Headquarters, Confederate Provisional Forces, Charleston, South Carolina: General Order No. 9, April 6, 1861

Headquarters, Prov. Forces,

Charleston, S. C, U. S. A., April 6, 1861.

General Order

No. 9.

The following general instructions are issued for the government of commanders of batteries, and will be furnished by them to captains of batteries under their command.

I. Should Fort Sumter at any time fire upon the works on Morris, James, or Sullivan's islands, or on any vessel or steamer in the service of or friendly to the Confederate States, this act of aggression will be the signal for the commencement of hostilities; the mortar, enfilade and other batteries of the harbor bearing on Fort Sumter will immediately open their fire upon it, with a view, first, to dismount as many of the guns as possible, and then to effect a breach, if practicable. Great care should be taken not to fire rapidly, but accurately.

The order to fire slowly but surely should be strictly enforced. There must be no waste of powder, shot or shells, the object being to worry out the garrison, if practicable.

II. The mortar batteries will continue their firing day and night at the rate, collectively, in the daytime, of one shell every two minutes, and at night of one every ten minutes. There being sixteen mortars in position (four at Fort Johnson, two near the Moultrie House, two near Sullivan's Island point, two at Mount Pleasant, and six at Cummings Point), each mortar will be fired every thirty-two minutes in the first case, and once every two hours and forty minutes in the second.

III. The batteries opposite to each other will endeavor to fire in succession in relative proportion to their armaments, and so as to cause their shells to explode sometimes immediately over and within Fort Sumter, and at other times on its parade or interior ground. The firing, having been commenced by the Moultrie House mortar battery (Captain Butler), will be continued in the following order: first by the Fort Johnson (Captain James), in the proportion of two shells from the latter to one from the former; then by Cummings Point mortar batteries (Major Stevens and Captain King), followed by Sullivan's Island point mortar battery (Captain Hallonquist), and then last by the Mount Pleasant mortar battery (Captain Martin), in the proportion of three shells from the Cummings Point mortar battery to one from each of the two batteries.

IV. Commanders of batteries to make application for additional ammunition.

V. Lights carefully placed, and batteries to open on Sumter at the signal.

SOURCE:  Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 464-5.

Official Reports of the Operations in Charleston Harbor, S. C., December 20, 1860 – April 14, 1861: No. 26. – Joint reports of Maj. D. R. Jones, Assistant Adjutant-General, C. S. Army; and Col. Charles Allston, jr., Commander H. T. Hartstene, C. S. Navy, and Messrs. William Porcher Miles and Roger A. Pryor, aides-de-camp

No. 26.

Joint reports of Maj. D. R. Jones, Assistant Adjutant-General, C. S. Army; and Col. Charles Allston, jr., Commander H. T. Hartstene, C. S. Navy,  and Messrs. William Porcher Miles and Roger A. Pryor, aides-de-camp.

CHARLESTON, April 15, 1861.

SIR: We, the undersigned, beg leave to submit the following report of our visit to Fort Sumter, and of our interview with Major Anderson, on Saturday, the 13th instant, in obedience to your orders.

We arrived at the fort about a quarter to 3 o'clock p.m.; were met at the wharf by Captain Seymour, and were at once conducted to the presence of Major Anderson. We informed him that we came from you to say that, on learning the fort was in flames, and his flag down, you had sent Colonels Miles and Pryor and Captain Lee, members of your staff, to offer any assistance in your power, and that as soon as his flag of truce was hoisted you sent us to receive any propositions he might wish to make. Major Anderson said an exceedingly disagreeable and embarrassing mistake had occurred; that his flagstaff had been shot down, but that as soon as it could be done his flag was again hoisted.

Just at this time it was reported to him that General Wigfall was outside the fort demanding to see the commanding officer. Major Anderson said that he went out and met General Wigfall, who told him that he came from General Beauregard to demand the surrender of the fort, and urged Major Anderson to haul down his flag and run up a flag of truce; that General Beauregard would give him the same terms offered before the conflict began. Major Anderson then stated that he was much surprised to learn from Colonels Miles and Pryor and Captain Lee, who had arrived at the fort soon after he had lowered his flag, that although General Wigfall was on the staff of General Beauregard, he had been two days away from him, and was acting on the staff of some general on Morris Island; that as soon as he (Major Anderson) learned this, he told Captain Lee that he would immediately run up his flag and recommence his firing.

Major Anderson then read to us a note which he had sent to you by the hands of Captain Lee, in which he said that he would surrender the fort on the same terms offered by you in your letter to him on the 11th instant. On learning this we told him that we were authorized to offer him those terms, excepting only the clause relating to the salute to the flag, to which Major Anderson replied it would be exceedingly gratifying to him, as well as to his command, to be permitted to salute their flag, having so gallantly defended the fort under such trying circumstances, and hoped that General Beauregard would not refuse it, as such a privilege was not unusual. We told him we were not authorized to grant that privilege, and asked him what his answer would be if not permitted to salute his flag. He said he would not urge the point, but would prefer to refer the matter again to you, and requested us to see you again and get your reply.

Major Anderson requested us to say to Governor Pickens and yourself that, as an evidence of his desire to save the public property as much as possible, he had three times on Friday and twice on Saturday sent his men up to extinguish the fire under the heavy fire of our batteries, and when the magazines were in imminent danger of being blown up.

We then returned to the city and reported to you substantially as above.

We have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servants,

D. R. JONES,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

CHAS. ALLSTON, JR.,

Colonel and A. D.C.

Brig. Gen. G. T. BEAUREGARD,

Commanding Provisional Army.

_______________

CHARLESTON, S.C., April 14, 1861.

GENERAL: In accordance with your order we have the honor to take the following report:

On Saturday, April 13, at about 7 o'clock p.m., we proceeded to Fort Sumter by your order to arrange finally the conditions of the evacuation. We presented your communication to Major Anderson, who, after perusing it, read it aloud to his officers, all of whom, we believe, were present. The major expressed himself much gratified with the tenor of the communication and the generous terms agreed to by you. We inquired of Major Anderson when he desired to leave, He said as soon as possible, and suggested 9 o'clock the next morning. It was arranged that the Catawba or some other steamer should convey the major and his command either directly to New York or put them on board the United States fleet then lying outside the bar, according as one or the other plan might be agreed upon after a conference with the commander of the fleet. Major Anderson requested us to take Lieutenant Snyder down to the fleet for the purpose of arranging the matter. This Captain Hartstene undertook to do.

We have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servants,

D. R. JONES,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

WM. PORCHER MILES,

R. A. PRYOR,

H. J. HARTSTENE, C. S. N,

Aides-de-Camp.

Brigadier-General BEAUREGARD,

Comdg. Provisional Army, C. S. A.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 64-6; This report is quoted in Samuel Wylie Crawford’s The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 442.

Official Reports of the Operations in Charleston Harbor, S. C., December 20, 1860 – April 14, 1861: No. 21. – Reports of Capt. George B. Cuthbert, Palmetto Guard, South Carolina Infantry.

No. 21.

Reports of Capt. G. B. Cuthbert, Palmetto Guard, South Carolina Infantry.

PALMETTO GUARD ENCAMPMENT,

Morris Island, April 17, 1861.

DEAR SIR: In the report which I now make I propose to give an account of the most prominent incidents connected with the batteries manned by the Palmetto Guard, and which transpired during the engagement which took place on the 12th and 13th instant. I will also take occasion to mention the names of those who particularly distinguished themselves by their courage and efficiency. In conclusion I shall render you a statement of the number of shells and solid shot fired from the above-mentioned batteries.

The mortar battery at Cummings Point opened fire on Fort Sumter in its turn, after the signal shell from Fort Johnson, having been preceded by the mortar batteries on Sullivan's Island and the mortar battery of the Marion Artillery.

At the dawn of day the Iron battery commenced its work of demolition. The first shell from columbiad No. 1, fired by the venerable Edmund Ruffin, of Virginia, burst directly upon the parapet of the southwest angle of the fort. After the first round the Iron battery continued firing at regular intervals of fifteen minutes, in accordance with the orders of General Beauregard. The mortar battery continued during the day in the order prescribed.

At 7 o'clock a.m. Major Anderson fired his first shot. This was directed at the Iron battery. The ball passed a few feet above the upper bolts of the shed. The enemy continued firing at too great an elevation until the sixth shot, which fell harmlessly upon the upper portion of the shed, between the embrasures No. 2 and No. 3. At 9 o'clock a.m. columbiad No 1 became disabled by the recoil of the piece, which broke the bolts connecting the chains with the epaulement. This damage was repaired, however, after the expiration of an hour. At 10 o'clock a.m. columbiad No. 2, being aimed at the 10-inch columbiad bearing upon the Iron battery from the parapet of the southwest angle, was fired with such precision as to dismount the grim monster. A few minutes afterwards the window of columbiad No. 2 was struck near the center by a 42-pounder shot, which shattered the bolts and scattered the fragments between the cannoneers. The proper working of this window, however, was not interfered with by this occurrence, but in a half hour after this columbiad recoiled with such violence as to break the lever-bar by which the window was lifted. This casualty prevented the use of this gun until the following morning, several engineers being engaged for the purpose of repairing it. After the second shot from the same piece on the following morning the bar became fractured again in the same place, and, until the surrender, columbiad No. 2 was fought with its shutter opened permanently. The fire of the Iron battery was directed during the first day at the guns in barbette and those in the casemates. Major Anderson directed his fire for four consecutive hours from 7 to 11 o'clock a.m., at the Iron battery, striking it seven times. He then pointed his guns at the mortar battery of Cummings Point, and making no impression upon the unbroken wall of sand he turned his attention to the 42-pounders, thrusting at successive intervals their muzzles along the sides of their palmetto embrasures. At 4 o'clock p.m. the gunners at Fort Sumter ceased firing towards Morris Island, the batteries pointing in that direction being completely silenced. The rifled cannon did great execution, two of its balls passing entirely through the walls of Fort Sumter.

On the morning of the 13th we attempted to breach with our columbiads by concentrating our fire upon a point to the right of the sally-port, intending thus to effect another object at the same time, viz., by the ricochet of the ball to beat away the traverse of granite, which had been built up for the purpose of protecting the doorway from an enfilading fire. We had fired but a few shots when a shell from the mortar battery at Cummings Point fell upon the northwestern portion of the roof of the fort. After the lapse of some minutes we perceived the smoke issuing from that quarter. Soon flames burst upward. From that moment until the flagstaff was shot down seven-second shells were fired rapidly from the Iron battery, aimed in such a manner as to scatter the flame and to increase the fury of the conflagration. I refer you, dear sir, to the marks of shot and shell upon the outer and interior walls of the fort to enable you to form an adequate idea of the accuracy with which the columbiads, the mortars, the rifled cannon, and the 42-pounders of the Cummings Point batteries were aimed and fired.

The posts of the officers of the Palmetto Guard were as' follows: Captain Cuthbert commanded and directed the fire of the Iron battery; First Lieutenant Holmes, assisted by Lieutenant Armstrong, of the Citadel Academy, commanded the mortar battery; Second Lieutenant Brownfield commanded and directed the fire of the 42-pounders; Captain Thomas, of the Citadel Academy, with a squad of the Palmetto Guard, had charge of the rifled cannon; to Major Stevens was assigned the post of superintending the working of all these batteries, and he was so recognized; Lieutenant Buist acted as gunner to No. 3 columbiad during the greater part of the engagement, aiming many of his shots very accurately.

Lieutenants Holmes, Brownfield, and Buist behaved throughout the conflict with distinguished courage and gallantry. Major Stevens, Captain Thomas, and Lieutenant Armstrong, by their coolness, bravery, and skill, gave the highest evidence of their long military training. Lieutenant Brownfield's 42-pounders were fired with great precision, and to his industry and pride in his battery is attributable the fine working condition of his guns. To Mr. Phillips and Mr. Campbell much praise is due for their untiring devotion to their particular department of the magazine stores. In the Iron battery, Orderly Sergeant Bissell aimed many a capital shot at the casemates, and the two Sergeants Webb at the parapet. Bissell crippled the gun of the left casemate, bearing directly upon the Iron battery, and Serg. L. S. Webb dismounted the 10-inch columbiad upon the parapet. Second Sergeant Bissell and Mr. Farelly also made some good shots. At the 42-pounders Sergeant Brownfield, Corporals Rhett, Wright, and Dwyer distinguished themselves as gunners. At the mortar battery Sergeant Gaillard, Corporals Robinson, Zalam, Brailijon, and Rhett did good service as gunners. Capt. Stephen Elliott, of the Beaufort Artillery, was present during the action on the 12th instant, and aimed several good shots.

On the same day when columbiad No. 2 was silenced in consequence of the serious accident referred to above, to repair the damage it became necessary to send forthwith to Charleston to procure the proper materials and implements. Privates Trouche, Craskeys, and Alrains volunteered to go in an open boat, under heavy fire from Fort Sumter and Fort Johnson. They went, and succeeded in accomplishing their errand. A sand bag on the first day of the engagement seriously interfered with the working of the window of columbiad No. 1. Private Allison volunteered to extricate the troublesome impediment. While engaged in the performance of this important service a ball from one of the casemates of Fort Sumter passed directly over him, striking the iron shed. He removed the bag and returned to his post.

The sang-froid of Mr. Lining, the judge-advocate of the Seventeenth Regiment, who served as a private during the engagement, has already received ample commendation in the public prints. I can vouch for the truth of the incident, having been an eye witness. (Please incorporate the report of the Courier in relation to the circumstance.)

The appointment of the Palmetto Guard to the occupation of Fort Sumter for one night was the highest compliment ever bestowed upon any volunteer corps in the history of our State, and that event will always be held by them in grateful remembrance. Upon reaching the stronghold, however, their labors were not yet finished. I wish to take no laurels from the brows of the members of the fire-engine companies of Charleston, but truth requires that I should state that, from the moment of their being disbanded within the walls of the fort, the Palmetto Guard worked incessantly at the engines until after midnight.

A proper respect for the memory of the dead, as well as the desire to put on record a noble act, induces me recount the following fact: Immediately before the departure of the Palmetto Guard for Fort Sumter, Sergeant Webb, Corporal Robinson, and Private Mackay placed a neat and appropriate head-piece over the grave of the unfortunate Howe, the first victim of the sad explosion which took place while Major Anderson was engaged in saluting his flag. The performance of this sacred duty did credit to their generous hearts, and proved that Carolina chivalry exists only in combination with a spirit of reverence and magnanimity. I am proud of the opportunity of stating that all of the members of the company conducted themselves nobly and bravely in the fight. Nor will those whose names have not been mentioned in this report object to the particular honorable notice of their gallant comrades.

Statement of ammunition expended upon Fort Sumter from the Iron battery: Shell, 60; solid shot, 183.

Ammunition expended from the other batteries of Cummings Point: Mortars, 197 shell; 42-pounders, 333 solid-shot, 3 grape-shot; rifled cannon, 11 shot, 19 shell.

With increased admiration for your own individual courage and efficiency on these two eventful days, I remain, dear sir, your obedient servant,

G. B. CUTHBERT,

Captain Palmetto Guard.

W. G. DE SAUSSURE,

Colonel, Commanding Battalion of Artillery.

_______________

PALMETTO GUARD ENCAMPMENT,

Morris Island, April 20, 1861.

DEAR SIR: I write to make an addition to the report which you received yesterday. Please incorporate the following:

Private Gourdin Young volunteered to accompany Colonel Wigfall in a small boat when the latter gentleman was instructed to proceed to Fort Sumter on the fall of the United States flag, for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of that circumstance and to propose a surrender of the fortification. During the passage from Morris Island, amid an incessant fire of shell and grape, he displayed that coolness and determination characteristic of a true South Carolinian. Upon his return he was borne upon the shoulders of his fellow-comrades to the Iron battery.

With great respect, I remain yours, very truly,

G. B. CUTHBERT.

Col. W. G. DE SAUSSURE.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 54-7; This report is quoted in Samuel Wylie Crawford’s The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 430.

Diary of John Hay: Saturday, January 23, 1864

Saturday night I went on board the Ben Deford with the General to visit Folly and Morris Islands. Col. J——, Major B——, Capt. R—— and F—— were in the party. In the morning we were at Pawnee Landing, Folly River. We mounted and rode to Gen’l Terry’s headquarters; saw model of Fort Wagner. Terry joined Gilmore and we went up the beach to Light House Inlet; saw the scene of the crossing by Shaw; crossed and went in ambulances to Wagner; spent some time there. From Wagner walked up to Gregg, leaving our ambulance. Saw the mortar batteries before getting there. From Gregg had a good view of Fort Sumter — silent as the grave—flag flying over it — a great flag flying over the battery on Sullivan's Island. The city, too, was spread out before us like a map; everything very silent; a ship lying silent at the wharf. No sign of life in Ripley, Johnson or Pinckney.

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 157-8; William Roscoe Thayer, John Hay: In Two Volumes, Volume 1, p. 158-9.

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, April 10, 1863

The President has not yet returned. The Cabinet did not convene to-day. Affairs look uncomfortable in North Carolina. The army there needs reinforcing, and had we Charleston we would send more vessels into those waters.

Neither the War Department nor army men entertain an idea that the Rebels have withdrawn any of their forces from the Rappahannock to go into North Carolina, but I have apprehensions that such may be the case. From what quarter but that can they have collected the large force that is now pressing Foster?

We have more definite yet not wholly reliable rumors from Charleston. A contest took place on the afternoon of the 7th, Tuesday, of three hours, from two till five. Two of our vessels are reported injured, — the Keokuk, said to be sunk on Morris Island, and the Ironsides, disabled. Neither is a turret vessel. On the whole, this account, if not what we wish, is not very discouraging. The movement I judged to have been merely a reconnoissance, to feel and pioneer the way for the grand attack. Fox persists that the ironclads are invulnerable. I shall not be surprised if some are damaged, perhaps disabled. In fact, I have supposed that some of them would probably be sunk, and shall be satisfied if we lose several and get Charleston. I hope we shall not lose them and fail to get the city.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 265-6

John Hay to John G. Nicolay, April 23, 1863

Hilton Head, S. C,

April 23, 1863.

MY DEAR NICO:

In yours of the 15th received last night, you say “there was verbal indication of much wrath at the report that Dupont intended to withdraw his fleet and abandon his position.” I was surprised at this. If you have received my different letters you will see why. He would have obeyed orders had he done so. You say we have gained points d'appui for future work. The navy say not. They say they cannot lie off Morris Island to cover the landing of our troops, (or rather the crossing from Folly Island, the only practicable route), without imminent danger of being driven ashore and wrecked by the first northeasterly breeze that comes. It is not for me to say what is, or what is not, possible. My old ideas have been horribly shattered when I have seen two men, each of whom I had formerly considered an oracle on every subject connected with ships, accusing each other of ignorance and charlatanism.

I do not think Dupont is either a fool or a coward. I think there is a great deal of truth in his statement that, while the fight in Charleston harbor demonstrated the great defensive properties of the Monitors, it also proved that they could not be relied upon for aggressive operations.

With an adequate force I think Hunter could dislodge the enemy from Morris Island, and from that point make a hole in Fort Sumter; but even then little has been done. The General is sanguine. He wants a fight. I hope he may have one before I return.

To-day I start for Florida. . . . .

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 83-4; Michael Burlingame, Editor, At Lincoln’s Side: John Hay’s Civil War Correspondence and Selected Writings, p. 37-8 where the entire letter appears.

John Hay to John G. Nicolay, April 16, 1863

Hilton Head, S. C,

April 16, 1863.

MY DEAR NICOLAY:

The General and the Admiral this morning received the orders from Washington directing the continuance of operations against Charleston. The contrast was very great in the manner in which they received them. The General was absolutely delighted. He said he felt more encouraged, and was in better heart and hope than before, at this indication of the earnestness of the government to finish this business here. He said, however, that the Admiral seemed in very low spirits about it. He talked despondingly about it, adhering to the same impressions of the desperate character of the enterprise as I reported to the President after my first interview with him. Perhaps having so strongly expressed his belief that the enterprise was impracticable he feels that he is rebuked by an opposite opinion from Washington.

General Hunter is in the best feather about the matter. He believed before we came back that with the help of the gunboats we could take Morris Island and from that point reduce Fort Sumter; and he is well pleased to have another chance at it. Whether the intention of the government be to reduce Charleston now, with adequate men and means, or by powerful demonstrations to retain a large force of the enemy here, he is equally anxious to go to work again.

I write this entirely confidentially for you and for the President to know the ideas prevalent here.

Gen. Seymour has been with you before this, and has given to the government the fullest information relative to military matters here. His arrival, I suppose, will only confirm the resolution already taken. Admiral Dupont's despatches by the Flambeau of course put a darker shade on the matter than anything Seymour will say, as he was strongly in favor of staying there and fighting it out. . . .

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 81-3; Michael Burlingame, Editor, At Lincoln’s Side: John Hay’s Civil War Correspondence and Selected Writings, p. 36-7 where the entire letter appears.

John Hay to John G. Nicolay, April 10, 1863

[Stono] River, S. C, April 10.

I have written some particulars of my interview with Admiral DuPont which I thought the President should know. Please give it to him, reading it yourself if you care to. I went up into the harbor yesterday. The gray-coated rascals were on both sides, waiting for another attack. A crowd of them were crawling cautiously over the bluff to look at the wreck of the Keokuk which has sunk near the shore. They are very busy throwing up new batteries on Morris Island, and did not fire on us though we were in easy range. While I was gone they published the order making me Voln. A. D. C.

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 74-5; Michael Burlingame, Editor, At Lincoln’s Side: John Hay’s Civil War Correspondence and Selected Writings, p. 34 where the entire letter appears.

1st Lieutenant George W. Snyder to Major Robert Anderson, April 4, 1861

FORT SUMTER S.C., April 4, 1861.

Maj. ROBERT ANDERSON,

First Artillery, U. S. Army Commanding Fort Sumter :

MAJOR: In compliance with your directions, I went, under a flag of truce, to the city of Charleston, in company with Captain Talbot, and had an interview with Governor Pickens and General Beauregard. In the interview with the governor, Captain Talbot only being present, I stated all the circumstances connected with the visits of Captain Seymour and myself to Cummings Point and the schooner Rhoda H. Shannon, which had been fired into by the batteries on Morris Island, on the 3d instant. I called his attention to the fact that he had not complied with his own proposition, to warn all vessels bearing the United States flag not to enter the Harbor. The governor replied that he and General Beauregard, with their staff officers, were standing on the piazza of the Moultrie House on Sullivan's Island, and saw the whole affair, and that my statement corroborated entirely his own personal observation, although it differed slightly from the report of Colonel De Saussure, the commanding officer on Morris Island. The governor said that the commander of the vessel whose duty it was to warn vessels not to enter the harbor had left his post, and had reported that the weather was too boisterous and the sea too rough for him to go out to the schooner Shannon; that this commander had already been sent for, and would be dismissed; that the commander of the cutter would be reprimanded for not going out and examining whether the Shannon were disabled; and that peremptory orders had been sent to Morris Island to stop this random firing.

The governor also said that if Major Anderson deemed it his duty to send out, under unfavorable circumstances, and examine the condition of the schooner Shannon, it was doubly theirs, imposed by humanity, and also by the commercial interest of their harbor.

General Beauregard was invited in, and I repeated what I had said to Governor Pickens to him. The general replied in the same terms as the governor, adding that the practice firing on Morris Island would take place at particular hours.

There was an objection made to Captain Talbot leaving Fort Sumter for Washington, but this was finally overruled and the captain allowed to depart. The governor said that orders had been received from Montgomery not to allow any man in the ranks, or any laborers, to leave Fort Sumter, and not to allow Major Anderson to obtain supplies in Charleston; that Mr. Crawford, a commissioner from the Confederate States, now in Washington, had sent a dispatch to him stating that he was authorized to say that no attempt would be made to re-enforce Fort Sumter with men or provisions, but that Mr. Lincoln would not order Major Anderson to withdraw from Fort Sumter, and would leave him to act for himself; also, advising the governor not to allow any supplies to be sent from the city to Fort Sumter.

I called the attention of both General Beauregard and Governor Pickens to the schooner lying near the left flank of Fort. Sumter. They said they knew nothing of her, but would send and ascertain, and direct her to move further from the fort. Governor Pickens remarked that as they were now acting under the authority of the Confederate States he had consulted with General Beauregard, who was now in command of the troops stationed here.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. W. SNYDER,

First Lieut. of Engineers, U. S.. Army.

Monday, April 8.

Sent by James E. Harvey by telegraph, last Saturday morning.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 241-2

Captain John G. Foster to Brevet Brigadier-General Joseph G. Totten, April 8, 1861

Fort Sumter, S. C. April 8, 1861.

General Joseph G. Totten,

Chief Engineer U. S. Army, Washington, D. C:

General: The increased activity and vigilance of the investing force, as reported yesterday, still continues. Three large traverses are nearly completed on the front, from battery Nos. 3 to 5, on Morris Island, and traverses are also being erected in the interior of battery No. 5. Additions of sand-bags are being made to the covering of the magazine, between Nos. 2 and 3, and to the left flank of No. 1, where I think they are constructing a service magazine.

I am busily at work constructing splinter-proof shelters on the terreplein. I obtain timber by taking the gun-carriages to pieces, and form the covering of the 2-inch iron pieces for embrasures, as seen below. The plates are spiked on, so as to be securely retained in their places, even if struck by a shell, which I am confident it will turn.

Our supplies are entirely cut off from the city, and those on hand are very limited.

The besieging forces worked all day yesterday, whenever the intervals between the showers of rain would allow.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. G. Foster, Captain Engineers.

P. S. — I received yesterday a letter from the Secretary of War to Major Anderson, which, by mistake, had been enveloped to me. I handed it to Major Anderson without reading.

Respectfully, &c.,

J. G. Foster, Captain Engineers.

SOURCES: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 385-6

Major Robert Anderson to Colonel Lorenzo Thomas, April 8, 1861

No. 96.]

fort Sumter, S. C, April 8, 1861.

Col. L. Thomas, Adjutant-General U. S. Army:

Colonel: I have the honor to report that the resumption of work yesterday (Sunday) at various points on Morris Island, and the vigorous prosecution of it this morning, apparently strengthening nearly all the batteries which are under the fire of our guns, shows that they either have received some news from Washington which has put them on the qui vive, or that they have received orders from Montgomery to commence operations here. I am preparing by the side of my barbette guns protection for our men from the shells, which will be almost continuously bursting over or in our work.

I had the honor to receive by yesterday's mail the letter of the honorable Secretary of War, dated April 4, and confess that what he there states surprises me very greatly, following as it does and contradicting so positively the assurance Mr. Crawford telegraphed he was authorized to make. I trust that this matter will be at once put in a correct light, as a movement made now, when the South has been erroneously informed that none such will be attempted, would produce most disastrous results throughout our country.

It is, of course, now too late for me to give any advice in reference to the proposed scheme of Captain Fox. I fear that its result cannot fail to be disastrous to all concerned. Even with his boat at our walls the loss of life (as I think I mentioned to Mr. Fox) in unloading her will more than pay for the good to be accomplished by the expedition, which keeps us, if I can maintain possession of this work, out of position, surrounded by strong works, which must be carried to make this fort of the least value to the United States Government.

We have not oil enough to keep a light in the lantern for one night. The boats will have, therefore, to rely at night entirely upon other marks. I ought to have been informed that this expedition was to come. Colonel Lamon's remark convinced me that the idea, merely hinted at to me by Captain Fox, would not be carried out. We shall strive to do our duty, though I frankly say that my heart is not in the war which I see is to be thus commenced. That God will still avert it, and cause us to resort to pacific measures to maintain our rights, is my ardent prayer.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Robert Anderson,

Major, First Artillery, Commanding.

SOURCES: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 384-5

Captain Truman Seymour & Lieutenant George W. Snyder to Major Robert Anderson, April 3, 1861

fort Sumter, April 3, 1861.

Maj. Robert Anderson, First Artillery, U. S. Army,

Commanding Fort Sumter, Charleston Harbor:

Major: In obedience to your directions, we visited Cummings Point, and the schooner bearing the United States flag, which was fired into by the batteries on Morris Island, and respectfully present the following statement concerning the affair:

The commanding officer on Morris Island, Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. De Saussure, stated that a schooner with the United States flag at her peak endeavored to enter the harbor this afternoon about 3 o'clock; that in accordance with his orders to prevent any vessel under that flag from entering the harbor, he had fired three shots across her bows, and this not causing her to heave to, he had fired at her, and had driven her out of the harbor; that he thought one or two shots had taken effect, and that if he had a boat that could live to get out to her he would send and see if she were disabled, and inform Major Anderson at once, but that he had no proper boat, as the schooner was at anchor in a very rough place; that the revenue cutter had gone out to examine her condition. We ascertained the schooner to be the Rhoda B. Shannon. Joseph Marts, master, of Dorchester, N. J., bound from Boston to Savannah with a cargo of ice, having left the former place on March 26. On account of unfavorable weather, the master had obtained but one observation, and that was an imperfect one on yesterday. On his arrival off Charleston Bar, supposing himself to be off Tybee, and seeing a pilot-boat, he directed one of his men to hold the United States flag in the fore rigging as a signal for a pilot. As none came, the flag was taken down in a few minutes, and the master undertook to bring his vessel into the harbor without a pilot. He did not discover that he was not in Savannah Harbor until he had crossed the bar and had advanced some distance in the harbor. As he was passing Morris Island, displaying no flag, a shot was fired from a battery on shore across the bows of the schooner. The master states that he thought they wished him to show his colors, and that he displayed the United States flag at his peak. One or two shots were then fired across the schooner's bows, but he did not know what to do or what the people on shore wished him to do; that he kept the vessel on her course until they fired at her, and one shot had gone through the mainsail, about two feet above the boom, when he put her about and stood out to sea, anchoring his vessel in the Swash Channel, just inside of the bar; that the batteries kept on firing at his vessel for some time after he had turned to go out to sea.

The master of the schooner stated that before leaving Boston, he had learned how affairs stood in Charleston Harbor, and that Fort Sumter was to be given up in a few days; that they had established a new confederacy down South.

After satisfying ourselves that the vessel was uninjured, and as she was lying in a very rough place, we advised the master to move his vessel — either to stand out to sea and go on to Savannah, or to come into the harbor and anchor.

On our return we stopped at Cummings Point, and stated the facts to Lieutenant-Colonel De Saussure. He said that the vessel would not be molested if she came into the harbor.

The schooner weighed anchor a short time after we left, and stood in towards Morris Island for some distance, but finally turned about and went to sea.

Respectfully submitted.

T. Seymour, Captain, First Artillery.

G. W. Snyder, Lieutenant of Engineers.

SOURCES: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 379-80

Major Robert Anderson to Colonel Lorenzo Thomas, April 4, 1861

fort Sumter, S. C., April 4, 1861.

(Received A. G. O., April 6.)

Col. L. Thomas, Adjutant-General U. S. Army:

Colonel: I have the honor to send herewith a report of the circumstances attending a firing yesterday afternoon by the batteries on Morris Island at a schooner bearing our flag, bound from Boston to Savannah, which, erroneously mistaking the lighthouse off this harbor for that of Tybee, and having failed to get a pilot, was entering the harbor.

The remarks made to me by Colonel Lamon, taken in connection with the tenor of newspaper articles, have induced me, as stated in previous communications, to believe that orders would soon be issued for my abandoning this work. When the firing commenced some of my heaviest guns were concealed from their view by planking, and by the time the battery was ready the firing had ceased. I then, acting in strict accordance with the spirit and wording of the orders of the War Department, as communicated to me in the letter from the Secretary of War dated February 23, 1861, determined not to commence firing until I had sent to the vessel and investigated the circumstances.

The accompanying report presents them. Invested by a force so superior that a collision would, in all probability, terminate in the destruction of our force before relief could reach us, with only a few days’ provisions on hand, and with a scanty supply of ammunition, as will be seen by a reference to my letter of February 27, in hourly expectation of receiving definite instructions from the War Department, and with orders so explicit and peremptory as those I am acting under, I deeply regret that I did not feel myself at liberty to resent the insult thus offered to the flag of my beloved country.

I think that proper notification should be given to our merchant vessels of the rigid instructions under which the commanders of these batteries are acting; that they should be notified that they must, as soon as a shot is fired ahead of them, at once round to and communicate with the batteries.

The authorities here are certainly blamable for not having constantly vessels off to communicate instructions to those seeking entrance into this harbor.

Captain Talbot is relieved, of course, by order No. 7, from duty at this post. I avail myself of this opportunity of stating that he has been zealous, intelligent, and active in the discharge of all his duties here, so far as his health permitted him to attempt their performance. I send him on with these despatches, to give the Department an opportunity, if deemed proper, to modify, in consequence of this unfortunate affair, any order they may have sent to me. I will delay obedience thereto until I have time to receive a telegram after Captain Talbot's having reported to the War Department.

I am Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Robert Anderson,

Major, First Artillery, Commanding.

_______________

[Inclosure.]

SOURCES: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 378-9

2nd Lieutenant Norman J. Hall's Notes: Probably Presented to Lincoln and his Cabinet March 15, 1861

I have the honor to state that I could not concur with Captain Rodgers, with whom I was directed to confer, in his plan for the entrance of the harbor of Charleston with men and provisions for Fort Sumter. He proposes to procure a vessel (steamboat), with a draught of not over six and one-half feet, in some Northern port, and with the cargo to be cleared for Charleston, letting it be known, as if in confidence, that the design is to force a landing on the southern extreme of Morris Island; to carry the batteries by the rear and destroy the channel; to bring in the vessel, the vessel to regulate her speed so as to arrive off the bar in a dark night and at high tide, and to proceed through the Swash Channel with her lights extinguished; in case of discovery and being fired at, to drop a cork with a light in it, which would deceive the gunners. If the batteries are lighted up the men cannot see in the distance; if they are not, the lights will not be visible. The commander is to be allowed to back his vessel in case of a storm on the way down.

My objections to this plan are very numerous. In the first place, the deception would be apparent, as no one would attempt a forced landing with means possible to such a vessel. Secondly, not being a sea-going vessel the danger to life and the success of the undertaking is so great as to appear imprudent at best. Thirdly, it is unsafe to calculate upon not being seen off the bar, as a number of watch vessels, some with troops and cannon, are stationed off and along the entrance. Fourthly, even though the above dangers should all be safely passed and it should prove a moonless night and high tide at a proper time, still a chance shot through the machinery would defeat the enterprise.

The plan is grounded upon the most fortunate and improbable circumstances. It might succeed; but I think failure would be the rule. By an examination of the chart of the harbor of Charleston it will be seen that the Swash Channel passes outside the range of all the batteries erected along the entrance, except, perhaps, the small one near Cummings Point (of one 32-pounder and one 12-pounder), and this can be safely neglected. Fort Moultrie can bring several guns to bear for a mile and a half (not ten minutes), but their field has been greatly reduced by the traverse with small embrasures lately thrown up on the parapet. Considering as effective all the means in the hands of those hostile to the undertakings, the following are at present to be noticed: The channel will not admit of more than six and one-half feet draught with ease in sailing; at least one steamer with troops and field guns will be near the bar; a line of pilot schooners and signal vessels form a cordon outside the bar; the main ship channel is obstructed with sunken ships; Maffitt's Channel is raked and crossed by the fires of Moultrie and batteries placed along Sullivan's Island; the buoys and range lights are removed; the anchorage, except a small area, is under the fire of guns from the several fortified points; the Swash Channel is readily followed by ranging Fort Sumter on St. Michael's till within five hundred yards of the fort, where a detour to the right will be necessary. Carefully navigated, passing very near the north side of the fort, the vessel may be brought to the wharf at high tide. If not successful, small boats may be furnished by the fort. The only effective guns are those of Fort Moultrie on this entrance. I have the honor to propose that a war vessel (the Brooklyn best) be dispatched with two schooners and two ordinary steam-tugs, each of not more than six feet and a half draught, and under the same pretension as that first proposed, and this combination will give color to the rumor. One of the schooners is to be loaded with  provisions entirely, and the hay is to be stored on the starboard. The other, with some provisions, is to carry the troops. The vessels arrived off the bar, the Brooklyn can keep all hostile vessels at a distance and make the following arrangement:

The vessel with provisions is to be placed upon the right, next a screw-tug, next the vessel with troops, and again a tug. The right-hand vessel will cover those on the left, protecting from fire the troops and means of locomotion. The vessels should arrive off the bar two hours before high tide, so that the tide will be rising all the way in, and if grounded may be floated off in a short time. To prevent vessels from the city and the cutters inside the harbor from interfering, the fort shall be signaled, and will reply by lowering its flag or showing a light, and will prevent any vessel going out. Signals should be agreed upon, and the time, day or night, also. Two field pieces, loaded with canister, might be used to meet a desperate attempt to board the vessels. The hay in bales should be wet, to prevent heated balls from setting fire to the vessels.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 201-2

Memorandum of Different Plans for Re-Enforcing Fort Sumter

Memoranda read before the President and Cabinet, General Scott and Commodore Stringham, and Mr. Fox, late of the Navy, Washington, March 15, 1861, by Bvt. Brig. Gen. Joseph G. Totten, Chief of Engineers.*

The obstacles to the relief of Fort Sumter are natural or artificial obstacles to navigation, and military opposition.

The main channel in its best natural state would not admit the passage of vessels larger than sloops of war; so that, before it was obstructed, a naval attack, to be very formidable, must have consisted of many vessels of this kind.

In designing the defenses of Charleston Harbor, therefore, it was considered that Fort Sumter, with Castle Pinckney, would suffice, with some improvement of Fort Moultrie, and the erection of batteries in time of war on James Island at the position called Fort Johnson. A deeper entrance would have demanded a stronger system.

The South Carolina troops have strengthened Fort Moultrie and added batteries thereto; they possess Castle Pinckney; they have erected batteries at Fort Johnson, and, not having Fort Sumter, they have planted a number of guns (number not known) on Morris Island.

These last do not, certainly, bring their system up to that which included Fort Sumter; but they, as is represented, have also so blocked the main channel, or made its navigation so intricate, that only vessels light in draught can enter – vessels unavoidably weak to resist and impotent to assail.

If we suppose a squadron of war vessels as large as can be forced through the impediments of the main bar to have overcome that difficulty, and, under pressure of steam, to advance in daylight (as I think would be indispensable), they would suffer greatly from the fire of Morris Island, Fort Moultrie, and its adjacent batteries – but they would suffer much less than the small vessels, because much stronger and with vital parts better secured, and because their own fire would, to a certain extent, keep under, and, to a great degree, render uncertain the fire of the batteries. But whether larger or smaller, the vessels have not merely to pass the fire of the batteries – they must remain exposed to it. Because, before getting beyond the fire of Fort Moultrie, they come within scope of Fort Johnson, and while yet under the guns of these batteries they will be reached by Castle Pinckney. There is no point of shelter within these waters; and although the squadron of heavy sloops might survive the dangers of the passage, they could not long endure the cannonade that would be concentrated on any anchorage. In these very waters, this problem was settled in the Revolutionary War by the contest between the squadron of Sir Peter Parker and the single work of Fort Moultrie – then certainly not more powerful than now.

To enable the supposed squadron to remain, it is indispensable that a military force should capture the batteries from the land, and be strong enough, besides, to hold possession against the troops now assembled in and around them, and those that would rapidly come from the interior.

Should small vessels attempt this entrance by daylight, their destruction would be inevitable; at any rate, the chances of getting through would be too slender to justify any such enterprise. We have certain information that there is much practice with these guns, and that the practice now is good. If this risk were to be run by daylight, the vessels might have a draught of about eight feet, and could use the “Swash Channel,” or a passage between this and the main channel, or, finally, the latter. But I must repeat that unless we were to find a degree of inaptness and imbecility, and a want of vigilance and courage that we have no right to assume, this attempt by daylight with small vessels, even of great speed, must fail.

There remains another project, namely, to enter at night by the “Swash” Channel with a few (two or three) fast steam-tugs, having a draught of only (or about)five feet. To do this it will be necessary to take position before dark off this channel, so as to get upon the proper leading line to be followed after dark by the ascertained course, or, possibly, by the bearing of the lights of Fort Sumter. With proper precautions in screening the lights and fires of the boats, &c., I think the risk would not be so great, considering only the batteries, as to deter from this attempt, provided the object were of very great importance. I should expect one or two, perhaps all, of these vessels to reach Fort Sumter, and the shoal upon which they must be grounded – provided no other impediments awaited them.

But, in the first place, it is a necessary condition that the boats arrive off the harbor before night. If they can see to take these bearings, they can be seen from the shore. In the next place, it seems impossible to fit out any expedition, however small and unobtrusive, without arousing inquiry, and causing the intelligence to be transmitted by telegraph. We may be certain, therefore, that these tugs will be waited for by steamers lying in the channelway, full of men.

This mode of relieving Fort Sumter, or another by men in rowboats passing up the same channel, is so obvious that it is unreasonable to suppose it has not been duly considered and provided for, where so much intelligence and resource in military means have been displayed in the scheme of defense, and so much earnestness and energy in execution. We know that guard rowboats and steamers are active during the night; and that they have all the means of intercepting with certainty this little expedition, and overpowering it, by boarding – a commencement of war.

This attempt, like any other, will inevitably involve a collision.

This raises a question that I am not called on to discuss, but as to which I may say that if the General Government adopts a course that must be attended with this result, its first measure should not be one so likely to meet disaster and defeat; nor one, I may add, which, even if successful, would give but momentary relief, while it would open all the powers of attack upon the fort, certainly reducing it before the means of recovering Charleston Harbor, with all its forts and batteries and environs, can possibly be concentrated there.

Respectfully submitted.

J. G. T.

_______________

* See also General Totten to Secretary of War, April 3, 1861, post.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 198-200

Edward Bates to Abraham Lincoln, March 15, 1861

The President of the United States has required my opinion in writing, upon the following question:

“Assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort Sumter, under all the circumstances, is it wise to attempt it?”

This is not a question of lawful right nor physical power, but of prudence & patriotism only. The right is, in my mind unquestionable, and I have no doubt at all that the Government has the power and the means, not only to provision the Fort, but also, if the exigency required, to man it, with its war complement of 650 men, so as to make it impregnable to any local force that could be brought against it. Assuming all this, we come back to the question – “Under all the circumstances, is it wise,” now to provision the fort?

The wisdom of the act must be tested by the value of the object to be gained, & by the hazards to be encountered in the enterprise. The object to be gained, by the supply of provisions, is not to strengthen the fortress, so as to command the harbor and enforce the laws, but only to prolong the labors & privations of the brave little garrison that have so long held it, with patient courage.

The possession of the fort, as we now hold it, does not enable us to collect the revenue or enforce the laws of commercial navigation. It may indeed involve a point of honor or a point of pride, but I do not see any great national interest involved in the bare fact of holding the fort, as we now hold it – and to hold it at all, we must supply it with provisions. And it seems to me that we may, in humanity & patriotism, safely waive the point of pride, in the consciousness that we have the power, and lack nothing but the will, to hold Fort Sumter in such condition as to command the harbor of Charleston, cut off all its commerce, and even lay the city in ashes.

The hazards to be met are many and obvious. If the attempt be made in rapid boats light enough to pass the bar in safety, still they must pass under the fire of Fort Moultrie and the batteries on Morris' Island. They might possibly escape that danger, but they cannot hope to escape the armed guard boats which ply all night, from the Fort to the outer edge of the bar- These armed guard boats would be sure to take or destroy our unarmed tugs, unless repelled by force, either from our ships outside the bar, or from Fort Sumter within – and that is war. True, war already exists by the act of South Carolina – but this Government has, thus far, magnanimously forborne to retort the outrage. And I am willing to forbear yet longer, in the hope of a peaceful solution of our present difficulties. I am most unwilling to strike – I will not say the first blow, for South Carolina has already struck that – but I am unwilling, “under all the circumstances,” at this moment to do any act, which may have the semblance, before the world, of beginning a civil war, the terrible consequences of which would, I think, find no parallel in modern times. For I am convinced that flagrant civil war in the Southern states, would soon become a social war, and that could hardly fail to bring on a servile war, the horrors of which need not be dwelt upon.

To avoid these evils, I would make great sacrifices, – and Fort Sumter is one; but if war be forced upon us by causeless & pertinacious rebellion, I am for resisting it, with all the might of the nation.

I am persuaded, moreover, that in several of the misguided states of the South, a large proportion of the people are really lovers of the Union, and anxious to be safely back, under the protection of its flag. A reaction has already begun, and, if encouraged by wise, moderate, and firm measures on the part of this Government, I persuade myself that the nation will be restored to its integrity, without the effusion of blood.

For these reasons, I am willing to evacuate Fort Sumter, rather than be an active party in the beginning of civil war. The port of Charleston, is, comparatively, a small thing. If the present difficulties should continue & grow, I am convinced, that the real struggle will be at the mouth of the Mississippi, for it is not politically possible for any foreign power, to hold the mouth of that river, against the people of the middle & upper valley.

If Fort Sumter must be evacuated, then it is my decided opinion, that the more Southern forts, – Pickens, Key West &c – should, without delay, be put in condition of easy defence against all assailants; and that the whole coast from South Carolina to Texas, should be as well guarded as the power of the Navy will enable us.

Upon the whole, I do not think it wise now to attempt to provision Fort Sumter.

Most respectfully submitted

Edwd. Bates

Atty. Genl

SOURCE: Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Captain John G. Foster to Brevet Brigadier-General Joseph G. Totten, March 31, 1861

Fort Sumter, S. C, March 31, 1861.

General Jos. G. Totten,

Chief Engineer United States Army, Washington, D. C.:

General: Yesterday the members of the State Convention visited the batteries on Morris Island and Fort Moultrie, and from both places extensive firing took place in honor of the event. This gave me an opportunity of observing what batteries have been increased in strength since my last report on this subject.

The following is the present armament, very nearly, viz.:

Battery No. 1. — Four guns. Embrasures closed by sandbags. Not fired yesterday.

Mortar battery between Nos. 1 and 2. — Three mortars. Fired yesterday. These have practiced much lately, to obtain the range and length of fuse for this fort.

Battery No. 2, iron-clad. — Three heavy guns. Two of them fired yesterday.

Battery No. 3. — Three guns. Embrasures closed with sandbags. Did not fire.

Mortar battery between Nos. 3 and 4. — Two mortars. Fired yesterday.

Battery No. 4. — Three guns. Two fired.

Battery No. 5. — Four heavy guns, one Columbiad or 8-inch seacoast howitzer. Two fired yesterday. I think there are six guns in this battery, although only four have been seen to fire.

Star of the West battery. — Four heavy guns, one of them an 8-inch Columbiad or 8-inch seacoast howitzer. All fired yesterday.

Battery No. 7. — These guns are not all in the same battery, but are distributed along the beach apparently in three batteries. Eleven guns fired yesterday. All were very heavy guns except two, which I think were field-pieces in a sort of second tier.

Above these batteries, on the sand-hills, is a line of intrenchments surrounding a house, and also several tents. The fieldpieces are apparently capable of being used to defend the flanks of this intrenchment, and to fire on the channel. Their rear is covered, each with a traverse.

It was evident in this firing that not all the guns in position were fired.

At Fort Moultrie the firing exhibited the same complete armament as last reported.

The provisions that I laid in for my force having become exhausted, and the supplies of the command being too limited to spare me any more, I am obliged to discharge nearly all my men to-day. I retain only enough to man a boat.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. G. Foster,

Captain Engineers.

SOURCE: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 302-4

Diary of Sir Arthur James Lyon Fremantle: Thursday, June 11, 1863

General Ripley took me in his boat to Morris Island. We passed Fort Sumter on our left, and got aground for five minutes in its immediate neighbourhood; then bearing off towards the right, we passed Fort Cummins Point, and (after entering a narrow creek) Fort Wagner on our left. The latter is a powerful, well-constructed field-work, mounting nine heavy guns, and it completely cuts across Morris Island at the end nearest to Fort Sumter. General Ripley pointed at Fort Wagner with some pride.

We landed near the house of the colonel who commanded the troops in Morris Island,* and borrowed his horses to ride to the further extremity of the island. We passed the wreck of the Keokuk, whose turret was just visible above the water, at a distance from the shore of about 1500 yards. On this beach I also inspected the remains of the so-called “Yankee Devil,” a curious construction, which on the day of the attack had been pushed into the harbour by one of the Monitors. This vessel, with her appendage, happened to be the first to receive the fire of Fort Sumter, and after a quarter of an hour Monitor and Devil got foul of one another, when both came to grief, and the latter floated harmlessly ashore. It seems to have been composed of double twenty-inch beams, forming a sort of platform or stage fifty feet long by twenty broad, from which depended chains with grappling irons to rake up hostile torpedoes. The machine was also provided with a gigantic torpedo of its own, which was to blow up piles or other obstacles.

Morris Island is a miserable, low, sandy desert, and at its further extremity there is a range of low sandhills, which form admirable natural parapets. About ten guns and mortars were placed behind them, and two companies of regular artillery were stationed at this point under the command of Captain Mitchell (the “patriot's” son), to whom I was introduced. He seemed a quiet, unassuming man, and was spoken of by General Ripley as an excellent officer. He told me he expected to be able to open fire in a day or two upon the Yankees in Folly Island and Little Folly; and he expressed a hope that a few shell might drive them out from Little Folly, which is only distant 600 yards from his guns. The enemy's large batteries are on Folly Island, 3400 yards off, but within range of Captain Mitchell's rifled artillery, one of which was a twelve-pounder, Whitworth.

A blockade-runner, named the Ruby, deceived by some lights on Folly Island, ran ashore at one o'clock this morning in the narrow inlet between Morris Island and Little Folly. The Yankees immediately opened fire on her, and her crew, despairing of getting her off, set her on fire — a foolish measure, as she was right under Captain Mitchell's guns — and whenever a group of Yankees approached the wreck, a shell was placed in their midst, which effectually checked their curiosity. The Ruby was therefore burning in peace. Her crew had escaped, all except one man, who was drowned in trying to save a valuable trunk.

After having conversed some time with Captain Mitchell and his brother officers, we took leave of them; and General Ripley, pursuing his tour of inspection, took me up some of the numerous creeks which intersect the low marshy land of James Island. In one of these I saw the shattered remains of the sham Keokuk, which was a wooden imitation of its equally short-lived original, and had been used as a floating target by the different forts.

In passing Fort Sumter, I observed that the eastern face, from which the guns (except those en barbette) had been removed, was being further strengthened by a facing of twelve feet of sand, supported by logs of wood. There can be no doubt that Sumter could be destroyed if a vessel could be found impervious enough to lie pretty close in and batter it for five hours; but with its heavy armament and plunging fire, this catastrophe was not deemed probable. General Ripley told me that, in his opinion, the proper manner to attack Charleston, was to land on Morris Island, take Forts Wagner and Cummins Point, and then turn their guns on Fort Sumter. He does not think much of the 15inch guns. The enemy does not dare use more than 35 lb. of powder to propel 425 lb. of iron; the velocity consequently is very trifling. He knows and admires the British 68-pounder, weighing 95 cwt., but he does not think it heavy enough effectually to destroy ironclads. He considers the 11-inch gun, throwing a shot of 170 lb., as the most efficient for that purpose.

In returning from Morris Island, we passed two steamers, which had successfully run the blockade last night, besides the luckless Ruby, which had also passed the blockading squadron before she came to grief. The names of the other two are the Anaconda and Racoon, both fine-looking vessels.

I dined at Mr Robertson's, at the corner of Rutledge Street, and met Captain Tucker of the navy there. He is a very good fellow, and a perfect gentleman. He commands the Chicora gunboat, and it was he who, with his own and another gunboat (Palmetto State), crossed the bar last February, and raised the blockade for a few hours. He told me that several Yankee blockaders surrendered, but could not be taken possession of, and the others bolted at such a pace as to render pursuit hopeless, for these little gunboats are very slow. They made the attack at daylight, and though much fired at were never struck. They seem to have taken the Yankees by surprise, and to have created great alarm; but at that time the blockading squadron consisted entirely of improvised men-of-war. Since this exploit, the frigate Ironsides, and the sloop of war Powhattan, have been added to its strength.

It poured with rain during the evening, and we had a violent thunderstorm. General Beauregard returned to Charleston this afternoon.

_______________

* This must have been about the spot from whence Fort Sumter was afterwards bombarded. I cannot help thinking that the Confederates made a great mistake in not fortifying the further end of Morris Island and keeping a larger garrison there, for when the Federals landed, they met with no fortification until they reached Fort Wagner.

SOURCE: Sir Arthur James Lyon Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States: April-June, 1863, p. 188-93

Major Robert Anderson to Colonel Samuel Cooper, March 9, 1861

fort Sumter, March 9, 1861.

(Received A. G. O., March 12.)

Colonel S. Cooper,

Adjutant-General. United States Army.

Colonel: I have the honor to report that we can see the South Carolinians engaged this morning strengthening and extending considerably what we supposed to have been intended for a mortar battery at Fort Johnson. Small parties are also working at Nos. 9 and 10, and a very heavy force at the bend of the island, this side of No. 1. Whether they are constructing another battery there or strengthening one that is already there I cannot tell. One of my officers reports that he has counted nine 24-pounders which have been landed at Cummings Point within a week. Yesterday he saw several shot or shells which appeared to be about eight inches in diameter. They are certainly busy strengthening the batteries already constructed, and probably adding others. It appears to me that vessels will, even now, from the time they cross the bar, be under fire from the batteries on Morris Island until they get under the walls of this work. I do not speak of the batteries which have been constructed on Sullivan's Island, as I am not certain of their positions. Fort Moultrie will, of course, be a very formidable enemy.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Robert Anderson,

Major First Artillery, Commanding.

colonel S. Cooper, Adjutant-General United States Army.

SOURCES: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 281; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 192.