Had some talk to-day with Chase on financial matters. Our
drafts on Barings now cost us 29 percent. I object to this as presenting an
untrue statement of naval expenditures, — unjust to the Navy Department as well
as incorrect in fact. If I draw for $100,000 it ought not to take from the
naval appropriation $129,000. No estimates, no appropriations by Congress,
embrace the $29,000 brought on by the mistaken Treasury policy of depreciating
the currency. I therefore desire the Secretary of the Treasury to place
$100,000 in the hands of the Barings to the credit of the Navy Department, less
the exchange. This he declines to do, but insists on deducting the difference
between money and inconvertible paper, which I claim to be wrong, because in
our foreign expenditures the paper which his financial policy forces upon us at
home is worthless abroad. The depreciation is the result of a mistaken
financial policy, and illustrates its error and tendency to error.
The departure from a specie standard and the adoption of an
irredeemable paper currency deranges the finances and is fraught with
disastrous consequences. This vitiation of the currency is the beginning of
evil, — a fatal mistake, which will be likely to overwhelm Chase and the
Administration, if he and they remain here long enough.
Had some conversation with Chase relating to the War. He is
much discouraged, thinks the President is, believes the President is disposed
to let matters take their course, deplores this state of things but can see no
relief. I asked if the principal source of the difficulty was not in the fact
that we actually had not a War Department. Stanton is dissatisfied, and he and
those under his influence do not sustain and encourage McClellan, yet he needs
to be constantly stimulated, inspired, and pushed forward. It was, I said,
apparent to me, and I thought to him, that the Secretary of War, though
arrogant and often offensive in language, did not direct army movements; he
appears to have something else than army operations in view. The army officers
here, or others than he, appear to control military movements. Chase was
disturbed by my remarks. Said Stanton had not been sustained, and his
Department had become demoralized, but he (C.) should never consent to remain
if Stanton left. I told him he misapprehended me. I was not the man to propose
the exclusion of Stanton, or any one of our Cabinet associates, but we must
look at things as they are and not fear to discuss them. It was our duty to
meet difficulties and try to correct them. It was wrong for him, or any one, to
say he would not remain and do his duty if the welfare of the country required
a change of policy or a personal change in any one Department. If Stanton was
militarily unfit, indifferent, dissatisfied, or engaged in petty personal
intrigues against a man whom he disliked, to the neglect of the duties with
which he was intrusted, or had not the necessary administrative ability, was
from rudeness or any other cause offensive, we ought not to shut our eyes to
the fact. If a man were to be brought into the War Department, or proposed to
be brought in, with heart and mind in the cause, sincere, earnest, and capable,
who would master the generals and control them, break up cliquism, and bring
forward those officers who had the highest military qualities, we ought not to
object to it. I knew not that such a change was thought of. Without
controverting or assenting, he said Stanton had given way just as Cameron did,
and in that way lost command and influence. It is evident that Chase takes
pretty much the same views that I do, but has not made up his mind to act upon
his convictions. He feels that he has been influenced by Stanton, whose political
and official support he wants in his aspirations, but begins to have a
suspicion that S. is unreliable. They have consulted and acted in concert and
C. had flattered himself that he had secured S. in his interest, but must have
become aware that there is a stronger tie between Seward and Stanton than any
cord of his. C. is not always an acute and accurate reader of men, but he
cannot have failed to detect some of the infirm traits of Stanton. When I
declined to make myself a party to the combination against McClellan and
refused to sign the paper which Chase brought me, Stanton, with whom I was not
very intimate, spoke to me in regard to it. I told Stanton I thought the course
proposed was disrespectful to the President. Stanton said he felt under no obligation
to Mr. Lincoln, that the obligations were the other way, both to him and to me.
His remarks made an impression on me most unfavorable, and confirmed my
previous opinion that he is not faithful and true but insincere.
The real character of J. P. Hale is exhibited in a single
transaction. He wrote me an impertinent and dictatorial letter which I received
on Wednesday morning, admonishing me not to violate law in the appointment of
midshipmen. Learning from my answer that I was making these appointments
notwithstanding his warning and protest, he had the superlative meanness to
call on Assistant Secretary Fox, and request him, if I was actually making the
appointments which he declares to be illegal, to procure on his (Hale's)
application the appointment of a lad for whom he felt an interest. This is
after his supercilious letter to me, and one equally supercilious to Fox, which
the latter showed me, in which he buttoned up his virtue to the throat and said
he would never acquiesce in such a violation of the law. Oh, John P. Hale, how
transparent is thy virtue! Long speeches, loud professions, Scriptural
quotations, funny anecdotes, vehement denunciations avail not to cover thy
nakedness, which is very bald.
The President has issued a proclamation on martial law, —
suspension of habeas corpus he terms it, meaning, of course, a
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Of this
proclamation, I knew nothing until I saw it in the papers, and am not sorry
that I did not. I question the wisdom or utility of a multiplicity of
proclamations striking deep on great questions.
SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864,
p. 147-50
