No. 10.
Reports of Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood, U. S.
Army, commanding Fourth Army Corps, of operations October 26, 1864-January 5,
1865.
HEADQUARTERS FOURTH
ARMY CORPS,
Huntsville, Ala., January 10, 1865.
GENERAL: In pursuance with orders received from the headquarters
Department of the Cumberland to report the operations of the corps from the
time it was detached from the main army of the Military Division of the
Mississippi, in the latter part of October, to its arrival at Nashville, on the
1st of December ultimo, I have the honor to submit the following:
During the evening of the 26th of October ultimo, in the
vicinity of Gaylesville, Ala., an order was received from Maj. Gen. W. T.
Sherman, commanding the grand Military Division of the Mississippi, directing
that the Fourth Corps should proceed to Chattanooga, and stating that the
commanding officer of the corps would there receive instructions from
Major-General Thomas, commanding the Department of the Cumberland, regulating
its future movements. By rapid marches, though a portion of the road was
exceedingly heavy from the recent rains, the corps reached Rossville, four
miles from Chattanooga, during the afternoon of the 29th. Here it encamped for
the night. During the night of the 29th an order was received by telegraph
directing the corps to proceed by railway to Athens, Ala. Early the morning of
the 30th the corps moved into Chattanooga to take the cars. So soon as the
trains could be got ready the Third Division was embarked, and before noon all
the sections transporting the division moved out of Chattanooga and proceeded
to Athens, where it arrived on the morning of the 31st. The First Division
embarked the morning of the 1st of November and the Second Division as soon as
the transportation could be obtained for it. The instructions from the
commanding general were to concentrate the corps at Athens, with an intimation
that it would have to march thence to Pulaski, but not to proceed to the latter
without a special order to that effect, unless it should be learned
satisfactorily that the enemy had crossed the river and was moving on that
place. The artillery and transportation of the corps were ordered to follow, by
the way of Stevenson, Winchester, &c., and a brigade of the First Division
was left as an escort to convoy them. At midday on the 31st of October, at
Athens, instructions were received from the commanding general to move to
Pulaski immediately. The Third Division being the only portion of the corps
which had arrived at Athens, marched that afternoon ten miles, and the
following day, November 1, after a march of twenty-four miles, involving the
passage of Elk River, reached Pulaski. On the following morning preparations
were commenced for putting the town in defensible condition. General Hatch's
cavalry, which had arrived there the preceding day, was dispatched to the
Tennessee River, in the neighborhood of Florence, to co-operate with General
Croxton's command, already in that region, in gaining intelligence of the
movements of the enemy, and to retard his march should he cross the Tennessee
River and attempt to move northward.
By Saturday, the 5th of November, the three divisions of the
corps, less the brigade escorting the artillery and trains, were concentrated
at Pulaski. On the following morning an elaborate system of field-works was
laid out, a certain portion assigned to each division, and ground was
immediately broken in their construction. The labor was vigorously continued,
notwithstanding the inclemency of the weather, till the works were completed,
and when completed the works were impregnable; the Fourth Corps could have
easily held them against the entire rebel army commanded by General Hood. The
trains and artillery of the corps reached Pulaski on Saturday, the 12th. On the
following day the several batteries were assigned their positions in the
various works. The information received from the cavalry corroborated the
information which had been previously obtained, that the enemy was in force on
the Tennessee River and was preparing to advance. The vital questions were,
what route would he take, and where would the blow fall. On the 13th of
November Major-General Schofield arrived at Pulaski, and on the 14th assumed
command of all the forces. He brought with him a portion of the Twenty-third Corps.
The information received from the 14th to the 22d attested that the enemy had
not only crossed the river in heavy force, but was moving northward. On the 22d
it was satisfactorily settled that he was moving northward through
Lawrenceburg, and would thence probably move on Columbia; possibly, however, he
might turn eastward from Lawrenceburg toward Pulaski. The Second Division of
the corps was sent to Lynnville, ten miles north of Pulaski, the afternoon of
the 22d. During the forenoon of the 23d it was ascertained satisfactorily that
the bulk of the enemy's force was moving northward from Lawrenceburg. Hence the
remaining two divisions of the corps, the First and Third, with the artillery
and trains, moved to Lynnville during the afternoon of that day. Information
received during the night at Lynnville indicated that the enemy was advancing
rapidly on Columbia, and would probably reach that place on the 24th. This
would have placed him between us and Nashville.
The head of the corps moved at 1 a.m. of the 24th, and by 3
a.m. the whole corps was in motion. By a rapid march the two leading divisions
of the corps, the Second and Third, were concentrated at Columbia and in
position by 12 m., having marched a distance of twenty miles. They had been
preceded by Cox's division, of the Twenty-third Corps, which had barely arrived
in time, by turning westward some two or three miles south of Columbia, and
taking position on the Mount Pleasant road, to prevent the head of the enemy's
column from occupying Columbia in advance of our forces. When the corps
evacuated Pulaski on the 3d, the Third Brigade of the First Division, Colonel
Waters, Eighty-fourth Illinois Volunteers, commanding, was left to cover the
rear. This service was well performed. The afternoon of the 24th of November
was spent by the Second and Third Divisions in throwing up strong
intrenchments. The First Division, which had marched in rear of the train,
arrived during the evening and went into position on the left of the corps. The
Twenty-third Corps was in position on the right. Friday, the 25th, the work of
intrenching was continued, and by night-fall a strong line of works was
completed. An apprehension was raised at this time that the Twenty-third Corps,
occupying the right of our intrenched position, would not be able to maintain
its position against a decided assault. It was hence deemed expedient to
construct an interior line of works north and west of the town; this line would
have the advantage of being much shorter and of occupying much stronger ground
than the exterior line, and of having its flanks resting more securely on Duck
River. For the construction of the interior line the First and Second Divisions
of the Fourth Corps, and all of the Twenty-third Corps, less one brigade, were
withdrawn from the exterior line. The Third Division was left to hold in the
exterior line, the entire former front of the corps, the remainder of the
exterior line being held by a brigade of the Twenty-third Corps. During the
night of the 25th of November the First and Second Divisions were actively
employed in constructing the interior line, and the dawn of the 26th had it
well advanced toward completion. Just before daylight on the 26th the enemy
made a decided assault on the pickets on and adjacent to the Pulaski road. As
he had advanced in greatly superior numbers he succeeded in driving back the
pickets a considerable distance, but re-enforcements being promptly brought up
the enemy was in turn driven back and the picket-line substantially restored to
its former position. It terminated in an affair of pickets, and would scarcely
have deserved an official mention, as so many such affairs occur in an active
campaign, were it not that we have to lament in connection with it the mortal
wounding and subsequent death of Captain Green, Forty-ninth Ohio Volunteers,
picket officer of the First Brigade, Third Division. When our pickets along a
part of the front of his brigade were driven back he rushed out, with all the
gallantry and enthusiasm of his soldierly character, to the front, and by his
orders and the influence of his example succeeded in driving back the enemy.
While he was so engaged he received a wound in the abdomen, from which he died
in twenty-four hours afterward. His gallant spirit winged its way to join the
hosts of others that have preceded it, victims to their patriotic devotion to
their country. No further effort was made by the enemy, so long as our forces
occupied the southern bank of Duck River, to molest us.
During the 26th an intimation was communicated that the
forces would evacuate Columbia and pass to the northern bank of the river that
night, the movement to be commenced just after night-fall. Preparations were
made accordingly, but just after dark instructions were distributed that the
troops would remain in position, and that the evacuation would not take place
till the following night, the 27th. Sunday, the 27th, was a dark, dreary, and
cheerless day. An occasional picket skirmish broke the dull monotony of the
day. The transportation of the corps and its reserve artillery were passed to
the north bank of the river during the day. At 5 p.m. the artillery was
withdrawn from the exterior line and sent across the river. At 7 p.m. the
infantry of the corps commenced to withdraw from the lines and prepare to cross
the river. The Third Division led, followed by the First, then the Second. The
pickets were ordered to remain in position for half an hour after the most
advanced division, the Third, commenced to withdraw, then to retire quietly to
the exterior line of works, where they were to remain for an hour, then to
withdraw to the interior line, where they were to remain till midnight, or
later, should the passage of the troops over the river not warrant their
crossing at that hour. The whole operation was accomplished as directed. The
enemy did not attempt to interrupt the movement. After crossing the river the
troops bivouacked till daylight. The passage of the river had been made about
two miles below the town. After the passage was completed all the bridges were
destroyed. Shortly after daylight of the 28th the corps moved up the river, and
took position to prevent the passage of the river should the enemy attempt to
cross it near the town. Intrenchments were at once thrown up; pickets and outposts
were judiciously disposed to give an early intimation of the movements of the
enemy. Near night-fall of the 28th some evidences were received that the enemy
was crossing the river some five miles above our left. By daylight on the
morning of the 29th these evidences were so far strengthened as to require
immediate and vigorous action to prevent our being flanked and turned. A
brigade, the Second of the Third Division, Colonel Post, Fifty-ninth Illinois,
commanding, was ordered to make a reconnaissance eastward and up the river to
watch the movements of the enemy, with instructions to report frequently during
the day the result of his observations, and further, if the enemy after
crossing should turn westward at once with a view of attacking our left flank in
the position we then occupied, to hold him in check as long as possible by
retreating slowly and contesting the ground stubbornly. Orders were also issued
for the First and Second Divisions of the Fourth Corps, with all the baggage
and other trains of the entire force present, and all the reserve artillery, to
commence moving to the rear at 8 a.m. on the 29th. At the appointed hour the
movement was begun; but to check any immediate movement of the enemy to the
left after crossing the river the First Division was stopped on the hills on
the south bank of Rutherford's Creek. This stream is an affluent of Duck River,
and is crossed by the turnpike road to Franklin, about four miles north of
Columbia. Frequent reports were received from Colonel Post during the day,
which were duly reported to Major-General Schofield, commanding the forces
present, showing that the enemy had crossed the river in force and was moving
northward and parallel with the Columbia and Franklin pike, with trains,
&c. The Second Division of the Fourth Corps moved up the Franklin pike as a
convoy to the trains and reserve artillery of the forces, and arrived at Spring
Hill, a small village but twelve miles north of Columbia, at 12.30 p.m. As the
head of the division approached the village it was perceived that a regiment of
infantry and one of cavalry, previously stationed in that vicinity, and which
had deployed east of the road, were being forced back on the town. The First
Brigade, Second Division, Colonel Opdycke, was immediately deployed into order
of battle east of the road to check the enemy, which, as his force was cavalry,
was easily done. So soon as this was done the division was disposed so as to
cover the passage of the trains and the reserve artillery by the village.
Opdycke's brigade was posted northward, with its left resting on the turnpike
road, Colonel Lane's brigade was formed in the center, and Brigadier-General
Bradley's brigade was formed on the right, with its right slightly refused, but
not sufficiently to rest on the road. Skirmishing was kept up during the
afternoon, without, however, serious result, till 4.30 p.m. Then the enemy
appeared in front, and on the flank of Bradley's brigade, with a strong
infantry force (it Was Cleburne’s division, of Cheatham's corps); and made a
vigorous attack. As Bradley's brigade was heavily outflanked, while pressed in
front, it was forced from its position, and its right doubled back on the road
and into the village. A few prisoners were captured from us, including the
assistant adjutant-general of the brigade. But the heaviest loss was in the
serious wounding of the gallant brigade commander, Brig. Gen. L. P. Bradley.
While nobly attempting to stay his brigade under the tremendous assault which
was then being made on it he received a serious wound (fortunately for the
country and the military service it was only a flesh wound), which compelled
him to relinquish command of his brigade and leave the field. He was succeeded
in command by that gallant soldier and useful officer, Col. Joseph Conrad,
Fifteenth Wisconsin [Missouri] Volunteers. Fortunately, the enemy did not press
the success he had gained. The casualties of the Second Division amounted to
some 350 killed and wounded. The immense trains and reserve artillery were
parked in the village of Spring Hill and protected by the Second Division;
crescent-shaped, with its convexity eastward and its flanks resting on the
road, the division maintained its defensive position. The enemy, encamped a
short distance only from the division, did not renew the attack. At 7 p.m. the
movement of withdrawing from the north bank of Duck River was commenced Cox's
division, of the Twenty-third Corps, led off. It was followed by the Third
Division of the Fourth Corps, and lastly came the First Division of the Fourth
Corps, and covered the retreat to Spring Hill. The movement to Spring Bill was
protracted and much drawn out by the delay in crossing Rutherford's Creek. By
some unfortunate oversight no sufficient bridge had been constructed over this
creek, and the troops, arriving at it in the night, were much delayed in
crossing it. After the First Division followed the pickets. The head of the
Third Division arrived at Spring Hill about midnight, passed rapidly and
silently through the village, and took post about a mile north of it, formed
parallel to the road and east of it. The object of this disposition was to
cover the movement of the trains out of Spring Hill and toward Franklin. Cox's
division of the Twenty-third Corps, had already moved on toward Franklin. As
rapidly as possible the trains were drawn out of park and pushed toward
Franklin. While this work was in progress the First Division came up, passed
rapidly through Spring Hill, and moved on as a convoy to the trains. It was
necessary to move the troops rapidly and silently through Spring Hill to avoid
a night attack from an entire corps of four divisions—Cheatham's—which lay
encamped within 800 yards of the road. The effect of a night attack on a column
en route would have been, beyond doubt, most disastrous. The embarrassment
of the situation was greatly increased by the presence of the large number of
wagons, artillery carriages, &c., which had to be protected and quietly
withdrawn. By 5 a.m. of the 30th the whole of the trains had been put on the
road, and the rear had passed a mile north of Spring Hill. The Third Division
then moved out, marching east of the road a short distance and parallel to it,
as a cover to the train; the Second Division followed the Third. A few miles
north of Spring Hill, just before the dawn, the rebel cavalry made a dash at
the trains, but was promptly repulsed by a part of the division. The march was
continued without further interruption till about 7 a.m., when the rebel
cavalry made a second dash at the trains, but was again quickly repulsed by two
regiments of the Third Division, deployed as skirmishers, aided by a section of
artillery. Without further interruption the command continued its march to the
vicinity of Franklin. Much credit is due to Colonel Opdycke, whose brigade
brought up the rear, for the energetic measures he adopted and carried out to
get forward the greatly fatigued and worn-out men of the entire command. But
for these judicious measures many weary and sorefooted soldiers would evidently
have fallen into the hands of the enemy. Reference is made to Colonel Opdycke's
report for more minute details.
On arriving at Franklin the Twenty-third Corps had taken
position in the suburbs of the village, with its left resting on the river
above the town and its right extending across and west of the turnpike road.
The First Division of the Fourth Corps (Kimball's) was posted on the right of
the Twenty-third Corps, with its right flank resting on the river below the
town. Intrenchments were at once thrown up by the Twenty-third Corps and
Kimball's division, of the Fourth Corps. The Third Division of the Fourth Corps
arrived next, and was ordered to cross the river and take post on the north
side. This was done. Wagner's (the Second Division), which was marching in
rear, was ordered to halt on a range of hills nearly two miles south of the
town and deploy his command to hold the enemy in check should he attempt to
press us. In the meantime the transportation was being passed rapidly across
the river. At 12 m. General Wagner -reported the appearance of the enemy in
heavy force in his front, and later he reported that the enemy was evidently
making preparations to attack him in force. The position General Wagner then
held was entirely too extensive to be covered by one division, and as the
country was open on both flanks and favorable to the movement of troops, the
position could be readily flanked, hence General Wagner very judiciously
determined to retire his command nearer to the town. He posted two brigades, Conrad's
and Lane s, across the pike, with their flanks slightly refused, about a third
of a mile south of the intrenched position of the Twenty-third Corps. The other
brigade, Opdycke's, was sent inside of our main works—a most fortunate
disposition of this brigade, as the sequel of this narrative will show.
Conrad's and Lane's brigades hastily threw up rude barricades to protect
themselves from the coming storm. Their orders were to maintain their position
as long as it could be done without becoming too severely engaged, and then
retire on the main line. At 4 p.m. the enemy made a vigorous attack on the
front of these two advanced brigades, threatening at the same time their flanks
with strong columns. Unwilling to abandon their position so long as there was
any probability of maintaining it, unfortunately, the gallant commanders
remained in front too long, and as a consequence, when they did retire, they
were followed so closely by the enemy as to enter the works through the break
which had been caused by the burst over them of the retiring brigades. The
enemy had come on with a terrific dash, had entered our intrenchment, and
victory seemed almost within his grasp. Our line had been broken in the center,
two 4-gun batteries had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and it seemed that
it was only necessary for him to press the advantage he had gained to complete
his success. But at this critical moment the gallant, prompt, and ready Opdycke
was at hand, calling to his men in a stentorian tone, "Forward to the lines!"
and, adding example to command, he, with his bold brigade, with lowered
bayonets, rushed forward, bore the exultant enemy back over our intrenchments,
recovered the lost guns, and captured nigh 400 prisoners. But this reverse did
not seem to discourage the enemy; it seemed rather to add to his determination
and increase the vigor of his assaults. On, on, he came, till he made four
distinct assaults, each time to be hurled back, with heavy loss. So vigorous
and fierce were these assaults that the enemy reached the exterior slope of the
rude intrenchments, and hand-to-hand encounters occurred between the courageous
combatants across the works, and between the assaults the work of death was not
stopped. The undulations of the ground are such as to afford good protection to
an attacking force. Under this cover the enemy pressed sharpshooters as near
our lines as possible, and kept up a most galling fire. While these vigorous
attacks were being made on our center and left the right, held by Kimball's
division, was also fiercely attacked three times, all of which assaults were
handsomely repulsed, with comparatively slight loss to us, but with terrific
slaughter of the enemy. At no time did the enemy gain any advantage on this
part of our lines. As night approached the enemy desisted from his fierce
assaults, and his offensive efforts degenerated into a sharp skirmish fire.
Thus terminated one of the fiercest, best contested, most
vigorously sustained passages at arms which have occurred in this war. I am
sure it will be no exaggeration to estimate the loss of the enemy in killed,
wounded, and captured at 6,000. His loss, as attested by the dispatches of his
commanding general, was particularly heavy in general officers, no less than 14
in killed, wounded, and captured. After the conflict was over the ground was
thickly strewn with the enemy's dead and wounded. Our captures amounted to 21
battle-flags and stands of colors, 11 swords and sabers, and 618 prisoners,
including 46 officers. Our casualties amounted to 5 officers killed. 37
wounded, and 14 missing. Enlisted men--killed, 62; wounded, 570; missing, 680.
Total casualties, 1,368.
For more minute details of this interesting contest I must
refer to the reports of division and brigade commanders, herewith forwarded;
they will repay perusal.
The highest commendation is due to Brigadier-Generals
Kimball and Wagner, commanding the First and Second Divisions of the Fourth
Corps, for the skillful manner in which they handled their commands and for
personal gallantry displayed in trying positions. These division commanders
write in high terms of praise of the good conduct of their brigade commanders,
and these latter of the soldierly conduct of their regimental commanders.
Among so many who not only did their duty well, but nobly,
it is difficult to discriminate individual officers or men for special mention,
but I am sure it will not be deemed invidious if I signalize Col. Emerson
Opdycke, One hundred and twenty-fifth Ohio Volunteers, commanding First
Brigade, Second Division, and Lieut. Col. G. W. Smith, Eighty-eighth Illinois,
commanding his regiment in Opdycke's brigade, whose good fortune it was on this
blood-stained day, the 30th of November, 1864, to render the most important and
distinguished service. The artillery was splendidly served and made terrible
havoc in the enemy's ranks, both as he advanced and retired. The officers and
men of the batteries are entitled to the highest praise for their good conduct.
When the enemy had temporarily broken our center Major-General
Schofield, commanding the forces in the vicinity of Franklin, under the
apprehension that our forces engaged on the south side of the river might be
compelled to pass to the north side, ordered the following disposition, which
was made, of the Third Division (then in reserve) of the Fourth Corps, with a
view to cover in the withdrawal of our troops, should it become necessary:
Beatty's brigade was deployed on the north bank of the river above the town;
Streight's brigade along the bank of the river immediately opposite the town;
and Post's brigade on the bank of the river below the town. Fortunately, the
exigency for which this disposition was made did not occur in the progress of
the contest, but the brigades retained their positions to cover the withdrawal
at night, which had been ordered before the occurrence of the attack. To
prepare for the withdrawal and retirement toward Nashville the trains were
started before night-fall of the 30th. At midnight the troops on the south side
of the river began to withdraw from the lines and pass to the north side of the
stream; this work was rapidly and successfully accomplished. The enemy probably
suspected what was going on, but did not attempt to interfere with the
movement. The Third Division of the Fourth Corps had been designated to move in
rear and cover the retrograde movement. By 3 a.m. of the 1st of December all
the troops had been withdrawn from the south side of the river, and the bridges
were fired. So soon as the conflagration was so far advanced as to insure its
being complete the Third Division commenced to withdraw, and by 4 a.m. the
whole of it was on the road. As the flames rose from the bridge and
communicated fully to the enemy our movements he opened a heavy cannonade,
which, fortunately, did no injury, and was soon suspended; otherwise the enemy
did not attempt to molest us. The rear of the command reached Brentwood, nine
miles north of Franklin, at 9 a.m. There the command was halted an hour to
allow the men to cook breakfast. Between 10 and 11 o'clock the march was
resumed, and the rear of the troops reached the vicinity of Nashville at 1 p.m.
The corps was reported to Major-General Thomas, commanding the forces, and by
him the position designated, which it occupied from that date to the 15th of
December, when offensive operations were commenced.
In conclusion it is proper that I should remark that during
the operations briefly sketched in this report the corps was commanded by
Major-General Stanley. He was wounded in the battle at Franklin, and was
compelled by the casualty to relinquish command of the corps before he could
submit a report of its operations; hence the duty has devolved on me.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
TH. J. WOOD,
Brigadier-General of
Volunteers, Commanding.
Brig. Gen. W. D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff._______________
HEADQUARTERS FOURTH
CORPS,
Huntsville, Ala.,
January 5, 1865.
GENERAL: The Fourth Army Corps arrived in the vicinity of
Nashville, on the retreat from Pulaski, on the 1st of December, ultimo. Maj.
Gen. D. S. Stanley, having been wounded in the conflict at Franklin, on the
30th of November, and having received a leave of absence on account of his
wound, relinquished and I assumed command of the corps on the 2d of December.
So soon as I had assumed command of the corps I placed it in position as
follows, in conformity with orders received from the commanding general of the
forces in the field in person: The left of the corps rested on the Casino and
extended westward across the Granny White and Hillsborough pikes; the right
rested on the left of the Detachment of the Army of the Tennessee (Maj. Gen. A.
J. Smith's command), midway between the Hillsborough and Hardin pikes. As the
condition of the forces was not such as to warrant the commencement of
offensive operations immediately, the first duty to be provided for was the
safety of Nashville against assault. For this purpose a line of strong
intrenchments, strengthened with an abatis, slashes of timber, and pointed
stakes firmly planted in the ground, was constructed along the entire front of
the corps. The entire development of this work was something over two miles; it
was completed by the morning of the 5th of December. But while the safety of
Nashville was being provided for, preparations were also being made for
offensive operations. The troops were rapidly re-equipped in every particular,
the trains repaired and loaded with supplies, &c. As early as the 7th of
December the commanding general of the forces had begun to communicate to the
corps commanders his plans of attack, and had intimated that the morning of the
10th would witness the inauguration of offensive operations. But the morning of
the 9th dawned upon us, bringing a heavy sleet storm, which soon covered the
whole face of the earth with a perfect ruer de glace, and rendered all
movements of troops, so long as it remained, impossible. The weather and the
condition of the ground were not sufficiently ameliorated before midday of the
14th of December to permit the commencement of operations with any hope of
success. The commanding general summoned a meeting of corps commanders at his
headquarters at 3 p.m. on the 14th, and delivered to them written orders, from
which the following are extracts:
As soon as the weather will admit of offensive operations
the troops will move against the enemy's position in the following order:
* * * * * * * * * *
3. Brig. Gen. T. J. Wood, commanding Fourth Corps, after
leaving a strong skirmish line in his works from Laurens' Hill to his extreme
right, will form the remainder of the Fourth Corps on the Hillsborough pike, to
support General Smith's left, and operate on the left and rear of the enemy's
advanced position, on Montgomery's Hill.
* * * * * * * * * *
Should the weather permit the troops will be formed in time
to commence operations at 6 a.m., or as soon thereafter as practicable.
To carry out these brief but sententious and pointed
instructions of the commanding general, I directed, so soon as I had returned
to my headquarters, the division commanders to assemble there at 7 p.m., and
after explaining to them fully the intended movements, delivered to them the
following written orders:
HEADQUARTERS
FOURTH ARMY CORPS,
Near
Nashville, Tenn., December 14, 1864.
Orders of the day for the Fourth Army
Corps for to-morrow, December 15, 1864:
I. Reveille will be sounded at 4 a.m.
The troops will get their breakfast, break up their camps, pack up everything,
and be prepared to move at 6 a.m.
II. Brigadier-General Elliott,
commanding Second Division, will move out by his right, taking the small road
which passes by the right of his present position, form in echelon with General
A. J. Smith's left, slightly refusing his own left, and, maintaining this
relative position to General Smith's troops, will advance with them. When he
moves out he will leave a strong line of skirmishers in his solid works.
Ill. Brigadier-General Kimball,
commanding First Division, on being relieved by General Steedman, will move his
division to the Hillsborough pike, inside of our lines, and by it through the
lines, and form in echelon to General Elliott's left, slightly refusing his own
left. He will maintain this position and advance with General Elliott.
IV. As soon as General Kimball's
division has passed out of the works, by the Hillsborough pike, General Beatty,
commanding Third Division, will take up the movement, drawing out by his left,
and will form in echelon to General Kimball's left. He will maintain this
position and advance with General Kimball; he will also leave a strong line of
skirmishers behind the solid works along his present position.
V. The pickets on post, being
strengthened when in the judgment of division commanders it becomes necessary,
will advance as a line of skirmishers to cover the movement. The formation of
the troops will be in two lines--the front line deployed, the second line in
close column by division, massed opposite the interval in the front line. Each
division commander will, so far as possible, hold one brigade in reserve. Five
wagon-loads of ammunition, ten ambulances, and the wagons loaded with the
intrenching tools, will, as nearly as possible, follow immediately after each
division; the remaining ammunition wagons, ambulances, and all other wagons,
will remain inside of our present lines until further orders. One rifle battery
will accompany the Second Division, and one battery of light 12-pounders will
accompany each of the other divisions; the rest of the artillery of the corps
will maintain its present positions in the lines.
By order of Brig. Gen. T. J. Wood:
J.
S. FULLERTON,
Assistant
Adjutant-General.
The morning of the 15th was dark and somber; a heavy fall of
fog and smoke rested on the face of the earth and enveloped every object in
darkness. At 6 a.m. the movement of the troops was entirely impracticable, but
between 7 and 8 a.m. the fog began to rise, and the troops silently and rapidly
commenced to move into the positions assigned to them. This preliminary work
being completed, nothing further remained for the Fourth Corps to do until the
cavalry and General Smith had made the long swing from our right which was
necessary to bring them on the left and rear of the enemy's position. At 12.30
p.m., General Smith having swung up his right so that his command prolonged the
front of the Fourth Corps, the serried ranks of the corps began to advance
toward the enemy's intrenched position.
I should have remarked previously that as soon as the troops
began to debouch from our intrenched lines the skirmishers were pushed forward
to cover the movement, and soon became sharply engaged with the enemy's
skirmishers and rapidly drove them back. During fill the preliminary movement's
an occasional shot, as the shells hurled through the air and burst over the
troops from the enemy's batteries, added interest to the scene and showed that
he was keenly watching our operations. When the grand array of the troops began
to move forward in unison the pageant was magnificently grand and imposing. Far
as the eye could reach the lines and masses of blue, over which the nation's
emblem flaunted proudly, moved forward in such perfect order that the heart of
the patriot might easily draw from it the happy presage of the coming glorious
victory. A few minutes after 12.30 p.m. I deemed the moment favorable for the
attack on the left and rear of Montgomery's Hill. Montgomery's Hill is an
irregularly cone-shaped eminence, which rises some 150 feet above the general
level of the Country. The ascent to its summit throughout most of its
circumference is quite abrupt, and its sides are covered with forest trees. The
enemy had encircled the hill just below its crest with a strong line of
intrenchments, and embarrassed the approach of an assaulting force with an
abatis and rows of sharpened stakes firmly planted in the ground. The hill was
the enemy's most advanced position, and was not more than 800 yards from our
lines. The ascent on the left and rear of the hill, taken with reference to the
enemy's occupation, is more gradual than the portion which directly confronted
our intrenchments. As our troops advanced and swung to the left, the left of
the hill was brought directly in front of the Third Division of the corps. This
disposition was favorable to the assault. I ordered Brigadier-General Beatty,
commanding the Third Division, to detail a brigade to make the attack. The
Second Brigade of the Third Division, commanded by Col. P. Sidney Post,
Fifty-ninth Illinois Veteran Volunteers, was selected for the work.
The necessary arrangements having been made, at 1 p.m. I
gave the order for the assault. At the command, as sweeps the stiff' gale over
the ocean, driving every object before it, so swept the brigade up the wooded
slope, over the enemy's intrenchments; and the hill was won. The Second Brigade
was nobly supported in the assault by the First Brigade (Colonel Streight's) of
the Third Division. Quite a number of prisoners and small-arms were captured in
the assault. Previous to the assault I had caused the enemy to be well pounded
by the artillery from our lines. This was the first success of the day, and it
greatly exalted the enthusiasm of the troops. Our casualties were small
compared with the success. Up to this time the Twenty-third Corps,
Major-General Schofield commanding, had been held in reserve in rear of the
Fourth Corps and Major-General Smith's command; but shortly after the assault
on Montgomery's Hill I received a message from the commanding general of the
forces to the effect that he had ordered General Schofield to move his command
to the right to prolong General Smith's front, and directing me to move my
reserves as much to the right as could be done compatible with the safety of my
own front. The order was at once obeyed by shifting the reserve brigade of each
division toward our right. The entire line of the corps was steadily pressed
forward and the enemy engaged throughout its whole front. The battery
accompanying each division was brought to the front, and being placed in short
and effective range of the enemy's main line, allowed him no rest. As the
troops advanced the skirmishers were constantly engaged, at times so sharply
that the fusilade nearly equaled in fierceness the engagement of solid lines of
battle. I pressed the corps as near to the enemy's main line as possible
without making a direct assault on it. In doing so at the same time swinging to
the left, the right of the corps, which had during the previous portion of the
day been in rear of General Smith's left to support it, passed in front of it.
This movement brought the center of the corps, General Kimball's division,
directly opposite a very strongly fortified hill near the center of the enemy's
main line. Impressed with the importance of carrying this hill, as the enemy's
center would be broken thereby, I ordered up two batteries and had them so
placed as to bring a converging fire on the crest of the hill. I will here
remark that the enemy's artillery on this hill had been annoying us seriously
all day. After the two batteries had played on the enemy's line for half an
hour, during which time the practice had been most accurate, I ordered General
Kimball to assault the hill with his entire division. Most nobly did the
division respond to the order. With the most exalted enthusiasm and with loud
cheers it rushed forward up the steep ascent and over the intrenchments. The
solid fruits of this magnificent assault were several pieces of artillery and
stands of colors, many stand of small-arms, and numerous prisoners. The Second
Division of the corps (General Elliott's) followed the movement of General
Kimball's division, and entered the enemy's works farther to the right shortly
after the main assault had been successful. The division in this movement
captured three pieces of artillery. Farther to the left the Third Division,
General Beatty commanding, had attacked and carried the enemy's intrenchments
and captured several pieces of artillery and caissons and numerous prisoners.
Fortunately, this brilliant success along the entire front
of the corps was achieved with comparatively slight loss. The onset was so
fierce, the movement of the troops so rapid, that a very brief interval elapsed
between the first shout of the advancing lines and the planting of our colors
on the enemy's works. But this rapid movement had somewhat disordered the
ranks, as well as blown the men, and it was hence necessary to halt the corps
for a brief space to reform and prepare for a farther advance. The enemy on
being driven from his works had retired in the direction (eastward) of the
Franklin pike. His works extending across this pike were still intact. While
the troops were being reformed I received an order from the commanding general
to move toward the Franklin pike, some two miles and a half distant, to reach
it if possible before dark, drive the enemy hard, and form the corps across it,
facing southward. This order was received about 5 p.m., almost sunset. The
reformation of the troops was quickly completed, and the whole corps, formed in
two lines and covered by a cloud of skirmishers, was pushed rapidly toward the
Franklin pike. Soon our skirmishers became engaged with the enemy's, but only
to drive them. But the rapidly approaching darkness too soon brought a period
to this glorious work. After crossing the Granny White pike, and arriving
within about three-quarters of a mile of the Franklin pike, the darkness became
so thick that it was necessary, in order to avoid confusion and to prevent our
troops from firing into each other, to halt the corps for the night. The corps
was formed parallel to the Granny White pike, its right resting on General
Smith's left and its left on the most northern line, then abandoned, of the
enemy's works. In this position, about 7 p.m. of a bleak December night, the
troops bivouacked, after their arduous but, fortunately, glorious labors of the
day. The result of the day's operations for the corps was the capture of 10
pieces of artillery, 5 caissons, several stand of colors, a considerable number
of small-arms, and some 500 prisoners. The enemy's intrenched lines had been
broken in two places by direct assault and he driven more than two miles. Of his
loss in killed and wounded I could form no estimate, but it must have been
heavy. Fortunately, our casualties were unusually light compared with the
success achieved, not more than 350 killed and wounded in the corps. After
having provided for the safety of the corps for the night I repaired to the
quarters of the commanding general to receive his orders for the operations of
the morrow. These orders were to advance at daylight the following morning, the
16th, and if the enemy was still in front to attack him; but if he had
retreated to pass to the eastward of the Franklin pike, to face southward, and
pursue him till found.
At 11.30 p.m. of the 15th instructions were distributed to
the division commanders to advance at daylight and attack the enemy if found in
front of their commands; but if he should not be found to cross' to the
eastward of the Franklin pike and move southward parallel to it, Elliott's
division leading, followed by Kimball's, then Beatty's. At 6 a.m. on the 16th
instant the corps commenced to move toward the Franklin pike. The movement at
once developed the enemy in our front, and sharp skirmishing commenced
immediately. The enemy was steadily driven back, and at 8 a.m. we gained
possession of the Franklin pike. The enemy's skirmishers, after being driven
eastward of the pike, retreated southward. Elliott's division was deployed
across the road, facing southward; Beatty's division was formed on the left of
Elliott s, and Kimball's division massed near the pike in rear of Elliott's. In
this order the corps advanced nearly three-quarters of a mile, when it
encountered a heavy skirmish line stoutly barricaded. Some half a mile in rear
of the enemy's skirmish line his main line, strongly intrenched, could be seen.
An effort was at once made to connect General Elliott's right with General
Smith's left. The interval being too great to accomplish this, I ordered
General Kimball to bring up his division and occupy the space between Generals
Smith's and Elliott's commands. This was promptly done, the troops moving
handsomely into position under a sharp fire of musketry and artillery. Thus
formed, the entire corps advanced in magnificent array, under a galling fire of
small-arms and artillery, and drove the enemy's skirmishers into his main line.
Farther advance was impossible without making a direct assault on the enemy's
intrenched lines, and the happy moment for the grand effort had not yet
arrived. I hence ordered the division commanders to press their skirmishers as
near to the enemy's intrenchments as possible, and to harass him with a
constant fire.
In a conflict of this nature I knew we would have greatly
the advantage of him, as our supply of ammunition was inexhaustible and his
limited. All the batteries of the corps on the field were brought to the front,
placed in eligible positions in short range of the enemy's works, and ordered
to keep up a measured but steady fire on his artillery. The practice of the
batteries was uncommonly fine. The ranges were accurately obtained, the
elevations correctly given, and the ammunition being unusually good, the firing
was consequently most effective. It was really entertaining to witness it. The
enemy replied spiritedly with musketry and artillery, and his practice with
both was good. In the progress of the duel he disabled two guns in Ziegler's
battery. After the dispositions above recounted had been made the commanding
general joined me near our most advanced position on the Franklin pike,
examined the positions of the troops, approved the same, and ordered that the
enemy should be vigorously pressed and unceasingly harassed by our fire. He
further directed that I should be constantly on the alert for any opening for a
more decisive effort, but for the time to bide events. The general plan of the
battle for the preceding day--namely, to outflank and turn his left--was still
to be acted on. Before leaving me the commanding general desired me to confer
with Major-General Steedman, whose command had moved out that morning from
Nashville by the Nolensville pike, and arrange a military connection between
his right and my left. The enemy had made some display of force between the
Franklin and Nolensville pikes, but its extent could not be fixed, and it was
hence necessary to take precautions with reference to it. Near 12 m. I rode
toward the left and met Major-General Steedman, communicated to him the views
of the commanding general, and submitted to him some suggestions in regard to
the disposition of his command to meet those views. General Steedman coincided
in opinion with me and promptly and handsomely, though exposed to a sharp fire
from one of the enemy's batteries, placed his command, both infantry and
artillery, in a position which effectually secured my left from being turned. I
will here remark that General Steedman's command most gallantly and effectually
co-operated with my command during the remainder of the day.
For a proper understanding of the last great and decisive
struggle in the battle of Nashville a brief description of the scene of its
occurrence and of the topography of the adjacent country is requisite. The
basin in which the city of Nashville stands is inclosed on the southwest,
south, and southeast by the Brentwood Hills. The Franklin pike runs nearly due
south from Nashville. The Brentwood Hills consist of two ranges or
branches--the branch to the west of the Franklin pike runs from northwest to
southeast; the branch to the east of the Franklin pike runs from northeast to
southwest; the two branches unite' in a depression, or gap, about nine miles
from Nashville. The Franklin pike passes through this gap, and in it is
situated the little hamlet of Brentwood. The most northern point of each branch
is about five miles from Nashville. From this description it will be perceived
that the general configuration of the Brentwood Hills is that of a rudely
shaped V. Nashville is north of and about opposite the center of the space
included between the two branches; Brentwood is at the apex. The valley
inclosed between the two branches is nearly bisected by the Franklin pike. The
average elevation of the Brentwood Hills above the general level of the
surrounding country is about 350 feet. The surface of the Nashville basin is
broken by detached hills, some of which rise to an elevation of 150 feet, with
abrupt sides, densely wooded. About five miles from Nashville the Franklin pike
passes along the base of one of these isolated heights, which is known as the
Overton Hill. When the heavy stress which had been put on the enemy during the
forenoon of the 16th had forced him into his works, he was found to occupy a
strongly intrenched line running for some distance along the base of the
western branch of the Brentwood Hills; thence across the valley eastward to and
across the Franklin pike, around the northern slope of the Overton Hill, about
midway between its summit and base, with a retired flank, running nearly
southward, prolonged along its eastern slope. This line of intrenchments was
strengthened with an abatis and other embarrassments to an assault. The right
of the enemy's main line rested on the Overton Hill. A close examination of the
position satisfied me that if the Overton Hill could be carried the enemy's
right would be turned, his line from the Franklin pike westward would be taken
in reverse, and his line of retreat along the Franklin pike and the valley
leading to Brentwood commanded effectually. The capture of half of the rebel
army would almost certainly have been the guerdon of success. It was evident
that the assault would be very difficult, and, if successful, Would probably be
attended with heavy loss; but the prize at stake was worth the hazard. Early in
the afternoon I began to make preparations for assaulting the hill. Owing to
the openness of the country the preparatory movements could not be concealed
from the enemy; in truth, from our extreme proximity to his intrenchments, they
were necessarily made under the fire of his artillery. Knowing that the safety
of his army depended on holding the Overton Hill to the last moment, he
re-enforced the position heavily with troops drawn from his left and left
center. I directed Colonel Post to reconnoiter the position closely, with the
view of determining, first, the feasibility of an assault, and, secondly, to
determine the most practicable point on which to direct it.
After a thorough and close reconnaissance, in which perhaps
three-quarters of an hour were spent, Colonel Post reported that the position
was truly formidable; that it would be very difficult to carry, but that he
thought he could do it with his brigade. He further reported that an assault,
in his opinion, on the northern slope of the hill held out the greatest promise
of success. I ordered him to prepare his brigade for an assault immediately and
to inform me when he was ready to move. I directed General Beatty, commanding
Third Division, to have the First Brigade (Colonel Streight's) formed to
support Colonel Post's. I further ordered Major Goodspeed, chief of artillery
of the corps, to open a concentrated fire on the hill for the purpose of
silencing the enemy's batteries and demolishing his defenses, and to continue
the fire as long as it could be done with safety to our advancing troops. The
order was effectually obeyed. I also conferred with Major-General Steedman and
explained to him what I intended to do. He promptly agreed to move his command
forward with the assaulting brigade to cover its left; also to participate in
the assault, with a view to carrying whatever might be in its front. Everything
being prepared for the attack, near 3 p.m. I gave the order for the assaulting
brigade to advance, This it did steadily, followed by its support.
Major-General Steedman's command moved simultaneously. I will here remark that
General Steedman's artillery had kept up an effective fire on the enemy's works
during the interval during which the preparations for the assault were being
made. The front of the assaulting force was covered with a cloud of
skirmishers, who had been ordered to advance rapidly, for the purpose of
drawing the fire of the enemy, as far as possible, and to annoy his
artillerists, and to prevent, as much as it could be done, the working of his
guns. The assaulting force was instructed to move steadily forward to within a
short distance of the enemy's works, and then, by a "bold burst,"
ascend the steep ascent, cross the abatis, dash over the rude but strong
parapet, and secure the coveted goal.
The troops were full of enthusiasm, and the splendid array
in which the advance was made gave hopeful promise of success. Near the foot of
the ascent the assaulting force dashed forward for the last great effort. It
was welcomed with a most terrific fire of grape and canister and musketry; but
its course was onward. When near, however, the enemy's works (a few of our men,
stouter of limb and steadier of movement, had already entered his line) his
reserves on the slope of the hill rose and poured in a fire before which no
troops could live. Unfortunately, the casualties had been particularly heavy
among the officers, and more unfortunately still, when he had arrived almost at
the abatis, while gallantly leading his brigade, the chivalric Post was struck
down by a grape-shot and his horse killed under him. The brigade--its
battalions bleeding, torn, and broken--first halted and then began to retire;
but there was little disorder and nothing of panic. The troops promptly halted
and were readily reformed by their officers. But for the unfortunate fall of
Colonel Post, the commander of the assaulting brigade, I think the attack would
have succeeded. I had watched the assault with a keen and anxious gaze. It was
made by troops whom I had long commanded and whom I had learned to love and
admire for their noble deeds on many a hard-fought field. I had observed, with
pride and exultation, the evident steady resolve with which they had prepared
for the assault, the cheerfulness with which they had received the announcement
that they were les enfans perdus. So soon as I perceived the troops
begin to retire, apprehending that the enemy might attempt an offensive return,
I dispatched an order to all the batteries bearing on the hill to open the
heaviest possible fire so soon as their fronts were sufficiently cleared by the
retiring troops to permit it. I also ordered Colonel Knefler, commanding Third
Brigade, Third Division, to hold his command well in hand, ready to charge the
enemy should he presume to follow our troops. Both orders were promptly obeyed,
and if the enemy ever had the temerity to contemplate an offensive return, he
never attempted to carry it into effect. Not a prisoner was captured from us--a
fact almost unparalleled in an assault so fierce, so near to success, but
unsuccessful; and no foot of ground previously won was lost. After the repulse
our soldiers, white and colored, lay indiscriminately near the enemy's works at
the outer edge of the abatis. But while the assault was not immediately
successful, it paved the way for the grand and final success of the day. The
re-enforcements for the Overton Hill, which the enemy had drawn from his left
and left center, had so much weakened that part of his line as to assure the
success of General Smith's attack.
After withdrawing and reposting the troops that had been
engaged in the assault I rode toward the right to look to the condition of the
First and Second Divisions. Shortly after reaching the First Division, which
was on the right of the corps, an electric shout, which announced that a grand
advance was being made by our right and right center, was borne from the right
toward the left. I at once ordered the whole corps to advance and assault the
enemy's works, but the order was scarcely necessary. All had caught the
inspiration, and officers of all grades and the men, each and every one, seemed
to vie with each other in a generous rivalry and in the dash with which they
assaulted the enemy's works. So general and so combined an attack on all parts
of the enemy's line was resistless. It rushed forward like a mighty wave,
driving everything before it. The sharp fire of musketry and artillery did not
cause an instant's pause. I advanced with the First Division and witnessed,
with the highest satisfaction, the gallant style in which it assaulted and
carried the enemy's works. The division carried every point of the works in its
front and captured five pieces of artillery, several hundred prisoners, and
many hundred stand of small-arms. The Second Division gallantly carried the
enemy's works in its front and captured many prisoners and small-arms. The
Third Division reassaulted the Overton Hill, carried it, and captured four
pieces of artillery, a large number of prisoners and small-arms, and two stand
of colors. The enemy fled in the utmost confusion. The entire corps pushed
rapidly forward, pressed the pursuit, and continued it several miles and till the
fast approaching darkness made it necessary to halt for the night. In the
pursuit the Third Division captured five pieces of artillery. The batteries of
the corps advanced with the infantry in the pursuit, and by timely discharges
increased the confusion and hastened the flight of the enemy. The corps
bivouacked eight miles from Nashville, and within a mile of the Brentwood Pass,
which was under our guns. By the day's operations the enemy had been driven
from a strongly intrenched position by assault and forced into an
indiscriminate rout. In his flight he had strewn the ground with small-arms,
bayonets, cartridge-boxes, blankets, and other material, all attesting the
completeness of the disorder to which he had abandoned himself. The captures of
the day were 14 pieces of artillery, 980 prisoners, 2 stand of colors, and
thousands of small-arms. It may be truthfully remarked that military history
scarcely affords a parallel of a more complete victory.
At 12.30 a.m. of the 17th instructions were received from
the commanding general of the forces to move the Fourth Corps as early as
practicable down the Franklin pike in pursuit of the enemy. At 6 a.m. of the
17th I directed division commanders to advance as early as practicable, move
rapidly, and if the enemy should be overtaken to press him vigorously. The
night had been rainy and the morning broke dark and cloudy. It was, hence,
nearly 8 a.m. before the column was well in motion, but it then advanced
rapidly. The instructions of the commanding general, received during the night,
informed me that the cavalry would move on my left during the day. It did not,
however, get to my left before I moved, and at 10 a.m. I was detained a short
time in permitting a portion of the cavalry to get to the front, which was necessary,
in order that it might reach the position assigned to it in the order of march.
After this brief delay I pushed rapidly forward, and, although the road was
very heavy, reached Franklin at 1.20 p.m. The whole line of march of the day
bore unmistakable evidence of the signalness of the victory our arms had
achieved and the completeness of the rout. The road was strewn with small-arms,
accounterments, and blankets. The enemy had destroyed all the bridges over the
Big Harpeth at Franklin, and as the rains of the previous night and that
morning had so swollen the stream as to make it impassable by infantry without
a bridge, it was necessary to halt to build one, the pontoon train not having
come up. Colonel Suman, Ninth Indiana, nobly volunteered to build the bridge,
and thanks to his energy and ingenuity and the industry of his gallant
regiment, it was ready--though he had few conveniences in the way of tools, the
scantiest materials, and the stream was rising rapidly--for the corps at
daylight the morning of the 18th. This service was the more useful, as well as
the more gratifying, as our cavalry, which, from reaching the Harpeth earlier
on the 17th, had been able to ford it, was sharply engaged with the enemy's
rear guard, several miles in front, and the whole corps was burning with
impatience to get forward to join in the conflict. The corps was pushed rapidly
across the Harpeth, pressed forward and marched eighteen miles that day, though
the road was very heavy and many crossings had to be made over the streams.
Near night-fall it passed in front of the cavalry and encamped about a mile in
advance of it. The weather was very inclement.
During the night of the 18th the rain poured down in
torrents, and the morning brought no improvement to the weather of the night.
During the night I received instructions from the commanding general of the
forces informing me, first, that the cavalry, then encamped in my rear, would
move at 6 a.m., pass to the front, and that I should move out at 8 a.m. The
cavalry had not all passed at 8 a.m., but at the appointed hour the corps was
in motion. The rain still fell in torrents, flooding the earth with water and
rendering all movements off the pike impossible. The head of the column
advanced three miles and a half and arrived at Rutherford's Creek. This is a
bold and rapid stream, usually fordable, but subject to rapid freshets, and the
heavy rains of the preceding twenty-four hours had swollen it beyond a
possibility of it being crossed without bridges. To construct these it was
necessary we should first occupy the opposite bank of the stream. As the head
of column approached the creek the hostile fire from the southern bank opened
with musketry and artillery. To clear the enemy from the opposite bank at the
turnpike crossing, where the bridge for the passage of the artillery and trains
had to be constructed, it was necessary to pass troops over, either above or
below, and as the pontoon train was not yet up, every expedient that ingenuity
could devise was resorted to to effect the desired object. Rafts were
constructed and launched, but the current was so rapid that they were
unmanageable. Huge forest trees growing near the margin of the stream were
felled athwart the stream, with the hope of spanning it in this way and getting
some riflemen over; but the creek was so rapid and the flood so deep that these
huge torsos of the forest were swept away by the resistless torrent. In these
efforts was passed one of the most dreary, uncomfortable, and inclement days I
remember to have passed in the course of nineteen and a half years of active
field service. Late in the afternoon some dismounted cavalry succeeded in
crossing the creek on the ruins of the railroad bridge and drove off the enemy
from its southern bank. During the night and the early forenoon of the
following day, the 20th, two bridges for infantry were constructed across the
stream--one at the turnpike crossing, by Colonel Opdycke's brigade, of the
Second Division, and the other by General Grose's brigade, of the First Division.
So soon as these were completed the infantry of the corps was passed over,
marched three miles, and encamped for the night on the northern bank of Duck
River.
During the night of the 20th the weather became bitterly
cold. Wednesday, the 21st, operations were suspended, and the corps remained
quietly in camp, as the pontoon train, detained by the swollen streams, the
inclement weather, and the miserable condition of the roads, had not been able
to get to the front. The day was bitterly cold, and the rest which the command
gained by laying in camp was much needed after their arduous and laborious
service of the many preceding days. During the night of the 21st, between
midnight and daylight, the pontoon train came up and reported. I had, as early
as the evening of the 20th, encamped a brigade (the First Brigade of the Third
Division, Colonel Streight commanding) on the margin of the river, ready to lay
down the bridge the very earliest moment that it could be done. So soon as it
was light enough to work the morning of the 22d a sufficient number of pontoons
(they were canvass) were put together to throw across the river a detachment of
the Fifty-first Indiana to clear the opposite bank of the enemy. This service
was handsomely performed by the detachment, and quite a number of prisoners was
the result of the operation. So soon as the opposite bank was cleared of the
enemy Colonel Streight commenced to lay down the bridge, and completed the work
with commendable celerity, though, owing to the inexperience of the troops in
such service and the extreme coldness of the weather, more time was consumed in
doing it than could have been desired. So soon as the bridge was completed I
began to pass the infantry of the corps, and during the time which intervened
before the time designed by the commanding general for the cavalry to commence
crossing, succeeded in getting over most of the artillery and a sufficiency of
the ammunition and baggage trains to permit the corps to continue the pursuit.
After crossing the river I moved the corps a mile out of the town of Columbia,
which stands on the southern bank of the river, and encamped it for the
remainder of the night.
During the evening of the 22d the commanding general
informed me that he wished the pursuit continued by the Fourth Corps and the
cavalry, conjointly, so soon as the cavalry had crossed the river; that he
wished the Fourth Corps to press down the turnpike road, and the cavalry to
move through the country on either side of the corps. Friday, the 23d, I rested
near Columbia, awaiting for the cavalry to complete its passage of Duck River,
till midday, when, the cavalry not being yet over, I informed the commanding
general I would move the corps a few miles to the front that afternoon, encamp
for the night, and wait the following morning for the cavalry to move out, with
which, as already stated, I had been instructed to co-operate. While at Duck
River we learned that the enemy had thrown several pieces of artillery into the
river, being unable to get them across. We also learned that his rear guard was
composed of all the organized infantry that could be drawn from his army, which
was placed under the command of General Walthall, and his cavalry commanded by
General Forrest. After advancing some five miles south of Columbia, the
afternoon of the 23d, the head of the corps came on a party of the enemy posted
advantageously in a gap through which the highway passed, with inclosing
heights on either side. I ordered Brigadier-General Kimball, commanding the
leading division, to deploy two regiments as skirmishers, bring up a section of
artillery, and with this force to advance and dislodge the enemy from the pass.
The service was handsomely and quickly performed. One captain of cavalry and
one private certainly killed and four privates captured were among the known
casualties to the enemy. It being now near night-fall, the corps was halted to
await the completion of the crossing of the cavalry.
On the following morning, the 24th, I was detained till 12
m., waiting for the cavalry to come up and move out. Shortly after the cavalry
had passed out through my camp Brevet Major-General Wilson sent me a message to
the effect that he had found the ground so soft that he could not operate off
of the turnpike, and begging that I would not become impatient at the delay he
was causing in the movement of my command. At 12 m. the road was free of the
cavalry, when the corps was put in motion and marched sixteen miles that
afternoon, and encamped two miles south of Lynnville. During all this period of
the pursuit, and, indeed, to the end of it, the rear guard of the enemy offered
slight resistance, and generally fled at the mere presence of our' troops.
Sunday morning, the 25th, the corps followed closely on the heels of the
cavalry, passed through Pulaski, from which the cavalry had rapidly driven the
enemy's rear guard, and encamped for the night six miles from the town, on the
Lamb's Ferry road. The corps marched sixteen miles on the 25th, the last six
miles on a road next to impracticable from the depth of the mud. As we could
not have the use of the turnpike farther south than Pulaski, I ordered all the
artillery of the corps but four batteries to be left at Pulaski, using the
horses of the batteries left to increase the horses of the pieces taken with
the command to eight, and of the caissons to ten horses each. I also ordered
that only a limited number of ammunition wagons, carrying but ten boxes each,
should accompany the command. These arrangements were necessary on account of
the condition of the road on which the enemy had retreated. Without extra teams
to the artillery carriages and lightening of the usual load of an ammunition
wagon, it would have been impracticable to get the vehicles along; a vigorous
pursuit would have been impossible. These dispositions were reported to the
commanding general. He directed me to follow the cavalry and support it. The
pursuit was continued with all possible celerity to Lexington, Ala., thirty
miles south of Pulaski. Six miles south of Lexington Brevet Major-General
Wilson learned certainly, on the 28th, the rear of the enemy had crossed the
Tennessee River on the 27th, and that his bridge was taken up the morning of
the 28th. These facts were reported to the commanding general, who ordered that
the pursuit be discontinued. To continue it farther at that time, besides being
useless, even if possible, was really impossible. Of the pursuit it may be
truly remarked that it is without a parallel in this war. It was continued for
more than a hundred miles at the most inclement season of the year, over a road
the whole of which was bad, and thirty miles of which were wretched, almost
beyond description. It were scarcely an hyperbole to say that the road from
Pulaski to Lexington was bottomless when we passed over it. It was strewn with
the wrecks of wagons, artillery carriages, and other material abandoned by the
enemy in his flight. The corps remained two days at Lexington awaiting orders.
On the 30th of December
instructions were received to take post at this place. On the 31st the corps
marched to Elk River, a distance of fifteen miles. The river being too swollen
to ford two days were spent in bridging it. Colonel Suman, Ninth Indiana, and
Major Watson, Seventy-fifth Illinois, using the pioneers of the corps as
laborers and mechanics, built a substantial trestle bridge, 309 feet long, over
which the corps, with its artillery and wagons, safely passed. Elk River was
crossed on the 3d of January, and on the 5th the corps was encamped in the
vicinity of this place.
Thus was closed for the Fourth Corps one of the most
remarkable campaigns of the war. The enemy, superior in numbers, had been
driven by assault, in utter rout and demoralization, from strongly intrenched
positions, pursued more than 100 miles, and forced to recross the Tennessee
River. By actual capture on the field of battle and by abandonment in his
flight the enemy had lost three-quarters of his artillery; in prisoners taken
from him, by desertion, in killed and wounded, his force had certainly been
diminished 15,000; and his loss in small-arms, ammunition, and other material
of war enormous. From an organized army, beleaguering the capital of Tennessee,
the foe had been beaten into a disorganized mass--a mere rabble. The Fourth
Corps captured 25 pieces of artillery, 4 stand of colors, and of small-arms a
large number, of which, however, no account could be taken, as the pursuit was
commenced early the morning of the 17th. Of the artillery captured 19 pieces
were taken by assault on the enemy's works. The corps captured 111 commissioned
officers and 1,857 non-commissioned officers and privates.
The casualties of the corps amounted to—Officers, killed,
19; wounded, 55. Non-commissioned officers and privates, killed, 114; wounded,
759.*
For the more minute details of the movements of the troops
on the field of battle and in the pursuit, I most respectfully refer the
commanding general to the reports of the division, brigade, and regimental
commanders; and for the special mention of numerous acts of gallantry and good
conduct, I must also refer him to their reports.
I desire to commend to the consideration of the commanding
general the skill and intelligence evinced by the division commanders—Brigadier-Generals
Kimball, Elliott, and Beatty—in the handling of their commands, and for the
personal gallantry displayed by them on the field of battle. Their services
entitle them to the gratitude of the nation and to the most kindly
consideration of the Government. The division commanders mention the services
of their brigade commanders in terms of the highest praise; they also commend
their staff officers for good conduct and valuable services. The reports of the
brigade commanders attest the meritorious conduct of the regimental commanders
and of the brigade staff officers.
From the very best opportunity of observing, I can truly
bear testimony, and I do it with the highest satisfaction, to the soldierly, in
truth, splendid conduct of the whole corps in all the conflicts of the 15th and
16th. I have never seen troops behave better on any battlefield.
To the members of my staff--Lieutenant-Colonel Fullerton,
assistant adjutant-general and chief of staff; Lieutenant-Colonel Greenwood,
assistant inspector-general; Major Sinclair, assistant adjutant-general; Major
Dawson, Fifteenth Ohio Volunteers, chief of outposts and pickets; First Lieut.
George Shaffer, Ninety-third Ohio, and First Lieut. C. D. Hammer, One hundred
and twenty-fourth Ohio, aides-de-camp; Captain Stansbury, Nineteenth Regulars,
assistant commissary of musters; Capt. Henry Kaldenbaugh, provost-marshal; and
Lieutenant Kennedy, acting assistant inspector--I owe many thanks for the
zealous, intelligent, and gallant manner in which they performed their duties,
both on the field of battle and in the long and arduous pursuit. I commend them
to the favorable consideration of my seniors in rank and to the Government.
Major Goodspeed, chief of artillery, rendered the most
valuable service on both the 15th and 16th. A battery was never required in any
position that it was not promptly put there. The officers of all the batteries
engaged behaved with great gallantry, as did their men. The artillery practice
on both those days was splendid.
Surgeon Heard, medical director, Surgeon Brumley, medical
inspector, and Captain Tousley, chief of ambulances, performed their duties
most satisfactorily. Ample preparation had been made in advance for the
wounded, and humane and efficient care was promptly rendered them.
Lieutenant-Colonel Hayes, chief quartermaster, and Captain
Hodgdon, chief commissary, performed the duties of their respective departments
in a satisfactory manner.
To the officers of every grade and to the brave but nameless
men in the ranks my grateful thanks for the cheerful, gallant, and effective
manner in which every duty was performed are due, and are hereby officially
tendered.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
TH. J. WOOD,
Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Commanding.
Brig. Gen. WILLIAM D. WHIPPLE,
Chief of Staff and Assistant Adjutant-General.
ADDENDA.
HEADQUARTERS FOURTH
ARMY CORPS,
Nashville, Tenn.,
December 2, 1864.
Brig. Gen. G. D. WAGNER,
Commanding Second Division, Fourth Army Corps:
GENERAL: When General Stanley left he directed me to address
you and express for him to you, and to the officers and men serving in your
command, his sincere thanks and gratitude for the gallant service rendered at
the battle of Franklin on the 30th of November. His wound compelled him to
leave you for a time, and while he did it with regret, he felt from the record
you have made that in whatever position you may be called to act, under
whatever circumstances you may be surrounded, you will in future, as in the
past, discharge the duties devolving upon you with credit to yourselves and
honor to his successor and to the corps.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. H. SINCLAIR,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
(Same to General Kimball.)
_______________
HEADQUARTERS FOURTH
ARMY CORPS,
Huntsville, Ala.,
January 6, 1865.
OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF FOURTH ARMY CORPS:
You have received the commendation of his Excellency the
President of the United States for your glorious deeds in the various conflicts
around Nashville on the 15th and 16th ultimo. You have also received the
commendation of the commanding general of the forces engaged in those
conflicts, not only for your splendid achievements on the field of battle, but
for your cheerful endurance of privations and hardships, in the most inclement
weather, during the long and vigorous pursuit which followed the rout of the
enemy in the vicinity of Nashville. As your actual commander on the field and
in the pursuit, 1 desire to add my commendation to the high encomiums you have
already received, and to tender you my grateful thanks for your soldierly
conduct both on the field of battle and in the trying pursuit.
Without faltering, at the command of your officers, you
repeatedly assaulted the enemy's strongly intrenched positions, and drove him
from them in confusion and dismay. When he was utterly routed and no longer
durst confront you in battle, you at once commenced the most vigorous pursuit,
continued it more than a hundred miles, at the most inclement season of the
year, over the most miserable roads, and across deep and difficult streams,
which were passed by your labor alone, and until the enemy was driven in utter
disorganization across the Tennessee River. The substantial fruits of these
glorious deeds were 24 pieces of artillery, 5 caissons, several stand of
colors, many thousand stand of small arms, and 2,486 prisoners. Such noble
services entitle you to the lasting gratitude of the nation. Fortunately, this
great success was achieved with comparatively slight loss to the corps—750
killed and wounded will cover the entire casualties of the corps in the two
days' conflict.
To the friends of the gallant dead and to the wounded—and I
am sure you will join me in this tribute of comradeship—I offer my sincere
sympathy and condolence.
I am, respectfully, yours,
TH. J. WOOD,
Brigadier-General of Volunteers.
_______________
HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS,
Huntsville, Ala., January 7, 1865.
Brigadier-General WHIPPLE, Chief of Staff:The number of flags captured by this corps at Franklin, 21,
and at Nashville, 4; total, 25. A few of the flags were taken by officers of
the Twenty-third Corps from the captors at Franklin; some were sent home by the
captors.
Swords and sabers captured at Franklin, 11; at Nashville,
28; total, 39. Regimental commanders report many more swords captured and thrown
away, for want of transportation, in the pursuit of Hood. Guns captured at
Nashville, 25.
Prisoners reported by the corps provost-marshal, captured at
Spring Hill and Franklin, 46 commissioned officers and 572 enlisted men;
captured at Nashville, 111 commissioned officers and 1,857 enlisted men; total,
2,586 prisoners.
I regret that I could not send this report sooner; it was
impossible to get division reports.
TH. J. WOOD,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
_______________
HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS,
Huntsville, Ala., January 13, 1865.
Brig. Gen. W. D. WHIPPLE,
Asst. Adjt. Gen. and Chief of Staff, Dept. of the
Cumberland:GENERAL: Though the troops whose gallant conduct I desire to
commend to the notice of the commanding general do not belong to my command,
yet as he had charged me with the duty of trying to destroy the force of the
rebel General Lyon, and as the gallantry was displayed in the operations
against the rebel chieftain, I deem it my duty, as it certainly is my pleasure,
to make a special report of the obstinate defense made by First Lieut. John H.
Hull, One hundred and first U.S. Colored Troops, and the small detachment under
his command. Lieutenant Hull, with a detachment of fifty- four colored
recruits, was ordered on the 7th instant to Scottsborough, on Memphis and
Charleston Railroad, to guard the water-tanks and depot. During the afternoon
of the 8th Lieutenant Bull found the enemy advancing on him in heavy force.
Retiring to the depot, which he had loop-holed for defense, he awaited the
attack. The enemy made a vigorous assault on the north side of the depot, which
was repulsed. Changing his point of attack, he assaulted the south side of the
depot, only to be repulsed. Finally he attacked the west end and north side of
the building, to be again more seriously repulsed than in either of the
previous assaults. Lieutenant Hull reports that the enemy came up in the
assaults so near that he seized the muzzles of the muskets and attempted to
wrest them through the loopholes. After the third repulse the enemy retired out
of musket range and opened on the depot with his artillery, two 12-pounder
howitzers. This made the building untenable, when Lieutenant Hull evacuated it
and led his brave little band up the side of the mountain, a distance of about
450 yards, intending there to renew the fight, but the enemy scarcely attempted
to follow. After reaching the mountain Lieutenant Hull learned that a train
with re-enforcements had reached one of the water-tanks, about a mile and a
quarter distant. He at once concentrated his command to it, and was not
followed by the enemy, who, on the contrary, retreated toward the Tennessee
River. Lieutenant Hull estimates the enemy's force at 1,200, and reports having
inflicted on him a loss of Colonel Oneal and 17 men killed and 45 wounded. The
casualties of the gallant garrison were 2 men wounded. I think such a resolute
defense against such overwhelming odds merits commendation in orders, not only
as an act of justice to the brave men who made it, but as an example to other
railroad guards of what may be accomplished by a determined resistance. I am
informed that the recruits under Lieutenant Hull's command had not been
mustered into the service. Justice to these brave men requires that it should
be done without delay.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
TH. J. WOOD,
Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Commanding.
_______________
* But see revised table, p. 99
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies,
Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 119-41
