AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, October 18th, 1854.
TO THE HON. WM. L. MARCY,
Secretary of State.
SIR: The undersigned, in compliance with the wish expressed
by the President in the several confidential despatches you have addressed to
us respectively to that effect, have met in conference, first at Ostend, in Belgium,
on the 9th, 10th, and 11th instant, and then at Aix-la-Chapelle, in Prussia, on
the days next following, up to the date hereof.
There has been a full and unreserved interchange of views
and sentiments between us, which, we are most happy to inform you, has resulted
in a cordial coincidence of opinion on the grave and important subjects
submitted to our consideration.
We have arrived at the conclusion and are thoroughly
convinced that an immediate and earnest effort ought to be made by the
Government of the United States to purchase Cuba from Spain, at any price for
which it can be obtained, not exceeding the sum of one hundred and twenty
millions of dollars.
The proposal should, in our opinion, be made in such a
manner as to be presented, through the necessary diplomatic forms, to the
Supreme Constituent Cortes about to assemble. On this momentous question, in
which the people both of Spain and the United States are so deeply interested,
all our proceedings ought to be open, frank, and public. They should be of such
a character as to challenge the approbation of the World.
We firmly believe that, in the progress of human events, the
time has arrived when the vital interests of Spain are as seriously involved in
the sale as those of the United States in the purchase of the Island, and
that the transaction will prove equally honorable to both nations.
Under these circumstances, we cannot anticipate a failure,
unless, possibly, through the malign influence of foreign Powers who possess no
right whatever to interfere in the matter.
We proceed to state some of the reasons which have brought
us to this conclusion; and, for the sake of clearness, we shall specify them
under two distinct heads:
1. The United States ought, if practicable, to purchase Cuba
with as little delay as possible.
2. The probability is great that the Government and Cortes
of Spain will prove willing to sell it, because this would essentially promote
the highest and best interests of the Spanish people.
Then—1. It must be clear to every reflecting mind that, from
the peculiarity of its geographical position and the considerations attendant
on it, Cuba is as necessary to the North American Republic as any of its
present members, and that it belongs naturally to that great family of States
of which the Union is the Providential Nursery.
From its locality it commands the mouth of the Mississippi
and the immense and annually increasing trade which must seek this avenue to
the ocean.
On the numerous navigable streams, measuring an aggregate
course of some thirty thousand miles, which disembogue themselves through this
magnificent river into the Gulf of Mexico, the increase of the population,
within the last ten years, amounts to more than that of the entire Union at the
time Louisiana was annexed to it.
The natural and main outlet of the products of this entire
population, the highway of their direct intercourse with the Atlantic and the
Pacific States, can never be secure, but must ever be endangered whilst Cuba is
a dependency of a distant Power, in whose possession it has proved to be a
source of constant annoyance and embarrassment to their interests.
Indeed, the Union can never enjoy repose, nor possess
reliable security, as long as Cuba is not embraced within its boundaries.
Its immediate acquisition by our Government is of paramount
importance, and we cannot doubt but that it is a consummation devoutly wished
for by its inhabitants.
The intercourse which its proximity to our coasts begets and
encourages between them and the citizens of the United States has, in the
progress of time, so united their interests and blended their fortunes, that
they now look upon each other as if they were one people and had but one
destiny.
Considerations exist which render delay in the acquisition
of this Island exceedingly dangerous to the United States.
The system of emigration and labor lately organized within
its limits, and the tyranny and oppression which characterize its immediate
rulers, threaten an insurrection, at every moment, which may result in direful
consequences to the American People.
Cuba has thus become to us an unceasing danger, and a
permanent cause of anxiety and alarm.
But we need not enlarge on these topics. It can scarcely be
apprehended that foreign Powers, in violation of international law, would
interpose their influence with Spain to prevent our acquisition of the Island.
Its inhabitants are now suffering under the worst of all possible
Governments,—that of absolute despotism, delegated by a distant Power to
irresponsible agents who are changed at short intervals, and who are tempted to
improve the brief opportunity thus afforded to accumulate fortunes by the
basest means.
As long as this system shall endure, humanity may in vain
demand the suppression of the African Slave trade in the Island. This is
rendered impossible whilst that infamous traffic remains an irresistible
temptation and a source of immense profit to needy and avaricious officials
who, to attain their end, scruple not to trample the most sacred principles
under foot.
The Spanish Government at home may be well disposed, but
experience has proved that it cannot control these remote depositories of its
power.
Besides, the commercial nations of the world cannot fail to
perceive and appreciate the great advantages which would result to their people
from a dissolution of the forced and unnatural connection between Spain and
Cuba, and the annexation of the latter to the United States. The trade of
England and France with Cuba would, in that event, assume at once an important
and profitable character, and rapidly extend with the increasing population and
prosperity of the Island.
2. But if the United States and every commercial nation
would be benefited by this transfer, the interests of Spain would also be
greatly and essentially promoted.
She cannot but see that such a sum of money as we are willing
to pay for the Island would effect in the development of her vast natural
resources.
Two thirds of this sum, if employed in the construction of a
system of Railroads, would ultimately prove a source of greater wealth to the
Spanish people than that opened to their vision by Cortes. Their prosperity
would date from the ratification of the Treaty of cession. France has already
constructed continuous lines of Railways from Havre, Marseilles, Valenciennes,
and Strasbourg, via Paris, to the Spanish frontier, and anxiously awaits the
day when Spain shall find herself in a condition to extend these roads, through
her Northern provinces, to Madrid, Seville, Cadiz, Malaga, and the frontiers of
Portugal.
This object once accomplished, Spain would become a centre
of attraction for the travelling world and secure a permanent and profitable
market for her various productions. Her fields, under the stimulus given to
industry by remunerating prices, would teem with cereal grain, and her
vineyards would bring forth a vastly increased quantity of choice wines. Spain
would speedily become, what a bountiful Providence intended she should be, one
of the first Nations of Continental Europe, rich, powerful, and contented.
Whilst two thirds of the price of the Island would be ample
for the completion of her most important public improvements, she might, with
the remaining forty millions, satisfy the demands now pressing so heavily upon
her credit, and create a sinking fund which would gradually relieve her from
the overwhelming debt now paralysing her energies.
Such is her present wretched financial condition, that her
best bonds are sold, upon her own Bourse, at about one third of their par
value; whilst another class, on which she pays no interest, have but a nominal
value and are quoted at about one sixth of the amount for which they were
issued. Besides, these latter are held principally by British creditors, who
may, from day to day, obtain the effective interposition of their own
Government, for the purpose of coercing payment. Intimations to that effect
have been already thrown out from high quarters, and unless some new, source of
revenue shall enable Spain to provide for such exigencies, it is not improbable
that they may be realized.
Should Spain reject the present golden opportunity for
developing her resources and removing her present financial embarrassments, it
may never again return.
Cuba, in its palmiest days, never yielded her Exchequer, after
deducting the expenses of its Government, a clear annual income of more than a
million and a half of dollars. These expenses have increased to such a degree
as to leave a deficit chargeable on the Treasury of Spain to the amount of six
hundred thousand dollars.
In a pecuniary point of view, therefore, the Island is an
encumbrance instead of a source of profit to the Mother Country.
Under no probable circumstances can Cuba ever yield to Spain
one per cent. on the large amount which the United States are willing to pay
for its acquisition.
But Spain is in imminent danger of losing Cuba without
remuneration.
Extreme oppression, it is now universally admitted,
justifies any people in endeavoring to relieve themselves from the yoke of
their oppressors. The sufferings which the corrupt, arbitrary, and unrelenting
local administration necessarily entails upon the inhabitants of Cuba cannot
fail to stimulate and keep alive that spirit of resistance and revolution
against Spain which has of late years been so often manifested. In this
condition of affairs, it is vain to expect that the sympathies of the people of
the United States will not be warmly enlisted in favor of their oppressed
neighbors.
We know that the President is justly inflexible in his
determination to execute the neutrality laws, but should the Cubans themselves
rise in revolt against the oppressions which they suffer, no human power could
prevent citizens of the United States and liberal minded men of other countries
from rushing to their assistance.
Besides, the present is an age of adventure, in which
restless and daring spirits abound in every portion of the world.
It is not improbable, therefore, that Cuba may be wrested
from Spain by a successful revolution; and in that event, she will lose both
the Island and the price which we are now willing to pay for it—a price far
beyond what was ever paid by one people to another for any province.
It may also be here remarked that the settlement of this
vexed question, by the cession of Cuba to the United States, would forever
prevent the dangerous complications between nations to which it may otherwise
give birth.
It is certain that, should the Cubans themselves organize an
insurrection against the Spanish Government, and should other independent
nations come to the aid of Spain in the contest, no human power could, in our
opinion, prevent the people and Government of the United States from taking
part in such a civil war in support of their neighbors and friends.
But if Spain, deaf to the voice of her own interest, and
actuated by stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to sell
Cuba to the United States, then the question will arise, what ought to be the
course of the American Government under such circumstances?
Self-preservation is the first law of nature, with States as
well as with individuals. All nations have, at different periods, acted upon
this maxim. Although it has been made the pretext for committing flagrant
injustice, as in the partition of Poland and other similar cases which history
records, yet the principle itself, though often abused, has always been
recognized.
The United States have never acquired a foot of territory,
except by fair purchase, or, as in the case of Texas, upon the free and
voluntary application of the people of that independent State, who desired to
blend their destinies with our own.
Even our acquisitions from Mexico are no exception to this
rule, because, although we might have claimed them by the right of conquest in
a just way, yet we purchased them for what was then considered by both parties
a full and ample equivalent.
Our past history forbids that we should acquire the Island
of Cuba without the consent of Spain, unless justified by the great law of
self-preservation. We must in any event preserve our own conscious rectitude
and our own self-respect.
Whilst pursuing this course, we can afford to disregard the
censures of the world to which we have been so often and so unjustly exposed.
After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba, far
beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, it
will then be time to consider the question, does Cuba in the possession of
Spain seriously endanger our internal peace and the existence of our
cherished Union?
Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then,
by every law human and Divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain,
if we possess the power; and this, upon the very same principle that would
justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor, if
there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own
home.
Under such circumstances, we ought neither to count the cost,
nor regard the odds which Spain might enlist against us. We forbear to enter
into the question, whether the present condition of the Island would justify
such a measure.
We should, however, be recreant to our duty, be unworthy of
our gallant forefathers, and commit base treason against our posterity, should
we permit Cuba to be Africanized and become a second St. Domingo, with all its
attendant horrors to the white race, and suffer the flames to extend to our
neighboring shores, seriously to endanger or actually to consume the fair
fabric of our Union.
We fear that the course and current of events are rapidly
tending towards such a catastrophe. We, however, hope for the best, though we
ought certainly to be prepared for the worst.
We also forbear to investigate the present condition of the
questions at issue between the United States and Spain,
A long series of injuries to our people have been committed
in Cuba by Spanish officials, and are unredressed. But recently a most flagrant
outrage on the rights of American citizens, and on the flag of the United
States, was perpetrated in the harbor of Havana, under circumstances which
without immediate redress would have justified a resort to measures of war, in
vindication of national honor. That outrage is not only unatoned, but the
Spanish Government has deliberately sanctioned the acts of its subordinates and
assumed the responsibility attaching to them.
Nothing could more impressively teach us the danger to which
those peaceful relations it has ever been the policy of the United States to
cherish with foreign nations are constantly exposed than the circumstances of
that case.
Situated as Spain and the United States are, the latter have
forborne to resort to extreme measures. But this course cannot, with due regard
to their own dignity as an independent nation, continue; and our
recommendations, now submitted, are dictated by the firm belief that the
cession of Cuba to the United States, with stipulations as beneficial to Spain
as those suggested, is the only effective mode of settling all past differences
and of securing the two countries against future collisions.
We have already witnessed the happy results for both
countries which followed a similar arrangement in regard to Florida.
Yours very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
J. Y. MASON.
PIERRE SOULÉ.
_______________
* MSS. Department of State, 66 Despatches from England.
Printed in H. Ex. Doc. 93. 33 Cong. 2 Sess. 127-132; Horton's Buchanan,
392-399. An extract is given in Curtis's Buchanan, II. 139.
SOURCE: John Bassett Moore, The
Works of James Buchanan: Comprising His Speeches, State Papers and Private
Correspondence, Volume 9: 1853-1855, p. 260-6
