Official Reports of the Battle of Gettysburg: No. 223. Reports of Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, U.S. Army, commanding Sixth Army Corps.

No. 223.

Reports of Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, U.S. Army, commanding Sixth Army Corps.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY CORPS,

Warrenton, Va., August 8, 1863.

GENERAL: I respectfully submit the following report of the operations of the Sixth Corps in the engagements near Gettysburg and since:

This command arrived on the field of Gettysburg on the afternoon of July 2, after a march of more than 30 miles.

Wheaton's and Eustis' brigades, of the third Division, temporarily commanded by Brigadier-General Wheaton, and Bartlett's brigade, of Wright's division, went into action about 5 p.m. on the left center, between divisions of the Fifth Corps, and assisted in repulsing the assault of the enemy. Russell's and Torbert's brigades, of Wright's division, were held in reserve that night. Neill's brigade, of Howe's division, was sent to the right of the line, reporting to Major-General Slocum, and Grant's brigade, of the same division, was posted on the extreme left of the general line. Shaler's brigade, of Wheaton's division, was held in reserve near the left center. The artillery of the corps was placed under the orders of the chief of artillery of the Army of the Potomac.

On the next morning and subsequently the following changes were made in the positions stated above: Russell's brigade was sent to the extreme left of the line, General Wright taking command of the troops of this corps there stationed. Subsequently it was returned to the left center, and on the following day it was placed in position, relieving a brigade of the Fifth Corps. Torbert's brigade was sent to the center, reporting to Major-General Newton, and remained in position until the morning of the 5th. Eustis' brigade was sent to the right center, also reporting to Major-General Newton. Shaler's brigade was also ordered to the left, and then to the right, and subsequently returned to the left center, and held in reserve.

During these movements the troops were more or less exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery, but, with the exception of the evening of July 2, they were at no time seriously engaged.

On July 5, Wright's division, supported by the rest of my command, was sent forward to determine the position of the enemy, who was discovered to be in retreat through Fairfield in the direction of Hagerstown. The rear of the column was shelled for a short time in the morning, and in the evening a brisk artillery fire was opened upon his wagon trains in the vicinity of Fairfield, while the infantry pursued the rear guard, which was posted to protect the passage of the trains; 250 prisoners were captured during the day.

On the following day the enemy continued his retreat through the mountain pass, with a strong rear guard well posted, with artillery in position.

During the night the corps marched to Emmitsburg, with the exception of Neill's brigade, which was detached and sent in pursuit of the retreating column. From Emmitsburg I marched by way of Hamburg to Middletown, and thence to Boonsborough, Md.

On July 11, the enemy was posted near Funkstown, Md., and the corps moved up and took position, after crossing Beaver Creek. The Vermont Brigade (Grant's, of the Second Division) were deployed as skirmishers, covering a front of over 2 miles, and during the afternoon repulsed three successive attacks made in line of battle. The remarkable conduct of the brigade on this occasion deserves high praise.

On July 13, my command was placed in the general line of battle in the vicinity of Hagerstown, connecting with the Eleventh Corps on the right and the Fifth Corps on the left, and continued in this position, with occasional sharp skirmishing, until the enemy retired from the front and during the night recrossed the Potomac. He was closely followed to the river by Wright's division and the rest of the command.

On the day following the retreat of the enemy, I moved by way of Boonsborough and Middletown to Berlin, and crossed the river in rear of the army, and continued my march by way of Union, Rectortown, and Barbee's Cross-Roads to Manassas Gap, and thence by way of Barbee's Cross-Roads to Warrenton.

During the operations herein reported, the conduct of the troops was admirable. The marches were very severe, and the hardships undergone were greater than in any previous campaign.

The casualties of the corps were as follows.* A nominal list has been already forwarded.

Very respectfully,

 JOHN SEDGWICK,

 Major-General, Commanding Sixth Army Corps.

 Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 182.

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HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY CORPS,

September 12, 1863.

GENERAL: In compliance with Special Orders, No. 227, Paragraph III, Headquarters Army of the Potomac, August 24, 1863, I respectfully report that no guns were captured by or captured from my command during the recent operations in Maryland and Pennsylvania.

I am, general, very respectfully,

 JOHN SEDGWICK,

 Major-General, Commanding Sixth Corps.

 Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

_______________

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY CORPS,

October 8, 1863.

GENERAL: I respectfully report that the number of Confederates buried by this command at Gettysburg was 4 officers and 91 enlisted men; total, 95.

I am, general, very respectfully,

JOHN SEDGWICK,

Major-General, Commanding Sixth Corps.

 Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 1 (Serial No. 43),  p. 663-4; George William Curtis, Correspondence of John Sedgwick, Major-General, Volume 2, p. 138-42

Colonel Charles Russell Lowell to Josephine Shaw, July 1, 1863

POOLESVILLE, July 1, 1863.

On Friday night at half past ten, I got orders to report next day to General Slocum. As I had to get in my patrols from a space of over thirty miles and had besides to reduce the baggage of the Regiment from eight wagons to two, I didn't start till 8.30 the next morning, made a comfortable march of twenty-five miles, reported as ordered, and went quietly into bivouac for the night, as I supposed. But about 11 came two despatches from General Heintzelman, one ordering me to remain at Poolesville, or to return if I had left, the other notifying me that General Halleck sent the same order. I was considerably disturbed, and telegraphed at once to General Hooker and to General Heintzelman and notified General Slocum. In the morning, 4 o'clock, I got order from General Hooker to report to General French, and from French to report immediately; also orders from Heintzelman to take no orders that did not come through his, Heintzelman's, Headquarters. This was embarrassing, but I decided with much reluctance to obey Heintzelman, as he was backed by Halleck, though I was sorely tempted to stay with Hooker in the Army of the Potomac. So I moved down the Potomac about fifty-seven miles, and, when I reached the mouth of the Monocacy, met some of my wagons with the news that the rebels in strong force had crossed the Potomac at the very ford I was especially to watch; that there had been no picket there at all, and no notice had gone either to Washington or to Hooker till nearly twelve hours after the crossing. Of course I was troubled, expecting that I should be made the scapegoat, although I was only to blame for having been unmilitary enough to express a wish to General Hooker to serve in a more active place and to leave the “all quiet along the Potomac” to some poorer regiment. I had no forage, but fortunately had rations in the wagons, which I issued, and started in pursuit.¹ I made excellent time and was far ahead on the Washington side, of any other troops. It was in an interval of pursuit, after two nights without much sleep, that I wrote that disagreeable pencil note. We did a good deal of hard marching Monday and Tuesday, but captured a lieutenant and four privates, and managed to keep Heintzelman pretty well informed of the movements of the Rebels who were in large force (Stuart with three brigades and Wade Hampton's legion), but I was still anxious lest I should be placed in arrest for leaving my post without orders from proper authority, — as not a word had I heard from Heintzelman, — and was very much relieved yesterday afternoon, when a despatch arrived stating that the General Commanding was gratified with my activity, and ordering me back to Poolesville as before. So back I have come, making a march of over thirty miles after 5 o'clock last evening, and reaching here in just the condition to enjoy amazingly the six hours of balmy languor which I have indulged in, — and then at length came the wagons and a general refreshment and reorganization of toilette. . . .

Wars are bad, but there are many things far worse. I believe more in “keeping gunpowder dry” than you do, but am quite convinced that we are likely to suffer a great deal before the end of this.

_______________

¹ Colonel Lowell, in a report to headquarters at Washington during this pursuit, telling that the enemy are apparently out of reach, unless driven back towards him by Hooker's cavalry, cheerfully ends thus: “Rations are out to-day, but I can manage, if you have any information that they are likely to return this way. Shall wait here for orders from you.”

SOURCE: Edward Waldo Emerson, Life and Letters of Charles Russell Lowell, p. 268-70, 428-9

Colonel Charles Russell Lowell to Josephine Shaw, June 26, 1863

Poolesville, June 26, 1863.

We have come to Poolesville just at the right moment — the whole army is passing here. I have seen a great many officers whom I know — especially at Headquarters, which are here to-night.

While I have been writing this, I have received orders to march to-morrow to Knoxville, to report to Major-General Slocum for temporary duty.¹

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¹ General Hooker, commanding the Army of the Potomac, sent this order to Lowell, who was at Poolesville, Maryland, watching the Potomac for spies, blockade-runners, guerrillas, or important raids. Lowell obeyed, and reported to Slocum, and was sent to Sandy Hook. June 28, Major-General Schenck, commanding Middle Department at Baltimore, was hastily notified from Washington: “A strong brigade of the enemy's cavalry have crossed . . . near Poolesville. Colonel Lowell, with five companies of the 2d Mass. Cavalry, who are there, should be warned, so that he may be ready for an attack.” Then Halleck, General-in-Chief, learned that Lowell was not there, and telegraphed Hooker: “Lowell's cavalry is the only force for scouts in this department, and he cannot be taken from General Heintzelman's command.” Lowell was also telegraphed to take no orders from General Hooker, and to return and watch the fords from Poolesville to Harper's Ferry. But unhappily Stuart had passed in his absence. Lowell's force was not large enough to cope with the rebel force, had he been there, and the raid seems to have resulted in more good than harm. General Doubleday, in his Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, says: “It is thought that he [Stuart] hoped by threatening Hooker's rear to detain him and delay his crossing the river, and thus give time to Lee to capture Harrisburg, and perhaps Philadelphia. His raid on this occasion was undoubtedly a mistake. When he rejoined the main body, his men were exhausted, his horses broken down, and the battle of Gettysburg was nearly over.”

SOURCE: Edward Waldo Emerson, Life and Letters of Charles Russell Lowell, p. 267, 428

Major-General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, December 3, 1864

Headquarters Army Of The Potomac, December 3, 1864.

I received the two volumes of the Army and Navy Review (British) and have read with great interest Captain Chesney's critique of the battle of Gettysburg. It is decidedly the most impartial account of this battle that I have read, and I think does more justice to my acts and motives than any account by my countrymen, including the grand address of Mr. Everett. What has struck me with surprise is the intimate knowledge of many facts not made very public at the time, such as Slocum's hesitation about reinforcing Howard, Butterfield's drawing up an order to withdraw, and other circumstances of a like nature. This familiarity with details evidences access to some source of information on our side, other than official reports or newspaper accounts. Captain Chesney's facts are singularly accurate, though he has fallen into one or two errors. I was never alarmed about my small arm ammunition, and after Hancock's repulsing the enemy on the 3d, I rode to the left, gave orders for an immediate advance, and used every exertion to have an attack made; but before the troops could be got ready, it became dark. There is no doubt the fatigue and other results of the three days' fighting had produced its effect on the troops and their movements were not as prompt as they would otherwise have been. I have no doubt all his statements about Lee, and his having been overruled, are true. Lee never before or since has exhibited such audacity. I am glad this impartial account by a foreign military critic has been written.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 248-9

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Lyman to Elizabeth Russell Lyman, September 24, 1863

September 24, 1863

Yesterday we were favored with the presence of Sir Henry Holland, the Queen's physician, who is one of the liveliest old birds for one of seventy-five that ever was seen. He travels two months every year, and has already been four or five times in these United States. Dr. Letterman, the Medical Director, put him in an ambulance, and Colonel Townsend and myself completed the party. What pains wounded people may suffer in ambulances, I know not; but I do know that, when driven at a trot, over open fields and through little ditches, the jolting is not to be expressed in words. But the royal medical person maintained his equanimity wonderfully and continued to smile, as if he were having a nice drive over a turnpike. First he was halted on a rising spot, when he could see four batteries of horse artillery, which did defile before him, to his great admiration. Then we bumped him six miles farther, to the Headquarters of the 12th Corps, close to the river. Here he hobnobbed with General Slocum, and then got on a horse and rode about the camps. After which he was taken to a safe spot, whence he could behold the Rebels and their earthworks. He returned quite fresh and departed in a most amiable mood.

There seems to me no particular prospect of a battle. I thought this morning, that we should have a great fight within a couple of days; but movements, which I dare say you will read of in the papers before this letter reaches you, have just knocked it. Entre nous, I believe in my heart that at this moment there is no reason why the whole of Lee's army should not be either cut to pieces, or in precipitate flight on Richmond. In saying this to you, I accuse nobody and betray no secrets, but merely state my opinion. Your bricks and mortar may be of the best; but, if there are three or four chief architects, none of whom can agree where to lay the first brick, the house will rise slowly.

SOURCE: George R. Agassiz, Editor, Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox, p. 21-2

Major-General George G. Meade to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, July 31, 1863

UNOFFICIAL.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

July 31, 1863.

Major-General HALLECK,

General-in-Chief :

MY DEAR GENERAL: I thank you most sincerely and heartily for your kind and generous letter of the 28th instant, received last evening.  It would be wrong in me to deny that I feared there existed in the minds of both the President and yourself an idea that I had failed to do what another would and could have done in the withdrawal of Lee's army. The expression you have been pleased to use in your letter, to wit, “a feeling of disappointment,” is one that I cheerfully accept and readily admit was as keenly felt by myself as any one. But permit me, dear general, to call your attention to the distinction between disappointment and dissatisfaction. The one was a natural feeling, in view of the momentous consequences that would have resulted from a successful attack, but does not necessarily convey with it any censure. I could not view the use of the latter expression in any other light than as intending to convey an expression of opinion on the part of the President that I had failed to do what I might and should have done. Now, let me say, in the frankness which characterizes your letter, that perhaps the President was right; if such was the case, it was my duty to give him an opportunity to replace me by one better fitted for the command of the army. It was, I assure you, with such feelings that I applied to be relieved. It was not from any personal consideration, for I have tried in this whole war to forget all personal considerations, and have always maintained they should not for an instant influence any one's actions.

Of course you will understand that I do not agree that the President was right, and I feel sure when the true state of the case comes to be known, that however natural and great may be the feeling of disappointment, no blame will be attached to any one.

Had I attacked Lee the day I proposed to do so, and in the ignorance that then existed of his position, I have every reason to believe the attack would have been unsuccessful, and would have resulted disastrously. This opinion is founded on the judgment of numerous distinguished officers, after inspecting Lee's vacated works and position. Among these officers I could name Generals Sedgwick, Wright, Slocum, Hays, Sykes, and others.

The idea that Lee had abandoned his lines early in the day that he withdrew, I have positive intelligence is not correct, and that not a man was withdrawn till after dark. I mention these facts to remove the impression, which newspaper correspondents have given the public, that it was only necessary to advance to secure an easy victory. I had great responsibility thrown on me. On one side were the known and important fruits of victory, and, on the other, the equally important and terrible consequences of a defeat. I considered my position at Williamsport very different from that at Gettysburg. When I left Frederick, it was with the firm determination to attack and fight Lee, without regard to time or place, as soon as I could come in contact with him; but after defeating him, and requiring him to abandon his schemes of invasion, I did not think myself justified in making a blind attack simply to prevent his escape, and running all the risks attending such a venture. Now, as I said before, in this, perhaps, I erred in judgment, for I take this occasion to say to you, and through you to the President, that I have no pretensions to any superior capacity for the post he has assigned me to; that all I can do is to exert my utmost efforts and do the best I can; but that the moment those who have a right to judge my actions think, or feel satisfied, either that I am wanting or that another would do better, that moment I earnestly desire to be relieved, not on my own account, but on account of the country and the cause.

You must excuse so much egotism, but your kind letter in a measure renders it necessary. I feel, general, very proud of your good opinion, and assure you I shall endeavor in the future to continue to merit it.

Reciprocating the kind feeling you have expressed, I remain, general, most truly and respectfully, yours,

 GEO. G. MEADE,

 Major-General.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 1 (Serial No. 43), p. 108-9; George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 139-41

Major-General George G. Mead to Major-Generals Oliver Otis Howard and Henry W. Slocum, July 5, 1863

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

July 5, 1863.

Commanding Officer Twelfth Corps:

In consequence of information received from General Sedgwick of the enemy in his presence, the movement ordered will be stopped where it is until further orders. Send a staff officer to these headquarters to-night for orders.

Very respectfully, &c.,

 S. WILLIAMS,

 Assistant Adjutant-General.

(Same to commanding officer Eleventh Corps.)

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 125; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 3 (Serial No. 45), p. 533

Major-General Oliver O. Howard to Major-General George G. Meade, July 1, 1863 – 5 p.m.

HDQRS. ELEVENTH CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

July 1, 1863 – 5 p.m.

GENERAL: General Reynolds attacked the enemy as soon as he arrived, with one division, about 10.45 a.m. He moved to the front of the town, driving in the enemy's advance for about half a mile, when he met with a strong force of A. P. Hill's corps. I pushed on as fast as I could by a parallel road; placed my corps in position on his right. General Reynolds was killed at 11.15 a.m. I assumed command of the two corps, and sent word to Slocum and Sickles to move up. I have fought the enemy from that time till this. The First Corps fell back, when outflanked on its left, to a stronger position, when the Eleventh Corps was ordered back, also to a stronger position.

General Hancock arrived at 4 p.m., and communicated his instructions. I am still holding on at this time.

Slocum is near, but will not come up to assume command.

Respectfully,

 O. O. HOWARD,

 Major-General.

General MEADE.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 55; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 1 (Serial No. 43), p. 696

Major-General Daniel A. Butterfield to Major-General John Sedgwick, July 1, 1863 – 7:30 p.m.

HEADQUARTERS,

Taneytown, July 1, 1863 – 7.30 p.m.

Major-General SEDGWICK:

GENERAL: The major-general commanding directs me to say that a general battle seems to be impending to-morrow at Gettysburg; that it is of the utmost importance that your command should be up. He directs that you stop all trains that impede your progress, or turn them out of the road. Your march will have to be a forced one to reach the scene of action, where we shall probably be largely outnumbered without your presence.

If any shorter road presents itself, without difficulty in getting up, you will use your discretion in taking it, and report the facts to these headquarters.

General Sykes has been ordered up from Hanover to Gettysburg, and General Slocum from Littlestown; General Hancock's corps from here. The whole army are there (Gettysburg), or under way for that point.

The general desires you to report here in person, without delay, the moment you receive this. He is waiting to see you here before going to the front.

I am, very respectfully,

 DANL. BUTTERFIELD,

Major-General, Chief of Staff.

[P. S.] – The trains will all go to Westminster and Union Bridge, as ordered.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 40; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 3 (Serial No. 45), p. 467-8

Major-General George G. Meade to Major Generals Winfield Scott Hancock and Abner Doubleday, July 1, 1863 – 6 p.m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

July 1, 1863 – 6 p.m.

Major-Generals HANCOCK and DOUBLEDAY:

If General Slocum is on the field, and I hope he is, of course he takes command. Say to him I thought it prudent to leave a division of the Third Corps at Emmitsburg, to hold in check any force attempting to come through there. It can be ordered up to-night, if' necessary. Sedgwick is moving up here, and will be pushed forward in the night, if required. It seems to me we have so concentrated that a battle at Gettysburg is now forced on us, and that, if we get up all our people, and attack with our whole force to-morrow, we ought to defeat the force the enemy has.

Very respectfully, &c.,

 GEO. G. MEADE,

 Major-General, Commanding.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 39; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 3 (Serial No. 45), p. 466

Major-General Winfield Scott Hancock to Major-General Daniel A. Butterfield, July 1, 1863 – 5:25 p.m.

5.25 [P.M., JULY 1, 1863.]

GENERAL: When I arrived here an hour since, I found that our troops had given up the front of Gettysburg and the town. We have now taken up a position in the cemetery, and cannot well be taken. It is a position, however, easily turned. Slocum is now coming on the ground, and is taking position on the right, which will protect the right. But we have, as yet, no troops on the left, the Third Corps not having yet reported; but I suppose that it is marching up. If so, its flank march will in a degree protect our left flank. In the meantime Gibbon had better march on so as to take position on our right or left, to our rear, as may be necessary, in some commanding position. General G. will see this dispatch. The battle is quiet now. I think we will be all right until night. I have sent all the trains back. When night comes, it can be told better what had best be done. I think we can retire; if not, we can fight here, as the ground appears not unfavorable with good troops. I will communicate in a few moments with General Slocum, and transfer the command to him.

Howard says that Doubleday's command gave way.

General Warren is here.

Your obedient servant,

 WINF'D S. HANCOCK,

 Major-General, Commanding Corps.

 General BUTTERFIELD,

 Chief of Staff.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 38-9; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 1 (Serial No. 43), p. 366

Major General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, May 20, 1863

CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., May 20, 1863.

The battle of Chancellorsville was a miserable failure, in which Hooker disappointed me greatly. His plan was admirably designed, and the early part of it, entrusted to others, was well executed; but after he had assembled his army on the other side near Chancellorsville, instead of striking at once vigorously and instantly, before the enemy, who were surprised, could concentrate, he delayed; gave them thirty-six hours to bring up and dispose of their troops; permitted them to attack him, and after their doing so, failed to take advantage of their error in dividing and separating their forces, but allowed them to engage only about half his army and to unite their forces after driving back a portion of ours. He then assumed the defensive, doing nothing for two days, while we could hear Sedgwick's guns, and knew they were trying to crush him and must succeed. Finally he withdrew to this side, giving up all the advantages gained, and having to recross with all the obstacles and difficulties increased. Notwithstanding these are my views, I have abstained from making them known to any one, out of consideration for Hooker, who has always pretended to be very friendly to me. I declined to join Couch in a representation to the President, when he was down here, and I refused to join Slocum, who desired to take action to have Hooker removed. I told both these gentlemen I would not join in any movement against Hooker, but that if the President chose to call on me officially for my opinions, I would give them. I have spoken to no one but Governor Curtin, and to him only because he came to see me and spoke so freely and bitterly against Hooker, that I allowed myself to say a part of what I have above written. I considered my conversation with Governor Curtin private, and did not expect he would repeat it or quote me. I have seen Senators Wade, Chandler, Wilson and Doolittle, all of whom have been down here to find out what they could, but I have abstained from saying anything, as they did not think proper to ask me any questions. Hooker is safe, I think, from the difficulty of finding a successor, and from the ridiculous appearance we present of changing our generals after each battle. He may, and I trust he will, do better next time; but unless he shows more aptitude than in the last affair, he will be very apt to be defeated again. Lee committed a terrible blunder in allowing us to come back; he might have destroyed us by a vigorous attack while we were retreating.

The review of my corps passed off very well yesterday, and Lord Abinger expressed himself greatly pleased. After the review I had a collation at my quarters, which seemed to be equally pleasing to his lordship. He said that if he had time to stop in Philadelphia, he would hunt you up.

Turnbull, who was at the review, showed me a few lines he had received from Proctor Smith, by a flag of truce that went after the wounded. Smith is Chief Engineer on Lee's staff. He begs to be remembered to you and me. Beckham is major of artillery and commands a battery with Stuart's cavalry. Smith is colonel.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1, p. 379-80

Major General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, May 10, 1863

CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, May 10, 1863.

There is a great deal of talking in the camp, and I see the press is beginning to attack Hooker. I think these last operations have shaken the confidence of the army in Hooker's judgment, particularly among the superior officers. I have been much gratified at the frequent expression of opinion that I ought to be placed in command. Three of my seniors (Couch, Slocum and Sedgwick) have sent me word that they were willing to serve under me. Couch, I hear, told the President he would not serve any longer under Hooker, and recommended my assignment to the command. I mention all this confidentially. I do not attach any importance to it, and do not believe there is the slightest probability of my being placed in command. I think I know myself, and am sincere when I say I do not desire the command; hence I can quietly attend to my duties, uninfluenced by what is going on around me, at the same time expressing, as I feel, great gratification that the army and my senior generals should think so well of my services and capacity as to be willing to serve under me. Having no political influence, being no intriguer, and indeed unambitious of the distinction, it is hardly probable I shall be called on to accept or decline. I see the papers attribute Hooker's withdrawal to the weak councils of his corps commanders. This is a base calumny. Four out of six of his corps commanders were positive and emphatic in their opposition to the withdrawal, and he did it contrary to their advice. Hooker, however, I should judge, feels very secure, and does not seem concerned. I have no idea what his next move will be. For my part it would seem that all projects based on pursuing this line of operations having been tried and failed, we should try some other route. Yet the Administration is so wedded to this line that it will be difficult to get authority to change.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1, p. 373-4

Brigadier General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, June 18, 1862

CAMP NEAR “NEW BRIDGE,” June 18, 1862.

Late last night orders came for our division to march at early daylight this morning, which we did, arriving here about 11 A. M., and relieving Slocum's (formerly Franklin's) division, being thus posted on the extreme right flank of our army and in the front. The enemy are in plain view of our picket line, we holding here the left bank of the Chickahominy, and they the opposite one. There is quite a wide bottom and swamp between the two banks, but our respective pickets are within musket range of each other. But shots are not exchanged unless there is a collection on either side, looking like an advance or a working party. The “New Bridge,” as it is called, you have doubtless seen mentioned and referred to in the newspapers. It is the bridge by which one of the main roads into Richmond crosses the Chickahominy. We hold the approaches on this side, the enemy on the other. They are throwing up earthworks to prevent our crossing, and all the afternoon our batteries have been shelling their working parties, and they have been shelling our batteries, with I fancy no damage on either side. The "New Bridge" is only five miles from Richmond, and from the high grounds near our camp we can plainly discern the spires of the Sacred City. To-morrow Reynolds and Seymour go to Mechanicsville, which is a little higher up the river and about four and a half miles from the city. Immediately adjoining our camp we have Fitz-John Porter's corps, in which General Morell now commands a division. Stoneman's division of cavalry is also in our vicinity, as well as Sykes's brigade of regulars. Willie¹ has been with me all the afternoon. He looks very well — better than he did at Alexandria.

Did you see in the papers of the 12th the instructions of Joe Johnston to Stonewall Jackson? I hope you have, for they most singularly confirm my expressed views of the object of Jackson's raid. Johnston tells him that anything he can do, either to prevent reinforcements reaching McClellan or to withdraw any portion of his force, will be of inestimable service; suggests his attacking either McDowell or Banks — whichever he thinks most practicable — and says it is reported McDowell is about advancing on Richmond, which he, Johnston, thinks extremely probable. You see how completely Jackson succeeded in carrying out these, by paralyzing McDowell's force of forty thousand men, through the stupidity of the authorities at Washington becoming alarmed and sending McDowell on a wild-goose chase after a wily foe, who never intended to be caught in a trap, and was prepared to back out so soon as his plans proved successful. I must do McDowell the justice to say that he saw this himself, but no protest on his part could shake the strategy of the War Department.

We are so near the enemy that we hear their bands distinctly at tattoo and parade. On our side no drums, bugles or bands are allowed, except to announce the approach of the enemy. I can hardly tell you how I felt this afternoon, when the old familiar sound of the heavy firing commenced. I thought of you and the dear children — of how much more I have to make me cling to life than during the Mexican War; I thought, too, of how I was preserved then and since in many perilous times through God's mercy and will, and prayed He would continue His gracious protection to me, and in His own good time restore me to you, or if this was not His will, and it was decreed that I was to be summoned, that He would forgive me, for His Son's sake, the infinite number of sins I have all my life been committing. You see, I do not shut my eyes to the contingencies of the future, but I look upon them with a hopeful eye and a firm reliance on the mercy of my heavenly Father. It is now 10 o'clock at night, dark and rainy. All is quiet in both camps, and the immense hosts arrayed against each other are, doubtless, quietly and peacefully sleeping, unless some one with thoughts like those I have expressed has a disturbing conscience.

__________

¹ William Sergeant, brother of Mrs. Meade.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1, p. 275-7

Major General William T. Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, May 10, 1865

CAMP OPPOSITE RICHMOND, May 10, 1865.

I wrote you on arrival from Savannah at Old Point. I got here yesterday and found my Army all in. Have seen Charley,¹ who is very well. We march tomorrow for Alexandria, whither I have sent my office papers. We will march slowly and leisurely and should reach Alexandria in ten or twelve days. I may have chance to write you meantime. I want you to go and attend your Fair, and say little of me, save that I regard my presence with my Army so important that I will not leave it till it is discharged or sent on new duties. I shall surely spend the summer with you, preferably at Lancaster, but will come to Chicago or wherever you may be when I can leave with propriety. This Army has stood by me in public and private dangers, and I must maintain my hold on it till it ceases to exist. All the officers and men have been to see me in camp to-day and they received with shouts my public denial of a review for Halleck.²  He had ordered Slocum's wing to pass him in review to-day. I forbade it. Tomorrow I march through Richmond with colors flying and drums beating as a matter of right and not by Halleck's favor, and no notice will be taken of him personally or officially. I dare him to oppose my march. He will think twice before he again undertakes to stand between me and my subordinates. Unless Grant interposes from his yielding and good nature I shall get some equally good opportunity to insult Stanton. . . .

Stanton wants to kill me because I do not favor the scheme of declaring the negroes of the South, now free, to be loyal voters, whereby politicians may manufacture just so much more pliable electioneering material. The Negroes don't want to vote. They want to work and enjoy property, and they are no friends of the Negro who seek to complicate him with new prejudices. As to the people of the South they are subjugated, but of course do not love us any more than the Irish or Scotch love the English, but that is no reason why we should assume all the expenses of their state governments. Our power is now so firmly established that we need not fear again their internal disturbances. I have papers and statistics which I will show your father in time. I showed some to Charley to-day and he perfectly agreed with me; so do all my officers. . . .

We cannot kill disarmed men. All this clamor after Jeff Davis, Thompson and others is all bosh. Any young man with a musket is now a more dangerous object than Jeff Davis. He is old, infirm, a fugitive hunted by his own people, and none so poor as do him reverence. It will be well in June before I can expect to leave my army. Don't attempt to come to Alexandria for I will be in a common tent, and overwhelmed with papers and business. Ord, Merritt, Crook, and all the big men of Halleck's army have been to see me, and share with me the disgust occasioned by their base betrayal of my confidence. . . .

__________

¹ General Charles Ewing.

² See Memoirs, II, 374. Sherman's refusal to accept Halleck's hospitality in Richmond is recorded on the same page

SOURCES: M. A. DeWolfe Howe, Editor, Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 352-4.  A full copy of this letter can be found in the William T Sherman Family papers (SHR), University of Notre Dame Archives (UNDA), Notre Dame, IN 46556, Folder CSHR 2/24

Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant to Congressman Elihu B. Washburne, June 9, 1864

Cold Harbor, Virginia,

June 9, 1864.

YOUR two letters inclosing orders published by Major-General Washburn have been received. I highly approve the course he is taking, and am glad to see that General Slocum is pursuing a similar course about Vicksburg. I directed some days ago that the Sixteenth Corps staff should report to your brother. I recommend, however, that no commander be named for the Sixteenth Corps until Sherman is heard from, to know whether he would not prefer the consolidation of that portion of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps in the field into one corps, and that serving in garrison from these two corps into another. It makes but little difference, however, about this, for as soon as this campaign is over it is probable there will be a reconstruction of departments and commands.

. . . . Everything is progressing favorably, but slowly. All the fight, except defensive and behind breastworks, is taken out of Lee's army. Unless my next move brings on a battle, the balance of the campaign will settle down to a siege. . . .

SOURCE: James Grant Wilson, Editor, General Grant’s Letters to a Friend 1861-1880, p. 34-5

THE MARCH TO THE SEA

From Atlanta to the Atlantic

From the Hawk-Eye

HOW SHERMAN MARCHED

The scouts report that throughout the march the army moved in four columns, Howard on the right, and Slocum on the left, with cavalry on the front and rear. In this manner, it covered a strip of nearly sixty miles in width. For 300 miles Sherman has cut through Georgia a swath of nearly 60 miles. It would seem that the “hero turned fugitive” might have been found somewhere in this tract of 18,000 square miles. If the search for him had been very earnest.

Immediately after leaving Atlanta, the column marched toward Macon devastated the country for miles west of the Macon and Atlanta Railroad, in order to retard the progress of Hood, should he attempt to follow in on Sherman’s rear.

WHAT OPPOSITION WAS ENCOUNTERED

Not the least significant and cheering fact of the march is, that but very little opposition to the grand raid, or rather occupation, was met. In their haste to fly, bridges over the small streams were, in several instances, left unburned by the citizens. They were terrified out of their discretion, and failed to respond to the despairing appeals of Generals and Legislators, to fell trees, burn bridges, and destroy subsistence. In no place was the road seriously blockaded, and the stores that were burned were fired by the rebel cavalry, who were feared by the agricultural Georgians as much as the Yankees. The horses were secreted in the swamps to escape both parties. We got nearly all, because the indispensable negro was very apt to designate the spots where the coming cavalry nags were to be fund. Our troops had a few skirmishes, in all of which they were successful. If Wheeler defeated Kilpatrick at any time, no one in Sherman’s army was aware of the fact when our scouts left it.

THE CAPTURE OF MILLEDGEVILLE

The rebel papers make no mention of the ludicrous fact that Milledgeville was surrendered to our scouts two days before the main army reached the town. – These scouts were met by the Mayor, who insisted on surrendering the place, only asking what private property should be respected. – These triumphant captors, after their informal entrée, proceeded to open the Penitentiary, releasing about one hundred and fifty inmates, some of them members of the Federal army, confined for what were really military offenses. Very few of the citizens remained, and those who did were not disturbed. On leaving Milledgeville, our forces burned the State buildings, exploded a quantity of ammunition and destroyed the depots.

A FIELD ORDER FROM SHERMAN

While in Milledgeville, a citizen made a complaint to Sherman having been robbed of a considerable amount in money and a valuable gold watch, establishing the fact with abundant evidence. Sherman immediately issued an order declaring that any of his army found engaged in stealing money or articles of no military value, of ravishing or wantonly burning private property, would be shot. The order was not violated, so far as could be ascertained.

DAMAGE TO THE GEORGIA RAILROADS

Our scouts assert that Sherman has completely destroyed the great railroad quadrilateral, of which Atlanta, Macon, Augusta, and Savannah are the four corners. The railroad leading east from Atlanta to Augusta is destroyed for over seventy miles, including bridges over the Yellow and contiguous rivers. The railroad running south from Atlanta to Macon, is destroyed for eighty miles. The railroad running east from Macon to Savannah is destroyed for a distance estimated at from ninety to one hundred miles. The railroad running between Augusta and Savannah is destroyed from Wanesboro [sic] to Savannah, a distance of over eighty miles. The Gulf Railroad has been cut, and Sherman’s position, when last heard from, insures that he holds the Charleston and Savannah Railroad.

We learn that this wholesale work of destruction was carried on leisurely, and with an eye of completeness. Every rail was heated and bent; every tie, bridge, water station, tank, wood-shed, and depot building, burned, and every culvert blown up. For miles on the Macon and Savannah, and the Augusta and Savannah Roads, the track is carried over marshy territory by extensive trestlework. – this is all burned, and will be very difficult to replace. In all, Sherman has completely destroyed nearly 400 miles of railroad track, and as he was nearly a month in doing it, we may readily believe that it is well done.

OUR PRISONERS NOT RELEASED

The Hopes that Sherman would reach Millen in time to release the body of our prisoners were not realized. The rebels had abundant opportunity to remove them by rail and on foot. They were hurried to Columbia, South Carolina, via Savannah, several days before our advance reached Millen.

THE CAPTURE OF FORT MACALISTER

On the 15th Inst., Hazen’s division (commanded by Gen. Sherman himself formerly,) of the 15th Corps, was ordered to storm Fort MacAllister after a demand for its surrender had been refused. The charge was made in column at the double-quick, and in less than fifteen minutes from the time the word to storm was given, our flag floated from the fort, which is strongly built of sand, with deep ditches and massive parapets. The garrison, consisting of three hundred men, were captured, together with twenty-three fine guns of heavy caliber. The loss of the division in the charge was seventy killed and wounded. The great strength of Fort MacAllister renders its capture by storm a feat of arms second to no valorous achievement of the war. It was Gen. Hazen’s division which bore the brunt of Hardee’s attack upon our right at Jonesboro the day before the rebel evacuation of Atlanta, so its talent for defense and offense is pretty firmly established. Gen. Sherman may be justly proud to say, as he did in describing the assault, “that was once my division.”

SHERMAN’S POSITION AROUND SAVANNAH

General Sherman feels certain that Savannah is his legitimate property, and the position of his forces around it at this moment would seem fully to justify his anticipations. The main body of his army is on the west of the city, stretching around it somewhat on the south. He has passed a body of infantry north of the Savannah River, the only direction of escape for the garrison.

The situation is simply this: Sherman with an army of veterans, out numbering the garrison four to one – perhaps more – is beleaguering Savannah, holding all the railroad communications, and has passed a body of troops north of the Savannah River, almost directly in the rear of the force which has been confronting general Foster at Pocotaligo, and hindered a seizure of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad north of the river. – The only avenue for the garrison to escape, is over a marshy [country], between Foster’s army, near Pocotaligo, and Sherman’s force, north of the Savannah River, and it is only through this interval (which may at any moment be closed,) that further reinforcements or supplies can enter Savannah. Since the war began we have never had such immense advantage over the garrison of any city in the South. At the very initiation of the investment we hold all railroads and have very nearly closed all outlet and inlet.

The water batteries below Savannah are on the south side of the river, and are liable to fall as Fort McAllister fell, provided enough firm land can be found in the rear of them to permit the movement of a sufficient body of troops.

SHERMAN’S NEW BASE

Sherman has now as safe and convenient a base of supplies as Grant. Indeed in some respects he has advantages over the armies on the James. His supplies ascend the Ogeechee river a short distance, and reach him after landing by a few miles transportation over a splendid shell road. – His flanks are protected by the Savannah river on the left, and the Ogeechee on the right, while his rear is approachable only through a strip of country south of Millen, flanked on both sides by impenetrable swamps. Unlimited supplies can be sent from Port Royal, and any number of heavy guns from the same well stocked post. He is five days from New York, three days from Fortress Monroe. He is in an invigorating winter climate, as you may imagine from the fact that I write with my coat off and my pocket-handkerchief in easy supporting distance, and I am thirty miles north of the latitude of Savannah. The weather is deliciously spring-line; just such a day as you would think clever for a Northern June.

THR TROOPS WANT TO GO TO SOUTH CAROLINA

Sherman related that during the march he was often assailed by good humored request from the ranks to be taken to South Carolina. There is a settled conviction in Sherman’s veterans that it is part of their mission to make the tour of the hot-beds of treason, and if they do we fancy the flower pots will suffer somewhat. With the talent for desolating a country, acquired and acquiring by that army, we are led to expect that the next census of the State that first fired on the flag now planted again on its borders will be very easily taken; It will be impossible to restrain the men; and it is almost impossible to wish to have them restrained from wiping from existence so foul an enemy to the Republic.

– Published in The Union Sentinel, Osceola, Iowa, Friday, December 30, 1864