Showing posts with label Atlanta. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Atlanta. Show all posts

Friday, May 8, 2020

Frederick Douglass to Theodore Tilton, October 15, 1864

Rochester, Oct. 15, 1864.
My Dear Mr. Tilton:

I am obliged by your favor containing a copy of your recent speech in Latimer hall. I had read that speech in the Tribune several days ago, and in my heart thanked you for daring thus to break the spell of enchantment which slavery, though wounded, dying and despised, is still able to bind the tongues of our republican orators. It was a timely word wisely and well spoken, the best and most luminous spark struck from the flint and steel of this canvass. To all appearance we have been more ashamed of the negro during than those of '56 and '60. The President's "To whom it may concern," frightened his party and his party in return frightened the President. I found him in this alarmed condition when I called upon him six weeks ago — and it is well to note the time. The country was struck with one of those bewilderments which dethrone reason for the moment. Every body was thinking and dreaming of peace — and the impression had gone abroad that the President's antislavery policy was about the only thing which prevented a peaceful settlement with the Rebels. McClellan was nominated and at that time his prospects were bright as Mr. Lincoln's were gloomy. You must therefore, judge the President's words in the light of the circumstances in which he spoke. Atlanta had not fallen; Sheridan had not swept the Shenandoah —and men were ready for peace almost at any price. The President was pressed on every hand to modify his letter “To whom it may concern,” — how to meet this pressure he did me the honor to ask my opinion. He showed me a letter written with a view to meet the peace clamour raised against him. The first point made in it was the important fact that no man or set of men authorized to speak for the Confederate Government had ever submitted a proposition for peace to him. Hence the charge that he had in some way stood in the way of peace fell to the ground. He had always stood ready to listen to any such propositions. The next point referred to was the charge that he had in his Niagara letter committed himself and the country to an abolition war rather than a war for the union, so that even if the latter could be attained by negotiation, the war would go on for Abolition. The President did not propose to take back what he had said in his Niagara letter but wished to relieve the fears of hit peace friends by making it appear that the thing which they feared could not happen and was wholly beyond his power. Even if I would, I could not carry on the war for the abolition of slavery. The country would not sustain such a war and I could do nothing without the support of Congress. I could not make the abolition of slavery an absolute prior condition to the re-establishment of the union. All that the President said on this point was to make manifest his want of power to do the thing which his enemies and pretended friends professed to be afraid he would do. Now the question he put to me was "Shall I send forth this letter?" To which I answered "Certainly not." It would be given a broader meaning than you intend to convey — it would be taken as a complete surrender of your antislavery policy — and do yon serious damage. In answer to your Copperhead accusers your friends can make this argument of your want of power — but you cannot wisely say a word on that point. I have looked and feared that Mr. Lincoln would say something of the sort, but he has been perfectly silent on that point and I think will remain so. But the thing which alarmed me most was this: The President said he wanted some plan devised by which we could get more of the slaves within our lines. He thought that now was their time— and that such only of them as succeeded in getting within our lines would be free after the war is over. This shows that the President only has faith in his proclamations of freedom during the war and that he believes their operation will cease with the war. We were long together and there was much said—but this is enough.

I gave my address, To the People of the U. S., to the Committee appointed to publish the Minutes of the Convention. It is too lengthy for a newspaper article though of course I should be very glad to see it noticed in the Independent. You may not be aware that I do not see the Independent now-a-days. It was discontinued several months ago. If you were not like myself taxed on every hand both by your own disposition to give and the disposition of others to ask I should ask you to send me the Independent for one year on your own account.

We had Anna Dickinson here on Thursday night. Her speech made a profound impression. Nothing from Phillips, Beecher or yourself could have been more eloquent, and in her masterly handling of statistics she reminded one of Horace Mann in his palmiest days. I never listened to her with more wonder. One thing however I think you can say to her, if you ever get the chance, for it ought to be said and she will hear it and bear it from you, as well or better than from most other persons, and that is Stop that waiting. She walked incessantly — back and forth — from one side the broad platform to the other. It is a new trick and one which I neither think useful or ornamental but really a defect and disfigurement. She would allow me to tell her so, I think, because she knows how sincerely I appreciate both her wonderful talents and her equally wonderful devotion to the cause of my enslaved race.

I am not doing much in this Presidential Canvass for the reason that Republican committees do not wish to expose themselves to the charge of being the "Niggar" party. The negro is the deformed child which is put out of the room when company comes. I hope to speak some after the election, though not much before, and I am inclined to think I shall be able to speak all the more usefully because I have had so little to say during the present canvass. I now look upon the election of Mr. Lincoln as settled. When there was any shadow of a hope that a man of more decided antislavery convictions and policy could be elected, I was not for Mr. Lincoln, but as soon as the Chicago convention my mind was made up and it is made up still. All dates changed with the Domination of McClellan.

I hope that in listening to Mr. Stanton's version of my visit to the President you kept in mind something of Mr. Stanton's own state of mind concerning public affairs. I found him in a very gloomy state of mind, much less hopeful than myself, and yet more cheerful than I expected to find him. I judge from your note that he must have imparted somewhat of the hue of his own mind to my statements. He thinks far less of the President's honesty than I do, and far less of his antislavery than I do I have not yet come to think that honesty and politics are incompatible.

SOURCE: Buffalo Public Library, Descriptive Catalogue of the Gluck Collection of Manuscripts and Autographs in the Buffalo Public Library, p. 35-7

Tuesday, May 5, 2020

Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant to Major-General William T. Sherman, August 18, 1864

CITY POINT, VA., August 18, 1864.
Major-General SHERMAN:

Richmond papers of the 17th give it as the opinion of military men that Atlanta can hold out one month yet. In the mean time, like Micawber, they expect something to turn up. If you can hold fast as you are now and prevent raids upon your rear you will destroy most of that army. I never would advise going backward even if your roads are cut so as to preclude the possibility of receiving supplies from the North, but would recommend the accumulation of ordnance stores and supplies while you can, and if it comes to the worst move south as you suggested. I have forced the enemy to move a large force north of the James River, and am now moving one corps by our left around Petersburg. I expect no great results, but will probably cut the Weldon road again, and will also demonstrate to the enemy that he has now the minimum garrison possible to hold his present lines with, and that to hold his roads he must re-enforce.

U.S. GRANT,            
Lieutenant-General

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 38, Part 5 (Serial No. 76), p. 569

Friday, May 1, 2020

Captain Charles Wright Wills: October 10, 1864

Near Kenesaw Mountain, October 10, 1864.

Was on the ground we charged on the 27th of June, and also on top of Kenesaw to-day. Very fine view, but nothing like equal to that from Lookout. The signal station here communicates direct with Atlanta, Allatoona and Roswell.

I picked up some black oak acorns to-day from a tree that shades the graves of 12 or 15 of our soldiers, mostly from our regiment, who fell on the 27th. They were buried where they fell. That charge was the maddest folly of the campaign.

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 308

Friday, April 17, 2020

Captain Charles Wright Wills: October 4, 1864

We have been expecting to move for several days. The Rebels have crossed the Chattanooga and are moving on our rear, a la Jonesboro. If half the force they took over get back I'll be much disappointed. We yesterday sent our extra baggage to Atlanta to store, and at 11 last night orders came to march at 5 a. m. to-day. We will be off in a few minutes now. Marietta is in our route direction.

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 304-5

Friday, April 10, 2020

Major-General William T. Sherman to James M. Calhoun et al, September 12, 1864

HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,                       
In the Field, Atlanta, Ga., September 12, 1864.
JAMES M. CALHOUN, Mayor,
E. E. RAWSON, and
S. C. WELLS,
Representing City Council of Atlanta:

GENTLEMEN: I have your letter of the 11th, in the nature of a petition to revoke my orders removing all the inhabitants from Atlanta. I have read it carefully, and give full credit to your statements of the distress that will be occasioned by it, and yet shall not revoke my orders, simply because my orders are not designed to meet the humanities of the case, but to prepare for the future struggles in which millions of good people outside of Atlanta have a deep interest. We must have peace, not only at Atlanta but in all America. To secure this we must stop the war that now desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop war we must defeat the rebel armies that are arrayed against the laws and Constitution, which all must respect and obey. To defeat these armies we must prepare the way to reach them in their recesses provided with the arms and instruments which enable us to accomplish our purpose. Now, I know the vindictive nature of our enemy, and that we may have many years of military operations from this quarter, and therefore deem it wise and prudent to prepare in time. The use of Atlanta for warlike purposes is inconsistent with its character as a home for families. There will be no manufactures, commerce, or agriculture here for the maintenance of families, and sooner or later want will compel the inhabitants to go. Why not go now, when all the arrangements are completed for the transfer, instead of waiting till the plunging shot of contending armies will renew the scenes of the past month? Of course, I do not apprehend any such thing at this moment, but you do not suppose this army will be here until the war is over. I cannot discuss this subject with you fairly, because I cannot impart to you what I propose to do, but I assert that my military plans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my offer of services to make their exodus in any direction as easy and comfortable as possible. You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War is cruelty and you cannot refine it, and those who brought war into our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I will make more sacrifices to-day than any of you to secure peace. But you cannot have peace and a division of our country. If the United States submits to a division now it will not stop, but will go on until we reap the fate of Mexico, which is eternal war. The United States does and must assert its authority wherever it once had power. If it relaxes one bit to pressure it is gone, and I know that such is the national feeling. This feeling assumes various shapes, but always comes back to that of Union. Once admit the Union, once more acknowledge the authority of the National Government, and instead of devoting your houses and streets and roads to the dread uses of war, and this army become at once your protectors and supporters, shielding you from danger, let it come from what quarter it may. I know that a few individuals cannot resist a torrent of error and passion such as swept the South into rebellion, but you can part out so that we may know those who desire a government and those who insist on war and its desolation. You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against these terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quiet at home is to stop the war, which can alone be done by admitting that it began in error and is perpetuated in pride.

We don't want your negroes or your horses or your houses or your lands or anything you have, but we do want, and will have, a just obedience to the laws of the United States. That we will have, and if it involves the destruction of your improvements we cannot help it. You have heretofore read public sentiment in your newspapers that live by falsehood and excitement, and the quicker you seek for truth in other quarters the better for you. I repeat then that by the original compact of government the United States had certain rights in Georgia, which have never been relinquished and never will be; that the South began war by seizing forts, arsenals, mints, custom-houses, &c., long before Mr. Lincoln was installed and before the South had one jot or tittle of provocation. I myself have seen in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi hundreds and thousands of women and children fleeing from your armies and desperadoes, hungry and with bleeding feet. In Memphis, Vicksburg, and Mississippi we fed thousands upon thousands of the families of rebel soldiers left on our hands and whom we could not see starve. Now that war comes home to you, you feel very different. You deprecate its horrors, but did not feel them when you sent car-loads of soldiers and ammunition and molded shells and shot to carry war into Kentucky and Tennessee, and desolate the homes of hundreds and thousands of good people who only asked to live in peace at their old homes and under the Government of their inheritance. But these comparisons are idle. I want peace, and believe it can now only be reached through union and war, and I will ever conduct war with a view to perfect an early success. But, my dear sirs, when that peace does come, you may call on me for anything. Then will I share with you the last cracker, and watch with you to shield your homes and families against danger from every quarter. Now you must go, and take with you the old and feeble, feed and nurse them and build for them in more quiet places proper habitations to shield them against the weather until the mad passions of men cool down and allow the Union and peace once more to settle over your old homes at Atlanta.

Yours, in haste,
W. T. SHERMAN,                
Major-General, Commanding.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 39, Part 2 (Serial No. 78), p. 418-9

Major-General William T. Sherman to Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant, November 2, 1864

HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,                       
In the Field, Rome, Ga.., November 2, 1864.
Lieut. Gen. U.S. GRANT,
City Point, Va.:

Your dispatch is received.* If I could hope to overhaul Hood I would turn against him with my whole force. Then he retreats to the southwest, drawing him as a decoy from Georgia, which is his chief object. If he ventures north of the Tennessee I may turn in that direction and endeavor to get between him and his line of retreat, but thus far he has not gone above the Tennessee. Thomas will have a force strong enough to prevent his reaching any country in which we have an interest, and he has orders if Hood turns to follow me to push for Selma. No single army can catch him, and I am convinced the best results will result from defeating Jeff. Davis' cherished plan of making me leave Georgia by maneuvering. Thus far I have confined my efforts to thwart his plans, and reduced my baggage so that I can pick up and start in any direction, but I would regard a pursuit of Hood as useless; still if he attempts to invade Middle Tennessee I will hold Decatur and be prepared to move in that direction, but unless I let go Atlanta my force will not be equal to his.

W. T. SHERMAN,                
Major-General, Commanding.
_______________

* Of November 1, p. [576, the footnote is in error and sited the page number as 676.]

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 39, Part 3 (Serial No. 79), p. 594-5

Major-General William T. Sherman to Major-General George H. Thomas, October 20, 1864

HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,                       
In the Field, Summerville, Ga., October 20, 1864.
Major-General THOMAS,
Commanding Department of the Cumberland:

GENERAL: I think I have thought over the whole field of the future, and being now authorized to act, I want all things bent to the following general plan of action for the next three months: Out of the forces now here and at Atlanta I propose to organize an efficient army of from 60,000 to 65,000 men, with which I propose to destroy Macon, Augusta, and, it may be, Savannah and Charleston, but I will always keep open the alternatives of the mouth of Appalachicola and Mobile. By this I propose to demonstrate the vulnerability of the South, and make its inhabitants feel that war and individual ruin are synonymous terms. To pursue Hood is folly, for he can twist and turn like a fox and wear out any army in pursuit. To continue to occupy long lines of railroads simply exposes our small detachments to be picked up in detail and forces me to make countermarches to protect lines of communication. I know I am right in this and shall proceed to its maturity. As to details, I propose to take General Howard and his army, General Schofield and his, and two of your corps, viz, Generals Davis and Slocum. I propose to remain along the Coosa watching Hood until all my preparations are made, viz, until I have repaired the railroad, sent back all surplus men and material, and stripped for the work. Then I will send General Stanley, with the Fourth Corps, across by Will's Valley and Caperton's to Stevenson to report to you. If you send me 5,000 or 6,000 new conscripts I may also send back one of General Slocum's or Davis' divisions, but I prefer to maintain organizations. I want you to retain command in Tennessee, and before starting I will give you delegated authority over Kentucky, Mississippi, Alabama, &c., whereby there will be unity of action behind me. I will want you to hold Chattanooga and Decatur in force, and on the occasion of my departure, of which you shall have ample notice, to watch Hood close. I think he will follow me, at least with his cavalry, in which event I want you to push south from Decatur and the head of the Tennessee for Columbus, Miss., and Selma, not absolutely to reach these points, but to divert or pursue according to the state of facts. If, however, Hood turns on you, you must act defensively on the line of the Tennessee. I will ask, and you may also urge, that at the same time Canby act vigorously up the Alabama River. I do not fear that the Southern army will again make a lodgment on the Mississippi, for past events demonstrate how rapidly armies can be raised in the Northwest on that question and how easily handled and supplied. The only hope of a Southern success is in the remote regions difficult of access. We have now a good entering wedge and should drive it home. It will take some time to complete these details, and I hope to hear from you in the mean time. We must preserve a large amount of secrecy, and I may actually change the ultimate point of arrival, but not the main object.

I am, &c.,
W. T. SHERMAN,                
Major-General, Commanding.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 39, Part 3 (Serial No. 79), p. 377-8

Thursday, April 9, 2020

Major-General William T. Sherman to Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant, November 6, 1864

HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,                       
In the Field, Kingston, Ga., November 6, 1864.
Lieut. Gen. U.S. GRANT,
Commander-in-Chief, City Point, Va.:

DEAR GENERAL: I have heretofore telegraphed and written you pretty fully, but I still have some thoughts in my busy brain that should be confided to you as a key to future developments. The taking of Atlanta broke upon Jeff. Davis so suddenly as to disturb the equilibrium of his usually well-balanced temper, so that at Augusta, Macon, Montgomery, and Columbia, S. C., he let out some of his thoughts which otherwise he would have kept to himself. As he is not only the President of the Southern Confederacy but also its Commander-in-Chief, we are bound to attach more importance to his words than we would to those of a mere civil chief magistrate. The whole burden of his song consisted in the statement that Sherman's communications must be broken and his army destroyed. Now, it is a well-settled principle that if we can prevent his succeeding in his threat we defeat him and derive all the moral advantages of a victory. Thus far Hood and Beauregard conjointly have utterly failed to interrupt my supplies or communications with my base. My railroad and telegraph are now in good order from Atlanta back to the Ohio River. His losses at Allatoona, Resaca, Ship's Gap, and Decatur exceed in number (his losses in men) ours at the block-houses at Big Shanty, Allatoona Creek, and Dalton; and the rapidity of his flight from Dalton to Gadsden takes from him all the merit or advantage claimed for his skillful and rapid lodgment made on my railroad. The only question in my mind is whether I ought not to have dogged him far over into Mississippi, trusting to some happy accident to bring him to bay and to battle. But I then thought that by so doing I would play into his hands by being drawn or decoyed too far away from our original line of advance. Besides, I had left at Atlanta a corps and railroad guards back to Chattanooga, which might have fallen an easy prey to his superior cavalry. I felt compelled to do what is usually a mistake in war, divide my forces, send a part back into Tennessee, retaining the balance here. As I have heretofore informed you, I sent Stanley back directly from Gaylesville and Schofield from Rome, both of whom have reached their destinations, and thus far Hood, who had brought up at Florence, is farther from my communications than when he started, and I have in Tennessee a force numerically greater than his, well commanded and well organized, so that I feel no uneasiness on the score of Hood reaching my main communications. My last accounts from General Thomas are to 9.30 last night, when Hood's army was about Florence in great distress about provisions, as he well must be. But that devil Forrest was down about Johnsonville and was making havoc among the gun-boats and transports. But Schofield's troops were arriving at Johnsonville and a fleet of gun-boats reported coming up from below, able to repair that trouble. But you know that that line of supplies was only opened for summer use when the Cumberland is not to be depended upon. We now have abundant supplies at Atlanta, Chattanooga, and Nashville, with the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and the Cumberland River unmolested, so that I regard Davis' threat to get his army on my rear, or on my communications, as a miserable failure. Now as to the second branch of my proposition, I admit that the first object should be the destruction of that army, and if Beauregard moves his infantry and artillery up into that pocket about Jackson and Paris, I will feel strongly tempted to move Thomas directly against him and myself move rapidly by Decatur and Purdy to cut off his retreat. But this would involve the abandonment of Atlanta and a retrograde movement, which would be very doubtful of expediency or success; for, as a matter of course, Beauregard, who watches me with his cavalry and his friendly citizens, would have timely notice and would slip out and escape to regain what we have earned at so much cost. I am more than satisfied that Beauregard has not the men to attack fortifications or meet me in battle, and it would be a great achievement for him to make me abandon Atlanta by mere threats and maneuvers. These are the reasons which have determined my former movements. I have employed the last ten days in running to the rear the sick and wounded and worthless, and all the vast amount of stores accumulated by our army in the advance, aiming to organize this branch of my army into four well-commanded corps, encumbered by only one gun to 1,000 men, and provisions and ammunition which can be loaded up in our mule teams, so that we can pick up and start on the shortest notice. I reckon that by the l0th instant this end will be reached, and by that date I also will have the troops all paid, the Presidential election over and out of our way, and I hope the early storms of November, now prevailing, will also give us the chance of a long period of fine healthy weather for campaigning. Then the question presents itself, What shall be done? On the supposition always that Thomas can hold the line of the Tennessee, and very shortly be able to assume the offensive as against Beauregard, I propose to act in such a manner against the material resources of the South as utterly to negative Davis' boasted threat and promises of protection. If we can march a well-appointed army right through his territory, it is a demonstration to the world, foreign and domestic, that we have a power which Davis cannot resist. This may not be war, but rather statesmanship, nevertheless it is overwhelming to my mind that there are thousands of people abroad and in the South who will reason thus: If the North can march an army right through the South, it is proof positive that the North can prevail in this contest, leaving only open the question of its willingness to use that power.

Now, Mr. Lincoln's election, which is assured, coupled with the conclusion thus reached, makes a complete, logical whole. Even without a battle, the result operating upon the minds of sensible men would produce fruits more than compensating for the expense, trouble, and risk. Admitting this reasoning to be good, that such a movement per se be right, still there may be reasons why one route would be better than another. There are three from Atlanta, southeast, south, and southwest, all open, with no serious enemy to oppose at present. The first would carry me across the only east and west railroad remaining in the Confederacy, which would be destroyed and thereby sever the communications between the armies of Lee and Beauregard. Incidentally, I might destroy the enemy's depots at Macon and Augusta and reach the seashore at Charleston or Savannah, from either of which points I could re-enforce our armies in Virginia. The second and easiest route would be due south, following substantially the valley of the Flint River, which is very fertile and well supplied, and fetching up on the navigable waters of the Appalachicola, destroying en route the same railroad, taking up the prisoners of war still at Andersonville, and destroying about 400,000 bales of cotton near Albany and Fort Gaines. This, however, would leave the army in a bad position for future movements. The third, down the Chattahoochee to Opelika and Montgomery, thence to Pensacola or Tensas Bayou, in communication with Fort Morgan. This latter route would enable me at once to co-operate with General Canby in the reduction of Mobile and occupation of the line of the Alabama. In my judgment the first would have a material effect upon your campaign in Virginia, the second would be the safest of execution, but the third would more properly fall within the sphere of my own command and have a direct bearing upon my own enemy, Beauregard. If, therefore, I should start before I hear further from you or before further developments turn my course, you may take it for granted that I have moved via Griffin to Barnesville; that I break up the road between Columbus and Macon good, and then, if I feint on Columbus, will move, via Macon and Millen, to Savannah, or if I feint on Macon you may take it for granted I have shot off toward Opelika, Montgomery, and Mobile Bay or Pensacola. I will not attempt to send couriers back, but trust to the Richmond papers to keep you well advised. I will give you notice by telegraph of the exact time of my departure. General Steedman is here to clear the railroad back to Chattanooga, and I will see that the road is broken completely between the Etowah and the Chattahoochee, including their bridges, and that Atlanta itself is utterly destroyed.

I am, with respect,
W. T. SHERMAN,                
Major-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 39, Part 3 (Serial No. 79), p. 658-61

Wednesday, April 8, 2020

Major-General William T. Sherman to “an Old Resident of St. Louis, Missouri,” September 8, 1864

IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GA., Sept. 8, 1864

DEAR SIR:—Yr kind note of Aug. 24 from Rochester, N. Y. reached me here and I am really thankful for the warm terms in which you write, and I know you will not feel the less kindly when you know we are inside Atlanta.  I don’t see why we cant have some sense about negroes as well as about horses, mules, iron, copper, etc.—but say nigger in the U. S. and from Sumner to Atty Kelly to the whole country goes crazy.  I never thought my nigger letter would get into the papers but since it has I lay low—I like niggers well enough, as niggers, but when fools & idiots try & make niggers better than ourselves I have an opinion.  We are also ruining our country in this bounty & substitute business.  It only amounts to spending money, it don’t make a single soldier.

Fools think they can buy off, and will spend their money on some worthless substitute who shirks and as is of no use & after spending all his money will have to serve besides.

Well this thing will work out its natural solution.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Maj. Gen.

SOURCES: “Negroes in Their Places,” The Montgomery Advertiser, Montgomery, Alabama, Tuesday, December 17, 1889, p. 4; “General Sherman on ‘Niggers,’” The Sentinel, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, Thursday, December 26, 1899, p. 1.

Saturday, March 28, 2020

Major-General Oliver O. Howard: General Field Orders No. 16, September 10, 1864

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS No. 16.
HDQRS. DEPARTMENT
AND ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,
East Point, Ga., September 10, 1864.

It is with pride, gratification, and a grateful sense of divine favor that I congratulate this noble army upon the successful termination of the campaign. Your officers claim for you a wonderful record—for example, a march of 400 miles, thirteen distinct engagements, 4,000 prisoners, and 20 stand of colors captured, and 3,000 of the enemy's dead buried in your front. Your movements upon the enemy's flank have been bold and successful: first, upon Resaca; second, upon Dallas; third, upon Kenesaw; fourth, upon Nickajack; fifth (via Roswell), upon the Augusta railroad; sixth, upon Ezra Church, to the southwest of Atlanta, and seventh, upon Jonesborough and the Macon railroad. Atlanta was evacuated while you were fighting at Jonesborough. The country may never know with what patience, labor, and exposure you have tugged away at every natural and artificial obstacle that an enterprising and confident enemy could interpose. The terrific battles you have fought may never be realized or credited, still a glad acclaim is already greeting you from the Government and people, in view of the results you have helped to gain, and I believe a sense of the magnitude of the achievements of the last 100 days will not abate but increase with time and history. Our rejoicing is tempered, as it always must be in war, by the soldier's sorrow at the loss of his companions in arms; on every hillside, in every valley, throughout your long and circuitous route from Dalton to Jonesborough, you have buried them. Your trusted and beloved commander fell in your midst; his name, the name of McPherson! carries with it a peculiar feeling of sorrow. I trust the impress of his character is upon you all to incite you to generous actions and noble deeds. To mourning friends and to all the disabled in battle, you extend a soldier's sympathy. My first intimate acquaintance with you dates from the 28th of July. I never beheld fiercer assaults than the enemy then made, and I never saw troops more steady and self-possessed in action than your divisions which were there engaged. I have learned that for cheerfulness, obedience, rapidity of movement, and confidence in battle, the Army of the Tennessee is not to be surpassed, and it shall be my study that your fair record shall continue, and my purpose to assist you to move steadily forward and plant the old flag in every proud city of the rebellion.

O. O. HOWARD,
Major-general.
SAM’L L. TAGGART
Ass’t. Adj’t. Gen’l.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 38, Part 3 (Serial No. 74), p. 49-50; Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 299-300

Captain Charles Wright Wills: Explanatory Note.

[The Army of the Tennessee remained at, or near, East Point, until October 4th. When General Sherman decided to destroy Atlanta, he gave the inhabitants their choice as to where they would go, either north, south, or remain, and take their chances in the ruined city. Prisoners captured during the campaign were also exchanged, and a detail of some 70 or 80 men from the regiment, commanded by Captain Wills, and a like command from the 100th Indiana, was given the duty of guarding the “neutral ground” at a place called Rough and Ready, some eight or ten miles south of Atlanta. This duty being performed, the detail rejoined the regiment, having been so occupied about ten days. The 4th Division was here broken up, and the “old 2d Brigade” was transferred to the 1st Division, commanded by Gen. C. R. Wood.]

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 304

Friday, January 3, 2020

Captain Charles Wright Wills: August 29, 1864

August 29, 1864.

I would much like to know what the Chicago Convention is doing to-day. We hear there is a possibility they may nominate Sherman. How we wish they would. He would hardly accept the nomination from such a party, but I would cheerfully live under Copperhead rule if they would give us such as Sherman. Sherman believes with Logan, “that if we can't subdue these Rebels and the rebellion, the next best thing we can do is to all go to hell together.”

We have already thrown our army so far to the right that our communications are not safe, but yet we can't quite reach the Montgomery or Macon railroads. It is determined to leave the 20th Corps at Vinings to guard the railroad bridge, and I think to move all the rest to the right. The army has just moved its length by the right flank. Looks easy and simple enough, but it took three days and nights of the hardest work of the campaign. The whole line lay in sight, and musket range of the enemy, not only our skirmishers, but our main line, and half a dozen men could, at any point, by showing themselves above the works, have drawn the enemy's fire. A gun, a caisson, or a wagon could hardly move without being shelled. On the night of the 25th, the 20th Corps moved back to the river to guard the railroad bridge seven miles from Atlanta; and the 4th moved toward the right.

Night of the 26th the 15th, 16th and 17th moved back on different roads toward the right. The wheels of the artillery were muffled and most of them moved off very quietly. One gun in our division was not muffled, and its rattling brought on a sharp fire, but I only heard of two men being hurt. Our regiment was deployed on the line our brigade occupied, and remained four hours after everything else had left. At 2:30 a. m. we were ordered to withdraw very quietly. We had fired very little for two hours, and moved out so quietly that, though our lines were only 25 yards apart in one place, the Rebels did not suspect our exit. We moved back three-quarters of a mile and waited an hour, I think, for some 17th Corps skirmishers. We could hear the Johnnies popping away at our old position, and occasionally they would open quite sharply as though angry at not receiving their regular replies. When we were fully two miles away they threw two shells into our deserted works. We did not lose a man, but I give you my word, this covering an evacuation is a delicate, dangerous, and far-from-pleasant duty. There was a Johnnie in the "pit" nearest us that got off a good thing the other day. A newsboy came along in the ditch, crying, "Heer's your Cincinnati, Louisville and Nashville papers." Crack! Crack!! went two Rebel guns, and a Johnnie holloed “There is your Atlanta Appeal! We caught up with the brigade just at daylight, it was raining, but our watch, the hard march, the wear and tear of such duty, made some sleep a necessity, so we tumbled down in the rank smelling weeds, and I was sleeping equal to Rip Van Winkle in half a minute. In half an hour we were awakened, took breakfast and marched a couple of miles to where the train was. Here somebody got Rebel on the brain, and we were run out a mile to investigate. We stopped in a nice, fine grove, and I didn't want to hear any more about the Rebels, but went to sleep instanter. That sleep did me a world of good. I woke about 4 p. m., and found the whole regiment with scarce a half-dozen exceptions, sound asleep. Finally the rear of the train started and we followed. At just midnight we came up to the train corral and laid down for the remnant of the night. At 6 a. m., we left the train and rejoined the division. At dark we camped on the Montgomery and Atlanta railroad, where the mile post says 15 miles to Atlanta. The march has been through a miserable rough country.

We have now been more than half-way around Atlanta, and I have not yet seen a country house that would more than compare favorably with the Coleman Mansion, or a farm that would in any respect vie with the stumpiest of Squire Shipley's stump quarter, or the most barren and scraggiest of Copperas creek barren or brakes. At 12 p. m. they aroused our regiment to tear up railroad track. In one and one-quarter hours we utterly destroyed rails and ties for twice the length of our regiment.

We, by main strength with our hands, turned the track upside down, pried the ties off, stacked them, piled the rails across and fired the piles. Used no tools whatever. On the 29th the 16th Corps moved down and destroyed the railroad to Fairburn. On the 30th the army started for Macon railroad, Kilpatrick's cavalry in advance. He did splendidly. Had hard skirmishing all the day. Took at least a dozen barricades, and went about as fast as we wanted to. He saved the Flint river bridge, and our corps crossed it, and by 12 p. m., were in good position with works within one-half mile of Jonesboro and the railroad.

Darkness kept us from taking the road that night. The enemy had a strong line of pickets all around us and we built our works under their fire. At daylight the 31st, we found the Rebels in plain sight in front of our regiment. I never saw them so thick. Our regiment is on the extreme right of the division.

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 291-4

Friday, December 20, 2019

Captain Charles Wright Wills: July 29, 1864


One and three-quarter miles southwest of Atlanta,
July 29, 1864.

On the evening of the 26th, Adj. Frank Lermond sent me word that the Army of the Tennessee was going to evacuate its position, the movement to commence at 12 p. m. When the lines are so close together the skirmish line is a ticklish place.

The parties can tell by hearing artillery move, etc., nearly what is going on, and in evacuation generally make a dash for the skirmish line or rear guard. At nearly every position Johnston has fortified we caught his skirmish line when he evacuated. Luckily our line got off about 4 a. m. on the 27th though they shelled us right lively.

That day our three corps moved along in the rear of the 23d, 4th, 14th and 20th, the intention being, I think, to extend the line to the right, if possible, to the Montgomery and Atlanta railroad and thus destroy another line of communication. We have thoroughly destroyed 50 miles of the Augusta and Atlanta railroad. The 16th Corps formed its line on the right of the 14th, and the 17th joined on the 16th, and on the morning of the 28th, we moved out to extend the line still further. At 12 m. we had just got into position and thrown a few rails along our line, when Hood's Rebel corps came down on Morgan L's and our divisions like an avalanche. Our two divisions did about all the fighting, and it lasted until 5 p. m.

We whipped them awfully. Their dead they left almost in line of battle along our entire front of two divisions.

It was the toughest fight of the campaign, but not a foot of our line gave way, and our loss is not one-twentieth of theirs. The rails saved us. I am tired of seeing such butchery but if they will charge us that way once a day for a week, this corps will end the war in this section.

Our loss in the regiment was 17 out of 150 we had in the fight, and the brigade loss will not exceed 100. I never saw so many Rebels dead. We are in excellent spirits, and propose to take Atlanta whenever Sherman wants it.

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 286-7

Wednesday, December 11, 2019

Captain Charles Wright Wills: July 25, 1864

July 25, 1864

We moved up to the rear of the corps on the 21, and had just got comfortably fixed for the night when orders came that we should report back to the brigade on the front line.  Just as we started a heavy rain set in, and continued while we marched one and one-half miles to the left, where we stacked arms in rear of a line of work occupied by the 6th Iowa. The Rebel line lay in plain sight, just across an open field, and the bullets made us keep pretty close.

At sunset we were ordered to extend, or rather build a line of works to hold our regiment, between the 6th Iowa and 40th Illinois. We had fairly commenced, and the boys were scattered everywhere, bringing rails, logs, etc., when the Johnnie's bugle sounded “forward,” and the Rebels raised a yell and fired a couple of volleys into us. There was a lively rush for our guns, but we saw through it in a minute, and in three minutes were at work again. Only two men were hurt in the regiment, one from Company C, and Wm. Nicholson of my company had the small bone of his leg broken just above the ankle. We got our works in shape about daylight, and about 8 a. m. I heard a cheer from our skirmishers, and saw the Rebel skirmishers run right over their works like deer. Our line followed them and took possession of their works, and no Rebel or works being in sight, and our boys knowing they were only two miles from Atlanta, thought sure they had the town, and all started on the “double quick” for it, yelling, “potatoes” or “tobacco,” or what he particularly hankered for. They got along swimmingly until within about three-quarters of a mile from town, when they ran against a strong line of works and were brought up standing, by a volley therefrom. They deployed immediately, and by the time their officers got up had a good line established, and were whacking away at the fort apparently as well satisfied as if they had got their tobaco.

McPherson had an idea that all was not right, for our line was allowed to advance no further than the one the Rebels had left, and we were set to work changing its front. At dinner when we were about leaving “the table,” Captain Smith mentioned hearing some heavy skirmishing in our rear as we came to our meal. That was the first any of us knew of the battle. In a few minutes we all heard it plainly, and from our works could see exactly in our rear a body of grey coats, advance from a wood and the battle opened, although we did not know what troops of ours were engaged. Have since heard it was a portion of the 16th Corps who were moving out to extend the line. Their being just in that position was a piece of luck, as it saved the trains of the Army of the Tennessee, and, perhaps, the whole army. I should think they fought an hour before the battle swung around toward us. During the battle, our regiment changed position three times, facing east, west and south. We helped repulse four charges, took 115 prisoners, and helped take 400 more. Also ran the enemy out of a line of works they had taken from our 3d brigade, and the best of it is, we lost only ten men. I cannot for my life see how we escaped so well. General Blair is reported to have said that the Army of the Tennessee is eternally disgraced for going outside of all precedent, in refusing to be whipped when attacked in flank and rear, as well as in front. Hood confines his strategy to maneuvering troops for battle, and pretends to be emphatically a “fighting cock.” He attacked Thomas on the 20th and 21st, away on the right, and on the 22d walked into us. He got his comb badly cut, and if I am any prophet at all, will not attempt another fight soon. Sherman estimates the enemy's loss in the three days' fighting at 12,000. Our loss in the same time is less than 3,500. I am surprised that we have not attacked them in return before this, but am far from anxious to charge their works. Although I do know that if we charge with two lines as good as our brigade, and don't go too fast, we can take any ordinary works. The prisoners we got the other day were run down. When our regiment drove the Rebels out of the works of the 3d brigade, a man shot through the thigh, asked me for water as I passed him. I asked him if the Rebels robbed him, he said, no, but they killed a man in the ditch with a spade right in front of him. I looked where he pointed and found a 97th Indiana boy with his thigh broken by a pistol shot, and three cuts in his face by a spade. He was not dead, he knew me, and reached out his hand smiling. He said an officer rode up with some footmen and told him to surrender, when he shot the officer and ran his bayonet through one of the men. Another shot him, and the man he bayoneted used the spade on him. McPherson was killed early in the fight. The Rebels had his body a few minutes, but the 16th Corps charged and retook it. Altogether, it was the prettiest fight I ever saw.

The Rebel plan of attack was excellent, and if their assaulting columns had charged simultaneously, there is no telling what might have been the upshot. As it was, part of 17th Corps changed position in their breastworks three times, that is, repulsed an assault from one side, and being attacked from the rear, jumped over and fought them the other way. I was up to where the 20th and 31st Illinois fought. The dead Rebels lay about as thick on one side of the works as the other, and right up to them. Two more fights like this, and there will be no more Rebel army here. We lost about 600 prisoners, and took 2,000.

Garrard's cavalry division went out to Covington on the Augusta road. Am just going on picket.

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 283-6

Wednesday, October 30, 2019

Captain Charles Wright Wills: July 19, 1864

Decatur, Ga., July 19, 1864.

To-night we are in Decatur, six miles from Atlanta. The Rebels were yet in Atlanta this morning, for they ran a train to this burg this morning, but they may now be gone. Our line of battle crosses the railroad nearly at right angles, facing Atlanta. I think the 23d Corps has swung around in front of us, and the 16th Corps is now on our left. Our cavalry had some fighting after 1 p. m. today. A citizen says there was nearly 4,500 Rebel cavalry here. A small portion of our mounted forces made a half-charge on the Johnnies just this side of town, and the Rebels stampeded. They knew we had a large force, and, of course, could not tell just what number was coming on them. They broke down every fence in town and ran over everything but the houses in their mad panic to get away. Our men, as usual, all stopped in town to flank the onions, potatoes, chickens and sundries, in which they were busily engaged when the Rebels, who had rallied and got a battery in position, opened right lively. Our men drove them away, and then all hands went to foraging again. To-morrow night, I think, will give us Atlanta, or there will be a fair start for a new graveyard near the town. I hear no fighting on the right. We have passed over the same miserable looking country to-day. I caught a small scorpion to-day, also a reddish brown bug not quite as large as a thrush, and as savage as a mad rat. Wish I could preserve some of these bugs and things; I know you'd like 'em

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 282

Tuesday, October 29, 2019

Captain Charles Wright Wills: July 20, 1864

July 20, 1864.

Assembly has just sounded. In a few hours we will know if it is to be a fight. Frank says we are detailed for train guard. If the army marches right into Atlanta, I'll think it d----d mean, but if there is a fight will not feel so badly, unless we can get a big battle out of Johnston. I want to help in that. We have moved up near the town the army has gone on. Can hear heavy guns occasionally, sounds about three miles away, half the distance to the city.

This little town is quite an old place. About half the citizens are still here. I saw a couple of right pretty girls. Some Confederate prisoners tell me that Johnston is gone to Richmond, and that Hood is commanding and intends to fight us at Atlanta.

The wheat and oats raised this year in this part of Georgia, if it had all been saved, would not more than have fed the citizens. Full one-half the cornfields will not turn out anything.

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 283

Wednesday, September 18, 2019

Captain Charles Wright Wills: July 18, 1864

Near Stone Mountain, July 18, 1864.

Osterhaus (or his division, for I hear that he resigned and yesterday started for the North, en route for Mexico, where he formerly resided, and that he intends entering the Mexican Army to fight “Johnny Crapeau”) was ahead to-day, and only lost a dozen or 50 men. Our brigade has been train guard, and we did not get into camp until 11 p. m. This night marching hurts us more than the hottest day marching. We camp to-night near Stone Mountain, and the depot of the same name 16 miles from Atlanta. It is evident to me that the Army of the Tennessee is doing the “flanking them out” this time. The 1st Division cut the railroad effectually. A train came from the East while they were at it, but discovering the smoke, reversed the engine and escaped. The 17th Corps I hear is close behind us protecting the commissary trains and forming our rear guard.

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 281-2

Thursday, August 1, 2019

Captain Charles Wright Wills: July 16, 1864

July 16, 1864, 76th of the Campaign.

I can hear no firing to-day, but we are so far from the right or center that we could hear nothing less than a 13-inch mortar. I will tell you all I know of the situation just to let you know how little a soldier knows of what is going on. In papers of this date you will see twice as much. The 17th Army Corps lies on the right bank of the river, and to the right of the army, six miles below the railroad crossing, skirmishing with the enemy on the opposite side. Next comes the 20th, 14th and 4th on the same side, the 4th lying across the railroad four miles, further up the 23d crossed the river, but probably only holds a position, as we do. Then the 16th Corps joins the left of the 23d, and the 15th last, both on the left bank. Not being perfect in heavy strategy, I can't exactly see the point, but no doubt Sherman does. I suppose the 4th, 14th and 20th Corps will cross near the railroad bridge, and be the first to occupy Atlanta. If we can't get to give Johnston a sound thrashing, I don't care about marching another step until fall. Health of the regiment still good, but we are expecting sickness soon. We have had a terrific thunderstorm, killed five men and wounded eight in the 18th Missouri, and killed a teamster and some mules. I never saw but one or two more severe ones.

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 279-80

Friday, July 12, 2019

Captain Charles Wright Wills: July 12, 1864

July 12, 1864.

We lay quietly in the shade all day the 11th, save those who had ambition enough to go fishing, berrying or swimming. The other bank of the Chattahoochie opposite us is yet lined with Rebel sharp-shooters, but there is a fine creek from which the boys get some fine fish. I saw an eel two feet long which came from it. Our boys never have made any bargain with the Johnnies to quit picket firing, even for an hour, but other corps and divisions often do. It would almost break the heart of one of our boys to see a Rebel without getting a shot at him. On the 12th, at 5 p. m., the "General" and "Assembly" sounded almost together, and we were under way in a twinkling. We understand we are going back to Marietta, and then over the river where the 23d Corps crossed it. We stopped here (about seven miles from Marietta), at 11 p. m., and had reveille at 3 this morning. Stoneman, with at least 10,000 cavalry, recrossed the river on the night of the 10th on a grand raid between Atlanta and Montgomery. We had a real amusing scene last night. About 12 o'clock we were nearly all asleep, when a mule came charging at full speed right through our regiment. In an instant every man was on his feet, and all who knew what was up, were swinging blankets and shouting whoa! The most of us did not know whether a cavalry charge was on us or the devil. Many of the men caught up their guns, and "treed," and altogether it was most ludicrous. Our regiment now marches 190 guns and 7 officers. I have 20 guns, all I started with, except what I have lost in battle. Just half.

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 277-8

Monday, June 24, 2019

Captain Charles Wright Wills: July 9, 1864

Nine miles from Atlanta, two and one-half miles southwest of railroad crossing,
July 9, 1864.

On the evening of the 7th, just dark, a Rebel battery in a fort which our guns had been bursting shells over all day, suddenly opened with eight 20-pound Parrotts, and for one-half an hour did some of the most rapid work I ever heard. They first paid their attention to our batteries, then demolished some half-dozen wagons and 20 mules for the 4th Division of the 17th Army Corps half a mile to our right, and then began scattering their compliments along our line, wherever I suppose they had detected our presence by smoke or noise. They kept getting closer and closer to us, and finally, a shell burst in front of our regiment. The next one went 50 yards past us and dropped into the 40th Illinois. Neither of them did any damage, and no more came so close. An hour afterward we fell in, and moving a mile to the left and one-half a mile to the front, occupied a ridge which we fortified by daylight, so they might shell and be hanged.

The Rebel skirmishers heard us moving as we came over, and threw more than a thousand bullets at us, but it was so pitchy dark that fortunately they did us no damage. From our colors we can see the fort that fired so the night of the 7th. They are about three-fourths of a mile distant. There have not been any bullets or shells passed over us since we got our works up, though the skirmish line at the foot of the hill, has a lively time. We have it very easy. I was on the 8th in charge of a line of skirmishers on the left of our brigade. The Rebels were seemingly quite peaceable, so much so, that I thought I'd walk over to some blackberry bushes 50 yards in front of our right.

I got about half way out when they sent about a dozen bullets at me. I retired in good order, considering. In the p. m. of the 7th, the skirmishers in front of a brigade of the 20th Corps, and the Rebel line, left their guns, and went out and were together nearly all the afternoon; 13 of the Rebels agreed to come into our line after dark. At the time appointed, heavy firing commenced on the Rebel side, and our boys, fearing foul play, poured in a few volleys. Through the heaviest of the fire two of the Rebels came running in. They said that the 13 started, and that the Rebels opened on them. The rest were probably killed. One of my men has just returned from visiting his brother in the 20th Corps. It is reported there that the 23d Corps crossed the river this p. m. without losing a man. The heavy firing this evening was our folks knocking down some block houses at the railroad bridge. The 4th Corps to-night lays right along the river bank.

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 276-7