Delivered in the House of Representatives, March 23, 1854—the
House being in Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union on the Nebraska
bill.
I propose, now, Mr. Chairman, to address a few observations
to the committee upon the merits of the bill. The subject has been thoroughly
discussed here and in the Senate, and I do not flatter myself that I shall be
able to add new facts or develop new trains of thought. The elements of a
correct judgment are already before the country, and the utmost that one now
engaging in the discussion can hope, is to present some of them in lights and
combinations worthy the attention of the House.
I shall not consume the time of the committee in discussing
what I cannot but regard as the subordinate and accidental aspects of the
subject; as, for example, the relations of individuals to the bill of the last Congress,
the alleged change of position by newspaper presses, and other points which do
not touch the heart of the subject, and cannot go into history in the permanent
connexion with our action upon it; assuming, also—what I think has been
abundantly demonstrated—that the interests of the country demanded the
organization of these territories, and that the rights of the few Indians within
their borders are protected by the bill, the only remaining question relates to
the clauses respecting slavery.
Among the many misrepresentations sent to the country by
some of the enemies of this bill, perhaps none is more flagrant than the charge
that it proposes to legislate slavery into Nebraska and Kansas. Sir, if the
bill contained such a feature, it could not receive my vote. The right to
establish involves the co-relative right to prohibit, and, denying both, I
would vote for neither. I go further and express the opinion that a clause
legislating slavery into those Territories could not command one Southern vote
in this House. It is due to both sections of the country, and the people, to
expose this groundless charge. What then, is the present condition of Nebraska
and Kansas? Why, sir, there is no government, no slavery, and very little
population there, (for your federal laws, exclude your citizens,) but a law
remains on the statute-book forever prohibiting slavery in those Territories.
It is proposed simply to take off this prohibition, but not to make an
enactment in affirmance of slavery there. Now, in the absence of any law
establishing slavery in that region previous to the prohibitory act, it is too
clear for dispute that the repeal of the prohibitory act, has not the
affirmatory effect of fixing slavery in that country. The effect of the repeal,
therefore, is neither to establish nor to exclude, but to leave the future condition
of the Territories dependent wholly on the action of the inhabitants, subject
only to such limitations as the federal constitution may impose. But, to guard
fully against hones misconstruction, and even against malicious perversion, the
language of the bill is perfectly explicit on this point.
I propose, for the present, to argue the question only upon
the compromises of 1820 and 1850. To those who may be called political
abolitionists it is useless to address any arguments. They opposed both those
settlements; they adhere to neither in good faith, but will appeal to them or
reject them as may best promote their incendiary purposes.—But I do not
consider this to be the position of the northern people. I believe that,
generally, they, and their representatives here, desire to look at this subject
calmly, and to do fairly and honestly whatever good faith demands. The American
characteristic is well understood by the abolitionists in and out of Congress,
and accordingly they clamorously proclaim that “plighted faith” is about to be
violated by the breach of a compact which the North, they say, has faithfully
kept on her part for more than thirty years. By their orators and presses, and
from their pulpits, (for the Church is resolved to engage in the struggle,) the
South is held up as a monster of perfidy, and the selectest vials of their
wrath are poured on the heads of those northern statemen who always sustained
their Missouri Compromise, while it had any remains of vitality, against the
assaults of its new defenders.
What, then is the true nature and extent of the compromise
of 1850? What of the former? What their relations? Are they consistent with
each other? Which of them ought, in good faith, to be applied to the
Territories contemplated by this bill? These are the questions to be decided,
in good faith, by those who recognize compromises as somewhat more important and
durable than ordinary acts of legislation. While for those who opposed them
both, and who spurn all settlements touching slavery, the less that is said,
either of compromises or of “plighted faith,” the better.
At the risk of treading on ground already occupied by
others, let me say something of the origin and history of the Missouri
Compromise, and of the relations of sections to it.
I have heard gentlemen here glorify Mr. Clay as the author
of the act of 1820, prohibiting slavery north of 36 deg. 30 min., and invoke
his memory to resist its violation. They must invoke some other “spirit” than
Mr. Clay’s, for he was not its author. My colleague [Mr. EWING] showed this not
long ago, but the statement has been persistently repeated since. While again
correcting this error, it may be well to notice the treatment this compromise
received very soon after its birth.
The people of Missouri having applied for leave to form a
State constitution, Congress, by the act of March 6, 1820, provided in the
first section:
“That the inhabitants of that portion
of the Missouri Territory included within the boundaries hereinafter designated
be, and they are hereby, authorized to form for themselves a constitution and
State Government, and to assume such name as they shall deem proper; and the
said state, when formed, shall be admitted to the Union upon an equal footing
with the original States in all respects whatsoever.”
And in the eight section:
“That in all that territory ceded by
France to the United States, under the name of Louisiana, which lies north of
36 deg. 30 min. north latitude, not included within the limits of the state
contemplated by this act, slavery and involuntary servitude, otherwise than in
the punishment of crimes, whereof the parties shall have been duly convicted,
shall be, and is hereby, forever prohibited.”
This the compromise prohibiting slavery north of the 36 deg.
30 min.—the compromise to which gentlemen say our plighted faith is now due.
There were two parties and two stipulations. Missouri was to form a
constitution, and was to be admitted “upon an equal footing with the original
States in all respects whatsoever.” This was the agreement on the one hand for
the benefit of Missouri, and, if you choose, of the South. On the other hand, slavery
was to be prohibited north of 36 deg. 30 min., and this was for the benefit of
the North.—The terms and conditions on each side were clearly expressed; but
with it Mr. Clay had nothing to do. He was a member of the House and the clause
prohibiting slavery originated in the Senate, on the motion of Mr. Thomas, of
Illinois. Mr. Clay has said publicly that he had no recollection even of voting
for it.
Well, sir, in pursuance of this “Missouri Compromise,” the
people of that Territory proceeded to form a constitution with which they
presented themselves for admission as a State at the next session of Congress.
Was the compact executed? The Senate promptly passed a bill for their admission
“on an equal footing with the original States;” but in the House it was
rejected by a strict sectional vote—the South for it, the North against it. The
“compromise” being thus repudiated and rejected by the North, by refusing to
Missouri and the South the equivalent (being her admission “on an equal footing
with the original States”) for the slavery prohibition, the bargain was broken,
and the act of 1820 lost the sacredness of a compromise. The pretest for this
repudiation was, that Missouri had put a clause in her constitution prohibiting
the immigration of the free negroes to the State. This she had a right to do,
unless it was a violation of the federal constitution; and if a violation, it
was simply void, and the clause of the latter which declares that:
“The Constitution, and laws of the
United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
anything in the constitution and laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding.”
And the proper tribunal to settle the fact was the federal
judiciary; so that in either aspect there was no ground for breaking the
bargain. But the Compromise of 1820 was thus broken, and for a long time there
seemed to be no prospect that this State, coming with a republican constitution
in her hand, could find admission. The whole question was at sea again, and so
remained until Mr. Clay appeared in the House, on the 21st day of February,
1821, having been detained at home by sickness in his family. He soon offered a
resolution for the purpose of raising a
joint committee of the two houses to inquire whether Missouri should be
remanded to the territorial condition, or admitted into the Union; and if the
latter, upon what terms?
The committee asked for was raised, and on the 26th of
February Mr. Clay reported from it the following condition of admission, which
was adopted by Congress.
“That Missouri shall be admitted into
this union on an equal footing with the original States in all respects
whatever, upon the fundamental condition that the 4th clause of the 25th
section of the 3d article of the constitution submitted on the part of said
State to Congress shall never be construed to authorize the passage of any law,
and that no law shall be passed in conformity thereto, by which any citizen of
either of the States in this Union shall be excluded from the enjoyment of any
of the privileges and immunities to which such citizen is entitled under the
constitution of the United states; provided,
That the legislature of the said State, by a solemn public act, shall declare
the assent of the said State to the said fundamental condition, and shall
transmit to the President of the United States, on or before the first Monday
in November next, an authentic copy of the said act; upon receipt whereof, the
President, by proclamation, shall announce the fact; whereupon, and without any
further proceedings on the part of Congress, the admission of the said State
into the Union shall be considered as complete.”
This was a new condition by which Missouri was to enter the
Union; not by the Compromise of 1820, “on an equal footing with the original
States,” as an equivalent for the prohibition of slavery north of 36 deg. 30
min., but upon the “fundamental condition” that her legislature should pass an
act declaring that the constitution of the State was not above the constitution
of the United States! She accepted the condition; and thus, by an act of her
legislature, in pursuance of the timely “fundamental condition” of a
congressional resolution, happily saved the federal constitution!!
It is due to the memory of the illustrious author of this “fundamental
condition” to say that no one could be more sensible than himself of the
intense humbuggery of the whole proceeding; and in his celebrated speech of
1850, on his compromise resolutions, he jocularly reviewed and exposed it to
the Senate.
This summary of the facts will not be denied here or
elsewhere; but they show that the Compromise now invoked was made in 1820; that
Missouri complied with her part of it; that it was repudiated by northern votes
in 1821; and that the State was finally admitted into the Union, not upon the
equivalent provided in the act of 1820, but by the express imposition on her of
a new compromise and condition.
So much for the result, on the first occasion that offered,
to test “plighted faith.”
Under these circumstances the act of 1820 might well have been
regarded as a rejected compact, and the question of slavery might have been
fought over again upon the organization of each new Territory. But the hope of
having something to be regarded as final on this vexed subject, thought a mere
geographical line, and that of doubtful constitutionality, prevailed in the
country, and that act, under the name of the “Missouri Compromise,” was
accepted as a settlement of the slavery controversy. The basis of the
settlement was a division (though very unequal) of all the territory then
possessed by the United States. Does any man doubt that if we had possessed more
territory the same principle of division would have been applied to it? It was
a division of common territory between slaveholding and non slave holding
States, or rather it was the exclusive appropriation of all north of 36 deg. 30
min. to free institutions and an implied allowance only of southern
institutions below that line. Whatever may be said of this arrangement in its
relations to the constitution, or as a measure of statesmanship, it was a clear
and simple adjustment. It was capable of easy application in all future time;
and as such, the South accepted it in good faith, and struggled to maintain it,
until it was finally and forever repudiated by our northern brethren.
Sir, the gentleman from Georgia, [Mr. STEPHENS,] and others,
have traced this compromise through our legislative history—they have shown how
often it was repudiated, and repudiated by the North, and I do not propose to
go over the same ground; but if falls within the line of my thoughts to fix
your attention on a period when the Missouri Compromise was ratified; and that
occasion is the more important because it carried the Compromise beyond the
territory acquired from France, and thus leaves no excuse for denying that it
was intended to be a rule of general application. I refer to the joint resolution
of 1845 for the annexation of Texas, which contains the following provision:
“New States of convenient size, not
exceeding four in number, in addition to the said state of Texas, and having
sufficient population, may hereafter, by the consent of said State, be formed
out of the territory thereof, which sall be entitled to admission under the
provisions of the federal constitution. And such States as may be formed out of
that portion of said territory lying south of 36 deg. 30 min. north latitude,
commonly known as the Missouri Compromise line, shall be admitted into the
Union, with or without slavery, as the people of each State asking admission
may desire. And in such State or States as shall be formed out of said
territory north of said Missouri Compromise line, slavery or involuntary
servitude (except for crime) shall be prohibited.”
Here the Missouri Compromise was distinctly applied to
territory clearly outside of the specific boundaries of the act of 1820, and it
is no answer to say that Texas was a part of the Louisiana purchase—first,
because this was a matter of dispute and conflicting claims with Spain; and
next, because in 1819 we exchanged to Spain our claims to Texas for Florida, by
which Texas became foreign territory, and relieved from the constitution and
laws of the United States, so that, upon
her return, she came as free from the operation of the Missouri Compromise as
Utah, New Mexico, or the British Islands. It follows, that in extending that
compromise to the portion of Texas lying north of 36 deg. 30 min., the Congress
on that occasion recognized it as a rule upon the question of slavery, as a
basis of settlement, to be applied to as well to new territory as to that
acquired from France. It will be remembered that the whole of Texas was
slaveholding territory, and the effect of the resolution was to make a large
part of it free. But this was assented to by the South; and now I ask the fair-minded
representatives of the people if the Missouri Compromise meant that it should
be recognized and extended when the South was to be excluded, and repudiated,
when it might work to her advantage?
This practical construction of the Missouri line obliged the
North, by every obligation of honor and good faith, to carry it through all
territory afterwards acquired, if any virtue at all was to be conceded to that
compromise.
But, while the line was extended as long as it worked out
free-soil territory, it was ignored and trampled under foot the moment their
fair application of it might have resulted to benefit of both Sections. Witness
the result in 1848, you gentlemen who talk of “plighted faith.” We had acquired
from Mexico a large territory, lying on both
sides of the line of 36 deg. 30 min. Three years before, the line had been
extended through Texas, by which a large slaveholding territory had been made
free-soil; and yet when, in 1848, on motion of the distinguished senator from
Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS,] a resolution passed in the Senate to “extend the
Missouri-Compromise line” through the recently-acquired territory, it was
rejected in this House by the united northern against the united southern vote.
Sir, how can an honest man get over these facts? How, in the
face of them, can an honest man charge the friends of this bill with disregard
of “plighted faith” and “solemn compacts?” I need not recur in detail to the
occasions, so often referred to in this debate, when the Missouri line was
offered by the South during the great struggle which ended in the Compromise of
1850, and was rejected by the North. It is enough to say that the record of
those transactions will preserve for history the fact that the Missouri Compromise
line of 36 deg. 30 min. was steadily repudiated by northern votes as a basis
for the settlement of the slavery controversy. Why was this sir?
The reason is obvious. The anti-slavery feeling at this time
ruled the councils of the North, and accordingly she left the ground of
compromise, and planted herself on the ground of power. She rejected the
principle of division. Glorying in her conscious strength, she came to
obliterate geographical lines, and to appropriate to herself the whole of the
territory acquired from Mexico. Her rallying cry was no longer “the Missouri
Compromise line,” but the “Wilmot proviso.” Old things had passed away; old
bargains were rejected, and the question took a new form.
The issue made up was, (and it went back of all divisions
and patched-up settlements, and to the very bottom of the subject,) shall slavery
be prohibited in all the Territories of the Untied States by act of Congress,
or shall it be left to the people who inhabit them, subject only to the federal
constitution; and on this was fought the great battle of 1850. The slaveholding
States said: We have exhausted every scheme of adjustment; we have offered the
old line; it is contemptuously refused; you claim all; very well, then, we
united with you in burying the past; we accept the broad issue of intervention
or non-intervention; we demand that all the citizens of the United States be
allowed to enter the common territory with the constitution alone in their
hands. If that instrument protects the title of the master to his slave in this
common territory, you cannot complain; and if it does not protect his title, we
ask no help from Congress; and the relations of the constitution to the subject
we are willing to have decided by the courts of the United States. We do not
ask Congress to interfere for us, and we will resist all legislative
interference against us.
The whole country saw that here was a great struggle of opposing
principles; and the excitement was in proportion to the magnitude of the
question. If the result had depended on a purely sectional vote, the “Wilmot proviso”
would have triumphed; but a large portion of the North, under the lead of the
distinguished senator from Michigan [Mr. Cass] and others, repudiated the “proviso.”—Governments
were formed for New Mexico and Utah without that odious restriction, leaving
them free to form their own institutions, and enter the Union with or without
slavery, as their constitution should
prescribe.
Nothing in this discussion has surprised me more than the
assertion, in respectable quarters, that the provisions touching slavery in the
New Mexico and Utah bills were not intended to establish any principle for the
future action of Congress upon that subject. I cannot but regard this as a narrow
and unstatesman like view. Such was not the sense in which that great
compromise was accepted by the American people. They well knew that it did not
abolish slavery; they knew, too, that past territories yet remained within the
Union to be settled, and that still vaster regions were to be acquired in the
progress of our inevitable expansion. As to all these, the question of slavery,
they knew, would present itself at each successive step in the extension of
American institutions and laws. If the settlement of 1850 was but an ordinary
act of legislation, and contained no principle of agreement of broader
application than the strips of territory embraced in those laws, for what had
the Union been shaken to its centre? To what end had our most eminent statesmen
devoted their highest efforts? What has been gained—a lasting peace? No, sir;
but, by this view, only a deceitful truce; a suspension of hostilities; the
suppression of a symptom, not the eradication of the disease. It make this
compromise not a final adjustment, on principle, of the distracting subject of
slavery, but a delusion, an expedient, a catch, a humbug. It brings it down to
the level of a mere temporary legislative contrivance; it leaves its great
authors shorn of the renown the world supposed it to confer and reduces them to
the condition of mere political jobbers. But, by the other construction, it
was, indeed, a “final settlement”—a settlement which makes its authors
immortal, which removes from the federal theatre the only question that can
disturb our domestic tranquility, and leaves Congress in the future nothing to
do in connexion with it, except to apply the established principle as the occasions
arise. No, sir; whatever some gentlemen by say now, the people were not guilty
of the folly imputed to them by the opponents of this bill. Their patriotic
acclamations went up to Heaven over an act of healing statesmanship, not over a
political job. They accepted those measures, not as a truce to faction, but as
a bond of lasting concord.
Mr. Chairman, in great collisions of opinion, especially
among an enlightened people, and upon questions of a continuing character, the particular
issue usually involves the general principle—and this happens with a certainty
proportioned to the magnitude of the questions at stake. History is full of
illustrations to the point. When our heroic ancestors threw the British tea
into Boston harbor and the whole country rose to sustain the act, it went far
deeper than a question of a tax on tea, and involved the great principle that
we would submit to no taxation without representation. When John Hampden
resisted the illegal imposition of ship money by Charles I, and carried the
point up to all the judges of England, though the immediate issue was whether
he should pay the paltry sum of twenty shillings, the great question involved
was the claim of the King to levy taxes without the consent of Parliament. So,
the circumstance connected with the legislation giving governments to Utah and
New Mexico must control and explain the effect and principle of those laws.
After events so recent, need I say that, in 1850, the manner in which the new
Territories should be organized led to a thorough discussion as to the policy to
be adopted respecting slavery? Is it not notorious that the Missouri Compromise
line was considered and deliberately rejected? Did not the non-slaveholding
States (generally) insist that the true policy was the prohibition of slavery
in the territories of the Union by act of congress, and, by consequence, insist
upon applying this principle to Utah and New Mexico? Did not the slaveholding
States, on the contrary, planting themselves on the ground of Federal
non-intervention, resist this policy, and, by consequence, its adoption and
application to those Territories? And after a long and fearful struggle, did
not the latter doctrine prevail, and was it not carried into law (or compact,
if you choose) in the New Mexico and Utah acts? Did not the public, the press,
conventions, and States, hail the result as a “final settlement, in principle and substance,” of the subject
of slavery? And are we to be told now that the Compromise of 1850 was an
adjustment to broader than those two territories? Are we to have a new
struggle, a new bargain, a new basis of settlement on the organization of each
new territory? Who, then, are the agitators?—who are faithful to the Compromise
of 1850?
If my conclusions are correct as to the relations of the
Compromise of 1820 to that of 1850, and as to the true nature and extent of the
latter, it follows that the former has no claim resting on good faith; but that
“plighted faith” to the Compromise of 1850 demands the removal of the Missouri prohibition.
I do not contend that the eighth section of the act of 1820 was, in terms,
repealed by the adjustment of 1850; it yet remains on the statute-book, and if
constitutional, is still operative. But if non-intervention by Congress be the
principle that underlies the Compromise of 1850, then the prohibition of 1820,
being inconsistent with that principle, should be removed, and perfect
non-intervention thus be established by law.
Among the many misrepresentations sent to the country by
some of the enemies of this bill, perhaps none is more flagrant than the charge
that it proposes to legislate slavery into Nebraska and Kansas. Sir, if the
bill contained such a feature, it could not receive my vote. The right to
establish involves the co-relative right to prohibit, and denying both, I would
vote for neither. So go further, and express the opinion that a clause
legislating slavery into those Territories could not command one Southern vote
in this House. It is due to both sections of the country, and to the people, to
expose this groundless charge. What then, is the present condition of Nebraska
and Kansas? Why, sir, there is no government, no slavery, and very little
population there, (for your federal laws, exclude your citizens,) but a law
remains on the statute-book forever prohibiting slavery in those Territories.
It is proposed simply to take of this prohibition, but not to make an enactment
in the affirmance of slavery there. Now, in the absence of any law establishing
slavery in that region previous to the prohibitory act, it is too clear for
dispute that the repeal of the prohibitory act, has not the affirmative effect
of fixing slavery in that country. The effect of the repeal, therefore, is
neither to establish nor to exclude, but to leave the future condition of the
Territories depended wholly on the action of the inhabitants, subject only to
such limitations as the federal constitution may impose. But, to guard fully
against honest misconstruction, and even against malicious perversion, the
language of the bill is perfectly explicit on this point.
“That the constitution, and all laws of
the United States, which are not locally inapplicable, shall have the same
force and effect within the said Territory of Nebraska as elsewhere within the
United States; except the eighth section of the act preparatory to the
admission of Missouri into the Union, approved March, 1820, which being inconsistent
with the principle of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States
and Territories as recognized by the legislation of 1820, (commonly called the
compromise measures,) is hereby declared inoperative and void; it being the
true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate slavery into any Territory
or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof
perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own
way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States: Provided, That nothing herein contained
shall be construed to revive or put in force any law or regulation which my
have existed prior to the act of March, 1820, either protecting, establishing,
prohibiting or abolishing slavery.”
This should be satisfactory to all candid men; but if any
one shall persist in attempting to mislead the people, the best answer will be
to impale him before them on the very words of the bill.
It will be observed that the right of the people to regulate
in their own way all their domestic institutions is left wholly untouched,
except whatever is done must be in accordance with the constitution—the supreme
law for us all; and the right of property, under the constitution, as well as
legislative action, is properly left to the decision of the federal judiciary.
This voids a contested issue which it is hardly in the competency of Congress
to decide, and refers it to the proper tribunal.
It is contended on one hand, upon the idea of the equality
of the States under the constitution and common property in the Territories,
that the citizens of the slaveholding States may remove to them with their
slaves, (and that the local legislature cannot exclude slavery, while in the
territorial condition; but it is to concede that the people may establish or
prohibit it when they come to exercise the power of a sovereign State;) on the
other hand, it is said that slavery, being in derogation of common right, can
exist only by force of positive law; and it is denied that the constitution
furnishes this law for the Territories; and it is further claimed that the
local legislature my establish or exclude it any time after government is
organized. As both parties appeal to the constitution, and base their
respective arguments on opposite constructions of that instrument, the bill
wisely refuses to make a question for judicial construction the subject of
legislative conflict, and properly refers it to the tribunal created by the
constitution itself, for the very purpose of deciding “all cases in law and
equity” arising under it.
Then, sir, neither the purpose nor effect of the bill is to
legislate slavery into Nebraska and Kansas; but its effect is to sweep away
this vestige of Congressional dictation on this subject, to allow the free
citizens of this Union to enter the common territory with the constitution and
the bill alone in their hands, and to remit the decision of their rights under
both to the courts of the country. Who can go before his constituents refusing
to stand on the platform of the constitution? Who can make a case to them of
refusing to abide the decision of the courts of the Union?
I have argued the subject hitherto chiefly upon the question
of “plighted faith;” and have consumed more of my limited time that properly
belongs to that aspect of the case, because diligent efforts have been made to
excite the northern mind against the friends of this bill representing them as
the violators of the public honor. Anxious as I am for its passage, I readily admit
that no benefit it could confer upon the country would atone for a deliberate
violation of the public faith; but I am for its passage, not only because I
believe that it embodies the true principle, but because, also, I sincerely
believe that it carries out the true spirit and intent of our last great
compromise, which is my judgment, covered the whole subject of slavery.
The clock admonishes me that I must hurry on and omit some
views I would like to present, if time allowed. But, Mr. Chairman, apart from
the historical argument, this contested feature in the bill is right in itself,
for it rests on the foundation principle of American government. Without
entering the wilderness of discussion in regard to the relations of the federal
government to the territories as political communities, I offer one or two
thoughts as to the proper limitations upon the power of Congress, according to
the true theory of our government. Political power in the Territories is
nowhere expressly granted in the constitution. The existence, therefore, and
the extent of its exercise, must be derived by implication; and implied powers
are to be exercised with more caution and strictness that express grants. Let
it be conceded that political power over the Territories exists in Congress,
and it is no matter whether it be implied from the power to acquire territory,
or from any other source in the constitution; and the question arises whether
it is an uncontrolled and despotic power, or whether it is limited by the
nature of the federal government.
The States are supreme as to all subjects not granted to the
common government. They establish their own institutions, at their own
pleasure; they regulate within themselves all the relations of society; and
they are now complete, self-sustaining, political communities; and they created
the federal government, not to fix for them and their posterity the relations
of society and the various elements that make up a complete social and political
community, but to execute for the common good certain specified grants of
power. The territories belong to the States in their united character; they are
to enter the Union on an equal footing with the original States; and, in the
meantime, they are to be settled and occupied by citizens of the existing
States. What is the pretest for the act of 1820 “forever” prohibiting American
citizens, on American soil, from establishing their own local, social and
political condition? You have no express power to do so in constitution, and
surely you can find none in the analogies of our political system. Can you
dictate a particular from of society and government for them one moment after
they become States? If not, why mock reason, and blot the statue book with this
prohibition?
The power of Congress over the Territories is either
absolute, or it has constitutional limitations. Let me illustrate further my
idea of the limitations on the power of Congress over the Territories and
districts growing out of the character and objects of the federal system.
Congress, by an express provision of the constitution, may exercise “exclusive
legislation” in the District of Columbia.—This is a far stronger and broader
grant of power than any to be implied from that instrument in relation to the
Territories, and yet it does not confer absolute
power in this District; for it must be observed that there is wide distinction
between “exclusive” and absolute
power of legislation. Will any man contend that Congress may establish a free
port of entry in this District, while a general tariff law applies to other
ports? And yet the language of the constitution is:
“No preference shall be given by any
regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of
another; nor shall vessels bound to or from one State be obliged to enter,
clear, or pay duties in another.”
So Congress has “exclusive legislation” over “all places
purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same
shall be for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other
needful building,” but it will not be said that congress may admit foreign
goods duty free at one of these points on the sea-board, while impost laws are
in force at other ports. Nor will an advocate be found for the power to
discriminate against the people of this District, by taxing articles exported
from it, though the limitation of the constitution is: “No tax or duty shall be
laid on articles exported from any State.
Why is this, and what is the limit? At the beginning it
was thought best that the seat of government should not be within the
limit of any State, and accordingly a separate territory was carved out
for it, where the Federal Government might exercise its few and limited powers,
and over this territory “exclusive legislation” was granted to Congress, but
the reasons and objects of the grant both of
the Territory and power, and the nature and purposes of the common Government,
must control this exclusive legislation. Accordingly, Congress may not
establish a despotism here, nor rob American citizens in regard to their local
and domestic affairs, nor deprive them of their property, nor violate
uniformity of taxation, nor discriminate for or against their ports. Out of
this view, too, grows the argument against the power to abolish slavery in the
district without the consent of the people. And though upon this point opposite
opinions have been expressed, yet the argument has so far prevailed that no
serious attempt has been made to interfere with their rights in this respect.
The argument in regard to the Territories is far stronger. I
have already said that the Constitution nowhere expressly grants political
power over the Territories. Let us bear in mind, then, that it can only be an
implied power—to be exercised by a limited government—over a region the common
property of the States which created this limited government; and the inference
is irresistible that it must be exercised in the spirit of the political system
out of which this limited government springs. It would follow if the power were
expressly granted, but follows with greater force since it is only derivative.
What, then, is the spirit of the system? I answer, the equality of the States—local
sovereignty in all matters of interior and domestic concern, embracing the
great mass of powers that belong to government; as if, for example, fixing the
relations of parent and child, guardian and ward, master and servant-regulating
the general rights of property, the course of inheritance, and the innumerable
conditions that grow out of the social and political state. Hence it never has
been pretended that Congress may invade them to control their free action on
these and other kindred subjects. It is apart from the objects for which the
States made the Federal Government, and prescribed the orbit in which it should
move. Carry the idea to the Territories. What are they? to whom do they belong?
who are to inhabit them? and what are to be their political relations to the
rest of the Confederacy? They are regions of country acquired by the common
efforts and treasure of all the States; they belong, therefore, to the States
for common use and enjoyment; the citizens of the States are to inhabit them;
and when the population shall be sufficient, they are to become equal members
of the Union.
I might run out of illustrations on this point to an
indefinite extent. Could Congress admit foreign goods duty free into the Union
through the ports of a Territory, in violation of the general revenue laws, or
lay a tax on articles exported from a Territory? The power will not be claimed—certainly
its exercise will never be attempted; and yet I have shown that the limitation
of the constitution in these and other respects apply in terms only to the
States; and the only arguments against the power are, first, that it has not
been expressly granted; and, next, that it cannot be fairly deduced from the
spirit of the analogies of our political system.—Sir, if the constitutional
limitations for which I contend do exist, then congress cannot discriminate against
any of the States by depriving them of equal enjoyment of the common territory;
but if these limitations do not exist, then the power of legislation is
absolute and Congress may as readily set up a monarchy as a republic. Gentlemen
my revolt at the conclusion, bit it flows with inevitable certainty from this
doctrine of intervention and uncontrolled political powers over the
Territories. The germ of congressional despotism is to be found in this
Missouri prohibition; for if the question of slavery may be determined for the
Territories by Congress, every other social and political question may in like
manner be settled for them by the same authority, and this would reduce them to
the most abject colonial vassalage. You cannot escape this conclusion by saying
that slavery is anti-republican, and congress must exclude it under the
obligation to provide a republican form of government, for slavery has already
existed in many of the States, and yet the constitution declares that Congress
shall secure to each State a republican form of government; hence it is a settled
principle of our system that the institution is not inconsistent with
republicanism.
Sir, I care not for refined distinctions or the subtleties
of verbal criticism. I repeat the above and plain proposition, that if Congress
may intervene on this subject, it may intervene on any other;
and having thus surrendered the principle, and broken away from constitutional
limitations, you are drawn into the very lap of arbitrary power. By this
doctrine you may erect a despotism under the American system. The whole theory
is a libel on our institutions. It carries us back to the abhorrent principles
of British colonial authority, against which we made the issue of independence.
I have never acquiesced in this odious claim, nor will I believe that it can
abide the test of public scrutiny. The bill on our table repudiates it, and only
wants fearless advocates to make it thoroughly odious. The political
Abolitionists think they can ride the storm of anti-slavery fanaticism; but I
tell them, they have encountered here an element more powerful still. They must
obliterate the memory of the principles on which our Government was founded;
they must undo the very texture of American mind; they must substitute in the
popular heart the dogmas of despotism for the doctrine of American liberty,
before they can triumph over the principles of this bill. The South insists on
it as embodying the doctrine of State equality, on which her very existence
depends; but it should commend itself equally to all sections, because
the underlying principle is not Northern or Southern,
but American. It is true, that the subject of slavery happens
to be the one at issue; but it is there as the representative of every other
social and political right. The freedom of these new countries to establish
their own institutions ought, therefore, to be as dear to the man from Maine as
to the man from Florida.
But again: cannot the North, with her overwhelming numbers,
compete with us on these new theaters in the race of settlement and
civilization—and must she not only violate the constitution by shutting out
half the States, common property-holders with her—but in the name of liberty
outrage liberty by erecting a despotism over the Territories Sir, we never will
submit to it—we will resist it to the last; and in this struggle of principle
against passion, of reason and right against fanaticism, are we defenceless?
No, sir; no sir.—It is true, New England, with a few noble exceptions, has
arrayed herself against the principle of the bill; yet even there the cause is
not lost. Her choicest sons are unmoved by the clamors that surround them, and
New Hampshire, the little Switzerland of the North, is unbroken by the frantic
rush of the agitators. She has the elements around which to rally her
hereditary principles.
But New England is not the Union. Observe what different
tokens come from East and West. Did you hear of the infuriated mob that basely
hung the author of this bill in effigy, on Boston Common? But did you note soon
after the cheering tones of approval the west wind brought from his prairie
State? Remember, Gentlemen, in the midst of your exultation, that the political
power of this country is now climbing the summits of the Allegany mountains,
and before this decade closes will have pursued its unreturning course far into
the valley of the Mississippi—that vast region richer than the delta of the
Nile, and whose millions and ever-increasing millions are destined to a
political unity as lasting as civilization and commerce, bound forever together
by the double tie of interest and affection. What, then, if Boston Chooses to
betray the principles that made her own origin illustrious—what if New England
Chooses to turn her back on the doctrines that marked her early history, and,
after winning political liberty for herself, proposes to deny it to others—still
we are not defenceless. True spirits in every eastern state will stand by the
flag of republican equality until it waves the people back beneath its folds.
Pennsylvania, that fine old Commonwealth, too often neglected in the piping
times of peace, but always appealed to, and never in vain, in ever crises of
the constitution, will stand upon the bill. But even if no support could be
found in the scenes of our early civilization, we would gather up this
inestimable principle, and turn to the West—the young, and growing, and
vigorous West—whose hardy sons, having just laid for themselves the foundations
of society, will never aid in robbing their fellow-citizens of the same sacred
privilege. Sir, in two years from this time you will not be able, in my
opinion, to find a man in the West who will dare to go before the people in
opposition to the principle of this bill.
My time is so nearly exhausted that I shall be obliged to
omit observations I had intended to offer as to the importance of action on
this subject. By keeping it an open question, nobody is to be benefitted except
the abolitionists and their sympathizers. Those who take the responsibility of
throwing it before the county as an apple of discord may themselves perish in
the storm they aid to arouse. The final triumph of the truth would not be
doubtful, but the immediate effect would be to furnish food for abolition
excitement.
Mr. Davis, of Rhode Island.
If you do pass the bill it will.
Mr. Breckinridge.
That gentleman is an enemy of the bill. He is sincere, no doubt; but
deceives himself. As he is a political abolitionist, I remark, with great
respect, that he would desire the passage of the bill if he thought it would
promote the anti-slavery movement. [Laughter.]
No, sir; if we reject the bill, we open up the waters of
bitterness, to be sealed again in time, but not until these agitators shall
have rioted awhile in the confusion of the country; we blow high the flames to
furnish habitations for these political salamanders, who can exist only in the
fires of domestic strife. But, if it passes, the question will be removed
forever from the halls of Congress, and deposited with the people, who can
settle it in a manner answerable to their own views of interest and happiness.
The occupation of federal agitators will be gone, and a barrier will be erected
against which the rampant spirit of modern fanaticism may rave in vain, and
before which it will receive its signal overthrow.
In the excitement of debates upon this subject heretofore,
threats have been made on both sides. I have none to make, sir. I come from a
state which is not in the habit of making threats. I believe that once, and
only once, she utters a political threat. That was in 1798, when the old federal
party struck at the vitals of the constitution. On that occasion, her warning
voice and firm attitude contributed to save our political system. If my time
allowed I believe I could prove that this Missouri prohibition was a bantling
of the same federal party scotched but
not killed in former conflicts.
I believe that the sentiments I have expressed are those of
the people I represent. I believe they are the sentiments of the Commonwealth
of Kentucky—a State which has never taken an extreme political position; a
State which, lying in the centre of the Union, has always extended one hand to
the North and the other to the South, to draw them together in bonds of amity,
and ever pulsation of those great heart sends the warm life-blood of affection
to the remotest extremities of the confederacy.
SOURCES: “Speech of Hon. J. C. Breckenridge of Kentucky,” Nashville Union and American, Nashville,
Tennessee, Wednesday, April 5, 1854, p. 2, which was continued the following
day in “Speech of Hon. J. C. Breckenridge of Kentucky,” Nashville Union and American, Nashville, Tennessee, Thursday, April
6, 1854, p. 2
