I met at the President's, and was introduced by him to,
Colonel Rawlins of General Grant's staff. He arrived yesterday with the
official report of the taking of Vicksburg and capture of Pemberton's army. Was
much pleased with him, his frank, intelligent, and interesting description of
men and account of army operations. His interview with the President and Cabinet
was of nearly two hours' duration, and all, I think, were entertained by him.
His honest, unpretending, and unassuming manners pleased me; the absence of
pretension, and I may say the unpolished and unrefined deportment, of this
earnest and sincere man, patriot, and soldier pleased me more than that of
almost any officer whom I have met. He was never at West Point and has had few
educational advantages, yet he is a soldier, and has a mind which has served
his general and his country well. He is a sincere and earnest friend of Grant,
who has evidently sent him here for a purpose.
It was the intention of the President last fall that General
McClernand, an old neighbor and friend of his, should have been associated with
Admiral Porter in active operations before Vicksburg. It was the expressed and
earnest wish of Porter to have a citizen general, and he made it a special
point to be relieved from associations with a West-Pointer; all West-Pointers,
he said, were egotistical and assuming and never willing to consider and treat
naval officers as equals. The President thought the opportunity a good one to
bring forward his friend McClernand, in whom he has confidence and who is a
volunteer officer of ability, and possesses, moreover, a good deal of political
influence in Illinois. Stanton and Halleck entered into his views, for Grant
was not a special favorite with either. He had also, like Hooker, the
reputation of indulging too freely in whiskey to be always safe and reliable.
Rawlins now comes from Vicksburg with statements in regard
to McClernand which show him an impracticable and unfit man, — that he has not
been subordinate and intelligent, but has been an embarrassment, and, instead
of directing or assisting in, has been really an obstruction to, army movements
and operations. In Rawlins's statements there is undoubtedly prejudice, but
with such appearance of candor, and earnest and intelligent conviction, that
there can be hardly a doubt McClernand is in fault, and Rawlins has been sent
here by Grant in order to enlist the President rather than bring dispatches. In
this, I think, he has succeeded, though the President feels kindly towards
McClernand. Grant evidently hates him, and Rawlins is imbued with the feelings
of his chief.
Seward wished me to meet him and the President at the War
Department to consider the subject of the immediate occupation of some portion
of Texas. My letters of the 9th and 23d ult. and conversation since have
awakened attention to the necessity of some decisive action. [These letters
follow.]
The European combination, or concerted understanding,
against us begins to be developed and appreciated. The use of the Rio Grande to
evade the blockade, and the establishment of regular lines of steamers to
Matamoras did not disturb some of our people, but certain movements and recent
givings-out of the French have alarmed Seward, who says Louis Napoleon is
making an effort to get Texas; he therefore urges the immediate occupation of
Galveston and also some other point. At the Cabinet meeting to-day, he took Stanton
aside and had ten minutes' private conversation with him in a low tone. I was
then invited to the conversation and received the above information. I agreed
to call as requested at the appointed time, but why this partial, ex-parte, half-and-half
way of doing these things? Why are not these matters unfolded to the whole
Cabinet? Why a special meeting of only three with General Halleck? It is as
important that the Secretary of the Treasury, who is granting clearances from
New York to Matamoras and thereby sanctions the illicit trade of the English
and French, should be advised if any of us. The question which Mr. Seward
raises is political, national, and so important to the whole country that the
Administration should be fully advised, but for some reason is restricted. The
Secretary of State likes to be exclusive; does not want all the Cabinet in
consultation, but is particular himself to attend all meetings. It exhibits
early bad training and party management, not good administration.
Soon after two I went to the War Department. Seward,
Stanton, and Halleck were there, and the Texas subject was being discussed.
Halleck, as usual, was heavy, sluggish, not prepared to express an opinion. Did
not know whether General Banks would think it best to move on Mobile or
Galveston, and if on Galveston whether he would prefer transportation by water or
would take an interior route. Had just written Banks. Wanted his reply. I
turned to Seward, and, alluding to his morning conversation, I inquired what a
demonstration on Mobile had to do with foreign designs in another section. How
far Halleck had been let into a knowledge of measures which were withheld from
a majority of the Cabinet I was uninformed, though I doubt not Halleck was more
fully posted than myself. Halleck, apprehending the purport of my inquiry, said
he mentioned Mobile because there had been some information from Banks
concerning operations in that direction before the new question came up. I then
asked, if a demonstration was to be made on Texas to protect and guard our
western frontier, whether Indianola was not a better point than Galveston.
Halleck said he did not know, — had not thought of that. “Where,” said he, “is
Indianola? What are its advantages?” I replied, in western Texas, where the
people had been more loyal than in eastern Texas. It was much nearer the Rio
Grande and the Mexican border, consequently was better situated to check
advances from the other side of the Rio Grande; the harbor had deeper water
than Galveston; the place was but slightly fortified, was nearer Austin, etc.,
etc. Halleck was totally ignorant on these matters; knew nothing of Indianola,1
was hardly aware there was such a place; settled down very stolidly; would
decide nothing for the present, but must wait to hear from General Banks. The
Secretary of State was profoundly deferential to the General-in-Chief, hoped he
would hear something from General Banks soon, requested to be immediately
informed when word was received; and we withdrew as General Halleck lighted
another cigar.
This is a specimen of the management of affairs. A majority
of the members of the Cabinet are not permitted to know what is doing. Mr.
Seward has something in regard to the schemes and designs of Louis Napoleon; he
cannot avoid communicating with the Secretaries of War and the Navy, hence the
door is partially open to them. Others are excluded. Great man Halleck is
consulted, but is not ready, — has received nothing from others, who he intends
shall have the responsibility. Therefore we must wait a few weeks and not
improbably lose a favorable opportunity.
The truth is that Halleck, who has been smuggled into
position here by Stanton, aided by Pope and General Scott, is unfit for the
place. He has some scholastic attainments but is no general. I can pass that
judgment upon him, though I do not profess to be a military man. He has failed
to acquit himself to advantage as yet, and the country needs other talents to
be successful.
______________
1 Indianola, Texas, is no longer to be found on
the map. It was situated on the western shore of Matagorda Bay on the site now
occupied by Port Lavaca, about 125 miles west-southwest of Galveston, but was
destroyed by cyclones in 1885 and 1886.
SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30,
1864, p. 386-92
