The wounded have been coming in to-day in large numbers.
From what I can learn, General Pope's estimate of the killed and wounded
greatly exceeds the actual number. He should, however, be best informed, but he
feels distressed and depressed and is greatly given to exaggeration.
Chase tells me that McClellan sends word that there are
twenty thousand stragglers on the road between Alexandria and Centreville,
which C. says is infamously false and sent out for infamous purposes. He called
on me today with a more carefully prepared, and less exceptionable, address to
the President, stating the signers did not deem it safe that McClellan should
be intrusted with an army, etc., and that, if required, the signers would give
their reasons for the protest against continuing him in command. This paper was
in the handwriting of Attorney-General Bates. The former was in Stanton's. This
was signed by Stanton, Chase, Smith, and Bates. A space was left between the
two last for Blair and myself; Seward is not in town, and, if I am not
mistaken, is purposely absent to be is relieved from participation in this
movement, which originates with Stanton, who is mad — perhaps with reason — and
determined to destroy McClellan. Seward and Stanton act in concert, but Seward
has opposed or declined being a party to the removal of McClellan, until since
Halleck was brought here, when Stanton became more fierce and determined.
Seward then gave way and went away. Chase, who has become hostile to McClellan,
is credulous, and sometimes the victim of intrigue; was taken into Stanton's
confidence, made to believe that the opportunity of Seward's absence should be
improved to shake off McClellan, whom they both disliked, by a combined Cabinet
movement to control the President, who, until recently, has clung to that
officer. It was not difficult, under the prevailing feeling of indignation
against McClellan, to enlist Smith. I am a little surprised that they got Mr.
Bates, though he has for some time openly urged the removal of McClellan. Chase
took upon himself to get my name, and then, if possible, Blair was to be
brought in. In all this, Chase flatters himself that he is attaching Stanton to
his interest; not but that he is himself sincere in his opposition to
McClellan, who was once his favorite, but whom he considers a deserter from his
faction and whom he now detests.
I told Chase I thought this paper an improvement on the
document of Saturday; was less exceptionable; but I did not like, and could not
unite in, the movement; that in a conference with the President I should have
no hesitation in saying or agreeing mainly in what was there expressed; for I
am satisfied the earnest men of the country would not be willing McClellan
should hereafter have command of our forces in the field, though I could not
say what is the feeling of the soldiers. Reflection had more fully satisfied me
that this method of conspiring to influence or control the President was
repugnant to my feelings and was not right; it was unusual, would be
disrespectful, and would justly be deemed offensive; that the President had called
us around him as friends and advisers, with whom he might counsel and consult
on all matters affecting the public welfare, not to enter into combinations to
control him. Nothing of this kind had hitherto taken place in our intercourse.
That we had not been sufficiently intimate, impressive, or formal perhaps, and
perhaps not sufficiently explicit and decisive in expressing our views on some
subjects.
Chase disclaimed any movement against the President and
thought the manner was respectful and correct. Said it was designed to tell the
President that the Administration must be broken up, or McC. dismissed. The
course he said was unusual, but the case was unusual. We had, it was true, been
too informal in our meeting. I had, he said, been too reserved in the
expression of my views, which he did me the compliment to say were sound, etc.
Conversations, he said, amounted to but little with the President on subjects
of this importance. Argument was useless. It was like throwing water on a
duck's back. A more decisive expression must be made and that in writing.
It was evident there was a fixed determination to remove,
and if possible to disgrace, McClellan. Chase frankly stated he desired it,
that he deliberately believed McClellan ought to be shot, and should, were he
President, be brought to summary punishment. I told him he was aware my faith
in McClellan's energy and reliability was shaken nine months ago; that as early
as last December I had, as he would recollect, expressed my disappointment in
the man and stated to him specially, as the friend and indorser of McClellan,
my misgivings, in order that he might remove my doubts or confirm them.
McClellan's hesitating course last fall, his indifference and neglect of my
many applications to cooperate with the Navy, his failure in many instances to
fulfill his promises, when the Rebels were erecting batteries on the west bank
of the Potomac, that they might close the navigation of the river, had shaken
my confidence in his efficiency and reliability, for he was not deficient in
sagacity or intelligence. But at that time McClellan was a general favorite,
and neither he (Chase) nor any one heeded my doubts and apprehensions.
A few weeks after the navigation of the river was first
interrupted by the Rebel batteries last November, I made known to the President
and Cabinet how I had been put off by General McClellan with broken promises
and frivolous and unsatisfactory answers, until I ceased conversing with him on
the subject. To me it seemed he had no plan or policy of his own, or any
realizing sense of the true condition of affairs, — the Rebels in sight of us,
almost within cannon-range, Washington beleaguered, only a single railroad
track to Baltimore, the Potomac about to be closed. He was occupied with
reviews and dress-parades, perhaps with drills and discipline, but was
regardless of the necessities of the case, — the political aspect of the
question, the effect of the closing of the only avenue from the National
Capital to the ocean, and the embarrassment which would follow to the
Government itself were the river blockaded. Though deprecating his course and
calling his attention to it, I did not think, as Chase now says he does, and as
I hear others say they do, that he was imbecile, a coward, a traitor; but it
was notorious that he hesitated, doubted, had not self-reliance, any definite
and determined plan, or audacity to act. He was wanting, in my opinion, in
several of the essential requisites of a general in chief command; in short, he
was not a fighting general. These are my present convictions. Some statements
of Stanton and some recent acts indicate failings, delinquencies of a more
serious character. The country is greatly incensed against him, but he has the
confidence of the army, I think.
Chase was disappointed, and I think a little chagrined,
because I would not unite in the written demand to the President. He said he
had not yet asked Blair and did not propose to till the others had been
consulted. This does not look well. It appears as if there was a combination by
two to get their associates committed, seriatim, in detail, by a
skillful ex parte movement without general consultation.
McClellan was first invited to Washington under the auspices
of Chase, more than of any one else, though all approved, for Scott was old,
infirm, and changeable. Seward soon had greater intimacy with McClellan than
Chase. Blair, informed in regard to the qualities of army officers, acquiesced
in McClellan's selection; thought him intelligent and capable, but dilatory. In
the winter, when Chase began to get alienated from McC. in consequence of his
hesitancy and reticence, or both, if not because of greater intimacy with
Seward, Blair seemed to confide more in the General, yet I do not think McC.
was a favorite, or that he grew in favor.
SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864,
p. 100-4
