The following Letter from Mr. CLAY to the Editors was
forwarded from Raleigh on the day of its date, but did not reach our hands in
time for the publication earlier than to-day.
TO THE EDITORS OF THE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER
RALEIGH, April 17, 1844
GENTLEMEN: Subsequent
to my departure from Ashland, in December last, I received various
communications from popular assemblages and private individuals, requesting an
expression of my opinion upon the question of the Annexation of Texas to the
United States. I have forborne to reply to them, because it was not very
convenient, during the progress of my journey, to do so, and for other reasons.
I did not think it proper, unnecessarily, to introduce at present a new element
among the other exciting subjects which agitate and engross the public mind.
The rejection of the overture of Texas, some years ago, to become annexed to
the United States, had met with general acquiescence. Nothing had since
occurred materially to vary the question. I had seen no evidence of a desire
being entertained, on the part of any considerable portion of the American
people, that Texas should become an integral part of the United States. During
my sojourn in New Orleans, I had, indeed, been greatly surprised, by
information which I received from Texas, that, in the course of last fall,
voluntary overture had proceeded from the Executive of the United States to the
Authorities of Texas to conclude a treaty of Annexation; and that, in order to
overcome the repugnance felt by any of them to a negotiation upon the subject,
strong and, as I believed, erroneous representations had been made to them of a
state of opinion in the Senate of the United States favorable to the
ratification of such a treaty. According to these representations, it had been ascertained
that a number of Senators, varying from thirty-five to forty-two, were ready to
sanction such a treaty. I was aware, too, that holders of Texas lands and Texas
scrip, and speculators in them, were actively engaged in promoting the object
of annexation. Still, I did not believe that any Executive of the United States
would venture upon so grave and momentous a proceeding, not only without any
general manifestation of public opinion in favor of it, but in direct
opposition to strong and decided expressions of public disapprobation. But it
appears that I was mistaken. To the astonishment of the whole nation, we are
now informed that a treaty of annexation has been actually concluded, and is to
be submitted to the Senate for its consideration. The motives for my silence,
therefore, no longer remain, and I feel it to be my duty to present an
exposition of my views and opinions upon the question, for what they may be
worth, to the public consideration. I adopt this method as being more
convenient than several replies to the respective communications which I have
received.
I regret that I have not the advantage of a view of the
treaty itself, so as to enable me to adapt an expression of my opinion to the
actual conditions and stipulations which it contains. Not possessing that
opportunity, I am constrained to treat the question according to what I presume
to be the terms of the treaty. If, without the loss of national character,
without the hazard of foreign war, with the general concurrence of the nation,
without any danger to the integrity of the Union, and without giving an
unreasonable price for Texas, the question of annexation were presented, it
would appear in quite a different light from that in which, I apprehend, it is
now to be regarded.
The United States acquired a title to Texas, extending, as I
believe, to the Rio del Norte, by the treaty of Louisiana. They ceded and
relinquished that title to Spain by the treaty of 1819, by which the Sabine was
substituted for the Rio del Norte as our western boundary. This treaty was
negotiated under the Administration of Mr. Monroe, and with the concurrence of
his Cabinet, of which Messrs. Crawford, Calhoun, and Wirt, being a majority,
all Southern gentlemen, composed a part. When the treaty was laid before the
House of Representatives, being a member of that body, I expressed the opinion,
which I then entertained, and still hold, that Texas was sacrificed to the
acquisition of Florida. We wanted Florida; but I thought it must, from its
position, inevitably fall into our possession; that the point of a few years,
sooner or later, was of no sort of consequence, and that in giving five
millions of dollars and Texas for it, we gave more than a just equivalent. But,
if we made a great sacrifice in the surrender of Texas, we ought to take care
not to make too great a sacrifice in the attempt to re-acquire it.
My opinions of the inexpediency of the treaty of 1819 did
not prevail. The country and Congress were satisfied with it, appropriations
were made to carry it into effect, the line of the Sabine was recognised by us
as our boundary, in negotiations both with Spain and Mexico, after Mexico
became independent, and measures have been in actual progress to mark the line,
from the Sabine to Red river, and thence to the Pacific ocean. We have thus
fairly alienated our title to Texas, by solemn national compacts, to the
fulfilment of which we stand bound by good faith and national honor. It is,
therefore, perfectly idle and ridiculous, if not dishonorable, to talk of
resuming our title to Texas, as if we had never parted with it. We can no more
do that than Spain can resume Florida, France Louisiana, or Great Britain the
thirteen colonies, now composing a part of the United States.
During the administration of Mr. Adams, Mr. Poinsett,
Minister of the United States at Mexico, was instructed by me, with the
President's authority, to propose a re-purchase of Texas; but he forbore even
to make an overture for that purpose. Upon his return to the United States, he
informed me, at New Orleans, that his reason for not making it was, that he
knew the purchase was wholly impracticable, and that he was persuaded that, if
he made the overture, it would have no other effect than to aggravate
irritations, already existing, upon matters of difference between the two
countries.
The events which have since transpired in Texas are well
known. She revolted against the Government of Mexico, flew to arms, and finally
fought and won the memorable battle of San Jacinto, annihilating a Mexican army
and making a captive of the Mexican President. The signal success of that
Revolution was greatly aided, if not wholly achieved, by citizens of the United
States who had migrated to Texas. These succors, if they could not always be
prevented by the Government of the United States, were furnished in a manner
and to an extent which brought upon us some national reproach in the eyes of an
impartial world. And, in my opinion, they impose on us the obligation of
scrupulously avoiding the imputation of having instigated and aided the
Revolution with the ultimate view of territorial aggrandizement. After the
battle of San Jacinto, the United States recognised the independence of Texas,
in conformity with the principle and practice which have always prevailed in
their councils of recognising the Government “de facto,” without regarding the question de jure. That recognition did not affect or impair the rights of
Mexico, or change the relations which existed between her and Texas. She, on
the contrary, has preserved all her rights, and has continued to assert, and so
far as I know yet asserts, her right to reduce Texas to obedience, as a part of
the Republic of Mexico. According to late intelligence, it is probable that she
has agreed upon a temporary suspension of hostilities; but, if that has been
done, I presume it is with the purpose, upon the termination of the armistice,
of renewing the war and enforcing her rights, as she considers them.
This narrative shows the present actual condition of Texas,
so far as I have information about it. If it be correct, Mexico has not
abandoned, but perseveres in the assertion of her rights by actual force of
arms, which, if suspended, are intended to be renewed. Under these
circumstances, if the Government of the United States were to acquire Texas, it
would acquire along with it all the incumbrances which Texas is under, and
among them the actual or suspended war between Mexico and Texas. Of that
consequence there cannot be a doubt. Annexation and war with Mexico are
identical. Now, for one, I certainly am not willing to involve this country in
a foreign war for the object of acquiring Texas. I know there are those who
regard such a war with indifference and as a trifling affair, on account of the
weakness of Mexico, and her inability to inflict serious injury upon this
country. But I do not look upon it thus lightly. I regard all wars as great
calamities, to be avoided, if possible, and honorable peace as the wisest and
truest policy of this country. What the United States most need are union,
peace, and patience. Nor do I think that the weakness of a Power should form a
motive, in any case, for inducing us to engage in or to depreciate the evils of
war. Honor and good faith and justice are equally due from this country towards
the weak as towards the strong. And, if an act of injustice were to be
perpetrated towards any Power, it would be more compatible with the dignity of
the nation, and, in my judgment, less dishonorable, to inflict it upon a powerful
instead of a weak foreign nation. But are we perfectly sure that we should be
free from injury in a state of war with Mexico? Have we any security that
countless numbers of foreign vessels, under the authority and flag of Mexico,
would not prey upon our defenceless commerce in the Mexican gulf, on the
Pacific ocean, and on every other sea and ocean? What commerce, on the other
hand, does Mexico offer, as an indemnity for our losses, to the gallantry and
enterprise of our countrymen? This view of the subject supposes that the war
would be confined to the United States and Mexico as the only belligerents. But
have we any certain guaranty that Mexico would obtain no allies among the great
European Powers? Suppose any such Powers, jealous of our increasing greatness,
and disposed to check our growth and cripple us, were to take part in behalf of
Mexico in the war, how would the different belligerents present themselves to
Christendom and the enlightened world? We have been seriously charged with an
inordinate spirit of territorial aggrandizement; and, without admitting the
justice of the charge, it must be owned that we have made vast acquisitions of
territory within the last forty years. Suppose Great Britain and France, or one
of them, were to take part with Mexico, and, by a manifesto, were to proclaim
that their objects were to assist a weak and helpless ally to check the spirit
of encroachment and ambition of an already overgrown Republic, seeking still
further acquisition of territory, to maintain the independence of Texas,
disconnected with the United States, and to prevent the further propagation of
slavery from the United States, what would be the effect of such allegations
upon the judgment of an impartial and enlightened world?
Assuming that the annexation of Texas is war with Mexico, is
it competent to the treaty-making power to plunge this country into war, not
only without the concurrence of, but without deigning to consult Congress, to
which, by the Constitution, belongs exclusively the power of declaring war?
I have hitherto considered the question upon the supposition
that the annexation is attempted without the assent of Mexico. If she yields
her consent, that would materially affect the foreign aspect of the question,
if it did not remove all foreign difficulties. On the assumption of that
assent, the question would be confined to the domestic considerations which
belong to it, embracing the terms and conditions upon which annexation is
proposed. I do not think that Texas ought to be received into the Union, as an
integral part of it, in decided opposition to the wishes of a considerable and
respectable portion of the Confederacy. I think it far more wise and important
to compose and harmonize the present Confederacy, as it now exists, than to
introduce a new element of discord and distraction into it. In my humble
opinion, it should be the constant and earnest endeavor of American statesmen
to eradicate prejudices, to cultivate and foster concord, and to produce
general contentment among all parts of our Confederacy. And true wisdom, it
seems to me, points to the duty of rendering its present members happy,
prosperous, and satisfied with each other, rather than to attempt to introduce
alien members, against the common consent and with the certainty of deep
dissatisfaction. Mr. Jefferson expressed the opinion, and others believed, that
it was never in the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution to add
foreign territory to the confederacy, out of which new States were to be
formed. The acquisitions of Louisiana and Florida may be defended upon the
peculiar ground of the relation in which they stood to the States of the Union.
After they were admitted, we might well pause awhile, people our vast wastes,
develop our resources, prepare the means of defending what we possess, and
augment our strength, power, and greatness. If hereafter further territory
should be wanted for an increased population, we need entertain no
apprehensions but that it will be acquired by means, it is to be hoped, fair,
honorable, and constitutional.
It is useless to disguise that there are those who espouse
and those who oppose the annexation of Texas upon the ground of the influence
which it would exert, in the balance of political power, between two great sections
of the Union. I conceive that no motive for the acquisition of foreign
territory would be more unfortunate, or pregnant with more fatal consequences,
than that of obtaining it for the purpose of strengthening one part against
another part of the common Confederacy. Such a principle, put into practical
operation, would menace the existence, if it did not certainly sow the seeds of
a dissolution of the Union. It would be to proclaim to the world an insatiable
and unquenchable thirst for foreign conquest or acquisition of territory. For
if to-day Texas be acquired to strengthen one part of the Confederacy, to-morrow
Canada may be required to add strength to another. And, after that might have
been obtained, still other and further acquisitions would become necessary to
equalize and adjust the balance of political power. Finally, in the progress of
this spirit of universal dominion, the part of the Confederacy which is now
weakest, would find itself still weaker from the impossibility of securing new
theatres for those peculiar institutions which it is charged with being
desirous to extend.
But would Texas, ultimately, really add strength to that
which is now considered the weakest part of the Confederacy? If my information
be correct, it would not. According to that, the territory of Texas is
susceptible of a division into five States of convenient size and form. Of
these, two only would be adapted to those peculiar institutions to which I have
referred, and the other three, lying west and north of San Antonio, being only
adapted to farming and grazing purposes, from the nature of their soil,
climate, and productions, would not admit of those institutions. In the end
therefore, there would be two slave and three free States probably added to the
Union. If this view of the soil and geography of Texas be correct, it might
serve to diminish the zeal both of those who oppose and those who are urging
annexation.
Should Texas be annexed to the Union, the United States will
assume and become responsible for the debt of Texas, be its amount what it may.
What it is, I do not know certainly; but the least I have seen it stated at is
thirteen millions of dollars. And this responsibility will exist, whether there
be a stipulation in the treaty or not expressly assuming the payment of the
debt of Texas. For I suppose it to be undeniable that, if one nation becomes
incorporated in another, all the debts, and obligations, and incumbrances, and
wars of the incorporated nation, become the debts, and obligations, and
incumbrances, and wars of the common nation created by the incorporation.
If any European nation entertains any ambitious designs upon
Texas, such as that of colonizing her, or in any way subjugating her, I should
regard it as the imperative duty of the Government of the United States to
oppose to such designs the most firm and determined resistance, to the extent,
if necessary, of appealing to arms to prevent the accomplishment of any such
designs. The Executive of the United States ought to be informed as to the aims
and views of foreign Powers with regard to Texas, and I presume that, if there
be any of the exceptionable character which I have indicated, the Executive
will disclose to the co-ordinate departments of the government, if not the
public, the evidence of them. From what I have seen and heard, I believe that
Great Britain has recently formally and solemnly disavowed any such aims or
purposes – has declared that she is desirous only of the independence of Texas,
and that she has no intention to interfere in her domestic institutions. If she
has made such disavowal and declaration, I presume they are in the possession
of the Executive.
In the future progress of events, it is probable that there
will be a voluntary or forcible separation of the British North American
possessions from the parent country. I am strongly inclined to think that it will
be best for the happiness of all parties that, in that event, they should be
erected into a separate and independent Republic. With the Canadian Republic on
one side, that of Texas on the other, and the United States, the friend of
both, between them, each could advance its own happiness by such constitutions,
laws, and measures, as were best adapted to its peculiar condition. They would
be natural allies, ready, by co-operation, to repel any European or foreign
attack either. Each would afford a secure refuge to the persecuted and
oppressed driven into exile by either of the others. They would emulate each
other in improvements, in free institutions, and in the science of
self-government. Whilst Texas has adopted our Constitution as the model of hers,
she has, in several important particulars, greatly improved upon it.
Although I have felt compelled, from the nature of the
inquiries addressed to me, to extend this communication to a much greater
length than I could have wished, I could not do justice to the subject, and
fairly and fully expose my own opinions in a shorter space. In conclusion, they
may be stated in a few words to be, that I consider the annexation of Texas, at
this time, without the assent of Mexico, as a measure compromising the national
character, involving us certainly in war with Mexico, probably with other
foreign Powers, dangerous to the integrity of the Union, inexpedient in the
present financial condition of the country, and not called for by any general
expression of public opinion.
I am, respectfully,
your obedient servant,
H. CLAY.
– Published in Daily National Intelligencer,
Washington, D.C., Saturday, April 27, 1844, p. 3
