go to Washington to take command of the Department of West Virginia, Susquehanna, Baltimore and Washington. That not wishing to take any one from the field, he had suggested Franklin, but they had declined to have Franklin. He then suggested my name, to which he had received no reply, but a message from the President asking him to meet him at Fortress Monroe. I made no reply to Grant, except to say I was ready to obey any order that might be given me. So far as having an independent command, which the Army of the Potomac is not, I would like this change very well; but in other respects, to have to manage Couch, Hunter, Wallace and Augur, and to be managed by the President, Secretary and Halleck, will be a pretty trying position that no man in his senses could desire. I am quite indifferent how it turns out. I think the President will urge the appointment of Halleck; but Grant will not agree to this if he can help it.

Grant told me Sherman has assigned Howard to McPherson's command.1 This had disgusted Joe Hooker, who had asked to be and had been relieved. To-morrow we make an attack on Petersburg. I am not sanguine of success, but hope for the best.

_______________

¹ Army of the Cumberland

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 216-7

Major-General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Mead, July 15, 1864

Headquarters Army Of The Potomac, July 15, 1864.

I suppose you are in a great state of excitement on account of the rebel invasion. I wrote you in my last that I thought it was a serious affair, and subsequent developments prove it to be so. Day before yesterday I went down to City Point to see General Grant, having heard a rumor that I was to be sent to Washington. I found Grant quite serious, but calm. He seemed to think that with the Sixth Corps from this army, and the Nineteenth from Louisiana, there would be troops enough, with Hunter's, Couch's and Augur's commands, not only to defeat the rebels, but to bag them. He said he had not contemplated sending me to Washington, but if another corps had to go, he would send me with it. I do not think the position a desirable one, as the difficulty will be to get the various commands together and harmonize such conflicting elements. If, however, I am ordered, I will do the best I can. I think Grant should either have gone himself or sent me earlier. He has given the supreme command to Wright, who is an excellent officer. I expect that after the rebels find Washington too strong for them, and they have done all the plundering they can, they will quietly slip across the Potomac and rush down here to reinforce Lee, who will then try to throw himself on us before our troops can get back.

I spoke to Grant about the report that I was to be relieved, and he said he had never heard a word of it, and did not believe there was any foundation for it, as he would most certainly have been consulted. I have therefore dismissed the matter as some idle talk from some person with whom the wish was father to the thought.

Lee has not sent away any of his army, and is doubtless disappointed that his diversion has not produced a greater weakening of Grant's army. He confidently expected to transfer the seat of war to Maryland, and thought his menace of Washington would induce the Government to order Grant back there with his army.

I was very sorry to hear of Franklin's capture, for his health is not good, owing to a wound he received in Louisiana, and I fear, if they send him to Charleston, his health may give way under the confinement in that climate, or be permanently injured.

Whilst I was writing we have a telegram reporting the withdrawal of the enemy across the Potomac, Wright in pursuit. Just as I expected. It also states there is a rumor that Franklin has made his escape, which I earnestly hope may prove true.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 212-3

Major-General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Mead, July 12, 1864

Headquarters Army Of The Potomac, July 12,1864.

I received to-night your letter of the 10th, and am glad to see you are not excited about the rebel invasion. This is a bold stroke of Lee's to endeavor to procure the withdrawal of this army from its menacing attitude, and to prevent the sending of reinforcements to Grant. The manoeuvre thus far has been successful, as not only has the Sixth Corps been sent away, but the Nineteenth Corps (twenty thousand strong), which was to reinforce us, has been diverted to Washington. This loss of strength will practically prevent our doing anything in the way of offensive movements until the campaign in Maryland is settled and the rebels so crippled as to quiet all apprehensions of their return. I understand Ord has been sent to Baltimore to command, in place of Wallace, defeated, and that Howe has been sent to supersede Sigel. Augur is in Washington, and Hunter coming from Cumberland. The danger is that with so many commanders, independent of each other (I ought to have mentioned Couch also), and their forces so scattered, that the rebs will have it all their own way to commit depredations and collect supplies, and when our troops leave the places they are now guarding, and attempt the offensive, that before they can concentrate, the rebs will fall upon some portion and whip them in detail. I consider the situation as critical; not that I believe the enemy can effect anything permanent, but I fear they will so embarrass and check our operations as to paralyze our efforts and prolong the period when we can collect enough troops here to do the work before us.

Hancock told me to-day he had been confidentially informed it was intended to remove me from command, and that he was to be my successor. He would not give me his authority, but said it was reliable. He did not know the grounds on which this action was to be based. This seemed to me so preposterous that I could not help laughing, but Hancock assured me it was undoubtedly in agitation, and thought I ought to be warned. He said, from what he could gather, he thought that Grant opposed it, but that he would be overruled. Hancock thought I would not be relieved entirely, but would be ordered somewhere, perhaps to Pennsylvania. Now, as my conscience is clear that I have done my duty to the best of my ability since this campaign commenced, and as I feel I have been unjustly treated, and have not had the credit I was and am entitled to, I shall not worry myself about any such outrage as being relieved without cause. I mention all this confidentially to you, simply as a preparation for the coming event, should it take place.

There have been recently with the army several Senators and Representatives; among others, Chandler and Wilkinson of Minnesota. The latter individual was at General Crawford's. He was very severe on me, showing he still retained the animus that dictated his attack on me in the Senate last winter.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 211-2

Major-General George G. Meade to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, July 1, 1863 – 6 p.m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

July 1, 1863 – 6 p.m.

(Received 10.20 p.m., via Frederick City.)

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief:

The First and Eleventh Corps have been engaged all day in front of Gettysburg. The Twelfth, Third, and Fifth have been moving up, and all, I hope, by this time on the field. This leaves only the Sixth, which will move up to-night. General Reynolds was killed this morning early in the action. I immediately sent up General Hancock to assume command. A. P. Hill and Ewell are certainly concentrating; Longstreet's whereabouts I do not know. If he is not up to-morrow, I hope with the force I have concentrated to defeat Hill and Ewell. At any rate, I see no other course than to hazard a general battle. Circumstances during the night may alter this decision, of which I will try to advise you. I have telegraphed Couch that if he can threaten Ewell's rear from Harrisburg without endangering himself, to do so.

 GEO. G. MEADE,

 Major-General.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 40-1; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 1 (Serial No. 43), p. 71-2

Major-General George G. Meade to Major-General John F. Reynolds, July 1, 1863

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

July 1, 1863.

Major-General REYNOLDS,

Commanding, &c., Gettysburg:

GENERAL: The telegraphic intelligence received from General Couch, with the various movements reported from Buford, seem to indicate the concentration of the enemy either at Chambersburg or at a point situated somewhere on a line drawn between Chambersburg and York, through Mummasburg and to the north of Gettysburg.

The commanding general cannot decide whether it is his best policy to move to attack until he learns something more definite of the point at which the enemy is concentrating. This he hopes to do during the day. Meanwhile, he would like to have your views upon the subject, at least so far as concerns your position. If the enemy is concentrating to our right of Gettysburg, that point would not at first glance seem to be a proper strategic point of concentration for this army.

If the enemy is concentrating in front of Gettysburg or to the left of it, the general is not sufficiently well informed of the nature of the country to judge of its character for either an offensive or defensive position. The numbers of the enemy are estimated at about 92,000 infantry, with 270 pieces of artillery, and his cavalry from 6,000 to 8,000. Our numbers ought to equal it, and, with the arrival of General French's command, which should get up to-morrow, exceed it, if not too much weakened by straggling and fatigue.

The general having just assumed command, in obedience to orders, with the position of affairs leaving no time to learn the condition of the army as to morale and proportionate strength compared with its last return, would gladly receive from you any suggestions as to the points laid down in this note. He feels that you know more of the condition of the troops in your vicinity and the country than he does. General Humphreys, who is at Emmitsburg with the Third Corps, the general considers an excellent adviser as to the nature of the country for defensive or offensive operations. If near enough to call him to consultation with you, without interference with the responsibilities that devolve upon you both, please do so. You have all the information which the general has received, and the general would like to have your views.

The movement of your corps to Gettysburg was ordered before the positive knowledge of the enemy's withdrawal from Harrisburg and concentration was received.

Very respectfully, &c.,

 S. WILLIAMS,

 Assistant Adjutant-General.

(Copy to Major-General Howard.)

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 33-4; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 3 (Serial No. 45), p. 460-1

Orders of Major-General George G. Meade, June 30, 1863

ORDERS.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

June 30, 1863.

Headquarters at Taneytown.

Third Corps to Emmitsburg; Second Corps to Taneytown; Fifth Corps to Hanover; Twelfth Corps to Two Taverns; First Corps to Gettysburg; Eleventh Corps to Gettysburg (or supporting distance); Sixth Corps to Manchester.

Cavalry to the front and flanks, well out in all directions, giving timely notice of positions and movements of the enemy. All empty wagons, surplus baggage, useless animals, and impediments of every sort to Union Bridge, 3 miles from Middleburg; a proper officer from each corps with them. Supplies will be brought up there as soon as practicable.

The general relies upon every commander to put his column in the lightest possible order. The telegraph corps to work east from Hanover, repairing the line, and all commanders to work repairing the line in their vicinity between Gettysburg and Hanover. Staff officers to report daily from each corps and with orderlies to leave for orders. Prompt information to be sent into headquarters at all times. All ready to move to the attack at any moment.

The commanding general desires you to be informed that, from present information, Longstreet and Hill are at Chambersburg, partly toward Gettysburg; Ewell at Carlisle and York. Movements indicate a disposition to advance from Chambersburg to Gettysburg.

General Couch telegraphs, 29th, his opinion that the enemy's operations on the Susquehanna are more to prevent co-operation with this army than offensive. The general believes he has relieved Harrisburg and Philadelphia, and now desires to look to his own army, and assume position for offensive or defensive, as occasion requires, or rest to the troops.

It is not his desire to wear the troops out by excessive fatigue and marches, and thus unfit them for the work they will be called upon to perform. Vigilance, energy, and prompt response to the orders from headquarters are necessary, and the personal attention of corps commanders must be given to reduction of impedimenta.  The orders and movements from these headquarters must be carefully and confidentially preserved, that they do not fall into the enemy's hands.

By command of Major-General Meade:

 S. WILLIAMS,

. Assistant Adjutant-General.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 16-7; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 3 (Serial No. 45), p. 416

Major General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, June 29, 1863

Headquarters Army Of The Potomac, June 29, 1863.

It has pleased Almighty God to place me in the trying position that for some time past we have been talking about. Yesterday morning, at 3 A. M., I was aroused from my sleep by an officer from Washington entering my tent, and after waking me up, saying he had come to give me trouble. At first I thought that it was either to relieve or arrest me, and promptly replied to him, that my conscience was clear, void of offense towards any man; I was prepared for his bad news. He then handed me a communication to read; which I found was an order relieving Hooker from the command and assigning me to it. As, dearest, you know how reluctant we both have been to see me placed in this position, and as it appears to be God's will for some good purpose — at any rate, as a soldier, I had nothing to do but accept and exert my utmost abilities to command success. This, so help me God, I will do, and trusting to Him, who in his good pleasure has thought it proper to place me where I am, I shall pray for strength and power to get through with the task assigned me. I cannot write you all I would like. I am moving at once against Lee, whom I am in hopes Couch will at least check for a few days; if so, a battle will decide the fate of our country and our cause. Pray earnestly, pray for the success of my country, (for it is my success besides). Love to all. I will try and write often, but must depend on George.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 11-12

Major General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, May 20, 1863

CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., May 20, 1863.

The battle of Chancellorsville was a miserable failure, in which Hooker disappointed me greatly. His plan was admirably designed, and the early part of it, entrusted to others, was well executed; but after he had assembled his army on the other side near Chancellorsville, instead of striking at once vigorously and instantly, before the enemy, who were surprised, could concentrate, he delayed; gave them thirty-six hours to bring up and dispose of their troops; permitted them to attack him, and after their doing so, failed to take advantage of their error in dividing and separating their forces, but allowed them to engage only about half his army and to unite their forces after driving back a portion of ours. He then assumed the defensive, doing nothing for two days, while we could hear Sedgwick's guns, and knew they were trying to crush him and must succeed. Finally he withdrew to this side, giving up all the advantages gained, and having to recross with all the obstacles and difficulties increased. Notwithstanding these are my views, I have abstained from making them known to any one, out of consideration for Hooker, who has always pretended to be very friendly to me. I declined to join Couch in a representation to the President, when he was down here, and I refused to join Slocum, who desired to take action to have Hooker removed. I told both these gentlemen I would not join in any movement against Hooker, but that if the President chose to call on me officially for my opinions, I would give them. I have spoken to no one but Governor Curtin, and to him only because he came to see me and spoke so freely and bitterly against Hooker, that I allowed myself to say a part of what I have above written. I considered my conversation with Governor Curtin private, and did not expect he would repeat it or quote me. I have seen Senators Wade, Chandler, Wilson and Doolittle, all of whom have been down here to find out what they could, but I have abstained from saying anything, as they did not think proper to ask me any questions. Hooker is safe, I think, from the difficulty of finding a successor, and from the ridiculous appearance we present of changing our generals after each battle. He may, and I trust he will, do better next time; but unless he shows more aptitude than in the last affair, he will be very apt to be defeated again. Lee committed a terrible blunder in allowing us to come back; he might have destroyed us by a vigorous attack while we were retreating.

The review of my corps passed off very well yesterday, and Lord Abinger expressed himself greatly pleased. After the review I had a collation at my quarters, which seemed to be equally pleasing to his lordship. He said that if he had time to stop in Philadelphia, he would hunt you up.

Turnbull, who was at the review, showed me a few lines he had received from Proctor Smith, by a flag of truce that went after the wounded. Smith is Chief Engineer on Lee's staff. He begs to be remembered to you and me. Beckham is major of artillery and commands a battery with Stuart's cavalry. Smith is colonel.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1, p. 379-80

Major General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, May 10, 1863

CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, May 10, 1863.

There is a great deal of talking in the camp, and I see the press is beginning to attack Hooker. I think these last operations have shaken the confidence of the army in Hooker's judgment, particularly among the superior officers. I have been much gratified at the frequent expression of opinion that I ought to be placed in command. Three of my seniors (Couch, Slocum and Sedgwick) have sent me word that they were willing to serve under me. Couch, I hear, told the President he would not serve any longer under Hooker, and recommended my assignment to the command. I mention all this confidentially. I do not attach any importance to it, and do not believe there is the slightest probability of my being placed in command. I think I know myself, and am sincere when I say I do not desire the command; hence I can quietly attend to my duties, uninfluenced by what is going on around me, at the same time expressing, as I feel, great gratification that the army and my senior generals should think so well of my services and capacity as to be willing to serve under me. Having no political influence, being no intriguer, and indeed unambitious of the distinction, it is hardly probable I shall be called on to accept or decline. I see the papers attribute Hooker's withdrawal to the weak councils of his corps commanders. This is a base calumny. Four out of six of his corps commanders were positive and emphatic in their opposition to the withdrawal, and he did it contrary to their advice. Hooker, however, I should judge, feels very secure, and does not seem concerned. I have no idea what his next move will be. For my part it would seem that all projects based on pursuing this line of operations having been tried and failed, we should try some other route. Yet the Administration is so wedded to this line that it will be difficult to get authority to change.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1, p. 373-4

Major General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, May 8, 1863

CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., May 8, 1863.

When I last wrote I could get no definite information of George's¹ whereabouts, but to-day Captain Newhall² has returned to headquarters and reports the cavalry all back across the Rappahannock, except two regiments that continued on and have arrived at Yorktown, having succeeded in destroying several bridges on the railroads from hence and Gordonsville to Richmond. Unfortunately our withdrawal across the Rappahannock will prevent advantage being taken of the cavalry success, as they will now have time to repair damages before we can get at them again.

Just after closing my letter yesterday I was summoned to headquarters, where I found the President and General Halleck. The former said he had come down to enquire for himself as to the condition of affairs and desired to see corps commanders. He and Halleck spent a couple of hours, took lunch, and talked of all sorts of things, but nothing was said of our recent operations, or any reference made to the future, nor was any corps commander called on for an opinion. The President remarked that the result was in his judgment most unfortunate; that he did not blame any one — he believed every one had done all in his power; and that the disaster was one that could not be helped. Nevertheless he thought its effect, both at home and abroad, would be more serious and injurious than any previous act of the war. In this I agree with him; and when it comes to be known that it might and should have been avoided, I think the country will hold some one responsible. My conscience and record are fortunately clear. I opposed the withdrawal with all my influence, and I tried all I could, on Sunday morning, to be permitted to take my corps into action, and to have a general battle with the whole army engaged, but I was overruled and censured for sending in a brigade of Humphreys's, which I did in spite of orders to the contrary. General Hooker has disappointed all his friends by failing to show his fighting qualities at the pinch. He was more cautious and took to digging quicker even than McClellan, thus proving that a man may talk very big when he has no responsibility, but that it is quite a different thing, acting when you are responsible and talking when others are. Who would have believed a few days ago that Hooker would withdraw his army, in opposition to the opinion of a majority of his corps commanders? Yet such is absolutely and actually the case.

My corps did not have much of a chance. On Friday, Sykes's division had a very handsome little affair, in which his command behaved very well and gained decided advantages, driving the enemy before them; but Sykes was recalled just as his advance was successful. In the evening he repelled an attack of the enemy. On Sunday, Humphreys's two brigades were engaged, creditably and successfully, and on Monday a brigade of Griffin's was sent forward to engage and feel the enemy's position, which duty was successfully accomplished. The heavy fighting, however, of Saturday and Sunday was done by Slocum, Couch and Sickles, particularly the latter, whose losses are greater than any other corps, unless it be Sedgwick's, which suffered very severely in his attempt to attack the enemy from Fredericksburg.

I have been a good deal flattered by the expression of opinion on the part of many officers, that they thought and wished I should be placed in command, and poor Hooker himself, after he had determined to withdraw, said to me, in the most desponding manner, that he was ready to turn over to me the Army of the Potomac; that he had enough of it, and almost wished he had never been born. Since seeing the President, however, he seems in better spirits, and I suppose, unless some strong pressure is brought to bear from external sources, he will not be disturbed. Hooker has one great advantage over his predecessors in not having any intriguer among his subordinate generals, who are working like beavers to get him out and themselves in.

For some reason or other they have prohibited bringing newspapers to camp, so that I am completely in the dark as to public opinion.

__________

¹ Son of General Meade.

² Frederick C. Newhall, of Philadelphia, aide-de-camp to General Pleasanton.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1, p. 371-3

Major-General George B. McClellan to Abraham Lincoln, October 29, 1862 – 2 p.m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

October 29, 1862 – 2 p.m.

 His Excellency the PRESIDENT:

In reply to your dispatch of this morning,* I have the honor to state that the accounts I get of the enemy's position and movements are very conflicting. A dispatch I have just received from General Kelley, at Cumberland, says three ladies, just in at Cherry Run from Martinsburg, report that Generals Hill, Jackson, and Hampton are encamped near there, with a regiment of cavalry at Hedgesville. General Pleasonton reports from Purcellville yesterday that information from Union people places Hill's command at Upperville, and that troops have been passing there for some days; that their pickets extend as far as the Snickersville and Aldie turnpike, over which they allow no one to pass, north or south. Pleasonton reports this morning that a Union Quaker, who escaped from the rebels yesterday, says he saw Longstreet at Upperville day before yesterday; that he had 18,000 men with him. Pleasonton also states that it is reported to him that Stuart with two brigades was at Berryville; that Walker's brigade was at Upperville. A Union man told him that Longstreet was at Upperville, Bloomfield, and Middleburg. General Couch reports yesterday that a contraband who came into Harper's Ferry from beyond Charlestown says Hill's division came back from near Leetown on Sunday, and that the cavalry told him Jackson was coming with his whole force to attack Harper's Ferry. He is confident that there is infantry back of Charlestown, as he heard the drums beating last night. General Porter reports last night that, through several sources, he is under the impression that R. E. Lee is not far distant from him, and that Stuart is within an hour's march; that there are the same number of cavalry regiments opposite him as usual, and that the enemy moved from Bunker Hill toward Shannondale yesterday.  I ordered General Averell to make a reconnaissance to Martinsburg, but he has not yet reported his return. General Pleasonton has his scouts well out toward Middleburg, Upperville, and Aldie, and I will soon have more reliable information. In the meantime I am pushing forward troops and supplies as rapidly as possible. We will occupy Waterford and Wheatland to-day. There is now no further difficulty in getting supplies of clothing. Reynolds' corps and Whipple's division have been fully supplied, and are being sent forward. Couch's corps moves forward from Harper's Ferry to-day around the Loudoun Heights.

 GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

Major-General, Commanding.

[19.]

__________

* See 11.15 a.m., Vol. XIX, Part II, p. 504

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 51, Part 1 (Serial No. 107), p. 897-8

Abraham Lincoln to Major General George G. Meade, July 14, 1863 (Never Sent)

Executive Mansion,

Washington, July 14, 1863.

Major General Meade

I have just seen your despatch to Gen. Halleck, asking to be relieved of your command, because of a supposed censure of mine.  I am very – very – grateful to you for the magnificient success you gave the cause of the country at Gettysburg; and I am sorry now to be the author of the slightest pain to you. But I was in such deep distress myself that I could not restrain some expression of it. I had been oppressed nearly ever since the battles at Gettysburg, by what appeared to be evidences that your self, and Gen. Couch, and Gen. Smith, were not seeking a collision with the enemy, but were trying to get him across the river without another battle. What these evidences were, if you please, I hope to tell you at some time, when we shall both feel better. The case, summarily stated is this. You fought and beat the enemy at Gettysburg; and, of course, to say the least, his loss was as great as yours.  He retreated; and you did not; as it seemed to me, pressingly pursue him; but a flood in the river detained him, till, by slow degrees, you were again upon him. You had at least twenty thousand veteran troops directly with you, and as many more raw ones within supporting distance, all in addition to those who fought with you at Gettysburg; while it was not possible that he had received a single recruit; and yet you stood and let the flood run down, bridges be built, and the enemy move away at his leisure, without attacking him. And Couch and Smith! The latter left Carlisle in time, upon all ordinary calculation, to have aided you in the last battle at Gettysburg; but he did not arrive.  More At the end of more than ten days, I believe twelve, under constant urging, he reached Hagerstown from Carlisle, which is not an inch over fiftyfive miles, if so much. And Couch's movement was very little different,

Again, my dear general, I do not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee's escape.  He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with the our other late successes, have ended the war. As it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely. If you could not safely attack Lee last Monday, how can you possibly do so South of the river, when you can take with you very few more then two thirds of the force you then had in hand? It would be unreasonable to expect, and I do not expect you can now effect much. Your golden opportunity is gone, and I am distressed immeasurably because of it.

I beg you will not consider this a prossecution, or persecution of yourself. As you had learned that I was dissatisfied, I have thought it best to kindly tell you why.

[ Endorsed on Envelope by Lincoln:]

To Gen. Meade, never sent, or signed.

SOURCES: Roy P. Basler, editor, Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Volume 6, p. 327-9.  The original draft of this letter can be found among The Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress.