Chase called on me this morning. Wishes a secret concerted
attack on Richmond. Says Stanton will furnish 10,000 men. Told him we would do
all that could be expected of the Navy in a sudden movement, but doubted if a
military expedition could be improvised as speedily and decisively as he
supposed. He thought it could certainly be effected in six days. I told him to
try. We would have a naval force ready in that tune, though not so large and
powerful as I would wish; but we would do our part.
Chase tells me that Harrington, Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury, was at Fortress Monroe last Thursday and heard Bankhead, who commands
the Minnesota, say that the Government was a poor affair, that the
Administration was inefficient, that it is time the politicians were cleared
out of Washington and the army in power. Harrington called subsequently and
confirmed the statement, — less strong perhaps in words but about as offensive.
I requested him to reduce his statement to writing.
At the Executive Mansion, the Secretary of State informed us
there was to be no Cabinet-meeting. He was authorized by the President to
communicate the fact. Smith said it would be as well, perhaps, to postpone the
Cabinet-meetings altogether and indefinitely, — there seemed no use latterly
for our coming together. Others expressed corresponding opinions. Seward turned
off, a little annoyed.
An unfavorable impression is getting abroad in regard to the
President and the Administration, not without reason, perhaps, which prompted
Smith and others to express their minds freely. There is really very little of
a government here at this time, so far as most of the Cabinet are concerned;
certainly but little consultation in this important period. Seward, when in
Washington, spends more or less of each day with the President, absorbs his
attention, and I fear to an extent influences his action not always wisely. The
President has good sense, intelligence, and an excellent heart, but is sadly
perplexed and distressed by events. He, to an extent, distrusts his own
administrative ability and experience. Seward, instead of strengthening and
fortifying him, encourages this self-distrust, but is not backward in giving
his own judgment and experience, which are often defective expedients, to guide
the Executive. A conviction of this state of things stirred up Smith to make
his remarks. The President has, I believe, sincere respect and regard for each
and every member of the Cabinet, but Seward seeks, and has at times, influence,
which is sometimes harmful. The President would often do better without him,
were he to follow his own instincts, or were he to consult all his advisers in
council. He would find his own opinions confirmed and be convinced that
Seward's suggestions are frequently unwise and weak and temporizing. No one
attempts to obtrude himself, or warn the President, or even to suggest to him
that others than S. should be consulted on some of the important measures of
the Government. In fact, they are not informed of some of the measures which
are of general interest until they see them in operation, or hear of them from
others. Chase is much chafed by these things, and endeavors, and to some extent
succeeds, in also getting beside the President, and obtaining
information of what is going forward. But this only excites and stimulates
Seward, who has the inside track and means to keep it. The President is
unsuspicious, or apparently so; readily gives his ear to suggestions from any
one. Only one of his Cabinet, however, has manifested a disposition to
monopolize his attention; but the discussion of important measures is sometimes
checked almost as soon as introduced, and, without any consultation, or without
being again brought forward, they are disposed of, the Secretary of State alone
having had sometimes certainly a view, or ear, or eye in the matter. He alone
has abbreviated general consultation in many cases. With greater leisure than
most of the Cabinet officers, unless it be Smith of the Interior, he runs to
the President two or three times a day, gets his ear, gives him his tongue,
makes himself interesting by anecdotes, and artfully contrives with Stanton's
aid to dispose of measures without action or give them direction independent of
his associates. Under the circumstances, I perhaps am, latterly, as little
interfered with as any one, though the duties of the State and Navy Departments
run together; yet I am sometimes excessively annoyed and embarrassed by
meddlesome intrusions and inconsiderate and unauthorized action by the
Secretary of State. The Navy Department has, necessarily, greater intimacy, or
connection, with the State Department than any other, for, besides
international questions growing out of the blockade, our squadrons and
commanders abroad come in contact with our ministers, consuls, and commercial
agents, and each has intercourse with the Governments and representatives of
other nations. Mutual understanding and cooperation are therefore essential and
indispensable. But while I never attempt to direct the agents of the State
Department, or think of it, or to meddle with affairs in the appropriate sphere
of the Secretary of State, an entirely different course is pursued by him as
regards the Navy and naval operations. He is anxious to direct, to be the
Premier, the real Executive, and give away national rights as a favor. Since
our first conflict, however, when he secretly interfered with the Sumter
expedition and got up an enterprise to Pensacola, we have had no similar
encounter; yet there has been an itching propensity on his part to have a
controlling voice in naval matters with which he has no business, — which he
really does not understand, — and he sometimes improperly interferes as in the
disposition of mails on captured vessels. The Attorney-General has experienced
similar improper interference, more than any other perhaps; none are exempt.
But the Secretary of State, while meddlesome with others, is not at all
communicative of the affairs of his own Department. Scarcely any important
measures or even appointments of that Department are brought before us, except
by the President himself or by his express direction. The consequence is that
there is reticence by others and the Government is administered in a great
measure by Departments. Seward is inquisitive and learns early what is doing by
each of his associates, frequently before we meet in council, while the other
Cabinet officers limit themselves to their provided duties and are sometimes
wholly unadvised of his.
I have administered the Navy Department almost entirely
independent of Cabinet consultation, and I may say almost without direction of
the President, who not only gives me his confidence but intrusts all naval
matters to me. This has not been my wish. Though glad to have his confidence, I
should prefer that every important naval movement should pass a Cabinet review.
To-day, for instance, Wilkes was given the appointment of Acting Rear-Admiral,
and I have sent him off with a squadron to cruise in the West Indies. All this
has been done without Cabinet consultation, or advice with any one, except
Seward and the President. The detail and the reserve are at the instigation of
Seward, who wished Wilkes, between whom and himself, since the Trent affair,
there seems to be an understanding, to have a command, without specifying
where. In due time our associates in the Cabinet will learn the main facts and
infer that I withheld from them my orders. My instructions to our naval
officers, — commanders of squadrons or single ships, — cruising on our blockade
duty, have never been submitted to the Cabinet, though I have communicated them
freely to each. I have never read but one of my letters of instructions to the
President, and that was to Captain Mercer of the Powhatan in command of the
naval expedition to Sumter a few weeks after I entered upon my duties, and
those instructions were, covertly, set aside and defeated by Seward.
So in regard to each and all the Departments; if I have
known of their regulations and instructions, much of it has not been in Cabinet
consultations. Seward beyond any and all others is responsible for this state
of things. It has given him individual power, but often at the expense of good
administration.
In everything relating to military operations by land,
General Scott first, then McClellan, then Halleck, have directed and
controlled. The Government was virtually in the hands of the General-in-Chief,
so far as armies and military operations were concerned. The Administration had
no distinct military policy, was permitted to have none. The President was
generally advised and consulted, but Seward was the special confidant of
General Scott, was more than any one of McClellan, and, in conjunction with
Stanton, of Halleck. With wonderful kindness of heart and deference to others,
the President, with little self-esteem and unaffected modesty, has permitted
this and in a great measure has surrendered to military officers prerogatives
intrusted to himself. The mental qualities of Seward are almost the precise
opposite of the President. He is obtrusive and never reserved or diffident of
his own powers, is assuming and presuming, meddlesome, and uncertain, ready to
exercise authority always, never doubting his right until challenged; then he
becomes timid, uncertain, distrustful, and inventive of schemes to extricate
himself, or to change his position. He is not particularly scrupulous in
accomplishing an end, nor so mindful of what is due to others as would be
expected of one who aims to be always courteous towards equals. The President
he treats with a familiarity that sometimes borders on disrespect. The
President, though he observes this ostentatious presumption, never receives it
otherwise than pleasantly, but treats it as a weakness in one to whom he
attributes qualities essential to statesmanship, whose pliability is pleasant,
and whose ready shrewdness he finds convenient and acceptable.
With temperaments so constituted and so unlike it is not
surprising that the obsequious affability and ready assumption of the
subordinate presumed on and to an extent influenced the really superior
intellect of the principal, and made himself in a degree the centralizing
personage. While the President conceded to the Secretary of State almost all that
he assumed, not one of his colleagues made that concession. They treated his
opinions respectfully, but as no better than the opinions of others, except as
they had merit; and his errors they exposed and opposed as they deserved. One
or two have always been ready to avail themselves of the opportunity. In the
early days of the Administration the Cabinet officers were absorbed by labors
and efforts to make themselves familiar with their duties, so as rightly to
discharge them. Those duties were more onerous and trying, in consequence of
the overthrow of old parties and the advent of new men and new organizations,
with the great rupture that was going on in the Government, avowedly to destroy
it, than had ever been experienced by any of their predecessors.
Whilst the other members of the Cabinet were absorbed in
familiarizing themselves with their duties and in preparing for impending
disaster, the Secretary of State, less apprehensive of disaster, spent a
considerable portion of every day with the President, patronizing and
instructing him, hearing and telling anecdotes, relating interesting details of
occurrences in the Senate, and inculcating his political party notions. I think
he has no very profound or sincere convictions. Cabinet-meetings, which should,
at that exciting and interesting period, have been daily, were infrequent,
irregular, and without system. The Secretary of State notified his associates
when the President desired a meeting of the heads of Departments. It seemed
unadvisable to the Premier — as he liked to be called and considered — that the
members should meet often, and they did not. Consequently there was very little
concerted action.
At the earlier meetings there was little or no formality;
the Cabinet-meetings were a sort of privy council or gathering of equals, much
like a Senatorial caucus, where there was no recognized leader and the
Secretary of State put himself in advance of the President. No seats were
assigned or regularly taken. The Secretary of State was invariably present some
little time before the Cabinet assembled and from his former position as the
chief executive of the largest State in the Union, as well as from his recent
place as a Senator, and from his admitted experience and familiarity with
affairs, assumed, and was allowed, as was proper, to take the lead in
consultations and also to give tone and direction to the manner and mode of
proceedings. The President, if he did not actually wish, readily acquiesced in,
this. Mr. Lincoln, having never had experience in administering the Government,
State or National, deferred to the suggestions and course of those who had. Mr.
Seward was not slow in taking upon himself to prescribe action and doing most
of the talking, without much regard to the modest chief, but often to the
disgust of his associates, particularly Mr. Bates, who was himself always
courteous and respectful, and to the annoyance of Mr. Chase, who had, like Mr.
Seward, experience as a chief magistrate. Discussions were desultory and
without order or system, but in the summing-up and conclusions the President,
who was a patient listener and learner, concentrated results, and often
determined questions adverse to the Secretary of State, regarding him and his
opinions, as he did those of his other advisers, for what they were worth and
generally no more. But the want of system and free communication among all as
equals prevented that concert and comity which is really strength to an
administration.
Each head of a Department took up and managed the affairs
which devolved upon him as he best could, frequently without consulting his
associates, and as a consequence without much knowledge of the transactions of
other Departments, but as each consulted with the President, the Premier, from
daily, almost hourly, intercourse with him, continued, if not present at these
interviews, to ascertain the doings of each and all, though himself imparting
but little of his own course to any. Great events of a general character began
to impel the members to assemble daily, and sometimes General Scott was
present, and occasionally Commodore Stringham; at times others were called in.
The conduct of affairs during this period was awkward and embarrassing. After a
few weeks the members, without preconcert, expressed a wish to be better
advised on subjects for which they were all measurably responsible to the
country. The Attorney-General expressed his dissatisfaction with these informal
proceedings and advised meetings on stated days for general and current
affairs, and hoped, when there was occasion, special calls would be made. The
Secretary of State alone dissented, hesitated, doubted, objected, thought it
inexpedient, said all had so much to do that we could not spare the time; but
the President was pleased with the suggestion, if he did not prompt it, and
concurred with the rest of the Cabinet.
The form of proceeding was discussed; Mr. Seward thought
that would take care of itself. Some suggestions were made in regard to important
appointments which had been made by each head of Department, the Secretary of
State taking the lead in selecting high officials without general consultation.
There seemed an understanding between the Secretaries of State and Treasury,
who had charge of the most important appointments, of which understanding the
President was perhaps cognizant. Chase had extensive patronage, Seward
appointments of high character. The two arranged that each should make his own
selection of subordinates. These two men had political aspirations which did
not extend to their associates (with perhaps a single exception that troubled
neither). Chase thought he was fortifying himself by this arrangement, but he
often was overreached, and the arrangement was one of the mistakes of his life.
Without going farther into details, the effect, and probably
the intention, of these proceedings in those early days was to dwarf the
President and elevate the Secretary of State. The latter also circumscribed the
sphere of [the former] so far as he could. Many of the important measures,
particularly of his own Department, he managed to dispose of, or contrived to
have determined, independent of the Cabinet.
My early collision with him in some complications connected
with the Sumter and Pensacola expeditions, when he was so flagrantly wrong as
to be overruled by the President, caused us to get along thenceforward without
serious difficulties, though, our duties being intimate, we were often brought
together and had occasional disagreements.
Between Seward and Chase there was perpetual rivalry and
mutual but courtly distrust. Each was ambitious. Both had capacity. Seward was
supple and dexterous; Chase was clumsy and strong. Seward made constant
mistakes, but recovered with a facility that was wonderful and almost always
without injury to himself; Chase committed fewer blunders, but persevered in
them when made, often to his own serious detriment. In the fevered condition of
public opinion, the aims and policies of the [two] were strongly developed.
Seward, who had sustained McClellan and came to possess, more than any one else
in the Cabinet, his confidence, finally yielded to Stanton's vehement demands
and acquiesced in his sacrifice. Chase, from an original friend and
self-constituted patron of McC., became disgusted, alienated, an implacable
enemy, denouncing McClellan as a coward and military imbecile. In all this he
was stimulated by Stanton, and the victim of Seward, who first supplanted him
with McC. and then gave up McC. to appease Stanton and public opinion.
SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864,
p. 130-9
