Captain William Francis Bartlett to Harriett Plummer Bartlett, April 10, 1862

Camp Before Yorktown, April 10, 1862.

Dear Mother: — I have been through some danger safely since I wrote you Sunday. Monday morning our regiment, with the Nineteenth Massachusetts, went out on a reconnoissance towards Yorktown. We marched three or four miles through the woods and mud, when we came to a rebel entrenchment on the opposite side of a swamp, which they had made by damming a stream.

The engineer who went with the General reconnoitered it, covered by our skirmishers. We exchanged perhaps a hundred shots with them, without doing any damage to any one, and, the engineer having accomplished his object, we left, and kept to the left; about two miles. We came to another battery on the same stream. Here they opened on us with shell from a thirty-two-pounder. Three men of the Nineteenth were wounded. One died that night. We got under the cover of some woods and covered the engineer while he reconnoitered. It looked pretty squally when they opened on us with shell, as we had no artillery with us. We withdrew about dark, having effected the object of the reconnoissance. We had to march home in the dark, through the woods, in mud up to our knees. It had rained hard all day.

I had the fortune to wear my rubber coat, so that I wasn't much wet above my waist. I walked, and wore my shoes. We were pretty tired when we got back. The Colonel and I had a tent to sleep in, but the men had nothing to do but lie down in the mud and let it rain. Most of them stood up round the fires all night to keep warm. I managed to get two dozen bottles of whiskey from the sutler, which he had brought for officers, and distributed it so that each man got a small drink of hot whiskey and water. I stayed out till eleven o'clock in the rain doing it. I then came in, took off my stockings and pants, which were wet through, rubbed my feet dry, and lay down and slept soundly enough. I woke all right in the morning. It was still raining, and is today, the third day. I hope it will stop soon. This has delayed the advance very much, as it is impossible to move artillery.

John Putnam is going back to Fort Monroe; he can't stand this, it is too rough for him. Riddle, the same.

Two or three of the officers are sick, but I am as well as ever. Arthur is a little unwell to-day, but you needn't tell his mother, because he will be all right tomorrow, and she would be only worried. General Sumner arrived to-day with the rest of his corps. I haven't seen General McClellan since he passed on the road. He is here. Colonel Lee is at the fort. He will not join us at present, he thinks.

Love to all.

W.

SOURCE: Francis Winthrop Palfrey, Memoir of William Francis Bartlett, p. 37-8

Diary of Salmon P. Chase: Tuesday, September 2, 1862

Cabinet met, but neither the President nor Secretary of War were present. Some conversation took place concerning Generals. Mr. F. W. Seward (the Secretary of State being out of town) said nothing. All others agreed that we needed a change in Commander of the Army. Mr. Blair referred to the report [support?] he had constantly given McClellan, but confessed that he now thought he could not wisely be trusted with the chief command. Mr. Bates was very decided against his competency, and Mr. Smith equally so. Mr. Welles was of the same judgment, though less positive in expression.

After some time, while the talk was going on, the President came in, saying that not seeing much for a Cabinet meeting to-day, he had been talking at the Department and Head Quarters about the War. The Secretary of War came in. In answer to some inquiry, the fact was stated, by the President or the Secretary that McClellan had been placed in command of the forces to defend the Capital — or rather, to use the President's own words, he “had set him to putting these troops into the fortifications about Washington,” believing that he could do that thing better than any other man. I remarked that this could be done equally well by the Engineer who constructed the Forts; and that putting Genl. McClellan in command for this purpose was equivalent to making him second in command of the entire Army. The Secretary of War said that no one was now responsible for the defense of the Capital; — that the Order to McClellan was given by the President direct to McClellan, and that Genl. Halleck considered himself relieved from responsibility although he acquiesced, and approved the Order; — that McClellan could now shield himself, should anything go wrong, under Halleck, while Halleck could and would disclaim all responsibility for the Order given. The President thought Genl. Halleck as much responsible as before; and repeated that the whole scope of the Order was, simply, to direct McClellan to put the troops in the fortifications and command them for the defense of Washington. I remarked that this seemed to me equivalent to making him Commander in Chief for the time being, and that I thought it would prove very difficult to make any substitution hereafter, for active operations, — that I had no feeling whatever against Genl. McClellan; — that he came to the command with my most cordial approbation and support; — that until I became satisfied that his delays would greatly injure our cause, he possessed my full confidence; — that after I had felt myself compelled to withdraw that confidence, I had (since the President, notwithstanding my opinion that he should, refrained from putting another in command) given him all possible support in every way, raising means and urging reinforcements;—that his experience as a military commander had been little else than a series of failures;—and that his omission to urge troops forward to the battles of Friday and Saturday, evinced a spirit which rendered him unworthy of trust, and that I could not but feel that giving the command to him was equivalent to giving Washington to the rebels. This and more I said. Other members of the Cabinet expressed a general concurrence but in no very energetic terms. (Mr. Blair must be excepted but he did not dissent.)

The President said it distressed him exceedingly to find himself differing on such a point from the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Treasury; that he would gladly resign his plan; but he could not see who could do the work wanted as well as McClellan. I named Hooker, or Sumner, or Burnside — either of whom, I thought, would be better.

At length the conversation ended and the meeting broke up, leaving the matter as we found it.

A few Tax Appointments were lying on the table. I asked the President to sign them which he did, saying he would sign them just as they were and ask no questions. I told him that they had all been prepared in accordance with his directions, and that it was necessary to complete the appointments. They were signed, and I returned to the Department.

SOURCE: Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 63-5

Diary of Salmon P. Chase: Monday, September 1, 1862

This has been an anxious day. An Order appears declaring command of his corps in Burnside; of that portion of the Army of the Potomac not sent forward to Pope, in McClellan; of the Army of Virginia and all forces temporarily attached, in Pope; of the whole, in Halleck. Reports from Pope's Army state that its losses are heavy, but in good spirits — confirm that neither Franklin nor Sumner arrived, — and that McClellan failed to send foward ammunition.

On suggestion of Judge Bates, the remonstrance against McClellan, which had been previously signed by Smith, was modified; and having been further slightly altered on my suggestion, was signed by Stanton, Bates and myself, and afterwards by Smith. Welles declined to sign it, on the ground that it might seem unfriendly to the President — though this was the exact reverse of its intent. He said he agreed in opinion and was willing to express it, personally. This determined us to await the Cabinet meeting to-morrow. Meantime, McClellan came up on invitation of Halleck, and held personal conference with him and the President. Soon after, a rumor pervaded the town that McClellan was to resume his full command. Col. Key called at my house and told me that he supposed such was the fact.

SOURCE: Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 63

Diary of Salmon P. Chase: Sunday, August 31, 1862

Much busied at Department to-day, although it is Sunday; and spent much time with the President, endeavoring to close appointments under Tax Law.

David Dudley Field called and said we had sustained a serious defeat yesterday, and that the Secretary of War wished to see me. Went to the Department and found that Genl. Pope had, in fact, been defeated partially, and had fallen back to Centreville. Fitz John Porter was not in the battle, nor was Franklin or Sumner, with whose corps the result would have probably been very different. Little fighting to-day. Clerks went out to battle-field as nurses, Mr. Harrington went with them.

SOURCE: Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 62-3

Senator James W. Grimes to Elizabeth S. Nealley Grimes, December 6, 1859

Senate Chamber, December 6th

This body was organized yesterday; Mason, of Virginia, immediately introduced Harper's Ferry resolutions, which are to be taken up, and discussed this morning on the assembling of the Senate. So you see the excitement is to be kept up upon the irrepressible conflict question.

Mr. Sumner appeared in his seat yesterday, looking in vigorous health. We expect to hear from him in a great speech during the session. There is an immense crowd of people here for one purpose and another, but I keep out of it pretty much. I am as retired here as ordinarily at home.

SOURCE: William Salter, The Life of James W. Grimes, p. 121

Robert Gould Shaw to Francis G. Shaw, September 21, 1862

maryland Heights, September 21, 1862.

Dear Father, — . . . We left Frederick on the 14th instant, marched that day and the next to Boonsborough, passing through a gap in the mountain where Burnside had had a fight the day before. On the 16th our corps, then commanded by General Mansfield, took up a position in rear of Sumner's, and lay there all day. The Massachusetts cavalry was very near us. I went over and spent the evening with them, and had a long talk with Forbes about home and friends there We lay on his blanket before the fire until nearly ten o'clock, and then I left him, little realizing what a day the next was to be, though a battle was expected; and I thought, as I rode off, that perhaps we shouldn't see each other again. Fortunately, we have both got through safely so far. At about eleven, P. M., Mansfield's corps was moved two or three miles to the right. At one in the morning of the 17th we rested in a wheat-field. Our pickets were firing all night, and at daylight we were waked up by the artillery; we were moved forward immediately, and went into action in about fifteen minutes. The Second Massachusetts was on the right of Gordon's brigade, and the Third Wisconsin next; the latter was in a very exposed position, and lost as many as two hundred killed and wounded in a short time. We were posted in a little orchard, and Colonel Andrews got a cross-fire on that part of the enemy's line, which, as we soon discovered, did a great deal of execution, and saved the Third Wisconsin from being completely used up. It was the prettiest thing we have ever done, and our loss was small at that time; in half an hour the brigade advanced through a corn-field in front, which until then had been occupied by the enemy; it was full of their dead and wounded, and one of our sergeants took a regimental color there, belonging to the Eleventh Mississippi. Beyond the corn-field was a large open field, and such a mass of dead and wounded men, mostly Rebels, as were lying there, I never saw before; it was a terrible sight, and our men had to be very careful to avoid treading on them; many were mangled and torn to pieces by artillery, but most of them had been wounded by musketry fire. We halted right among them, and the men did everything they could for their comfort, giving them water from their canteens, and trying to place them in easy positions. There are so many young boys and old men among the Rebels, that it seems hardly possible that they can have come of their own accord to fight us; and it makes you pity them all the more, as they lie moaning on the field.

The Second Massachusetts came to close quarters, i. e. within musket range, twice during the day; but we had several men wounded by shell, which were flying about loosely all day. It was the greatest fight of the war, and I wish I could give you a satisfactory account of everything I saw. . . .

At last, night came on, and, with the exception of an occasional shot from the outposts, all was quiet. The crickets chirped, and the frogs croaked, just as if nothing unusual had happened all day long; and presently the stars came out bright, and we lay down among the dead, and slept soundly until daylight. There were twenty dead bodies within a rod of me. The next day, much to our surprise, all was quiet, and the burying and hospital parties worked hard, caring for the dead and wounded

I never felt before the excitement which makes a man want to rush into the fight, but I did that day. Every battle makes me wish more and more that the war was over. It seems almost as if nothing could justify a battle like that of the 17th, and the horrors inseparable from it.

SOURCE: Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Editor, Harvard Memorial Biographies, Volume 2, p. 199-200

Major-General Henry W. Halleck to Major-General George B. McClellan, August 29, 1862 – 3 p.m.

WASHINGTON, D.C., August 29, 1862 – 3 p.m.

Major-General MCCLELLAN,  Alexandria, Va.:

Your proposed disposition of Sumner's corps seems to me judicious. Of course I have no time to examine into details. The present danger is a raid upon Washington in the nighttime. Dispose of all troops as you deem best. I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy. Perhaps he may get such information at Annandale as to prevent his going farther; otherwise he will push on toward Fairfax. Try to get something from direction of Manassas, either by telegram or through Franklin's scouts. Our people must move more actively and find out where the enemy is. I am tired of guesses.

H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 12, Part 3 (Serial No. 18), p. 722

Major-General George B. McClellan to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, August 30, 1862 – 2:10 p.m.

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,

August 30, 1862 – 2.10 p.m.

I know nothing of the calibers of Pope's artillery. All I can do is to direct my ordnance officer to lead up all the wagons sent to him. I have already sent all my headquarters wagons. You will have to see that wagons are sent from Washington. I can do nothing more than give the order that every available wagon in Alexandria shall be loaded at once.

The order to the brigade of Sumner that I directed to remain near Chain Bridge and Tennallytown should go from your headquarters to save time. I understand you to intend it also to move. I have no sharpshooters except the guard around my camp I have sent off every man but those, and will now send them with the train as you direct. I will also scud my only remaining squadron of cavalry with General Sumner. I can do no more. You now have every man of the Army of the Potomac who is within my reach.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 11, Part 1 (Serial No. 12), p. 101

Major-General Henry W. Halleck to Major-General George B. McClellan, August 27, 1862

WASHINGTON, D.C., August 27, 1862.

Major General MCCLELLAN,  Alexandria, Va.:

I have already advised you to bring up Sumner's corps. Perhaps we may also bring up Burnside's, if deemed necessary. General Barnard has all the troops he asked for at the forts, but I can give you no details I have sent for him to consult with you; nor do I know about the Bull Run Bridge. From your knowledge of the whole country about here you can best act. I have had no time to obtain such knowledge.

There is no cavalry here, or, rather, only part of a small battalion. One company has been sent to scout up the river toward Edwards Ferry. It is very likely to be cut off.

As you must be aware; more than three-quarters of my time is taken up with the raising of new troops and matters in the West. I have no time for details. You will therefore, as ranking general in the field, direct as you deem best; but at present orders for Pope's army should go through me.

Gunboats are at Aquia Creek.

H. W. HALLECK,

General-in. Chief

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 12, Part 3 (Serial No. 18), p. 691

Major General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, January 26, 1863 – 9 p.m.

CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., January 26, 1863 — 9 P. M.

I wrote you a long letter to-day, little thinking while I was quietly employed writing to you what momentous events were going on immediately around me. After writing to you, I went out to ride for exercise, and on my return at 6 P. M., found an order awaiting me, announcing Major General Hooker as in command of the Army of the Potomac and Major General Meade in command of the Centre Grand Division. I then learned for the first time that this news arrived this morning (Burnside having brought it down from Washington last night), and that he, Burnside, and all his staff had gone off this morning, and that Generals Sumner and Franklin had both been relieved and ordered to Washington. You can readily imagine my surprise at all this, although some such step had been talked about for some time back. As to my commanding a grand division, I consider it a mere temporary arrangement, as either some one of more rank will be sent, or, what is more likely, the grand division organization broken up altogether, as it was purely an invention of Burnside's, and has not, I think, been considered a good one. You will, doubtless, be anxious to know what I think of these changes. With all my respect, and I may almost say affection, for Burnside — for he has been most kind and considerate towards me — I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that he was not equal to the command of so large an army. He had some very positive qualifications, such as determination and nerve, but he wanted knowledge and judgment, and was deficient in that enlarged mental capacity which is essential in a commander. Another drawback was a very general opinion among officers and men, brought about by his own assertions, that the command was too much for him. This greatly weakened his position. As to Hooker, you know my opinion of him, frequently expressed. I believe my opinion is more favorable than any other of the old regular officers, most of whom are decided in their hostility to him. I believe Hooker is a good soldier; the danger he runs is of subjecting himself to bad influences, such as Dan Butterfield and Dan Sickles, who, being intellectually more clever than Hooker, and leading him to believe they are very influential, will obtain an injurious ascendancy over him and insensibly affect his conduct. I may, however, in this be wrong; time will prove.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1, p. 350-1

Major General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, January 2, 1863

CAMP OPPOSITE FREDERICKSBURG, January 2, 1863.

I think I wrote you we were on the eve of a movement, but day before yesterday Burnside got a telegram from the President directing him to suspend preparations and come to Washington. Burnside proceeded there post-haste, and was much astonished by the President telling him that a deputation of his (Burnside's) generals had called on him to protest against any further attempt to cross the river, and asking him to stop Burnside. Burnside asked the names of these officers, which the President declined giving. He then resigned his command, which the President refused to accept. He then made a written protest against Stanton and Halleck, which he read to the President in their presence, stating that neither had the confidence of the people nor the army, and calling on him to remove them and himself. To this they made no reply, and the President would not receive his paper, though he took no offense at its contents. Finding he could get nothing out of any of them, he came back, and thus matters stand. Burnside told me all this himself this morning, and read me his paper, which was right up and down. All this is confidential. God only knows what is to become of us and what will be done. No one in Washington has the courage to say or do anything beyond hampering and obstructing us. Burnside is in favor of advancing, but he is opposed by his principal generals — Sumner, Franklin and Hooker. I had a long talk with Franklin yesterday, who is very positive in his opinion that we cannot go to Richmond on this line, and hence there is no object in our attempting to move on it. I agreed with him on the impracticability of this line, but I did not think for that reason we ought to stand still, because we must move some time or other in some direction, and we are every day growing weaker, without any hope of reinforcements in future. In April, thirty-eight two-year regiments, from New York, and all the nine-month men go out of service. This is a serious consideration. Now, while I am not in favor of reattempting to cross here, yet I was in favor of crossing, if a suitable place could be found above or below, where we could rapidly cross and attack them before they could get ready to receive us, and I believed we could whip them, and a victory, I did not care under what circumstances, gained, or with what results followed, would be of immense advantage to us. Failing in this, I was for marching down to Urbana, sixty miles below here, where we could cross any time under cover of the gunboats, and from whence we had only twenty miles to West Point, the terminus of the York River Railroad. I agreed with Franklin that the James River was our proper and only base; but as they were determined in Washington that we should not go there, I thought, rather than stand still, we ought to attempt a practicable, though less desirable, line; and should that be forbidden, I was still in favor of making an attempt to whip them, if there was any reasonable probability of our doing so, even though we should not be either able or desirous of following up our victory. So you see I am among the fire-eaters, and may perhaps jeopardize my reputation by being too decided. But the fact is, I am tired of this playing war without risks. We must encounter risks if we fight, and we cannot carry on war without fighting. That was McClellan's vice. He was always waiting to have everything just as he wanted before he would attack, and before he could get things arranged as he wanted them, the enemy pounced on him and thwarted all his plans. There is now no doubt he allowed three distinct occasions to take Richmond slip through his hands, for want of nerve to run what he considered risks. Such a general will never command success, though he may avoid disaster.

I send you a piece from a Boston paper on poor Dehon, sent to me by some friend or relative. It does no more than justice to Dehon, who was a gallant officer and clever gentleman. I have felt his loss even more than poor Kuhn's, because, in his case, I was directly instrumental in placing him where he received his death wound, though at the time I sent him I had no idea of the great danger attending his mission. Kuhn, you know, was not with me when he fell, and I have never been able to ascertain whether he fell before or after I was wounded, but think it must have been very near the same time, and that he could not have been very far from me, though I did not see him.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1, p. 344-5

Abraham Lincoln to Major General George B. McClellan, May 9, 1862

FORT MONROE, VA., May 9, 1862.

Major-General McCLELLAN:

MY DEAR SIR: I have just assisted the Secretary of War in framing the part of a dispatch to you relating to army corps, which dispatch of course will have reached you long before this will.

I wish to say a few words to you privately on this subject. I ordered the army corps organization not only on the unanimous opinion of the twelve generals whom you had selected and assigned as generals of divisions, but also on the unanimous opinion of every military man I could get an opinion from, and every modern military book, yourself only excepted. Of course I did not on my own judgment pretend to understand the subject. I now think it indispensable for you to know how your struggle against it is received in quarters which we cannot entirely disregard. It is looked upon as merely all effort to pamper one or two pets and to persecute and degrade their supposed rivals. I have had no word from Sumner, Heintzelman, or Keyes. The commanders of these corps are of course the three highest officers with you, but I am constantly told that you have no consultation or communication with them; that you consult and communicate with nobody but General Fitz John Porter and perhaps General Franklin. I do not say these complaints are true or just, but at all events it is proper you should know of their existence. Do the commanders of corps disobey your orders in anything?

When you relieved General Hamilton of his command the other day you thereby lost the confidence of at least one of your best friends in the Senate. And here let me say, not as applicable to you personally, that Senators and Representatives speak of me in their places as they please without question, and that officers of the Army must cease addressing insulting letters to them for taking no greater liberty with them.

But to return: Are you strong enough – are you strong enough, even with my help – to set your foot upon the necks of Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes all at once? This is a practical and very serious question for you.

The success of your army and the cause of the country are the same, and of course I only desire the good of the cause.

Yours, truly,

 A. LINCOLN.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 11, Part 3 (Serial No. 14), p. 154-5

Major General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, December 16, 1862

OPPOSITE FREDERICKSBURG, VA., December 16, 1862.

I hope you received my telegram sent on the evening of the 13th inst., announcing my safety.¹ It was out of my power to write, and no mails were permitted to leave the camps, and the telegram I only smuggled through the kindness of Seth Williams. I almost forget when I wrote you last, but I think it was on the 10th inst. The next day we moved down to the river bank and commenced throwing over bridges at two points, one opposite the town, the other about two miles lower down. Franklin's grand division was assigned to the last position. The bridges were finished by the afternoon of the 11th without any opposition at our place, but with much trouble and quite severe loss at the town. On the 12th we crossed. Sumner at the town, Franklin below, and Hooker remaining in reserve. On the 13th it was determined to make an attack from both positions, and the honor of leading this attack was assigned to my division. I cannot give you all the details of the fight, but will simply say my men went in beautifully, carried everything before them, and drove the enemy for nearly half a mile, but finding themselves unsupported on either right or left, and encountering an overwhelming force of the enemy, they were checked and finally driven back. As an evidence of the work they had to do, it is only necessary to state that out of four thousand five hundred men taken into action, we know the names of eighteen hundred killed and wounded. There are besides some four hundred missing, many of whom are wounded. All the men agree it was the warmest work the Reserves had ever encountered. I cannot enumerate all the casualties, but among them was poor Dehon,² who fell pierced through the heart and expired almost immediately. Yesterday, under a flag, we found his body, and Coxe has taken it this morning to Washington. I had become very much attached to Dehon for his many excellent qualities, and it does seem as if the good luck that attends me is to be made up in the misfortunes of my staff. I was myself unhurt, although a ball passed through my hat so close, that if it had come from the front instead of the side, I would have been a "goner." The day after the battle, one of their sharpshooters took deliberate aim at me, his ball passing through the neck of my horse. The one I was riding at the time was a public horse, so that Baldy and Blacky are safe. Our attack on the left failed; same result on the right, though with greater loss and without the éclat we had, because we drove them for some distance and took some six hundred prisoners. The fact being, as I advised you, they had prepared themselves, in a series of heights covered with woods, where they had constructed redoubts and connected them with rifle pits, so that it was pretty much one fortification. On the town side, the works were so near that our people could make no progress out of the town, they coming immediately under the fire of the works. The 14th and 15th were spent in reconnoissances and deliberations, the result of which was, that last night we had the humiliation to be compelled to return this side of the river; in other words, acknowledge the superior strength of the enemy and proclaim, what we all knew before, that we never should have crossed, with the force we have, without some diversion being made on the James River in our favor. What will be done next I cannot tell. Burnside, I presume, is a dead cock in the pit, and your friend Joe Hooker (fighting Joe) is the next on the list, except that it is said fighting Joe recommended the withdrawal of the army. This operation was most successfully effected before daylight this morning, the enemy not having the slightest intimation until it was too late. I have seen George³ this morning; his regiment was over here nearly all the time, as there was no use for cavalry. Among the killed was poor Bayard, who was struck by a cannon shot while sitting under a tree. His loss is universally regretted. The day before we crossed, late in the evening, I got your letter of the 6th, and Mr. Stanton's important one dated November 29th, 1862.⁴ It was a very handsome compliment he paid you in transmitting it through you, which means, I should infer, that he would make you a major general if he could, and, that you had made me. Do you think major general sounds any better than brigadier?

__________

¹ Battle of Fredericksburg, December 11-15, 1862. Federal loss, killed, wounded, and missing, 12,653 (O. R.)

² Arthur Dehon, 1st Lieutenant 12th Rcgt. Mass. Vols., and A. D. C. to General Meade.

³ Son of General Meade.

⁴ Appointing him major-general U. S. Volunteers.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1, p. 337-8

Brigadier General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, November 14, 1862

CAMP NEAR RAPPAHANNOCK STATION, November 14, 1862.

Generals Halleck and Meigs, as I anticipated, objected to the change of base from the Orange and Alexandria Railroad to the Fredericksburg Railroad, but after discussion yielded their views to those of the general officers in command, and have returned to Washington, to endeavor to obtain the sanction of the still greater general, Stanton. It is also understood the army is to be divided into three commands, each of two corps, to be commanded respectively by Sumner, Hooker and Franklin. Our corps is to be under Franklin. Baldy Smith takes Franklin's corps, and Sykes is to have Porter's corps.

General McCall sent me Hooker's report of the battle of Glendale,¹ and called on me, as the present commander of the division, to reply to it; but I answered him that I considered his being in command at that time constituted him the proper person to reply, and if not himself, then Seymour, who commanded the Third Brigade, which was on the left of our line and adjacent to Hooker's command. I further told McCall that I hardly thought it worth while to make any public reply to Hooker; that the reputation of the Reserves was now well established, and the facts of the New Market battle very generally known, and Hooker's report would carry its antidote with its bane. What McCall has done I do not know, as I have not heard from him since. I have no doubt a portion of Seymour's command did run through Hooker's line, but he has made the mistake of confounding this portion of one brigade with the whole division, thus depriving us of the credit of having for four hours resisted an overwhelming onset of vastly superior numbers, and by this resistance, and the check which we gave the enemy, preventing his piercing our army, and enabling it that night to concentrate on the banks of the James River, which they never would have or could have effected if our whole division had run at the first fire, as Hooker charges.

__________

¹ Or New Market Road, June 30, 1862.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1, p. 327-8

Brigadier General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, November 13, 1862

CAMP NEAR RAPPAHANNOCK STATION, VA., November 13, 1862.

Day before yesterday we moved to this position, some ten miles from Warrenton. On the same day McClellan left us, to the regret and sincere grief of the whole army. Yesterday, I am informed, Generals Halleck and Meigs made their appearance at Warrenton, and it is understood a grand council of war is to be held to-day. McClellan has always objected to operating on this line, and insisted on the James River as being the proper base for operations. Halleck, under Washington influence, has been trying to force operations on this line — that is, the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Now, this road has but one track, and the distance from Alexandria to Gordonsville is over one hundred and fifty miles. This distance and the known capacity of the road is insufficient by one-third to carry the daily supplies required for this army. This fact to an ordinarily intelligent mind, unbiased by ridiculous fears for the safety of Washington, ought to be conclusive. The next line, and the one Burnside favors as a compromise, is the one from Fredericksburg to Richmond. This is open to the same objection as the other, except it is only seventy-five miles. Still, it will require a larger army to protect these seventy-five miles and keep open our communications than it will to attack Richmond itself. What the result of the council will be, no one can tell; but, as I have above conjectured, it is probable that, if Burnside proves stubborn, he will be told he must give way to one who is more reasonable. I also hear that Hooker is at Warrenton, and has been placed in command of Fitz-John Porter's corps, Porter having been relieved and ordered to Washington. I have not seen Hooker, as he did not arrive at Warrenton till after I had left. His having command only of a corps, under Burnside, in command of the army, and Sumner in command of two corps, is decidedly a coming down for Hooker, from the expectations the army and the public had been led to indulge in from the tone of the public press; and confirms what I have told you, that Hooker talked himself out in Washington. What we are coming to I cannot tell, but I must confess this interference by politicians with military men, and these personal intrigues and bickerings among military men, make me feel very sad and very doubtful of the future. It does seem as if Providence was against us, and that it was decreed we should not succeed as we ought to. The assigning of Hooker to Porter's corps leaves Reynolds, I presume, permanently in command of our corps, and will leave me undisturbed in command of my division. For this I ought to be, and am, duly grateful, and as some time since it was the height of my ambition to have a division, I suppose I ought to be satisfied with its accomplishment, which I would be, if I saw matters going on in other respects as I think they ought to.

The enemy, who for some time were disposed to dispute our advance and had constant skirmishing with us, have been quiet for two days past. They are said to be in force at Culpepper Court House, some eighteen miles in our front, and Jackson, with a considerable body, is reported as being yet in the Valley of the Shenandoah, waiting for a good chance to fall on our rear, and effect one of his bold and audacious raids. I look anxiously to see the result of McClellan's removal on the public mind.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1, p. 326-7

Brigadier General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, November 9, 1862

CAMP NEAR WARRENTON, VA., November 9, 1862.

To-day, in company with the other generals of our corps, I called to see McClellan. Reynolds made a few remarks, saying we had learned with deep regret of his departure and sincerely hoped he would soon return. McClellan was very much affected, almost to tears, and said that separation from this army was the severest blow that could be inflicted upon him. The army is greatly depressed.

We have had quite a snow storm, and to-day, though clear, is very raw and cold. Our men suffer a good deal; what the Southerners do, without clothing or shelter of any kind, I cannot imagine. I should think their sufferings must be very much greater than ours. Sumner has returned, and it is said Hooker is coming. If he does, Reynolds will take my division, and I shall come down to a brigade. The removal of McClellan, however, will keep Hooker away, if he can possibly avoid coming, as I know he will not serve voluntarily under Burnside. Still, it is said Hooker has injured himself very much by his prolonged stay in Washington, where he has talked too much and too indiscreetly, and that he is not now half as strong as when he went there.

Tell Sargie¹ I have received and perused with great interest the thrilling tale, in Peterson's, of the wonderful magnanimity of the Duke of Medina Sidonia. Such heroes don't live nowadays.

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¹ Son of General Meade

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1, p. 325-6

Brigadier General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, October 12, 1862

CAMP NEAR SHARPSBURG, MD., October 12, 1862.

Hooker and I are old acquaintances. We were at West Point together, served in Mexico together, and have met from time to time since. He is a very good soldier, capital general for an army corps, but I am not prepared to say as to his abilities for carrying on a campaign and commanding a large army. I should fear his judgment and prudence, as he is apt to think the only thing to be done is to pitch in and fight. He injured himself in Mexico by attaching himself to Pillow and his clique. Soon after the Mexican war, being in California, he resigned, did not succeed in private life, and at one time I understood he was quite low in fortune, and was glad to accept the position of wagon-master. His want of success, added to other causes, led him at this time into dissipation, and many of his friends thought he was ruined and gone. At the commencement of these troubles he repaired to Washington, and through California influence procured one of the first appointments as brigadier general. At Williamsburg he did some desperate fighting, and had a flare up with Sumner and McClellan. Being always intimate with the President, on McDowell's being relieved he got his corps, with which he was fortunate at South Mountain and Antietam. Now he is made, and his only danger is the fear that he will allow himself to be used by McClellan's enemies to injure him. Hooker is a Democrat and anti-Abolitionist — that is to say, he was. What he will be, when the command of the army is held out to him, is more than any one can tell, because I fear he is open to temptation and liable to be seduced by flattery.

McClellan does not seem to have made as much out of his operations in Maryland as I had hoped he would, and as I think he is entitled to. His failure to immediately pursue Lee (which Hooker would have done), and now this raid of Stuart's in our rear (for permitting which the public will hold McClellan accountable), will go far towards taking away from him the prestige of his recent victories. I don't wish you to mention it, but I think myself he errs on the side of prudence and caution, and that a little more rashness on his part would improve his generalship.

Stuart's raid will undoubtedly interfere with our contemplated movements, for he destroyed at Chambersburg a large amount of clothing destined for this army, which the men are greatly in need of, and without which they can hardly move.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1, p. 318-9

From Washington

Herald’s Dispatch.

WASHINGTON, May 18.

The recall of Gen. Hunter is fully determined on.  His proclamation will be made the subject of a communication by the President to Congress, and in that way to the country, unmistakeably [sic] condemning the course of General Hunter, as the policy of the Administration in the conduct of the war.  An effort has been made to have Gen. Bonham placed in command of the department of the South.  It is stated that if he could have had the consent of Gen. Hunter, he would long ago have recaptured Sumter, and restored Federal authority in Charleston.  Probably hereafter army officers will be required to attend exclusively to military duties, and leave the management of social and political affairs to the Government.

The intelligence received from the department of the South, states that our army is impatient at the kind of duties assigned them.

Accounts form McClellan’s army are, that Gen. Sumner has been relieved from active service in consequence of his refusal to reinforce Gen. Heintzelman at the battle of Williamsburg.

Special to Times.

Memphis papers of the 14th are looking for a battle at Corinth with terrible interest.  They estimate the Federal army at 60,000, and insist that it is greatly demoralized.  They say they don’t allow themselves to think of being defeated.

Beauregard is undoubtedly at Corinth.

WASHINGTON, May 18.

They navy department has received a communication from Com. Dupont, dated Port Royal, May 13th, giving an account of the capture of several rebel schooners.  No other news of importance.

The Post Office department directs that all mail matter destined for Burnside’s command be sent to New York.

– Published in The Davenport Daily Gazette, Davenport, Iowa, Tuesday Morning, May 20, 1862, p. 2

Abraham Lincoln to Major General George B. McClellan, April 9, 1862

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1862.

Major General McClellan.

My dear Sir.

Your despatches complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much.

Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acquiesced in it – certainly not without reluctance.

After you left I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this even was to go to General Hooker's old position.  General Banks' corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented, or would present when McDowell and Sumner should be gone, a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.

I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was constrained to substitute something for it myself. And allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond via Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade.

There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over 100,000 with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement, taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 108,000 then with you and en route to you. You now say you will have but 85,000 when all en route to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of 23,000 be accounted for?

 As to General Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what's like number of your own would have to do if that command was away.

I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you is with you by this time, and, if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon you – that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and re-enforcements than you can by re-enforcements alone.

And once more let me tell you it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy and the same or equal intrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note, is now noting, that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.

I beg to assure you that I have never written you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as, in my most anxious judgment, I consistently can. But you must act.

Yours, very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 11, Part 1 (Serial No. 12), p. 15; A copy of this letter can be found in the Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress;  Roy P. Basler, Editor, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 5, p. 184-5; 

Brigadier General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, March 18, 1862

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA, March 18, 1862.

I note all you write about McClellan. I fear it is all true, and that the most desperate efforts have been made and are still being made to take away his command and destroy him. Franklin told me that McClellan said to him, as they followed Lander's corpse, that he almost wished he was in the coffin instead of Lander. It is reported that they were about to introduce into the House of Representatives a vote of want of confidence in him, but were restrained by fearing it would not pass. It is said the President remains his friend.

McClellan is not the man to make himself popular with the masses. His manners are reserved and retiring. He was not popular either in Chicago or Cincinnati, when at the head of large railroad interests. He has never studied or practiced the art of pleasing, and indeed has not paid that attention to it which every man whose position is dependent on popular favor must pay, if he expects to retain his position. Now, you know long before the tide turned, I told you of ill-advised acts on his part, showing a disposition to gratify personal feelings, at the expense of his own interests. I have no doubt now that the enmity of Heintzelman, Sumner, McDowell and Keyes can all be traced to this very cause — his failure to conciliate them, and the injustice they consider his favoritism to others has been to them. So long as he had full swing, they were silent, but so soon as others had shaken the pedestal he stood on, they join in to lend their hands.

Don't you remember as early as last September, telling us how indignant Charles King was at the treatment of General Scott by McClellan, and that the General had said he would have arrested him for disrespect if he had dared to? In the selection of his staff he has not shown the judgment he might have done. There are too many men on it that are not worthy to be around a man with McClellan's reputation. Again, you know my opinion of his treatment of the Ball's Bluff affair, through personal regard for Stone. All these little things have combined, with his political foes, to shake his position. I think, however, it is pretty well settled that Old Abe has determined he will not cut his head off till he has had a chance, and as I wrote you before, all will depend now on the hazard of a die. Any disaster, never mind from what cause, will ruin him, and any success will reinstate him in public favor.

It is very hard to know what is going to be done, or what the enemy will do. My opinion is that they are concentrating all their available forces around Richmond, and that they will make there a determined and desperate resistance. Of course, this defense will be made at first in advance, as far as they deem it prudent to go, or as they can readily retire from, as for instance, the Rappahannock on the north, Fredericksburg and the Potomac on the east, Yorktown and Norfolk on the southeast. Where McClellan will attack them is not known, but before many days are over it will be settled, and we will have a fight either at Fredericksburg, Yorktown or Norfolk. For my part, the sooner we meet them the better. The thing has to be done, and there is nothing gained by delay. The morale is on our side; our recent victories, their retreat from Manassas, all combine to inspirit us and demoralize them; and if our men only behave as we hope and believe they will, I think before long we shall have Richmond.

I rode over this morning and saw Willie.¹ I found on my arrival that there was in camp a party of ladies and gentlemen, consisting of Mr. Charles King, of New York, and his daughter, Mrs. Captain Ricketts, and her sister, who is married to a son of Charles King, a captain in the Twelfth (Willie's) Regiment. These ladies had come out to see Captain King, accompanied by Colonel Van Rensselaer, who you remember married a niece of Charles King. They had prepared a lunch, and all the officers were partaking of it, and having, as is usual, a merry time. Soon after I rode up, Miss King recognized Kuhn, who was with me, and sent Captain Wister,² of the regiment after him, and in a few minutes Colonel Van Rensselaer came up to me, and, after the usual salutations, politely asked me to permit him to present me to the party. Of course I had to say yes, and went up with him and joined the party. Mrs. Ricketts, you know, was a Miss Lawrence. I had known her mother and family all my life. She is now a great heroine. After doing the civil to the party I retired.

__________

¹ William Sergeant, brother of Mrs. Meade.

² Francis Wister, captain 12th U. S. Infantry.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1, p. 253-4