Diary of John Hay: February 1 & 2, 1864

Evening of February 1st General Turner and I got on board a noisy little tug at the wharf which took us to the Ben Deford. We went upstairs and drank a few whiskey punches, and then to sleep.

In the morning found ourselves off Stono; — tide too low to let us over the bar; — were rowed ashore, — Gen. Terry, Turner and I. Stopped at lower end of Folly for an ambulance; rode to Gen. Terry’s headquarters and took horses to ride to Light House Inlet; crossed in a boat and walked up to Col. Davies. Col. D. full of a plan for capturing the Sumter garrison.

We went in ambulance to Wagner. The sound of firing had been heard all the morning. It grew more frequent, and Davies told us it was directed at a stranded blockade-runner. Just as we got in sight of Wagner a white smoke appeared in the clear air (the fog had lifted suddenly) and a sharp crack was heard. It seemed as if a celestial popcorn had been born in the ether. “There's a shell from Simkins,” said Turner. We went on, and there were more of them. As we got to Wagner we got out and sent the ambulance to a place of safety under the walls. They were just making ready to discharge a great gun from Wagner. The Generals clapped hands to their ears. The gun was fired, and the black globe went screaming close to the ground over the island, over the harbor, landing and bursting near the helpless blockade-runner stranded half-way from Fort Beauregard to Fort Moultrie. We walked up the beach. Heretofore we had from time to time seen little knots of men gathered to look at the fight, but now the beach was deserted. Once in a while you would see a fellow crouching below a sandhill keeping a sharp lookout. We soon came to Batteries Seymour, Barton and Chatfield, which were firing vigorously. We mounted the parapet and took a good look at the steamer. She was already a good deal damaged by one shell amidships.

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 158-9.

2nd Lieutenant Norman J. Hall's Notes: Probably Presented to Lincoln and his Cabinet March 15, 1861

I have the honor to state that I could not concur with Captain Rodgers, with whom I was directed to confer, in his plan for the entrance of the harbor of Charleston with men and provisions for Fort Sumter. He proposes to procure a vessel (steamboat), with a draught of not over six and one-half feet, in some Northern port, and with the cargo to be cleared for Charleston, letting it be known, as if in confidence, that the design is to force a landing on the southern extreme of Morris Island; to carry the batteries by the rear and destroy the channel; to bring in the vessel, the vessel to regulate her speed so as to arrive off the bar in a dark night and at high tide, and to proceed through the Swash Channel with her lights extinguished; in case of discovery and being fired at, to drop a cork with a light in it, which would deceive the gunners. If the batteries are lighted up the men cannot see in the distance; if they are not, the lights will not be visible. The commander is to be allowed to back his vessel in case of a storm on the way down.

My objections to this plan are very numerous. In the first place, the deception would be apparent, as no one would attempt a forced landing with means possible to such a vessel. Secondly, not being a sea-going vessel the danger to life and the success of the undertaking is so great as to appear imprudent at best. Thirdly, it is unsafe to calculate upon not being seen off the bar, as a number of watch vessels, some with troops and cannon, are stationed off and along the entrance. Fourthly, even though the above dangers should all be safely passed and it should prove a moonless night and high tide at a proper time, still a chance shot through the machinery would defeat the enterprise.

The plan is grounded upon the most fortunate and improbable circumstances. It might succeed; but I think failure would be the rule. By an examination of the chart of the harbor of Charleston it will be seen that the Swash Channel passes outside the range of all the batteries erected along the entrance, except, perhaps, the small one near Cummings Point (of one 32-pounder and one 12-pounder), and this can be safely neglected. Fort Moultrie can bring several guns to bear for a mile and a half (not ten minutes), but their field has been greatly reduced by the traverse with small embrasures lately thrown up on the parapet. Considering as effective all the means in the hands of those hostile to the undertakings, the following are at present to be noticed: The channel will not admit of more than six and one-half feet draught with ease in sailing; at least one steamer with troops and field guns will be near the bar; a line of pilot schooners and signal vessels form a cordon outside the bar; the main ship channel is obstructed with sunken ships; Maffitt's Channel is raked and crossed by the fires of Moultrie and batteries placed along Sullivan's Island; the buoys and range lights are removed; the anchorage, except a small area, is under the fire of guns from the several fortified points; the Swash Channel is readily followed by ranging Fort Sumter on St. Michael's till within five hundred yards of the fort, where a detour to the right will be necessary. Carefully navigated, passing very near the north side of the fort, the vessel may be brought to the wharf at high tide. If not successful, small boats may be furnished by the fort. The only effective guns are those of Fort Moultrie on this entrance. I have the honor to propose that a war vessel (the Brooklyn best) be dispatched with two schooners and two ordinary steam-tugs, each of not more than six feet and a half draught, and under the same pretension as that first proposed, and this combination will give color to the rumor. One of the schooners is to be loaded with  provisions entirely, and the hay is to be stored on the starboard. The other, with some provisions, is to carry the troops. The vessels arrived off the bar, the Brooklyn can keep all hostile vessels at a distance and make the following arrangement:

The vessel with provisions is to be placed upon the right, next a screw-tug, next the vessel with troops, and again a tug. The right-hand vessel will cover those on the left, protecting from fire the troops and means of locomotion. The vessels should arrive off the bar two hours before high tide, so that the tide will be rising all the way in, and if grounded may be floated off in a short time. To prevent vessels from the city and the cutters inside the harbor from interfering, the fort shall be signaled, and will reply by lowering its flag or showing a light, and will prevent any vessel going out. Signals should be agreed upon, and the time, day or night, also. Two field pieces, loaded with canister, might be used to meet a desperate attempt to board the vessels. The hay in bales should be wet, to prevent heated balls from setting fire to the vessels.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 201-2

Memorandum of Different Plans for Re-Enforcing Fort Sumter

Memoranda read before the President and Cabinet, General Scott and Commodore Stringham, and Mr. Fox, late of the Navy, Washington, March 15, 1861, by Bvt. Brig. Gen. Joseph G. Totten, Chief of Engineers.*

The obstacles to the relief of Fort Sumter are natural or artificial obstacles to navigation, and military opposition.

The main channel in its best natural state would not admit the passage of vessels larger than sloops of war; so that, before it was obstructed, a naval attack, to be very formidable, must have consisted of many vessels of this kind.

In designing the defenses of Charleston Harbor, therefore, it was considered that Fort Sumter, with Castle Pinckney, would suffice, with some improvement of Fort Moultrie, and the erection of batteries in time of war on James Island at the position called Fort Johnson. A deeper entrance would have demanded a stronger system.

The South Carolina troops have strengthened Fort Moultrie and added batteries thereto; they possess Castle Pinckney; they have erected batteries at Fort Johnson, and, not having Fort Sumter, they have planted a number of guns (number not known) on Morris Island.

These last do not, certainly, bring their system up to that which included Fort Sumter; but they, as is represented, have also so blocked the main channel, or made its navigation so intricate, that only vessels light in draught can enter – vessels unavoidably weak to resist and impotent to assail.

If we suppose a squadron of war vessels as large as can be forced through the impediments of the main bar to have overcome that difficulty, and, under pressure of steam, to advance in daylight (as I think would be indispensable), they would suffer greatly from the fire of Morris Island, Fort Moultrie, and its adjacent batteries – but they would suffer much less than the small vessels, because much stronger and with vital parts better secured, and because their own fire would, to a certain extent, keep under, and, to a great degree, render uncertain the fire of the batteries. But whether larger or smaller, the vessels have not merely to pass the fire of the batteries – they must remain exposed to it. Because, before getting beyond the fire of Fort Moultrie, they come within scope of Fort Johnson, and while yet under the guns of these batteries they will be reached by Castle Pinckney. There is no point of shelter within these waters; and although the squadron of heavy sloops might survive the dangers of the passage, they could not long endure the cannonade that would be concentrated on any anchorage. In these very waters, this problem was settled in the Revolutionary War by the contest between the squadron of Sir Peter Parker and the single work of Fort Moultrie – then certainly not more powerful than now.

To enable the supposed squadron to remain, it is indispensable that a military force should capture the batteries from the land, and be strong enough, besides, to hold possession against the troops now assembled in and around them, and those that would rapidly come from the interior.

Should small vessels attempt this entrance by daylight, their destruction would be inevitable; at any rate, the chances of getting through would be too slender to justify any such enterprise. We have certain information that there is much practice with these guns, and that the practice now is good. If this risk were to be run by daylight, the vessels might have a draught of about eight feet, and could use the “Swash Channel,” or a passage between this and the main channel, or, finally, the latter. But I must repeat that unless we were to find a degree of inaptness and imbecility, and a want of vigilance and courage that we have no right to assume, this attempt by daylight with small vessels, even of great speed, must fail.

There remains another project, namely, to enter at night by the “Swash” Channel with a few (two or three) fast steam-tugs, having a draught of only (or about)five feet. To do this it will be necessary to take position before dark off this channel, so as to get upon the proper leading line to be followed after dark by the ascertained course, or, possibly, by the bearing of the lights of Fort Sumter. With proper precautions in screening the lights and fires of the boats, &c., I think the risk would not be so great, considering only the batteries, as to deter from this attempt, provided the object were of very great importance. I should expect one or two, perhaps all, of these vessels to reach Fort Sumter, and the shoal upon which they must be grounded – provided no other impediments awaited them.

But, in the first place, it is a necessary condition that the boats arrive off the harbor before night. If they can see to take these bearings, they can be seen from the shore. In the next place, it seems impossible to fit out any expedition, however small and unobtrusive, without arousing inquiry, and causing the intelligence to be transmitted by telegraph. We may be certain, therefore, that these tugs will be waited for by steamers lying in the channelway, full of men.

This mode of relieving Fort Sumter, or another by men in rowboats passing up the same channel, is so obvious that it is unreasonable to suppose it has not been duly considered and provided for, where so much intelligence and resource in military means have been displayed in the scheme of defense, and so much earnestness and energy in execution. We know that guard rowboats and steamers are active during the night; and that they have all the means of intercepting with certainty this little expedition, and overpowering it, by boarding – a commencement of war.

This attempt, like any other, will inevitably involve a collision.

This raises a question that I am not called on to discuss, but as to which I may say that if the General Government adopts a course that must be attended with this result, its first measure should not be one so likely to meet disaster and defeat; nor one, I may add, which, even if successful, would give but momentary relief, while it would open all the powers of attack upon the fort, certainly reducing it before the means of recovering Charleston Harbor, with all its forts and batteries and environs, can possibly be concentrated there.

Respectfully submitted.

J. G. T.

_______________

* See also General Totten to Secretary of War, April 3, 1861, post.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 198-200

Edward Bates to Abraham Lincoln, March 15, 1861

The President of the United States has required my opinion in writing, upon the following question:

“Assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort Sumter, under all the circumstances, is it wise to attempt it?”

This is not a question of lawful right nor physical power, but of prudence & patriotism only. The right is, in my mind unquestionable, and I have no doubt at all that the Government has the power and the means, not only to provision the Fort, but also, if the exigency required, to man it, with its war complement of 650 men, so as to make it impregnable to any local force that could be brought against it. Assuming all this, we come back to the question – “Under all the circumstances, is it wise,” now to provision the fort?

The wisdom of the act must be tested by the value of the object to be gained, & by the hazards to be encountered in the enterprise. The object to be gained, by the supply of provisions, is not to strengthen the fortress, so as to command the harbor and enforce the laws, but only to prolong the labors & privations of the brave little garrison that have so long held it, with patient courage.

The possession of the fort, as we now hold it, does not enable us to collect the revenue or enforce the laws of commercial navigation. It may indeed involve a point of honor or a point of pride, but I do not see any great national interest involved in the bare fact of holding the fort, as we now hold it – and to hold it at all, we must supply it with provisions. And it seems to me that we may, in humanity & patriotism, safely waive the point of pride, in the consciousness that we have the power, and lack nothing but the will, to hold Fort Sumter in such condition as to command the harbor of Charleston, cut off all its commerce, and even lay the city in ashes.

The hazards to be met are many and obvious. If the attempt be made in rapid boats light enough to pass the bar in safety, still they must pass under the fire of Fort Moultrie and the batteries on Morris' Island. They might possibly escape that danger, but they cannot hope to escape the armed guard boats which ply all night, from the Fort to the outer edge of the bar- These armed guard boats would be sure to take or destroy our unarmed tugs, unless repelled by force, either from our ships outside the bar, or from Fort Sumter within – and that is war. True, war already exists by the act of South Carolina – but this Government has, thus far, magnanimously forborne to retort the outrage. And I am willing to forbear yet longer, in the hope of a peaceful solution of our present difficulties. I am most unwilling to strike – I will not say the first blow, for South Carolina has already struck that – but I am unwilling, “under all the circumstances,” at this moment to do any act, which may have the semblance, before the world, of beginning a civil war, the terrible consequences of which would, I think, find no parallel in modern times. For I am convinced that flagrant civil war in the Southern states, would soon become a social war, and that could hardly fail to bring on a servile war, the horrors of which need not be dwelt upon.

To avoid these evils, I would make great sacrifices, – and Fort Sumter is one; but if war be forced upon us by causeless & pertinacious rebellion, I am for resisting it, with all the might of the nation.

I am persuaded, moreover, that in several of the misguided states of the South, a large proportion of the people are really lovers of the Union, and anxious to be safely back, under the protection of its flag. A reaction has already begun, and, if encouraged by wise, moderate, and firm measures on the part of this Government, I persuade myself that the nation will be restored to its integrity, without the effusion of blood.

For these reasons, I am willing to evacuate Fort Sumter, rather than be an active party in the beginning of civil war. The port of Charleston, is, comparatively, a small thing. If the present difficulties should continue & grow, I am convinced, that the real struggle will be at the mouth of the Mississippi, for it is not politically possible for any foreign power, to hold the mouth of that river, against the people of the middle & upper valley.

If Fort Sumter must be evacuated, then it is my decided opinion, that the more Southern forts, – Pickens, Key West &c – should, without delay, be put in condition of easy defence against all assailants; and that the whole coast from South Carolina to Texas, should be as well guarded as the power of the Navy will enable us.

Upon the whole, I do not think it wise now to attempt to provision Fort Sumter.

Most respectfully submitted

Edwd. Bates

Atty. Genl

SOURCE: Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott to Abraham Lincoln, March 12, 1861

The President has done me the honor to propose certain military questions, concerning Fort Sumter to which he desires replies.

“1st.” To what point of time can Major Anderson maintain his position at Fort Sumter without fresh supplies or reinforcements?

Answer. In respect to subsistence he has bread, flour, and rice for about 26 days, and salt meat (pork) for about forty eight days. Without additional supplies of provisions he may hold out some forty days without much suffering from hunger.

The besiegers are understood to be about 3,500 men, now somewhat disciplined, and they have four powerful batteries on land, and one floating battery, all mounting guns and mortars of large calibre and of the best patterns, bearing on Fort Sumter. Supposing Major Anderson not to be reinforced and the means of the assailants to be skilfully and vigorously employed – Fort Sumter being defended by less than 100 men, including common laborers and musicians – it might be taken, at any time, by a single assault, and easily, if previously harassed, perseveringly, for many days and nights; the assailants having the ability (by the force of numbers) of converting one out of every three or four of those demonstrations, into a real attack.

“2d.” Can you, with all the means now in your control, supply or reinforce Fort Sumter within the period you specify as the time, within which Major Anderson may hold out without fresh supplies?”

Answer. No, not within many months; But not to speak of October or November, when the proposition was first made, and repeated, in writing, the third time, December 30th – it would have been easy to reinforce Fort Sumter, with war vessels, down to about the 12th of February. In this long delay, twice that time, Fort Moultrie has been re-armed and greatly strengthened, in every way, and many powerful new land batteries (besides rafts) have been constructed. Hulks have also been sunk in the principal channel, so as to render access to Fort Sumter, from the sea, impractical, without first carrying all the batteries of the secessionists. The difficulty of reinforcing has thus, by delay, been increased 1[0] or 12 fold. First, the late President refused to allow any attempt to be made, because he was holding negotiations with South Carolina Commissioners. Afterwards, Secretary Holt and myself endeavored to obtain a ship of war for the purpose; but failing in this we were obliged to employ the steamer Star of the West. That vessel, but for the hesitation of the commander, might then have landed, it is generally believed, men and subsistence. That attempt having failed, I next, before the late Cabinet, submitted, orally, either that succor be sent by ships of war, fighting their way to the Fort, or, that Major Anderson should ameliorate his condition by the muzzles of his guns; that is, enforcing supplies by bombardment, and by bringing-to merchant vessels and helping himself (giving orders for payment) or else should be allowed to surrender, as, sooner or later, had then become inevitable.

But before any resolution was taken – the late Secretary of the Navy making difficulties about the want of suitable vessels; – another commissioner from South Carolina arrived, causing further delay. When that had passed away, Secretaries Holt & Toucy, Capt. Ward of the Navy and myself, with the knowledge of President Buchanan, settled upon the employment, under the Captain (who was eager for the expedition) of four or more small steamers belonging to the Coast Survey.- At that time, I have no doubt Captain Ward would have suceeded with all his vessels. But he was kept back by something like a truce established between the late President and a number of principal seceders, here, in the Senate, & from South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana &c., and this truce continued to the termination of that administration. That plan and all others like it, are now pronounced, from the change of circumstances, impracticable, by Major Anderson Captain Foster and all the other officers of the Fort, as well as by Brig. General Totten, Chief of the Corps of Engineers: and, in this opinion, I fully concur. The three or four steamers would have been obliged to attempt to make their way past the hostile batteries in an obstructed channel. Possibly one of them might have reached the fort, with (being small) a few days subsistence, but would, certainly probably, have been destroyed on arriving at the entrance (by the concentrated fire of three or four powerful batteries), before landing a man or a ration. In this opinion Captain Ward finally concurred.

“3d.” If I could not supply or reinforce Fort Sumter, within the time specified, with all the means in my control, then what amount of means and of what description, in addition to that already at my control, would enable me to supply and reinforce the fortress within that time.”

Answer. I should need a fleet of war vessels and transports which, in the scattered disposition of the Navy (as understood) could not be collected in less than four months; – 5,000 additional regular troops, and 20,000 volunteers – that is, a force sufficient to take all the batteries both in the harbour (including Ft. Moultrie) as well as in the approach or outer bay. To raise, organize and discipline such an army (not to speak of necessary legislation by Congress, not now in session) would require from six to eight months. As a practical military question, the time for succoring Fort Sumter, with any means at hand, had passed away nearly a month ago. Since then a surrender under assault, or from starvation, has been merely a question of time.

It is, therefore, my opinion and advice that Major Anderson be instructed to evacuate the Fort – so long gallantly held by him and his companions – immediately on procuring suitable water transportation, and that he embark, with his command, for New York.

I have the honor to return, herewith, the reports and communications of Major Anderson and his officers, submitted to me by the President. These papers of themselves demonstrate how the Fort has become untenable during the delays I have described above.

Respectfully Submitted.

Winfield Scott.

Head Qrs. of the Army

Washington, March 12, 1861.

SOURCE: Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Simon Cameron to Abraham Lincoln, March 16, 1861

War Department

March 16th 1861

Sir,

In reply to the letter of inquiry, addressed to me by the President, whether “assuming it to be possible now to provision Fort Sumter, under all the circumstances, it is wise to attempt it,” I beg leave to say, that it has received the careful consideration, in the limited time I could bestow upon it, which its very grave importance demands, and that my mind has been, most reluctantly, forced to the conclusion that it would be unwise now to make such an attempt.

In coming to this conclusion, I am free to say, I am greatly influenced by the opinions of the Army officers who have expressed themselves on the subject, and who seem to concur that it is, perhaps, now impossible to succor that fort, substantially, if at all, without capturing, by means of a large expedition of ships of war and troops, all the opposing batteries of South Carolina. All the officers within Fort Sumter, together with Generals Scott and Totten, express this opinion, and it would seem to me that the President would not be justified to disregard such high authority without over-ruling considerations of public policy.

Major Anderson, in his report of the 28 ultimo, says, “I confess that I would not be willing to risk my reputation on an attempt to throw reinforcements into this harbor, within the time for our relief rendered necessary by the limited supply of our provisions, and with a view of holding possession of the same, with a force of less than twenty thousand good and well disciplined men.”

In this opinion, Major Anderson is, substantially, sustained by the reports of all the other officers within the fort, one of whom, Capt. Seymour, speaks thus emphatically on the subject: “It is not more than possible to supply this fort by ruse, with a few men or a small amount of provisions. Such is the unceasing vigilance employed to prevent it. To do so, openly, by vessels alone, unless they are shot proof, is, virtually impossible, so numerous and powerful are the opposing batteries. No vessel can lay near the fort without being exposed to continual fire, and the harbor could, and probably would, whenever necessary, be effectually closed, as one channel has already been. A projected attack, in large force, would draw to this harbor all the available resources, in men and materiel, of the contiguous States. Batteries of guns of heavy calibre, would be multiplied rapidly and indefinitely; at least 20,000 men, good marksmen and trained for months past with a view to the this very contingency, would be concentrated here before the attacking force could leave Northern ports. The harbor would be closed; a landing must be effected at some distance from our guns, which could give no aid. Charleston harbor would be a Sebastopol in such a conflict, and unlimited means would probably be required to ensure success, before which time the garrison of Fort Sumter would be starved out.”

General Scott, in his reply to the question, addressed to him by the President, on the 12th instant, what amount of means and of what description, in addition to those already at command, it would require to supply and reinforce the fort, says, “I should need a fleet of war vessels and transports, which, in the scattered disposition of the Navy (as understood) could not be collected in less than four months; 5000 additional regular troops, and 20.000 volunteers – that is, a force sufficient to take all the batteries, both in the harbor (including Fort Moultrie) as well as in the approach or outer bay. To raise, organize and discipline such an army (not to speak of necessary legislation by Congress not now in session) would require from six to eight months. As a practical military question, the time for succoring Fort Sumter, with any means at hand had passed away nearly a month ago. Since then, a surrender under assault, or from starvation, has been merely a question of time.”

It is true, there are those whose opinions are entitled to respectful consideration, who entertain the belief that Fort Sumter could yet be succored to a limited extent, without the employment of the large army and naval forces believed to be necessary by the Army officers whose opinions I have already quoted. Captain Ward, of the Navy, an officer of acknowledged merit, a month ago, believed it to be practicable to supply the fort with men and provisions to a limited extent, without the employment of any very large military or naval force. He then proposed to employ four or more small steamers belonging to the coast survey to accomplish the purpose, and we have the opinion of General Scott that he has no doubt that Captain Ward, at that time, would have succeeded with his proposed expedition, but was not allowd by the late President to attempt the execution of his plan. Now it is pronounced, from the change of circumstances, impracticable, by Major Anderson, and all the other officers of the Fort, as well as by Generals Scott and Totten, and in this opinion Captain Ward, after full consultation with the latter named officers and the Superintendent of the Coast Survey, I understand now reluctantly concurs.

Mr. Fox, another gentleman of experience as a seaman, who, having formerly been engaged on the Coast Survey, is familiar with the waters of the Charleston harbor, has proposed to make the attempt to supply the Fort with by the aid of cutters of light draught and large dimensions, and his proposal has, in a measure, been approved by Commodore Stringham; but he does not suppose, or propose, or profess to believe that provisions for more than one or two months could be furnished at a time.

There is no doubt whatever in my mind, that when Major Anderson first took possession of Fort Sumter he could have been easily supplied with men and provisions, and that when Captain Ward, with the concurrence of General Scott, a month ago, proposed his expedition, he would have succeeded, had he been allowed to attempt it, as, I think, he should have been. A different state of things, however, now exists. Fort Moultrie is now re-armed and strengthened in every way; many new land batteries have been constructed; the principal channel has been obstructed; in short, the difficulty of re-inforcing the Fort has been increased ten, if not twenty fold. Whatever might have been done as late as a month ago, it is too sadly evident that it cannot now be done without the sacrifice of life and treasure not at all commensurate with the object to be attained, and as the abandonment of the Fort in a few weeks, sooner or later, appears to be an inevitable necessity, it seems to me that the sooner it be done, the better.

The proposition presented by Mr. Fox, so sincerely entertained and ably advocated, would be entitled to my favorable consideration, if, with all the lights before me, and in the face of so many distinguished military authorities on the other side, I did not believe that the attempt to carry it into effect would initiate a bloody and protracted conflict. Should he succeed in relieving Fort Sumter, which is doubted by many of our most experienced soldiers and seamen, would that enable us to maintain our authority against the troops and fortifications of South Carolina? Sumter could not now contend against these formidable adversaries, if filled with provisions and men. That fortress was intended, as her position on the map will show, rather to repel an invading foe. It is equally clear, from repeated investigations and trials, that the range of her guns is too limited to reach the city of Charleston, if that were desirable. No practical benefit will result to the Country or the Government by accepting the proposal alluded to, and I am, therefore, of opinion that the cause of humanity and the highest obligations to the public interest would be best promoted by adopting the counsels of those brave and experienced men whose suggestions I have laid before you.

I have, sir, the honor to be, very respectfully,

Your Obt. Servt.

Simon Cameron

SOURCE: Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: November 4, 1862

An expose of funds in the hands of disbursing agents shows there are nearly seventy millions of dollars not accounted for!

The members of the legislature are fearful of an attack on the Southern Railroad, and asks that Gen. Mahone be sent to Petersburg.

The government is impressing flour at $12 per barrel, when it is selling at $24; and as the railroads are not allowed to transport any for private use, it may be hoped we shall have our bread cheaper some of these days. But will the government make itself popular with the people?

The Examiner says a clerk in the War Department is making money in the substitute business. If this be true, it is rank corruption! But, then, what is the cotton business?

The Chief of Ordnance Bureau, Col. J. Gorgas (Northern by birth), recommends the Secretary of War to remove the lighter guns, some sixty in number, from the lower tiers of Forts Sumter, Moultrie, and Morgan, for the defense of the rivers likely to be ascended by the enemy's gun-boats.

I saw, to-day, the President's order to revoke the authority heretofore given Gov. Baylor to raise a brigade, and in regard to his conduct as governor (ordering the massacre of the Indians after collecting them under pretense of forming a treaty of peace). The President suggests that nothing be done until the Governor be heard in his own defense. It was diabolical! If it had been consummated, it would have affixed the stigma of infamy to the government in all future time, and might have doomed us to merited subjugation.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 182-3

Captain John G. Foster to Brevet Brigadier-General Joseph G. Totten, March 31, 1861

Fort Sumter, S. C, March 31, 1861.

General Jos. G. Totten,

Chief Engineer United States Army, Washington, D. C.:

General: Yesterday the members of the State Convention visited the batteries on Morris Island and Fort Moultrie, and from both places extensive firing took place in honor of the event. This gave me an opportunity of observing what batteries have been increased in strength since my last report on this subject.

The following is the present armament, very nearly, viz.:

Battery No. 1. — Four guns. Embrasures closed by sandbags. Not fired yesterday.

Mortar battery between Nos. 1 and 2. — Three mortars. Fired yesterday. These have practiced much lately, to obtain the range and length of fuse for this fort.

Battery No. 2, iron-clad. — Three heavy guns. Two of them fired yesterday.

Battery No. 3. — Three guns. Embrasures closed with sandbags. Did not fire.

Mortar battery between Nos. 3 and 4. — Two mortars. Fired yesterday.

Battery No. 4. — Three guns. Two fired.

Battery No. 5. — Four heavy guns, one Columbiad or 8-inch seacoast howitzer. Two fired yesterday. I think there are six guns in this battery, although only four have been seen to fire.

Star of the West battery. — Four heavy guns, one of them an 8-inch Columbiad or 8-inch seacoast howitzer. All fired yesterday.

Battery No. 7. — These guns are not all in the same battery, but are distributed along the beach apparently in three batteries. Eleven guns fired yesterday. All were very heavy guns except two, which I think were field-pieces in a sort of second tier.

Above these batteries, on the sand-hills, is a line of intrenchments surrounding a house, and also several tents. The fieldpieces are apparently capable of being used to defend the flanks of this intrenchment, and to fire on the channel. Their rear is covered, each with a traverse.

It was evident in this firing that not all the guns in position were fired.

At Fort Moultrie the firing exhibited the same complete armament as last reported.

The provisions that I laid in for my force having become exhausted, and the supplies of the command being too limited to spare me any more, I am obliged to discharge nearly all my men to-day. I retain only enough to man a boat.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. G. Foster,

Captain Engineers.

SOURCE: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 302-4

John B. Floyd to Major Robert Anderson, December 21, 1860

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, December 21, 1860.

Major ANDERSON,

First Artillery, Commanding Fort Moultrie, S.C.:

SIR: In the verbal instructions communicated to you by Major Buell,^† you are directed to hold possession of the forts in the harbor of Charleston, and, if attacked, to defend yourself to the last extremity. Under these instructions, you might infer that you are required to make a vain and useless sacrifice of your own life and the lives of the men under your command, upon a mere point of honor. This is far from the President's intentions. You are to exercise a sound military discretion on this subject.

It is neither expected nor desired that you should expose your own life or that of your men in a hopeless conflict in defense of these forts. If they are invested or attacked by a force so superior that resistance would, in your judgment, be a useless waste of life, it will be your duty to yield to necessity, and make the best terms in your power.

This will be the conduct of an honorable, brave, and humane officer, and you will be fully justified in such action. These orders are strictly confidential, and not to be communicated even to the officers under your command, without close necessity.^‡

Very respectfully,

 JOHN B. FLOYD.

_______________

^† See Buell’s Memorandum, December 11, 1860, p. 89

^‡ This letter delivered to Major Anderson December 23, by Capt. John Withers, A. A. G.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 182-3.

Joseph Holt to Major Robert Anderson, February 23, 1861

WAR DEPARTMENT, February 23, 1861.

 Maj. ROBERT ANDERSON,

First Artillery, Commanding Fort Sumter, Charleston Harbor, S.C.:

SIR: It is proper I should state distinctly that you hold Fort Sumter as you held Fort Moultrie, under the verbal orders communicated by Major Buell,* subsequently modified by instructions addressed to you from this Department, under date of the 21st of December, 1860.

In your letter to Adjutant-General Cooper, of the 16th instant, you say:

I should like to be instructed on a question which may present itself in reference to the floating battery, viz: What course would it be proper for me to take if, without a declaration of war or a notification of hostilities, I should see them approaching  my fort with that battery? They may attempt placing it within good distance before a declaration of hostile intention.

It is not easy to answer satisfactorily this important question at this distance from the scene of action. In my letter to you of the 10th of January I said:

You will continue, as heretofore, to act strictly on the defensive, and to avoid, by all means compatible with the safety of your command, a collision with the hostile forces by which you are surrounded.

The policy thus indicated must still govern your conduct.

The President is not disposed at the present moment to change the instructions under which you have been heretofore acting, or to occupy any other than a defensive position. If, however, you are convinced by sufficient evidence that the raft of which you speak is advancing for the purpose of making an assault upon the fort, then you would be justified on the principle of self-defense in not awaiting its actual arrival there, but in repelling force by force on its approach. If, on the other hand, you have reason to believe that it is approaching merely to take up a position at a good distance should the pending question be not amicably settled, then, unless your safety is so clearly endangered as to render resistance an act of necessary self-defense and protection, you will act with that forbearance which has distinguished you heretofore in permitting the South Carolinians to strengthen Fort Moultrie and erect new batteries for the defense of the harbor. This will be but a redemption of the implied pledge contained in my letter on behalf of the President to Colonel Hayne, in which, when speaking of Fort Sumter, it is said:

The attitude of that garrison, as has been often declared, is neither menacing, nor defiant, nor unfriendly. It is acting under orders to stand strictly on the defensive, and the government and people of South Carolina must know that they can never  receive aught but shelter from its guns, unless, in the absence of all provocation, they should assault it and seek its destruction.

A dispatch received in this city a few days since from Governor Pickens, connected with the declaration on the part of those convened at Montgomery, claiming to act on behalf of South Carolina as well as the other seceded States, that the question of the possession of the forts and other public property therein had been taken from the decision of the individual States and would probably be preceded in its settlement by negotiation with the Government of the United States, has impressed the President with a belief that there will be no immediate attack on Fort Sumter, and the hope is indulged that wise and patriotic counsels may prevail and prevent it altogether.

The labors of the Peace Congress have not yet closed, and the presence of that body here adds another to the powerful motives already existing for the adoption of every measure, except in necessary self-defense, for avoiding a collision with the forces that surround you.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. HOLT.

_______________

* See Major Buell’s memorandum, December 11, 1860, p. 89

SOURCES: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 293-4; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 182-3.

Major Robert Anderson to Colonel Samuel Cooper, March 9, 1861

fort Sumter, March 9, 1861.

(Received A. G. O., March 12.)

Colonel S. Cooper,

Adjutant-General. United States Army.

Colonel: I have the honor to report that we can see the South Carolinians engaged this morning strengthening and extending considerably what we supposed to have been intended for a mortar battery at Fort Johnson. Small parties are also working at Nos. 9 and 10, and a very heavy force at the bend of the island, this side of No. 1. Whether they are constructing another battery there or strengthening one that is already there I cannot tell. One of my officers reports that he has counted nine 24-pounders which have been landed at Cummings Point within a week. Yesterday he saw several shot or shells which appeared to be about eight inches in diameter. They are certainly busy strengthening the batteries already constructed, and probably adding others. It appears to me that vessels will, even now, from the time they cross the bar, be under fire from the batteries on Morris Island until they get under the walls of this work. I do not speak of the batteries which have been constructed on Sullivan's Island, as I am not certain of their positions. Fort Moultrie will, of course, be a very formidable enemy.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Robert Anderson,

Major First Artillery, Commanding.

colonel S. Cooper, Adjutant-General United States Army.

SOURCES: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 281; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 192.

Captain John G. Foster to Brevet Brigadier-General Joseph G. Totten, March 6, 1861

Fort Sumter, S. C,

March 6, 1861.

General: I have the honor to report that during the day, and especially towards night, unusual activity was observed among the South Carolinians around us; several steamer loads of men were landed on Cummings Point. The number was greater than the arrangements for shelter, apparently, for I observe quite a large number grouped about their bivouac fires this morning. Their suffering must have been considerable during the night, for the weather suddenly changed from the warm temperature of the preceding days to a high degree of cold, for this climate, the wind blowing fresh from the north.

I learn that portable hot shot furnaces have been furnished to several, and probably all, of the batteries. The mortar battery on James Island, south of Fort Johnson, is armed, but the number of mortars is not ascertained. The magazine in the flank of this battery is also finished. The mortar battery on Sullivan's Island, west of Fort Moultrie, is also armed. All the batteries on Morris Island are armed. The guns range from 32pounders down, with the exception of the iron bomb-proof, which is (I think, from all reports and observations) armed with 8-inch Columbiads — three of them.

The raft does not meet expectations. It is being covered with railroad strap iron instead of the T rail. This has a crosssection of about three-fourths or one inch by two inches or two and a half inches.

They are now ironing the top portion, the front not being yet commenced. Two 8-inch Columbiads are lying on the wharf ready to be put on board. I do not think this floating battery will prove very formidable.

We have not yet received the inaugural address of President Lincoln, although it is reported from town that it is coercive in its character, and that much excitement prevails.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. G. Foster,

Captain Engineers.

General Jos. G. Totten,

Chief Engineer U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

SOURCE: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 280-1

Diary of William Howard Russell: April 22, 1861

To-day was fixed for the visit to Mr. Pringle's plantation, which lies above Georgetown near the Pedee River. Our party, which consisted of Mr. Mitchell, an eminent lawyer of Charleston, Colonel Reed, a neighboring planter, Mr. Ward, of New York, our host, and myself, were on board the Georgetown steamer at seven o'clock, A. M., and started with a quantity of commissariat stores, ammunition, and the like, for the use of the troops quartered along the coast. There was, of course, a large supply of newspapers also. At that early hour invitations to the “bar” were not uncommon, where the news was discussed by long-legged, grave, sallow men. There was a good deal of joking about “old Abe Lincoln's paper blockade,” and the report that the Government had ordered their cruisers to treat the crews of Confederate privateers as “pirates” provoked derisive and menacing comments. The full impulses of national life are breathing through the whole of this people. There is their flag flying over Sumter, and the Confederate banner is waving on all the sand-forts and headlands which guard the approaches to Charleston.

A civil war and persecution have already commenced. “Suspected Abolitionists” are ill-treated in the South, and “Suspected Secessionists” are mobbed and beaten in the North. The news of the attack on the 6th Massachusetts, and the Pennsylvania regiment, by the mob in Baltimore, has been received with great delight; but some long-headed people see that it will only expose Baltimore and Maryland to the full force of the Northern States. The riot took place on the anniversary of Lexington.

The “Nina” was soon in open sea, steering northwards and keeping four miles from shore in order to clear the shoals and banks which fringe the low sandy coasts, and effectually prevent even light gunboats covering a descent by their ordnance. This was one of the reasons why the Federal fleet did not make any attempt to relieve Fort Sumter during the engagement. On our way out we could see the holes made in the large hotel and other buildings on Sullivan's Island behind Fort Moultrie, by the shot from the fort, which caused terror among the negroes “miles away.” There was no sign of any blockading vessel, but look-out parties were posted along the beach, and as the skipper said we might have to make our return-journey by land, every sail on the horizon was anxiously scanned through our glasses.

Having passed the broad mouth of the Santee, the steamer in three hours and a half ran up an estuary, into which the Maccamaw River and the Pedee River pour their united waters.

Our vessel proceeded along-shore to a small jetty, at the end of which was a group of armed men, some of them being part of a military post, to defend the coast and river, established under cover of an earthwork and palisades constructed with trunks of trees, and mounting three 32-pounders. Several posts of a similar character lay on the river banks, and from some of these we were boarded by men in boats hungry for news and newspapers. Most of the men at the pier were cavalry troopers, belonging to a volunteer association of the gentry for coast defence, and they had been out night and day patrolling the shores, and doing the work of common soldiers — very precious material for such work. They wore gray tunics, slashed and faced with yellow, buff belts, slouched felt hats, ornamented with drooping cocks' plumes, and long jackboots, which well became their fine persons and bold bearing, and were evidently due to “Cavalier” associations. They were all equals. Our friends on board the boat hailed them by their Christian names, gave and heard the news. Among the cases landed at the pier were certain of champagne and pâtés, on which Captain Blank was wont to regale his company daily at his own expense, or that of his cotton broker. Their horses picketed in the shade of trees close to the beach, the parties of women riding up and down the sands, or driving in light tax-carts, suggested images of a large picnic, and a state of society quite indifferent to Uncle Abe's cruisers and “Hessians.” After a short delay here, the steamer proceeded on her way to Georgetown, an ancient and once important settlement and port, which was marked in the distance by the little forest of masts rising above the level land, and the tops of the trees beyond, and by a solitary church-spire.

As the "Nina" approaches the tumble-down wharf of the old town, two or three citizens advance from the shade of shaky sheds to welcome us, and a few country vehicles and light phaetons are drawn forth from the same shelter to receive the passengers, while the negro boys and girls who have been playing upon the bales of cotton and barrels of rice, which represent the trade of the place on the wharf, take up commanding positions for the better observation of our proceedings.

There is about Georgetown an air of quaint simplicity and old-fashioned quiet, which contrasts refreshingly with the bustle and tumult of American cities. While waiting for our vehicle we enjoyed the hospitality of Colonel Reed, who took us into an old-fashioned, angular, wooden mansion, more than a century old, still sound in every timber, and testifying, in its quaint wainscotings, and the rigid framework of door and window, to the durability of its cypress timbers and the preservative character of the atmosphere. In early days it was the grand house of the old settlement, and the residence of the founder of the female branch of the family of our host, who now only makes it his halting-place when passing to and fro between Charleston and his plantation, leaving it the year round in charge of an old servant and her grandchild. Rose-trees and flowering shrubs clustered before the porch and filled the garden in front, and the establishment gave one a good idea of a London merchant's retreat about Chelsea a hundred and fifty years ago.

At length we were ready for our journey, and, in two light covered gigs, proceeded along the sandy track which, after a while, led us to a road cut deep in the bosom of the woods, where silence was only broken by the cry of a woodpecker, the scream of a crane, or the sharp challenge of the jay. For miles we passed through the shades of this forest, meeting only two or three vehicles containing female planterdom on little excursions of pleasure or business, who smiled their welcome as we passed. Arrived at a deep chocolate-colored stream, called Black River, full of fish and alligators, we find a flat large enough to accommodate vehicles and passengers, and propelled by two negroes pulling upon a stretched rope, in the manner usual in the ferry-boats in Switzerland.

Another drive through a more open country, and we reach a fine grove of pine and live-oak, which melts away into a shrubbery guarded by a rustic gateway: passing through this, we are brought by a sudden turn to the planter's house, buried in trees, which dispute with the green sward and with wild flower-beds the space between the hall-door and the waters of the Pedee; and in a few minutes, as we gaze over the expanse of fields marked by the deep water-cuts, and bounded by a fringe of unceasing forest, just tinged with green by the first life of the early rice-crops, the chimneys of the steamer we had left at Georgetown, gliding as it were through the fields, indicate the existence of another navigable river still beyond.

Leaving the veranda which commanded this agreeable foreground, we enter the mansion, and are reminded by its low-browed, old-fashioned rooms, of the country houses yet to be found in parts of Ireland or on the Scottish border, with additions, made by the luxury and love of foreign travel, of more than one generation of educated Southern planters. Paintings from Italy illustrate the walls, in juxtaposition with interesting portraits of early colonial governors and their lovely womankind, limned with no uncertain hand, and full of the vigor of touch and naturalness of drapery, of which Copley has left us too few exemplars; and one portrait of Benjamin West claims for itself such honor as his own pencil can give. An excellent library — filled with collections of French and English classics, and with those ponderous editions of Voltaire, Rousseau, the “Mémoires pour Servir,” books of travel and history which delighted our forefathers in the last century, and many works of American and general history — affords ample occupation for a rainy day.

It was five o'clock before we reached our planter's house — White House Plantation. My small luggage was carried into my room by an old negro in livery, who took great pains to assure me of my perfect welcome, and who turned out to be a most excellent valet. A low room hung with colored mezzotints, windows covered with creepers, and an old-fashioned bedstead and quaint chairs, lodged me sumptuously; and after such toilet as was considered necessary by our host for a bachelor's party, we sat down to an excellent dinner, cooked by negroes and served by negroes, and aided by claret mellowed in Carolinian suns, and by Madeira brought down stairs cautiously, as in the days of Horace and Maecenas, from the cellar between the attic and the thatched roof.

Our party was increased by a neighboring planter, and after dinner the conversation returned to the old channel — all the frogs praying for a king — anyhow a prince — to rule over them. Our good host is anxious to get away to Europe, where his wife and children are, and all he fears is being mobbed at New York, where Southerners are exposed to insult, though they may get off better in that respect than Black Republicans would down South. Some of our guests talked of the duello, and of famous hands with the pistol in these parts. The conversation had altogether very much the tone which would have probably characterized the talk of a group of Tory Irish gentlemen over their wine some sixty years ago, and very pleasant it was. Not a man — no, not one — will ever join the Union again! “Thank God!” they say, “we are freed from that tyranny at last.” And yet Mr. Seward calls it the most beneficent government in the world, which never hurt a human being yet!

But alas! all the good things which the house affords, can be enjoyed but for a brief season. Just as nature has expanded every charm, developed every grace, and clothed the scene with all the beauty of opened flower, of ripening grain, and of mature vegetation, on the wings of the wind the poisoned breath comes borne to the home of the white man, and he must fly before it or perish. The books lie unopened on the shelves, the flower blooms and dies unheeded, and, pity ’tis, ’tis true, the old Madeira garnered ’neath the roof, settles down for a fresh lease of life, and sets about its solitary task of acquiring a finer flavor for the infrequent lips of its banished master and his welcome visitors. This is the story, at least, that we hear on all sides, and such is the tale repeated to us beneath the porch, when the moon while softening enhances the loveliness of the scene, and the rich melody of mockingbirds fills the grove.

Within these hospitable doors Horace might banquet better than he did with Nasidienus, and drink such wine as can be only found among the descendants of the ancestry who, improvident enough in all else, learnt the wisdom of bottling up choice old Bual and Sercial, ere the demon of oidium had dried up their generous sources forever. To these must be added excellent bread, ingenious varieties of the galette, compounded now of rice and now of Indian meal, delicious butter and fruits, all good of their kind. And is there anything better rising up from the bottom of the social bowl? My black friends who attend on me are grave as Mussulman Khitmutgars. They are attired in liveries and wear white cravats and Berlin gloves. At night when we retire, off they go to their outer darkness in the small settlement of negro-hood, which is separated from our house by a wooden palisade. Their fidelity is undoubted. The house breathes an air of security. The doors and windows are unlocked. There is but one gun, a fowling-piece, on the premises. No planter hereabouts has any dread of his slaves. But I have seen, within the short time I have been in this part of the world, several dreadful accounts of murder and violence, in which masters suffered at the hands of their slaves. There is something suspicious in the constant never-ending statement that “we are not afraid of our slaves.” The curfew and the night patrol in the streets, the prisons and watch-houses, and the police regulations, prove that strict supervision, at all events, is needed and necessary. My host is a kind man and a good master. If slaves are happy anywhere, they should be so with him.

These people are fed by their master. They have half a pound per diem of fat pork, and corn in abundance. They rear poultry and sell their chickens and eggs to the house. They are clothed by their master. He keeps them in sickness as in health. Now and then there are gifts of tobacco and molasses for the deserving. There was little labor going on in the fields, for the rice has been just exerting itself to get its head above water. These fields yield plentifully; the waters of the river are fat, and they are let in whenever the planter requires it by means of floodgates and small canals, through which the flats can carry their loads of grain to the river for loading the steamers.

SOURCE: William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South, p. 127-32

Jeremiah S. Black to Brevet Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott, January 16, 1861

department Of State, January 16, 1861.

lieutenant-general Winfield Scott:

Dear General: The habitual frankness of your character, the deep interest you take in everything that concerns the public defense, your expressed desire that I should hear and understand your views — these reasons, together with an earnest wish to know my own duty and to do it, induce me to beg you for a little light, which perhaps you alone can shed, upon the present state of our affairs.

1. Is it the duty of the Government tore-enforce Major Anderson?

2. If yes, how soon is it necessary that those re-enforcements should be there?

3. What obstacles exist to prevent the sending of such re-enforcements at any time when it may be necessary to do so?

I trust you will not regard it as presumption in me if I give you the crude notions which I myself have already formed out of very imperfect materials.

A statement of my errors, if errors they be, will enable you to correct them the more easily.

I. It seems now to be settled that Major Anderson and his command at Fort Sumter are not to be withdrawn. The United States Government is not to surrender its last hold upon its own property in South Carolina. Major Anderson has a position so nearly impregnable that an attack upon him at present is wholly improbable, and he is supplied with provisions which will last him very well for two months. In the meantime Fort Sumter is invested on every side by the avowedly hostile forces of South Carolina. It is in a state of seige. They have already prevented communication between its commander and his own Government, both by sea and land. There is no doubt that they intend to continue this state of things, as far as it is in their power to do so. In the course of a few weeks from this time it will become very difficult for him to hold out. The constant labor and anxiety of his men will exhaust their physical power, and this exhaustion, of course, will proceed very much more rapidly as soon as they begin to get short of provision.

If the troops remain in Fort Sumter without any change in their condition, and the hostile attitude of South Carolina remains as it is now, the question of Major Anderson's surrender is one of time only. If he is not to be relieved, is it not entirely clear that he should be ordered to surrender at once? It having been determined that the latter order shall not be given, it follows that relief must be sent him at some time before it is too late to save him.

II. This brings me to the second question: When should the re-enforcements and provisions be sent? Can we justify ourselves in delaying the performance of that duty?

The authorities of South Carolina are improving every moment, and increasing their ability to prevent re-enforcement every hour, while every day that rises sees us with a power diminished to send in the requisite relief. I think it certain that Major Anderson could be put in possession of all the defensive powers he needs with very little risk to this Government, if the efforts were made immediately; but it is impossible to predict how much blood or money it may cost if it be postponed for two or three months.

The fact that other persons are to have charge of the Government before the worst comes to the worst has no influence upon my mind, and, I take it for granted, will not be regarded as a just element in making up your opinion.

The anxiety which an American citizen must feel about any future event which may affect the existence of the country, is not less if he expects it to occur on the 5th of March than it would be if he knew it was going to happen on the 3d.

III. I am persuaded that the difficulty of relieving Major Anderson has been very much magnified to the minds of some persons. From you I shall be able to ascertain whether I am mistaken or they. I am thoroughly satisfied that the battery on Morris Island can give no serious trouble. A vessel going in where the Star of the West went will not be within the reach of the battery's guns longer than from six to ten minutes. The number of shots that could be fired upon her in that time may be easily calculated, and I think the chances of her being seriously injured can be demonstrated, by simple arithmetic, to be very small. A very unlucky shot might cripple her, to be sure, and therefore the risk is something. But then it is a maxim, not less in war than in peace, that where nothing is ventured nothing can be gained. The removal of the buoys has undoubtedly made the navigation of the channel more difficult. But there are pilots outside of Charleston, and many of the officers of the Navy, who could steer a ship into the harbor by the natural landmarks with perfect safety. This, be it remembered, is not now a subject of speculation; the actual experiment has been tried. The Star of the West did pass the battery, and did overcome the difficulties of the navigation, meeting with no serious trouble from either cause. They have tried it; we can say probatum est; and there is an end to the controversy.

I am convinced that a pirate, or a slaver, or a smuggler, who could be assured of making five hundred dollars by going into the harbor in the face of all the dangers which now threaten a vessel bearing the American flag, would laugh them to scorn, and to one of our naval officers who has the average of daring, “the danger's self were lure alone!”

There really seems to me nothing in the way that ought to stop us except the guns of Fort Moultrie. If they are suffered to open a fire upon a vessel bearing re-enforcements to Fort Sumter, they might stop any other vessel as they stopped the Star of the West. But is it necessary that this intolerable outrage should be submitted to? Would it not be an act of pure self-defense on the part of Major Anderson to silence Fort Moultrie, if it be necessary to do so, for the purpose of insuring the safety of a vessel whose arrival at Fort Sumter is necessary for his protection, and could he not do it effectually? Would the South Carolinians dare to fire upon any vessel which Major Anderson would tell them beforehand must be permitted to pass, on pain of his guns being opened upon her assailants? But suppose it impossible for an unarmed vessel to pass the battery, what is the difficulty of sending the Brooklyn or the Macedonian in? I have never heard it alleged that the latter could not cross the bar, and I think if the fact had been so it would have been mentioned in my hearing before this time. It will turn out upon investigation, after all that has been said and sung about the Brooklyn, that there is water enough there for her. She draws ordinarily only sixteen and one-half feet, and her draught can be reduced eighteen inches by putting her upon an even keel. The shallowest place will give her eighteen feet of water at high tide. In point of fact, she has crossed that bar more than once. But apart even from these resources, the Government has at its command three or four smaller steamers of light draught and great speed, which could be armed and at sea in a few days, and would not be in the least troubled by any opposition that could be made to their entrance.

It is not, however, necessary to go into the details, with which, I presume, you are fully acquainted. I admit that the state of things may be somewhat worse now than they were a week ago, and are probably getting worse every day; but is not that the strongest reason that can be given for taking time by the forelock?

I feel confident that you will excuse me for making this communication. I have some responsibilities of my own to meet, and I can discharge them only when I understand the subject to which they relate. Your opinion, of course, will be conclusive upon me, for on such a matter I cannot do otherwise than defer to your better judgment. If you think it most consistent with your duty to be silent, I shall have no right to complain.

If you would rather answer orally than make a written reply, I will meet you either at your own quarters or here in the State Department, as may best suit your convenience.

I am, most respectfully, yours, &c.,

J. S. Black.

SOURCE: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 237-9

Isaac W. Hayne to James Buchanan, February 7, 1861

Washington, February 7, 1861.

To His Excellency James Buchanan, President.

Sir: Your reply through your Secretary of the War Department to my communication of the 31st of January, covering the demand of the Governor of South Carolina for the delivery of Fort Sumter, was received yesterday. Although the very distinct and emphatic refusal of that demand closes my mission, I feel constrained to correct some strange misapprehensions into which your Secretary has fallen.

There has been no modification of the demand authorized to be made, and no change whatever in its character, and of this you were distinctly informed in my communication of the 31st of January. You have the original demand as delivered to me by Governor Pickens on the 12th of January, and you have an extract from the further instructions received by me, expressly stating that he, the Governor, was confirmed in the views he entertained on the 12th of January, by that very correspondence which you assign as the cause of the alleged modification. You assume that the character of the demand has been modified, yet you have from me but one communication, and that asserts the contrary, and you have nothing from the Governor but the very demand itself, which you say has been modified. What purpose of peace or conciliation your Secretary could have had in view in the introduction of this point at all, it is difficult to perceive.

You next attempt to ridicule the proposal as simply an offer on the part of South Carolina to buy Fort Sumter and contents as property of the United States, sustained by a declaration, in effect, that if she is not permitted to make the purchase, she will seize the fort by force of arms. It is difficult to consider this as other than intentional misconstruction. You were told that South Carolina, as a separate, independent sovereignty, would not tolerate the occupation, by foreign troops, of a military post within her limits, but that inasmuch as you, in repeated messages and in your correspondence, had “laid much stress” upon the character of your duties, arising from considering forts as property, South Carolina, so far as this matter of property suggested by yourself was concerned, would make compensation for all injury done the property, in the exercise of her sovereign right of eminent domain. And this your Secretary calls a proposal to purchase. The idea of purchase is entirely inconsistent with the assertion of the paramout right in the purchaser. I had supposed that an “interest in property” as such, could be no other than “purely proprietary,” and if I confined myself to this narrow view of your relations to Fort Sumter, you at least should not consider it the subject of criticism. Until your letter of yesterday, you chose so to consider your relations, in everything which you have written, or which has been written under your direction.

It was precisely because you had yourself chosen to place your action upon the ground of “purely proprietary” right, that the proposal of compensation was made, and you now admit that in this view “it (Fort Sumter) would probably be subjected to the exercise of the right of eminent domain.”

In your letter of yesterday (through your Secretary) you shift your position. You claim that your Government bears to Fort Sumter “political relations of a much higher and more imposing character.”

It was no part of my mission to discuss the “political relations” of the United States Government to anything within the territorial limits of South Carolina. South Carolina claims to have severed all political connection with your Government, and to have destroyed all political relations of your Government with everything within her borders. She is unquestionably at this moment de facto a separate and independent Government, exercising complete sovereignty over every foot of her soil except Fort Sumter. Now that the intention is avowed to hold this place as a military post, with the claim of exclusive jurisdiction on the part of a Government foreign to South Carolina, it will be for the authorities to determine what is the proper course to be pursued. It is vain to ignore the fact that South Carolina is, to yours, a foreign Government, and how with this patent fact before you, you can consider the continued occupation of a fort in her harbor a pacific measure and parcel of a peaceful policy, passes certainly my comprehension.

You say that the fort was garrisoned for our protection, and is held for the same purposes for which it has been ever held since its construction. Are you not aware, that to hold, in the territory of a foreign power, a fortress against her will, avowedly for the purpose of protecting her citizens, is, perhaps, the highest insult which one Government can offer to another? But Fort Sumter was never garrisoned at all until South Carolina had dissolved her connection with your Government. This garrison entered it at night, with every circumstance of secrecy, after spiking the guns and burning the gun-carriages, and cutting down the flag-staff of an adjacent fort, which was then abandoned. South Carolina had not taken Fort Sumter into her own possession, only because of her misplaced confidence in a Government which deceived her. A fortress occupied under the circumstances above stated, is considered by you not only as no cause of irritation, but you represent it as held for our protection!

Your Excellency's Secretary has indulged in irony on a very grave subject. As to the responsibility for consequences, if indeed, it does rest on us, I can assure your Excellency we are happily unconscious of the fact.

I return to Charleston to-morrow. With considerations of high regard,

I am, very respectfully,

I. W. Hayne,

Special Envoy.

SOURCE: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 231-3