Showing posts with label Winfield Scott. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Winfield Scott. Show all posts

Friday, February 2, 2018

Edwin M. Stanton to Major-General John A. Dix, April 7, 1865 – 10 a.m.

WAR DEPARTMENT,         
Washington City, April 7, 1865 10 a.m.
Major-General Dix,
New York:

General Sheridan attacked and routed Lee's army yesterday, capturing Generals Ewell, Kershaw, Barton, Corse, and many other general officers, several thousand prisoners, and a large number of cannon, and expects to force Lee to surrender all that is left of his army. Details will be given speedily as possible, but the telegraph is working badly.

EDWIN M. STANTON,       
Secretary of War.
(Same to Lieutenant-General Scott, Governors, &c.)

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I Volume 46, Part 3 (Serial No. 97), p. 640

Monday, January 22, 2018

Senator Salmon P. Chase to Edward S. Hamlin, July 19, 1852

Washington City, July 19, 1852.

My Dear Sir, I say as usual, “ditto to Mr. Burke.” The ideas of your letter are my own. I fear more danger — much more to the cause of Freedom from Pierce's election than from Scott's. Still, if the least dependence can be placed on the professions of the Freesoil Democrats who are supporting him, even he will not be able to do much mischief should the vote for the Pittsburgh nominees prove large & their support warm. Clay writes me the cause moves steadily on in Kentucky: and I think it probable that all the boarder slave states will be represented at Pittsburg, as well as all the Free States. This will make a great impression, & if the vote shall correspond, and the Freesoil Democrats shall prove true, not much need be apprehended even from Pierce.

The present duty seems to be that of putting the Pittsburg Convention on the right ground and under the right name — then getting the right candidates and then giving the largest possible vote. My judgment is that it should assume the name of the Independent Democracy — adopt the Buffalo Platform — modified by the introduction of judicious Land Reform & European Freedom Resolutions — and nominate Hale for President & Spaulding or some other good western democrat for Vice & make the best fight possible. Much has been said to me about receiving the nomination, but my judgment is against it. Hale & Sumner urge me & our friends in the House I think agree with them — that as a Democrat I would carry the largest votes — but I think Hale is good enough Democrat — far better certainly than Cass or Buchanan or Pierce or King; and I wish to be out of the scrape for many reasons.

I hear from Cleveland that there is a good deal of feeling there against me, & I should not be surprised if there were some in Cincinnati.

You will see my letter to Butler before long. The Herald Correspondent here applied to me to allow its appearance first in that paper, which I consented to thinking it would be read by more of the class I wish to reach, than in any other paper at first. I hope you will approve of it.

I wish very much that you wd. buy the Nonpariel & put Miller there, or get somebody else to do so. I will cheerfully contribute $500.

P. S. I want to ask you two or three questions in confidence, and to beg of you perfectly frank answers.

Do you think I ought to be reelected? Do you think there is any probability of my reelection; and, in this connection, what so far as you know are the sentiments of the Democrats towards me? What do you think my course ought to be in relation to state politics?

SOURCE: Diary and correspondence of Salmon P. ChaseAnnual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 243-4

Sunday, January 21, 2018

Senator Salmon P. Chase to Edward S. Hamlin, June 28, 1852

Washington, June 28, 1852.

My Dear Sir, I received only today your letter of the 15th. I left the city on the adjournment over upon the assembling of the Whig Convention and was detained by the necessity of making some summer arrangement for my daughter who is at school in New York, and whose school has a vacation at this time. I was detained beyond my expectation and only reached the City this morning.

I agree with you in thinking that I cannot consistently sustain Pierce, King, and the Slavery Platform of Baltimore. I have declared my purpose not to do so. What is to be done beyond I am not so clear about. If we could have an Independent Democratic Rally, thoroughly democratic in name & fact, without wild extravagance and without any shrinking from a bold avowal of sound principles, I should support it cheerfully. But a mere freesoil rally will simply elect Pierce and, I fear, ensure the indefinite extension of slavery. Can we have such a rally?

We might have had, could we have prevailed on the New York Barnburners to stand firm. Indeed if they had only stood firm we should never have been placed in a situation making a rally necessary. If 1 had time I could tell you much on this subject. Now without a single New York leader remaining firm what can we do? Whom can we nominate? At present it seems to me that we must endeavor to organize without nominations—upon the Herkimer principle of refuting our support to nominations we cannot honorably support. A Democratic Association with its members pledged to carry out their democratic principles in to practical & consistent application to the slavery & other questions, & refusing their support at this election to Pierce & King, because of their own positions & the character of the platforms they are nominated upon — this seems to me the best present measure Next we should do what is possible to have a good nomination on a right platform & under the right name at Pittsburgh. If Wilmot and some good western Democrat say Spalding could be nominated for President & Vice President we could get a good vote for them of the right sort. Hale don't want the nomination. He wishes to be free to canvass New Hampshire.

My impression derived from a journey in New York is that Pierce will not carry that State. The Whigs here are confident that Scott will carry Ohio. What do you think?

I wish we could have the right kind of a Press in Ohio. But where can we get the money. I wd. give $500 — who besides?

SOURCE: Diary and correspondence of Salmon P. ChaseAnnual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 242-3

Wednesday, January 3, 2018

Senator Salmon P. Chase to Senator Charles Sumner, June 11, 1851

Cincinnati, June 11,1851.

My Dear Sumner, I had just written & mailed to you a note this morning, when I received your welcome though brief letter of the 5th.

I can easily believe that you have no personal joy in the result of the senatorial controversy in Massachusetts. You will have less when you have had more experience of the station. I was gratified by my election. It proved to some solicitous friends that I had not thrown myself away, and it disappointed the malice of some whose hostility I had not otherwise deserved, than by a steady adherence to my own convictions of right and duty. Above all I rejoiced on account of our great cause, for I nattered myself that in my new position I should be able to accomplish more for it than hitherto. In this last respect I have been disappointed. I have not seen the progress I hoped. The elements of the great combination between the “Lords of the Loom & the Lords of the Lash” are mightier than I imagined. For a year past I have often thought of resigning, and I can echo, heartily, your words “Could I, with propriety, make a vacancy I would do it.”

The seat which you have selected is that which was occupied by Greene of Rhode Island, I believe. It is a very good seat; but I wish you & Hale both were on the other side of the Chamber.
In relation to rooms I agree with you as to the most eligible plan. Mine, last winter, was a modification of it. I had two rooms and my own servant, but went out to all my meals. If the same building is to be had next winter, I think a few could unite and by having a cook occupy the basement carry out your entire idea.

As to the Presidency my idea is Scott for the Whigs — a Compromise Democrat for the Old Line — and a real democrat for the Free Democracy, & a Southern Rights man for the extremists. Concession enough by the Democrats may take the last named out of the field, but would strengthen Scott, by making it impossible for Compromise Whigs to support the Compromise Democrat. The Compromise Whigs are not strong enough to nominate a declared Compromise Whig.

Yours cordially,
[SALMON P. CHASE.]

I have yet a little thought of going with Mrs. C. to Europe this Summer. If I do which is the best route & plan.

SOURCE: Diary and correspondence of Salmon P. ChaseAnnual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 236-7

Monday, September 25, 2017

Salmon P. Chase to John Townsend Trowbridge of Somerville, Massachusetts, March 21, 1864

WASHINGTON, March 21, 1864.

. . . . IMMEDIATELY after the organization of the cabinet, the question of what should be the policy of the Government toward the seceded States, demanded the most serious attention. Anderson, with his little company of soldiers, was holding Fort Sumter, and the first question was, “Shall he be relieved?” General Scott declared that complete relief was impracticable with a less force than 20,000 men. He thought, however, that the fort might be defended for several months if reënforced and provisioned; but that reënforcements and provisioning were impracticable, as the fire of the enemy's batteries would be concentrated upon any vessel which might make the attempt, both while entering the harbor, and especially when endeavoring to land men and cargoes at the fort. The President finally determined to make the attempt to send provisions to the garrison.

Information that the attempt would be made was transmitted to the Governor of South Carolina, and its receipt was promptly followed by an order from the rebel authorities to reduce the fort. How this was accomplished is historical, and it is also historical how the country was aroused by the rebel guns which opened on the fort. The call for 75,000 men immediately followed. It soon became evident that nothing beyond the mere defense of Washington was to be accomplished by this force.

I took the liberty of urging upon General Scott to occupy Manassas and compel the rebels to evacuate Harper's Ferry and the Valley of the Shenandoah. It has since become evident that this might have been then done, and it is even probable that a vigorous use of the force then at the disposal of the Government might have driven the rebels from Richmond. The notion proposed, however, was thought to involve too much risk. The rebels were suffered for weeks to occupy Alexandria with an insignificant force, to incite insurrection in Baltimore, and to destroy the national property at Norfolk, except that which was destroyed under orders by ourselves. At last, after long delays, Baltimore was recovered, Alexandria was occupied by national troops, and the rebels were driven from Harper's Ferry. Meanwhile, it had become evident that the 75,000 men originally called for would be insufficient. To replace them I took the liberty to prepare a call for 65,000 volunteers. This proposition, after having been modified so as to include an increase of the regular army, was sanctioned by the President, who, with the consent of the Secretary of War, directed me to prepare also the necessary orders. I invited to my assistance Colonel Thomas, Major McDowell, and Captain W. B. Franklin. After a good deal of consideration the orders since known as Nos. 15 and 16 were framed; one for the enlistment of volunteers and the other for regular regiments. Major McDowell contributed the largest amount of information and suggestion, while the other two officers were by no means wanting in both. It was my part to decide between different opinions, and put the whole in form.

The object I had in view in all this was — as there was no law authorizing the raising of the force required — to prepare to make a regular system and plan in conformity with which all new enlistments should be made clear and intelligible in itself, and capable of being laid before Congress in a form which would be likely to receive its sanction. These orders were promulgated in May, 1861.

There were wide departures from this plan, however. Great irregularities prevailed. Regiments were raised under verbal authority from the President and Secretary of War, and under written memoranda of which no record was preserved. So that the orders failed to secure the objects I had in view — beyond the simple provision of force — which were, order and system, and through these efficiency and accountability.

During this time great efforts were made in Kentucky and in Missouri to precipitate those States into rebellion, and I was called on to take a very considerable part in the measures adopted to prevent their success. The President and Secretary of War, indeed, committed to me for a time the principal charge of what related to Kentucky and Tennessee, and I was very active also in promoting the measures deemed necessary for the safety of Missouri. When Rousseau, then a Union Senator in the Kentucky Legislature from Louisville, came to Washington to seek means of raising men for the defense of the Union, I took his matters in charge; obtained for him a colonel's commission and an order, which I drew up myself, authorizing him to raise twenty companies. I was also charged with the care of Nelson's work; drew most of the orders under which he acted; and provided the necessary means to meet expenses. So, also, I was called on to frame the orders under which Andrew Johnson was authorized to raise regiments in Tennessee. These duties brought me into intimate relations with those officers; particularly with the first two. They were worthy of the confidence reposed in them by the President. I doubt if more valuable work has been done with so much activity, economy and practical benefit in raising men, by almost any others. Nelson's movement into the interior of Kentucky and the establishment of the Camp Dick Robinson, was especially most opportune. I think that this movement saved Kentucky from secession. I am quite sure that, without the organization of Nelson and Rousseau, the State would not have been saved from that calamity.

While he was Secretary of War, General Cameron conferred much with me. I never undertook to do any thing in his department, except when asked to give my help, and then I gave it willingly. In addition to Western Border-State matters, the principal subjects of conference between General Cameron and myself were slavery and the employment of colored troops. We agreed very early that the necessity of arming them was inevitable; but we were alone in that opinion. At least no other member of the Administration gave open support, while the President and Mr. Blair, as least, were decidedly averse to it. The question of the employment of the colored people who sought refuge within our lines soon became one of practical importance. General Butler wrote from Fortress Monroe in May, 1861, asking what disposition should be made of such persons. The Secretary of War conferred with me, and I submitted my suggestions to him in the form of a letter, which he adopted with some slight modification. General Butler wrote again in July, and being again consulted, I again submitted suggestions which were adopted. In the first of these letters, General Butler was directed to refrain from surrendering alleged fugitives from service to alleged masters. In the second he was directed to employ them under such organizations and in such occupations as circumstances might suggest or require.

It will be observed by the reader of those letters that at the time they were written it was expected the rebellion would be suppressed without any radical interference with the domestic institutions or internal affairs of any State, and that the directions to General Butler contemplated only such measures as seemed then necessary to suppression. Hc was not to interfere with laborers whether slaves or free, in houses or on farms. He was to receive only such as came to him, and, regarding all laws for reclamation as temporarily suspended, was to employ them in the service of the United States, keeping such accounts as would enable loyal owners to seek compensation from Congress. . . .

SOURCES: Jacob William Schuckers, The Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase, p. 418-20; see John Niven, Editor, The Salmon P. Chase Papers, Volume 4: Correspondence, April 1863-1864, p. 335-50 for the entire letter.

Saturday, September 16, 2017

Major-General Benjamin F. Butler to Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott, May 24, 1861

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA,
Fort Monroe, May 24, 1861.
Lieutenant-General WINFIELD SCOTT:

I have the honor to report my arrival at this post Wednesday morning at 8 o'clock. I found that no troops had arrived except some recruits for the Third and Fourth Massachusetts Regiments of three-months' men and two detached companies of three-years' men which have been temporarily annexed to those regiments. This morning the Second New York Volunteers have reported themselves in good condition, numbering 782 men. These I have encamped on the farm of Mr. Segar, which is at the end of Mill Creek Bridge toward Hampton, and have also ordered into camp in connection with them the First Vermont Regiment (militia), Colonel Phelps. The force at this post may be stated thus: Colonel Dimick, commanding U.S. Regulars, 415 men; Third Regiment Massachusetts Militia and one company three-years' men, 727 men; Fourth Massachusetts Militia and one company three-years' men, 783 men; First Vermont Militia, 779 men; Second New York Volunteers, three years, 782 men. As there is very little sickness, the effective force kill be probably 3,375 men. Of these, the New York and Vermont regiments only are furnished with camp equipage.

Upon my arrival I put myself in communication with Colonel De Russy, of the Engineers, and consulted him upon two subjects:

First, as to the supply of water. I found that on that day the Minnesota was supplying herself from a well or spring on land of Mr. Clark, near the end of Mill Creek Bridge, about a mile from the fort, and that after pumping 800 gallons the well was exhausted, but refilled itself during the night, and from personal examinations of its surroundings I think it may be trusted to supply 700 to 1,000 gallons daily with a little enlargement of the reservoir. The water is of the best quality, and as it is immediately under the guns of the heaviest battery of the fort on the land side, I have thought it proper, with the advice of Colonel De Russy, of the Engineer Corps, to direct that a pipe be put in to bring it into the fort along the bridge and causeway, first having a cistern excavated at the fountain which will contain the whole supply of the spring. I have also advised with Colonel De Russy of the propriety of finishing the artesian well which had been begun here, and he is now in communication with a contractor for that purpose. There is an appropriation, as I understand, of $14,000 made by Congress for that purpose.

On Thursday I directed Colonel Phelps, of the Vermont regiment, to make a reconnaissance in force in Hampton and its neighborhood within two miles of the fort, in order to examine its capabilities for en-camping the troops about to arrive, and at the same time I made personal examination of the ground, Colonel De Russy being of opinion that the wood suggested by the Lieutenant-General might be a little unhealthy, and I was further determined upon encamping in this direction by considerations of probable advances in this direction, to which I will take leave to call your attention soon. The rebels upon our approach attempted to burn the bridge over Hampton Creek, but the fire was promptly extinguished by the Vermonters, assisted by the citizens. Colonel Phelps passed into the village of Hampton, and found only a few citizens, who professed to be watching their negroes, in which occupation I have not as yet disturbed them. I therefore encamped Colonel Phelps' Vermont regiment and Colonel Carr's New York regiment on the point of land just above the spring, about half way between Fort Monroe and Hampton.

Saturday, May 25. — I had written thus far when I was called away to meet Major Cary, of the active Virginia volunteers, upon questions which have arisen of very considerable importance both in a military and political aspect, and which I beg leave to submit herewith.

On Thursday night, three negroes, field hands, belonging to Col. Charles Mallory, now in command of the secession forces in this district, delivered themselves up to my picket guard, and, as I learned from the report of the officer of the guard in the morning, had been detained by him. I immediately gave personal attention to the matter, and found satisfactory evidence that these men were about to be taken to Carolina for the purpose of aiding the secession forces there; that two of them left wives and children (one a free woman) here; that the other had left his master from fear that he would be called upon to take part in the rebel armies. Satisfied of these facts from cautious examination of each of the negroes apart from the others, I determined for the present, and until better advised, as these men were very serviceable, and I had great need of labor in my quartermaster's department, to avail myself of their services, and that I would send a receipt to Colonel Mallory that I had so taken them, as I would for any other property of a private citizen which the exigencies of the service seemed to require to be taken by me, and especially property that was designed, adapted, and about to be used against the United States.

As this is but an individual instance in a course of policy which may be required to be pursued with regard to this species of property, I have detailed to the Lieutenant-General this case, and ask his direction. I am credibly informed that the negroes in this neighborhood are now being employed in the erection of batteries and other works by the rebels, which it would be nearly or quite impossible to construct without their labor. Shall they be allowed the use of this property against the United States, and we not be allowed its use in aid of the United States?

Major Cary, upon my interview with him, which took place between this fort and Hampton, desired information upon several questions: First: Whether I would permit the removal through the blockade of the families of all persons who desired to pass southward or northward. In reply to this, I informed him that I could not permit such removal, for the reasons, first, that presence of the families of belligerents in a country was always the best hostage for the good behavior of the citizens; and, secondly, that one object of our blockade being to prevent the passage of supplies of provisions into Virginia so long as she remained in a hostile attitude, the reduction of the number of consumers would in so far tend to neutralize that effect.

He also desired to know if the transit of persons and families northward from Virginia would be permitted. I answered him that with the exception of an interruption at Baltimore there was no interruption of the travel of peaceable persons north of the Potomac, and that all the internal lines of travel through Virginia were at present in the hands of his friends, and that it depended upon them whether that line of travel was interrupted, and that the authorities at Washington could better judge of this question than myself, as necessary travel could go by way of Washington; that the passage through our blockading squadron would require an amount of labor and surveillance to prevent abuse which I did not conceive I ought to be called upon to perform.

Major Cary demanded to know with regard to the negroes what course I intended to pursue. I answered him substantially as I have written above, when he desired to know if I did not feel myself bound by my constitutional obligations to deliver up fugitives under the fugitive-slave act. To this I replied that the fugitive-slave act did not affect a foreign country, which Virginia claimed to be, and that she must reckon it one of the infelicities of her position that in so far at least she was taken at her word; that in Maryland, a loyal State, fugitives from service had been returned, and that even now, although so much pressed by my necessities for the use of these men of Colonel Mallory's, yet if their master would come to the fort and take the oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the United States I would deliver the men up to him and endeavor to hire their services of him if he desired to part with them. To this Major Cary responded that Colonel Mallory was absent.

This morning the steamer Alabama arrived, having on board Colonel Duryea's regiment of New York, 850 strong, fully equipped. I have caused them to be landed and encamped with the First Vermont. The steamer Pembroke, from Massachusetts, has arrived, having two unattached companies — one of rifles and the other of infantry, 101 men each, and without equipage — so that now the actual number of men ready for service may be set down at 4,400, but not very efficient, some being quite new recruits and others not fully equipped, two regiments being wholly without tents.

The rebels have built a very strong battery on Sewell's Point, at the entrance of Elizabeth River, about four miles from this post, and about two and one-half miles from the Ripraps, or Fort Calhoun, and supported in the rear, at the distance of about a mile across Tanner's Creek, by the rebel forces gathered about there, amounting, as nearly as I can ascertain, to some 3,000 or 4,000 men, it being understood from the attack of the Monticello on Sunday last that I intended to menace Norfolk in that direction. Of course I had not at my disposal any force sufficient to make such an attack and carry this battery with any hope of holding possession of it should it be taken. I had determined, however, upon consultation with Commodore Stringham, to engage the battery with the naval force, and to endeavor, under the cover of their fire, to land and at least destroy the guns and works, and such plan was arranged for this morning; but yesterday Commodore Stringham received orders from the Navy Department to sail at once for Charleston, so that our expedition was disorganized. As we had no sufficient force to make such an attack — in the absence of the flag-ship Minnesota and her guns at long range — as would give the movement that assurance of success which I understand you desire should seem to attend our operations, it has been abandoned. I have, however, directed Colonel De Russy to prepare to put some guns of long range upon the Ripraps, so as to prevent any further approach towards us from Sewell's Point or Willoughby's Spit.

In this connection I beg leave to suggest to the Lieutenant-General the necessity in coast operations for say fifty surf-beats, of such construction as he caused to be prepared for the landing at Vera Cruz, the adaptation and efficiency of which have passed into history. May I respectfully request and urge that such a flotilla be furnished for coast operations.

I have learned that the enemy are about to fortify a point at Newport News, about eleven miles from this place, at the mouth of the James River, and on the northerly side of it. They have already a battery at Pig Point, on the southerly and opposite side of the river, which commands the Nansemond River. I think it of the last importance that we should occupy Newport News, and I am now organizing an expedition consisting of two regiments for that purpose, unless I find unexpected obstacles. I purpose this afternoon, in the steamer Yankee, to make a personal reconnaissance of that point, and at once to occupy the same with that amount of force, intending to intrench there for the purpose of being in possession and command of the entrance to the James River myself, and from that position, by the aid of the naval force, to be in condition to threaten Craney Island and the approaches of Norfolk, and also to hold one of the approaches to Richmond. By a march of nine miles, at farthest, I can support the post at Newport News; by the sea, in two hours, I can afford it relief. There is water enough to permit the approach of the largest sized vessels--indeed the Lieutenant-General will recollect that Newport News Point was once counted upon as a naval depot instead of Norfolk.

Trusting that these dispositions and movements will meet the approval of the Lieutenant-General, and begging pardon for the detailed length of this dispatch, I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

BENJ. F. BUTLER,
Major-General, Commanding.


[Indorsements.]

MAY 29, 1861

There is much to praise in this report, and nothing to condemn. It is highly interesting in several aspects, particularly in its relation to the slave question.

Respectfully submitted to the Secretary of War.
WINFIELD SCOTT.


I agree with the Lieutenant-General in his entire approval of the within report.

SIMON CAMERON.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 2 (Serial No. 2), p. 648-52

Official Reports: Expedition to and Occupation of Newport News, Va., May 27-29, 1861

Reports of Maj. Gen. B. F. Butler, U. S. Army, Commanding Department of Virginia.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 2 (Serial No. 2), p. 52-4

Major-General Benjamin F. Butler to Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott, May 27, 1861

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA,
May 27, 1861.

SIR: The expedition (of which I gave you information in my former dispatch) to Newport News got off in fine style this morning about 7 o'clock. I have added to the expedition the Eighth New York Regiment, 780 strong, which came here on board the Empire City on Sunday afternoon, and they proceeded without debarking. I also added two 6-pounder and two 12-pounder guns, with a detachment of twenty-five men from Colonel Dimick's command, who are intended to act as drill-masters to the volunteers in the exercise of the guns. My purpose is to intrench and hold that point, and ultimately to mount a few heavy guns, which will command that channel of approach to James River.

Since I wrote my last dispatch the question in regard to slave property is becoming one of very serious magnitude. The inhabitants of Virginia are using their negroes in the batteries, and are preparing to send their women and children South. The escapes from them are very numerous, and a squad has come in this morning to my pickets, bringing with them their women and children. Of course these cannot be dealt with upon the theory on which I designed to treat the services of able-bodied men and women who might come within my lines, and of which I gave you a detailed account in my last dispatch. I am in the utmost doubt what to do with this species of property. Up to this time I have had come within my lines men and women with their children — entire families — each family belonging to the same owner. I have therefore determined to employ, as I can do very profitably, the able-bodied persons in the party, issuing proper food for the support of all, and charging against their services the expense of care and sustenance of the non-laborers, keeping a strict and accurate account as well of the services as of the expenditures, having the worth of the services and the cost of the expenditures determined by a board of survey, hereafter to be detailed. I know of no other manner in which to dispose of this subject and the questions connected therewith. As a matter of property to the insurgents it will be of very great moment, the number I now have amounting, as I am informed, to what in good times would be of the value of $60,000. Twelve of these negroes, I am informed, have escaped from the erection of batteries on Sewell's Point, which this morning fired upon my expedition as it passed by out of range. As a means of offense, therefore, in the enemy's hands, these negroes, when able-bodied, are of the last importance. Without them the batteries could not have been erected, at least for many weeks. As a military question, it would seem to be a measure of necessity to deprive their masters of their services. How can this be done? As a political question and a question of humanity, can I receive the services of the father and mother and not take the children? Of the humanitarian aspect I have no doubt. Of the political one I have no right to judge. I therefore submit all this to your better judgment; and as these questions have a political aspect, I have ventured — and I trust I am not wrong in so doing — to duplicate the parts of my dispatches relating to this subject, and forward them to the Secretary of War.

It was understood when I left Washington that the three Massachusetts regiments, two of which are at the Relay House, should be forwarded to me here, and also Cook's light battery, of which I have the utmost need, if I am expected even to occupy an extended camp with safety. May I ask the attention of the Commanding General to this subject, and inquire if the exigencies of the service will permit these troops to be sent to me immediately? I have to report the arrival of no more troops except the New York Eighth since my last dispatch. The steamship Wabash, which was expected here to take the place of the Minnesota, has not yet reported herself. The Harriet Lane has reported herself here from Charleston, and is employed in convoying the Newport News expedition. I find myself extremely short of ammunition, having but a total in magazine of 85,000 rounds, (if which 5,000 rounds only are for the smooth-bore musket, and the major part of my command are provided with that arm. May I desire the attention of the Lieutenant-General to this state of facts, and ask that a large amount of ammunition for that arm — I would suggest “buck and ball” — be ordered forward from the Ordnance Department? The assistant adjutant-general has made a requisition for this purpose. I will endeavor to keep the Lieutenant-General informed daily of any occurrences of interest, provided I am not interfered with by the irregularity of the mails and modes of conveyance.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJ. F. BUTLER,
Major-General, Commanding.
 Lieutenant-General SCOTT.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 2 (Serial No. 2), p. 52-4

Major-General Benjamin F. Butler to Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott, May 29, 1861

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA,
May 29, 1861.

SIR: The expedition to Newport News, of which I spoke in my last, eight miles from this place, landed without opposition. 1 have caused an intrenched camp to be made there, which, when completed, will be able to hold itself against any force that may be brought against it, and afford even a better depot from which to advance than Fortress Monroe. The advantages of the News are these: There are two springs of very pure water there; the bluff is a fine, healthy location. It has two good, commodious wharves, to which steamers of any draught of water may come up at all stages of the tide; it is as near any point of operation as Fortress Monroe, where we are obliged to lighter all vessels of draught over ten feet, and have but one wharf. The News, upon which I propose to have a water battery of four 8-inch guns, commands the ship channel of James River, and a force there is a perpetual threat to Richmond.

My next point of operation I propose shall be Pig Point, which is exactly opposite the News, commanding Nansemond River. Once in command of that battery, which I believe may be easily turned, I can then advance along the Nansemond River and easily take Suffolk, and there either hold or destroy the railroad both between Richmond and Norfolk, and also between Norfolk and the South. With a perfect blockade of Elizabeth River, and taking and holding Suffolk and perhaps York, Norfolk will be so perfectly hemmed in, that starvation will cause the surrender, without risking an attack on the strongly-fortified intrenchments around Norfolk, with great loss and perhaps defeat.

If this plan of operations does not meet the approval of the Lieutenant-General I would be glad of his instructions specifically. If it is desirable to move on Richmond, James and York Rivers, both thus held, would seem to be the most eligible routes.

I have no co-operation substantially by the Navy, the only vessels here now being the Cumberland and Harriet Lane, the former too unwieldy to get near shore to use her heavy guns, the other so light in her battery as not to be able to cope with a single battery of the rebels.

I have yet need of surf-boats for sea-coast and river advances, and beg leave to suggest this matter again to you.

This evening the First New York Regiment, three years' men, came in on board the State of Georgia. It is in a most shameful state as regards camp equipage, camp kettles, &c.

Another matter needs pressing attention. The bore of a majority of the muskets in my command is smooth, of the issue of '48, and I have only 5,000 rounds of buck and ball and no other ammunition to fit this arm. Might I request immediate action upon this vital subject!

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

BENJ. F. BUTLER.
Major-General, Commanding.
General WINFIELD SCOTT.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 2 (Serial No. 2), p. 54

Simon Cameron to Major-General Benjamin F. Butler, May 30, 1861

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, May 30, 1861.
Major-General BUTLER:

SIR: Your action in respect to the negroes who came in your lines from the service of the rebels is approved.*

The Department is sensible of the embarrassment which must surround officers conducting military operations in a State by the laws of which slavery is sanctioned. The Government cannot recognize the rejection by any State of its federal obligations nor can it refuse the performance of the federal obligations resting upon itself. Among these federal obligations, however, none can be more important than that of suppressing and dispersing armed combinations formed for the purpose of overthrowing its whole constitutional authority. While therefore you will permit no interference by the persons under your command with the relations of persons held to service under the laws of any State you will on the other hand so long as any State within which your military operations are conducted is under the control of such armed combinations refrain from surrendering to alleged masters any persons who may come within your lines. You will employ such persons in the service to which they may be best adapted, keeping an account of the labor by them performed, of the value of it and of the expense of their maintenance. The question of their final disposition will be reserved for future determination.

Very Respectfully,
SIMON CAMERON,
Secretary of War.
_______________

* See Butler to Scott, May 24 and 27, 1861, Series 1, Vol. 2, pp. 52, 648

† Copies of this and Cameron to Butler, August 8, 1861, on same subject furnished to Brig. Gen. T. W. Sherman (commanding expedition to the coast of South Carolina), October 14, 1861. See Series I, Vol. VI.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series III, Volume 1 (Serial No. 122), p. 243; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series II, Volume 1 (Serial No. 114), p. 754-5

Friday, September 15, 2017

Diary of William Howard Russell: June 22, 1861

An active man would soon go mad if he were confined in Cairo. A mudbank stretching along the course of a muddy river is not attractive to a pedestrian; and, as is the case in most of the Southern cities, there is no place round Cairo where a man can stretch his legs, or take an honest walk in the country. A walk in the country! The Americans have not an idea of what the thing means. I speak now only of the inhabitants of the towns of the States through which I have passed, as far as I have seen of them. The roads are either impassable in mud or knee-deep in dust. There are no green shady lanes, no sheltering groves, no quiet paths through green meadows beneath umbrageous trees. Off the rail there is a morass — or, at best, a clearing — full of stumps. No temptations to take a stroll. Down away South the planters ride or drive; indeed in many places the saunterer by the wayside would probably encounter an alligator, or disturb a society of rattlesnakes. .

To-day I managed to struggle along the levee in a kind of sirocco, and visited the works at the extremity, which were constructed by an Hungarian named Waagner, one of the emigres who came with Kossuth to the United States. I found him in a hut full of flies, suffering from camp diarrhea, and waited on by Mr. O'Leary, who was formerly petty officer in our navy, served in the Furious in the Black Sea, and in the Shannon Brigade in India, now a lieutenant in the United States' army, where I should say he feels himself very much out of place. The Hungarian and the Milesian were, however, quite agreed about the utter incompetence of their military friends around them, and the great merits of heavy artillery. “When I tell them here the way poor Sir William made us rattle about them sixty-eight-pounder guns, the poor ignorant creatures laugh at me — not one of them believes it,” “It is most astonishing,” says the colonel, “how ignorant they are; there is not one of these men who can trace a regular work. Of West Point men I speak not, but of the people about here, and they will not learn of me — from me who know.” However, the works were well enough, strongly covered, commanded both rivers, and not to be reduced without trouble.

The heat drove me in among the flies of the crowded hotel, where Brigadier Prentiss is planning one of those absurd expeditions against a Secessionist camp at Commerce, in the State of Missouri, about two hours steaming up the river, and some twelve or fourteen miles inland. Cairo abounds in Secessionists and spies, and it is needful to take great precautions lest the expedition be known; but, after all, stores must be got ready, and put on board the steamers, and preparations must be made which cannot be concealed from the world. At dusk 700 men, supported by a six-pounder field-piece, were put on board the “City of Alton,” on which they clustered like bees in a swarm, and as the huge engine labored up and down against the stream, and the boat swayed from side to side, I felt a considerable desire to see General Prentiss chucked into the stream for his utter recklessness in cramming on board one huge tinder-box, all fire and touchwood, so many human beings, who, in event of an explosion, or a shot in the boiler, or of a heavy musketry fire on the banks, would have been converted into a great slaughter-house. One small boat hung from her stern, and although there were plenty of river flats and numerous steamers, even the horses belonging to the field-piece were crammed in among the men along the deck.

In my letter to Europe I made, at the time, some remarks by which the belligerents might have profited, and which at the time these pages are reproduced may strike them as possessing some value, illustrated as they have been by many events in the war. “A handful of horsemen would have been admirable to move in advance, feel the covers, and make prisoners for political or other purposes in case of flight; but the Americans persist in ignoring the use of horsemen, or at least in depreciating it, though they will at last find that they may shed much blood, and lose much more, before they can gain a victory without the aid of artillery and charges after the retreating enemy. From the want of cavalry, I suppose it is, the unmilitary practice of ‘scouting,’ as it is called here, has arisen. It is all very well in the days of Indian wars for footmen to creep about in the bushes, and shoot or be shot by sentries and pickets; but no civilized war recognizes such means of annoyance as firing upon sentinels, unless in case of an actual advance or feigned attack on the line. No camp can be safe without cavalry videttes and pickets; for the enemy can pour in impetuously after the alarm has been given, as fast as the outlying footmen can run in. In feeling the way for a column, cavalry are invaluable, and there can be little chance of ambuscades or surprises where they are judiciously employed; but ‘scouting’ on foot, or adventurous private expeditions on horseback, to have a look at the enemy, can do, and will do, nothing but harm. Every day the papers contain accounts of ‘scouts’ being killed, and sentries being picked off. The latter is a very barbarous and savage practice; and the Russian, in his most angry moments, abstained from it. If any officer wishes to obtain information as to his enemy, he has two ways of doing it. He can employ spies, who carry their lives in their hands, or he can beat up their quarters by a proper reconnoissance on his own responsibility, in which, however, it would be advisable not to trust his force to a railway train.”

At night there was a kind of émeute in camp. The day, as I have said, was excessively hot, and on returning to their tents and huts from evening parade the men found the contractor who supplies them with water had not filled the barrels; so they forced the sentries, broke barracks after hours, mobbed their officers, and streamed up to the hotel, which they surrounded, calling out, “Water, water,” in chorus. The General came out, and got up on a rail: “Gentlemen,” said he, “it is not my fault you are without water. It's your officers who are to blame; not me.” (“Groans for the Quartermaster,” from the men.) “If it is the fault of the contractor, I’ll see that he is punished. I’ll take steps at once to see that the matter is remedied. And now, gentlemen, I hope you'll go back to your quarters;” and the gentlemen took it into their heads very good-humoredly to obey the suggestion, fell in, and marched back two deep to their huts.

As the General was smoking his cigar before going to bed, I asked him why the officers had not more control over the men. “Well,” said he, “the officers are to blame for all this. The truth is, the term for which these volunteers enlisted is drawing to a close; and they have not as yet enrolled themselves in the United States army. They are merely volunteer regiments of the State of Illinois. If they were displeased with anything, therefore, they might refuse to enter the service or to take fresh engagements; and the officers would find themselves suddenly left without any men; they therefore curry favor with the privates, many of them, too, having an eye to the votes of the men when the elections of officers in the new regiments are to take place.”

The contractors have commenced plunder on a gigantic scale; and their influence with the authorities of the State is so powerful, there is little chance of punishing them. Besides, it is not considered expedient to deter contractors, by too scrupulous an exactitude, in coming forward at such a trying period; and the Quartermaster's department, which ought to be the most perfect, considering the number of persons connected with transport and carriage, is in a most disgraceful and inefficient condition. I told the General that one of the Southern leaders proposed to hang any contractor who was found out in cheating the men, and that the press cordially approved of the suggestion. “I am afraid” said he, “if any such proposal was carried out here, there would scarcely be a contractor left throughout the States.” Equal ignorance is shown by the medical authorities of the requirements of an army. There is not an ambulance or cacolet of any kind attached to this camp; and, as far as I could see, not even a litter was sent on board the steamer which has started with the expedition.

Although there has scarcely been a fought field or anything more serious than the miserable skirmishes of Shenck and Butler, the pressure of war has already told upon the people. The Cairo paper makes an urgent appeal to the authorities to relieve the distress and pauperism which the sudden interruption of trade has brought upon so many respectable citizens. And when I was at Memphis the other day, I observed a public notice in the journals, that the magistrates of the city would issue orders for money to families left in distress by the enrolment of the male members for military service. When General Scott, sorely against his will, was urged to make preparations for an armed invasion of the seceded States in case it became necessary, he said it would need some hundreds of thousands of men and many millions of money to effect that object. Mr. Seward, Mr. Chase, and Mr. Lincoln laughed pleasantly at this exaggeration, but they have begun to find by this time the old general was not quite so much in the wrong.

In reference to the discipline maintained in the camp, I must admit that proper precautions are used to prevent spies entering the lines. The sentries are posted closely and permit no one to go in without a pass in the day and a countersign at night. A conversation with General Prentiss in the front of the hotel was interrupted this evening by an Irishman, who ran past us towards the camp, hotly pursued by two policemen. The sentry on duty at the point of the lines close to us brought him up by the point of the bayonet. “Who goes tere?” “A friend, shure your honor; I'm a friend.” “Advance three paces and give the countersign.” “I don't know it, I tell you. Let me in, let me in.” But the German was resolute, and the policemen now coming up in hot pursuit, seized the culprit, who resisted violently, till General Prentiss rose from his chair and ordered the guard, who had turned out, to make a prisoner of the soldier and hand him over to the civil power, for which the man seemed to be most deeply grateful. As the policemen were walking him off, he exclaimed, “Be quiet wid ye, till I spake a word to the Giniral,” and then bowing and chuckling with drunken gravity, he said, “an’ indeed, Giniral, I'm much obleeged to ye altogither for this kindness. Long life to ye. We've got the better of that dirty German. Hoora' for Giniral Prentiss.” He preferred a chance of more whiskey in the police office and a light punishment to the work in camp and a heavy drill in the morning. An officer who was challenged by a sentry the other evening, asked him, “Do you know the countersign yourself?” “No, sir, it's not nine o'clock, and they have not given it out yet.” Another sentry stopped a man because he did not know the countersign. The fellow said, “I dare say you don't know it yourself.” “That's a lie,” he exclaimed; “it’s Plattsburgh.” “Pittsburgh it is, sure enough,” said the other, and walked on without further parley.

The Americans, Irish, and Germans, do not always coincide in the phonetic value of each letter in the passwords, and several difficulties have occurred in consequence. An incautious approach towards the posts at night is attended with risk; for the raw sentries are very quick on the trigger. More fatal and serious injuries have been inflicted on the Federals by themselves than by the enemy. “I declare to you, sir, the way the boys touched off their irons at me going home to my camp last night, was just like a running fight with the Ingins. I was a little ‘tight,’ and didn't mind it a cuss.”

SOURCE: William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South, Vol. 1, p. 341-5

Sunday, July 23, 2017

General Winfield Scott to Gustavus V. Fox, January 30, 1861

Washington, Jan. 30, 1861.
Confidential.
Dear Sir:

I have seen your letter to Mr. Blair. Come here as soon as you can.

Yrs respectfulIy
Winfield Scott.
G. V. Fox, Esqr.

[Envelope endorsed in Mrs. Fox's writing.—EDS.] “Gen. Scott, Feb. '61. Laid a week in the P.O., and he telegraphed and Gus went on.”

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 3

Saturday, July 15, 2017

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, July 31, 1863

I met at the President's, and was introduced by him to, Colonel Rawlins of General Grant's staff. He arrived yesterday with the official report of the taking of Vicksburg and capture of Pemberton's army. Was much pleased with him, his frank, intelligent, and interesting description of men and account of army operations. His interview with the President and Cabinet was of nearly two hours' duration, and all, I think, were entertained by him. His honest, unpretending, and unassuming manners pleased me; the absence of pretension, and I may say the unpolished and unrefined deportment, of this earnest and sincere man, patriot, and soldier pleased me more than that of almost any officer whom I have met. He was never at West Point and has had few educational advantages, yet he is a soldier, and has a mind which has served his general and his country well. He is a sincere and earnest friend of Grant, who has evidently sent him here for a purpose.

It was the intention of the President last fall that General McClernand, an old neighbor and friend of his, should have been associated with Admiral Porter in active operations before Vicksburg. It was the expressed and earnest wish of Porter to have a citizen general, and he made it a special point to be relieved from associations with a West-Pointer; all West-Pointers, he said, were egotistical and assuming and never willing to consider and treat naval officers as equals. The President thought the opportunity a good one to bring forward his friend McClernand, in whom he has confidence and who is a volunteer officer of ability, and possesses, moreover, a good deal of political influence in Illinois. Stanton and Halleck entered into his views, for Grant was not a special favorite with either. He had also, like Hooker, the reputation of indulging too freely in whiskey to be always safe and reliable.

Rawlins now comes from Vicksburg with statements in regard to McClernand which show him an impracticable and unfit man, — that he has not been subordinate and intelligent, but has been an embarrassment, and, instead of directing or assisting in, has been really an obstruction to, army movements and operations. In Rawlins's statements there is undoubtedly prejudice, but with such appearance of candor, and earnest and intelligent conviction, that there can be hardly a doubt McClernand is in fault, and Rawlins has been sent here by Grant in order to enlist the President rather than bring dispatches. In this, I think, he has succeeded, though the President feels kindly towards McClernand. Grant evidently hates him, and Rawlins is imbued with the feelings of his chief.

Seward wished me to meet him and the President at the War Department to consider the subject of the immediate occupation of some portion of Texas. My letters of the 9th and 23d ult. and conversation since have awakened attention to the necessity of some decisive action. [These letters follow.]


The European combination, or concerted understanding, against us begins to be developed and appreciated. The use of the Rio Grande to evade the blockade, and the establishment of regular lines of steamers to Matamoras did not disturb some of our people, but certain movements and recent givings-out of the French have alarmed Seward, who says Louis Napoleon is making an effort to get Texas; he therefore urges the immediate occupation of Galveston and also some other point. At the Cabinet meeting to-day, he took Stanton aside and had ten minutes' private conversation with him in a low tone. I was then invited to the conversation and received the above information. I agreed to call as requested at the appointed time, but why this partial, ex-parte, half-and-half way of doing these things? Why are not these matters unfolded to the whole Cabinet? Why a special meeting of only three with General Halleck? It is as important that the Secretary of the Treasury, who is granting clearances from New York to Matamoras and thereby sanctions the illicit trade of the English and French, should be advised if any of us. The question which Mr. Seward raises is political, national, and so important to the whole country that the Administration should be fully advised, but for some reason is restricted. The Secretary of State likes to be exclusive; does not want all the Cabinet in consultation, but is particular himself to attend all meetings. It exhibits early bad training and party management, not good administration.

Soon after two I went to the War Department. Seward, Stanton, and Halleck were there, and the Texas subject was being discussed. Halleck, as usual, was heavy, sluggish, not prepared to express an opinion. Did not know whether General Banks would think it best to move on Mobile or Galveston, and if on Galveston whether he would prefer transportation by water or would take an interior route. Had just written Banks. Wanted his reply. I turned to Seward, and, alluding to his morning conversation, I inquired what a demonstration on Mobile had to do with foreign designs in another section. How far Halleck had been let into a knowledge of measures which were withheld from a majority of the Cabinet I was uninformed, though I doubt not Halleck was more fully posted than myself. Halleck, apprehending the purport of my inquiry, said he mentioned Mobile because there had been some information from Banks concerning operations in that direction before the new question came up. I then asked, if a demonstration was to be made on Texas to protect and guard our western frontier, whether Indianola was not a better point than Galveston. Halleck said he did not know, — had not thought of that. “Where,” said he, “is Indianola? What are its advantages?” I replied, in western Texas, where the people had been more loyal than in eastern Texas. It was much nearer the Rio Grande and the Mexican border, consequently was better situated to check advances from the other side of the Rio Grande; the harbor had deeper water than Galveston; the place was but slightly fortified, was nearer Austin, etc., etc. Halleck was totally ignorant on these matters; knew nothing of Indianola,1 was hardly aware there was such a place; settled down very stolidly; would decide nothing for the present, but must wait to hear from General Banks. The Secretary of State was profoundly deferential to the General-in-Chief, hoped he would hear something from General Banks soon, requested to be immediately informed when word was received; and we withdrew as General Halleck lighted another cigar.

This is a specimen of the management of affairs. A majority of the members of the Cabinet are not permitted to know what is doing. Mr. Seward has something in regard to the schemes and designs of Louis Napoleon; he cannot avoid communicating with the Secretaries of War and the Navy, hence the door is partially open to them. Others are excluded. Great man Halleck is consulted, but is not ready, — has received nothing from others, who he intends shall have the responsibility. Therefore we must wait a few weeks and not improbably lose a favorable opportunity.

The truth is that Halleck, who has been smuggled into position here by Stanton, aided by Pope and General Scott, is unfit for the place. He has some scholastic attainments but is no general. I can pass that judgment upon him, though I do not profess to be a military man. He has failed to acquit himself to advantage as yet, and the country needs other talents to be successful.
______________

1 Indianola, Texas, is no longer to be found on the map. It was situated on the western shore of Matagorda Bay on the site now occupied by Port Lavaca, about 125 miles west-southwest of Galveston, but was destroyed by cyclones in 1885 and 1886.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 386-92

Sunday, April 30, 2017

Abraham Lincoln’s Message to the United States Congress, July 4, 1861

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

Having been convened on an extraordinary occasion, as authorized by the Constitution, your attention is not called to any ordinary subject of legislation.

At the beginning of the present Presidential term, four months ago, the functions of the Federal Government were found to be generally suspended within the several States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida, excepting only those of the Post-Office Department.

Within these States all the forts, arsenals, dock-yards, custom-houses, and the like, including the movable and stationary property in and about them, had been seized, and were held in open hostility to this Government, excepting only Forts Pickens, Taylor, and Jefferson, on and near the Florida coast, and Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, S. C. The forts thus seized had been put in improved condition; new ones had been built, and armed forces had been organized, and were organizing, all avowedly with the same hostile purpose.

The forts remaining in the possession of the Federal Government in and near these States were either besieged or menaced by warlike preparations, and especially Fort Sumter was nearly surrounded by well-protected hostile batteries, with guns equal in quality to the best of its own and outnumbering the latter as perhaps ten to one. A disproportionate share of the Federal muskets and rifles had somehow found their way into these States and had been seized to be used against the Government. Accumulations of the public revenue lying within them had been seized for the same object. The Navy was scattered in distant seas, leaving but a very small part of it within the immediate reach of the Government. Officers of the Federal Army and Navy had resigned in great numbers, and of those resigning a large proportion had taken up arms against the Government. Simultaneously, and in connection with all this, the purpose to sever the Federal Union was openly avowed. In accordance with this purpose an ordinance had been adopted in each of these States declaring the States, respectively, to be separated from the National Union. A formula for instituting a combined government of these States had been promulgated, and this illegal organization, in the character of Confederate States, was already invoking recognition, aid, and intervention from foreign powers.

Finding this condition of things and believing it to be an imperative duty upon the incoming Executive to prevent, if possible, the consummation of such attempt to destroy the Federal Union, a choice of means to that end became indispensable. This choice was made and was declared in the inaugural address. The policy chosen looked to the exhaustion of all peaceful measures before a resort to any stronger ones. It sought only to hold the public places and property not already wrested from the Government and to collect the revenue, relying for the rest on time, discussion, and the ballot-box. It promised a continuance of the mails, at Government expense, to the very people who were resisting the Government, and it gave repeated pledges against any disturbance to any of the people or any of their rights. Of all that which a President might constitutionally and justifiably do in such a case, everything was forborne without which it was believed possible to keep the Government on foot.

On the 5th of March (the present incumbent's first full day in office), a letter of Major Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter, written on the 28th of February, and received at the War Department on the 4th of March, was, by that Department, placed in his hands. This letter expressed the professional opinion of the writer that re-enforcements could not be thrown into that fort, within the time for his relief rendered necessary by the limited supply of provisions and with a view of holding possession of the same, with a force of less than 20,000 good and well-disciplined men. This opinion was concurred in by all the officers of his command, and their memoranda on the subject were made inclosures of Major Anderson's letter. The whole was immediately laid before Lieutenant-General Scott, who at once concurred with Major Anderson in opinion. On reflection, however, he took full time, consulting with other officers, both of the Army and the Navy, and at the end of four days came reluctantly, but decidedly, to the same conclusion as before. He also stated at the same time that no such sufficient force was then at the control of the Government or could be raised and brought to the ground within the time when the provisions in the fort would be exhausted. In a purely military point of view this reduced the duty of the Administration in the case to the mere matter of getting the garrison safely out of the fort.
It was believed, however, that to so abandon that position, under the circumstances, would be utterly ruinous; that the necessity under which it was to be done would not be fully understood; that by many it would be construed as a part of a voluntary policy; that at home it would discourage the friends of the Union, embolden its adversaries, and go far to insure to the latter a recognition abroad; that, in fact, it would be our national destruction consummated. This could not be allowed. Starvation was not yet upon the garrison, and ere it would be reached Fort Pickens might be reinforced. This last would be a clear indication of policy and would better enable the country to accept the evacuation of Fort Sumter as a military necessity. An order was at once directed to be sent for the landing of the troops from the steamship Brooklyn into Fort Pickens. This order could not go by land but must take the longer and slower route by sea. The first return news from the order was received just one week before the fall of Fort Sumter. The news itself was that the officer commanding the Sabine, to which vessel the troops had been transferred from the Brooklyn, acting upon some quasi armistice of the late Administration (and of the existence of which the present Administration, up to the time the order was dispatched, had only too vague and uncertain rumors to fix attention), had refused to land the troops. To now reinforce Fort Pickens before a crisis would be reached at Fort Sumter was impossible – rendered so by the near exhaustion of provisions in the latter-named fort. In precaution against such a conjuncture, the Government had a few days before commenced preparing an expedition, as well adapted as might be, to relieve Fort Sumter, which expedition was intended to be ultimately used or not, according to circumstances. The strongest anticipated case for using it was now presented, and it was resolved to send it forward. As had been intended, in this contingency, it was also resolved to notify the Governor of South Carolina that he might expect an attempt would be made to provision the fort, and that if the attempt should not be resisted there would be no effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition, without further notice, or in case of an attack upon the fort. This notice was accordingly given, whereupon the fort was attacked and bombarded to its fall without even awaiting the arrival of the provisioning expedition.

It is thus seen that the assault upon and reduction of Fort Sumter was in no sense a matter of self-defense on the part of the assailants. They well knew that the garrison in the fort could by no possibility commit aggression upon them. They knew – they were expressly notified-that the giving of bread to the few brave and hungry men of the garrison was all which would on that occasion be attempted unless themselves, by resisting so much, should provoke more. They knew that this Government desired to keep the garrison in the fort, not to assail them, but merely to maintain visible possession, and thus to preserve the Union from actual and immediate dissolution, trusting, as hereinbefore stated, to time, discussion, and the ballot-box for final adjustment; and they assailed and reduced the fort for precisely the reverse object – to drive out the visible authority of the Federal Union and thus force it to immediate dissolution. That this was their object the Executive well understood, and having said to them in the inaugural address, “You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors,” he took pains not only to keep this declaration good, but also to keep the case so free from the power of ingenious sophistry as that the world should not be able to misunderstand it. By the affair at Fort Sumter, with its surrounding circumstances, that point was reached. Then and thereby the assailants of the Government began the conflict of arms, without a gun in sight or in expectancy to return their fire, save only the few in the fort sent to that harbor years before for their own protection and still ready to give that protection in whatever was lawful. In this act, discarding all else, they have forced upon the country the distinct issue, “Immediate dissolution or blood.”

And this issue embraces more than the fate of these United States. It presents to the whole family of man the question whether a constitutional republic or democracy – a Government of the people, by the same people – can or cannot maintain its territorial integrity against its own domestic foes. It presents the question whether discontented individuals, too few in numbers to control administration, according to organic law, in any case, can always, upon the pretenses made in this case, or on any other pretenses, or arbitrarily without any pretense, break up their Government and thus practically put an end to free government upon the earth. It forces us to ask: “Is there, in all republics, this inherent and fatal weakness?” “Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?”

So viewing the issue, no choice was left but to call out the war power of the Government; and so to resist force employed for its destruction by force for its preservation.

The call was made, and the response of the country was most gratifying, surpassing in unanimity and spirit the most sanguine expectation. Yet none of the States commonly called slave States, except Delaware, gave a regiment through regular State organization. A few regiments have been organized within some others of those States by individual enterprise and received into the Government service. Of course the seceded States, so called (and to which Texas had been joined about the time of the inauguration), gave no troops to the cause of the Union. The border States, so called, were not uniform in their action, some of them being almost for the Union, while in others – as Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas – the Union sentiment was nearly repressed and silenced. The course taken in Virginia was the most remarkable, perhaps the most important. A convention elected by the people of that State to consider this very question of disrupting the Federal Union was in session at the capital of Virginia when Fort Sumter fell. To this body the people had chosen a large majority of professed Union men. Almost immediately after the fall of Sumter many members of that majority went over to the original disunion minority and with them adopted an ordinance for withdrawing the State from the Union. Whether this change was wrought by their great approval of the assault upon Sumter or their great resentment at the Government's resistance to that assault is not definitely known. Although they submitted the ordinance for ratification to a vote of the people to be taken on a day then somewhat more than a month distant, the convention and the Legislature (which was also in session at the same time and place), with leading men of the State not members of either, immediately commenced acting as if the State were already out of the Union. They pushed military preparations vigorously forward all over the State. They seized the U.S. Armory at Harper's Ferry and the navy-yard at Gosport, near Norfolk. They received – perhaps invited – into their State large bodies of troops with their warlike appointments from the so-called seceded States. They formally entered into a treaty of temporary alliance and co-operation with the so-called “Confederate States,” and sent members to their Congress at Montgomery. And finally, they permitted the insurrectionary Government to be transferred to their capital at Richmond.

The people of Virginia have thus allowed this giant insurrection to make its nest within her borders, and this Government has no choice left but to deal with it where it finds it. And it has the less regret, as the loyal citizens have in due form claimed its protection. Those loyal citizens this Government is bound to recognize and protect as being Virginia.

In the border States, so called – in fact, the middle States – there are those who favor a policy which they call “armed neutrality;” that is, an arming of those States to prevent the Union forces passing one way or the disunion the other over their soil. This would be disunion completed. Figuratively speaking, it would be the building of an impassable wall along the line of separation – and yet, not quite an impassable one, for under the guise of neutrality it would tie the hands of the Union men, and freely pass supplies from among them to the insurrectionists, which it could not do as an open enemy. At a stroke it would take all the trouble off the hands of secession, except only what proceeds from the external blockade. It would do for the disunionists that which of all things they most desire – feed them well and give them disunion without a struggle of their own. It recognizes no fidelity to the Constitution, no obligation to maintain the Union, and while very many who have favored it are doubtless loyal citizens it is nevertheless very injurious in effect.

Recurring to the action of the Government, it may be stated that at first a call was made for 75,000 militia, and rapidly following this a proclamation was issued for closing the ports of the insurrectionary districts by proceedings in the nature of blockade. So far all was believed to be strictly legal. At this point the insurrectionists announced their purpose to enter upon the practice of privateering.

Other calls were made for volunteers to serve for three years, unless sooner discharged, and also for large additions to the Regular Army and Navy. These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity, trusting then, as now, that Congress would readily ratify them. It is believed that nothing has been done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress.

Soon after the first call for militia it was considered a duty to authorize the commanding general in proper cases, according to his discretion, to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or in other words to arrest and detain, without resort to the ordinary processes and forms of law, such individuals as he might deem dangerous to the public safety. This authority has purposely been exercised but very sparingly. Nevertheless the legality and propriety of what has been done under it are questioned and the attention of the country has been called to the proposition that one who is sworn to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” should not himself violate them. Of course some consideration was given to the questions of power and propriety before this matter was acted upon. The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed were being resisted and failing of execution in nearly one-third of the States. Must they be allowed to finally fail of execution, even had it been perfectly clear that by the use of the means necessary to their execution some single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty that practically it relieves more of the guilty than of the innocent, should to a very limited extent be violated? To state the question more directly, are all the laws but one to go unexecuted and the Government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated? Even in such a case would not the official oath be broken if the Government should be overthrown, when it was believed that disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it? But it was not believed that this question was presented. It was not believed that any law was violated. The provision of the Constitution that “the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it,” is equivalent to a provision – is a provision – that such privilege may be suspended when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety does require it. It was decided that we have a case of rebellion, and that the public safety does require the qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ which was authorized to be made. Now, it is insisted that Congress and not the Executive is vested with this power. But the Constitution itself is silent as to which, or who, is to exercise the power; and as the provision was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed the framers of the instrument intended that in every case the danger should run its course until Congress could be called together, the very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by the rebellion.

No more extended argument is now offered, as an opinion at some length will probably be presented by the Attorney-General. Whether there shall be any legislation upon the subject, and if any, what, is submitted entirely to the better judgment of Congress.

The forbearance of this Government had been so extraordinary and so long continued as to lead some foreign nations to shape their action as if they supposed the early destruction of our national Union was probable. While this, on discovery, gave the Executive some concern, he is now happy to say that the sovereignty and rights of the United States are now everywhere practically respected by foreign powers, and a general sympathy with the country is manifested throughout the world.

The reports of the Secretaries of the Treasury, War, and the Navy will give the information in detail deemed necessary and convenient for your deliberation and action, while the Executive and all the Departments will stand ready to supply omissions or to communicate new facts considered important for you to know.

It is now recommended that you give the legal means for making this contest a short and a decisive one; that you place at the control of the Government for the work at least 400,000 men and $400,000,000. That number of men is about one-tenth of those of proper ages within the regions where apparently all are willing to engage, and the sum is less than a twenty-third part of the money value owned by the men who seem ready to devote the whole. A debt of $600,000,000 now is a less sum per head than was the debt of our Revolution when we came out of that struggle, and the money value in the country now bears even a greater proportion to what it was then than does the population. Surely each man has as strong a motive now to preserve our liberties as each had then to establish them.

A right result at this time will be worth more to the world than ten times the men and ten times the money. The evidence reaching us from the country leaves no doubt that the material for the work is abundant, and that it needs only the hand of legislation to give it legal sanction and the hand of the Executive to give it practical shape and efficiency. One of the greatest perplexities of the Government is to avoid receiving troops faster than it can provide for them. In a word, the people will save their Government if the Government itself will do its part only indifferently well.

It might seem at first thought to be of little difference whether the present movement at the South be called “secession” or “rebellion.” The movers, however, well understand the difference. At the beginning they knew they could never raise their treason to any respectable magnitude by any name which implies violation of law. They knew their people possessed as much of moral sense, as much of devotion to law and order, and as much pride in and reverence for the history and Government of their common country as any other civilized and patriotic people. They knew they could make no advancement directly in the teeth of these strong and noble sentiments. Accordingly they commenced by an insidious debauching of the public mind. They invented an ingenious sophism, which, if conceded, was followed by perfectly logical steps through all the incidents to the complete destruction of the Union. The sophism itself is, that any State of the Union may, consistently with the national Constitution, and therefore lawfully and peacefully, withdraw from the Union without the consent of the Union or of any other State. The little disguise that the supposed right is to be exercised only for just cause, themselves to be the sole judge of its justice, is too thin to merit any notice.

With rebellion thus sugar coated, they have been drugging the public mind of their section for more than thirty years, and until at length they have brought many good men to a willingness to take up arms against the Government the day after some assemblage of men have enacted the farcical pretense of taking their State out of the Union, who could have been brought to no such thing the day before.

This sophism derives much, perhaps the whole, of its currency from the assumption that there is some omnipotent and sacred supremacy pertaining to a State – to each State of our Federal Union. Our States have neither more nor less power than that reserved to them in the Union by the Constitution – no one of them ever having been a State out of the Union. The original ones passed into the Union even before they cast off their British colonial dependence, and the new ones each came into the Union directly from a condition of dependence, excepting Texas; and even Texas in its temporary independence was never designated a State. The new ones only took the designation of States on coming into the Union, while that name was first adopted for the old ones in and by the Declaration of Independence. Therein the “United Colonies” were declared to be “free and independent States;” but even then the object plainly was not to declare their independence of one another or of the Union, but directly the contrary, as their mutual pledge and their mutual action before, at the time, and afterward, abundantly show. The express plighting of faith by each and all of the original thirteen in the Articles of Confederation, two years later, that the Union shall be perpetual is most conclusive. Having never been States, either in substance or in name, outside of the Union, whence this magical omnipotence of “State rights,” asserting a claim of power to lawfully destroy the Union itself? Much is said about the “sovereignty” of the States, but the word even is not in the national Constitution, nor, as is believed, in any of the State constitutions. What is a “sovereignty” in the political sense of the term? Would it be far wrong to define it “a political community without a political superior?” Tested by this, no one of our States, except Texas, ever was a sovereignty; and even Texas gave up the character on coming into the Union, by which act she acknowledged the Constitution of the United States and the laws and treaties of the United States made in pursuance of the Constitution to be for her the supreme law of the land. The States have their status in the Union, and they have no other legal status. If they break from this they can only do so against law and by revolution. The Union, and not themselves separately, procured their independence and their liberty. By conquest or purchase the Union gave each of them whatever of independence and liberty it has. The Union is older than any of the States, and in fact it created them as States. Originally some dependent colonies made the Union, and in turn the Union threw off their old dependence for them and made them States, such as they are. Not one of them ever had a State constitution independent of the Union. Of course it is not forgotten that all the new States framed their constitutions before they entered the Union, nevertheless dependent upon and preparatory to coming into the Union.

Unquestionably the States have the powers and rights reserved to them in and by the national Constitution; but among these, surely, are not included all conceivable powers, however mischievous or destructive; but, at most, such only as were known in the world, at the time, as governmental powers; and certainly a power to destroy the Government itself had never been known as a governmental – as a merely administrative power. This relative matter of national power and State rights, as a principle, is no other than the principle of generality and locality. Whatever concerns the whole should be confided to the whole – to the General Government; while whatever concerns only the State should be left exclusively to the State. This is all there is of original principle about it. Whether the national Constitution, in defining boundaries between the two, has applied the principle with exact accuracy is not to be questioned. We are all bound by that defining, without question.

What is now combatted is the position that secession is consistent with the Constitution – is lawful and peaceful. It is not contended that there is any express law for it; and nothing should ever be implied as law which leads to unjust or absurd consequences. The nation purchased, with money, the countries out of which several of these States were formed. Is it just that they shall go off without leave and without refunding? The nation paid very large sums (in the aggregate, I believe, nearly a hundred millions) to relieve Florida of the aboriginal tribes. Is it just that she shall now be off without consent, or without making any return? The nation is now in debt for money applied to the benefit of these so-called seceding States, in common with the rest. Is it just either that creditors shall go unpaid, or the remaining States pay the whole? A part of the present national debt was contracted to pay the old debts of Texas. Is it just that she shall leave and pay no part of this herself? Again, if one State may secede, so may another; and when all shall have seceded none is left to pay the debts. Is this quite just to creditors? Did we notify them of this sage view of ours when we borrowed their money? If we now recognize this doctrine by allowing the seceders to go in peace, it is difficult to see what we can do if others choose to go, or to extort terms upon which they will promise to remain.

The seceders insist that our Constitution admits of secession. They have assumed to make a national constitution of their own, in which, of necessity, they have either discarded or retained the right of secession, as, they insist, it exists in ours. If they have discarded it, they thereby admit that on principle it ought not to be in ours. If they have retained it by their own construction of ours, they show that to be consistent they must secede from one another whenever they shall find it the easiest way of settling their debts or effecting any other selfish or unjust object. The principle itself is one of disintegration and upon which no Government can possibly endure.

If all the States save one should assert the power to drive that one out of the Union, it is presumed the whole class of seceder politicians would at once deny the power and denounce the act as the greatest outrage upon State rights. But suppose that precisely the same act, instead of being called “driving the one out,” should be called “the seceding of the others from that one,” it would be exactly what the seceders claim to do; unless, indeed, they make the point that the one, because it is a minority, may rightfully do what the others, because they are a majority, may not rightfully do. These politicians are subtle and profound on the rights of minorities. They are not partial to that power which made the Constitution, and speaks from the preamble, calling itself “We, the people.”

It may well be questioned whether there is to-day a majority of the legally qualified voters of any State, except, perhaps, South Carolina, in favor of disunion. There is much reason to believe that the Union men are the majority in many, if not in every other one, of the so-called seceded States. The contrary has not been demonstrated in any one of them. It is ventured to affirm this, even of Virginia and Tennessee; for the result of an election, held in military camps, where the bayonets are all on one side of the question voted upon, can scarcely be considered as demonstrating popular sentiment. At such all election all that large class who are, at once, for the Union and against coercion would be coerced to vote against the Union.

It may be affirmed, without extravagance, that the free Institutions we enjoy have developed the powers and improved the condition of our whole people beyond any example in the world. Of this we now have a striking and an impressive illustration. So large an army as the Government has now on foot was never before known without a soldier in it but who had taken his place there of his own free choice. But more than this; there are many single regiments whose members, one and another, possess full practical knowledge of all the arts, sciences, professions, and whatever else, whether useful or elegant, is known in the world; and there is scarcely one from which there could not be selected a President, a Cabinet, a Congress, and perhaps a court abundantly competent to administer the Government itself. Nor do I say this is not true, also in the army of our late friends, now adversaries, in this contest; but if it is, so much better the reason why the Government which has conferred such benefits on them and us should not be broken up. Whoever, in any section, proposes to abandon such a Government would do well to consider in deference to what principle it is that he does it – what better he is likely to get in its stead – whether the substitute will give, or be intended to give, so much of good to the people. There are some foreshadowings on this subject. Our adversaries have adopted some declarations of independence, in which, unlike the good old one, penned by Jefferson, they omit the words “all men are created equal.” Why? They have adopted a temporary national constitution, in the preamble of which, unlike our good old one, signed by Washington, they omit “We, the people,” and substitute “We, the deputies of the sovereign and independent States.” Why? Why this deliberate pressing out of view the rights of men and the authority of the people?

This is essentially a people's contest. On the side of the Union it is a struggle for maintaining in the world that form and substance of government whose leading object is to elevate the condition of men – to lift artificial weights from all shoulders; to clear the paths of laudable pursuit for all; to afford all an unfettered start and a fair chance in the race of life. Yielding to partial and temporary departures, from necessity, this is the leading object of the Government for whose existence we contend.

I am most happy to believe that the plain people understand and appreciate this. It is worthy of note that while in this, the Government's hour of trial, large numbers of those in the Army and Navy who have been favored with the offices have resigned and proved false to the hand which had pampered them, not one common soldier or common sailor is known to have deserted his flag.

Great honor is due to those officers who remained true, despite the example of their treacherous associates; but the greatest honor, and most important fact of all, is the unanimous firmness of the common soldiers and common sailors. To the last man, so far as known, they have successfully resisted the traitorous efforts of those whose commands but an hour before they obeyed as absolute law. This is the patriotic instinct of plain people. They understand, without an argument, that the destroying the Government which was made by Washington means no good to them.

Our popular Government has often been called an experiment. Two points in it our people have already settled – the successful establishing and the successful administering of it. One still remains – its successful maintenance against a formidable internal attempt to overthrow it. It is now for them to demonstrate to the world that those who can fairly carry an election can also suppress a rebellion; that ballots are the rightful and peaceful successors of bullets; and that when ballots have fairly and constitutionally decided there can be no successful appeal back to bullets; that there can be no successful appeal except to ballots themselves, at succeeding elections. Such will be a great lesson of peace; teaching men that what they cannot take by an election, neither can they take it by a war; teaching all the folly of being the beginners of a war.
Lest there might be some uneasiness in the minds of candid men as to what is to be the course of the Government toward the Southern States after the rebellion shall have been suppressed, the Executive deems it proper to say, it will be his purpose then, as ever, to be guided by the Constitution and the laws; and that he probably will have no different understanding of the powers and duties of the Federal Government relatively to the rights of the States and the people, under the Constitution, than that expressed in the inaugural address.

He desires to preserve the Government, that it may be administered for all, as it was administered by the men who made it. Loyal citizens everywhere have the right to claim this of their Government; and the Government has no right to withhold or neglect it. It is not perceived that, in giving it, there is any coercion, any conquest, or any subjugation, in any just sense of those terms.

The Constitution provides, and all the States have accepted the provision, that “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government.” But if a State may lawfully go out of the Union, having done so, it may also discard the republican form of government; so that to prevent its going out is an indispensable means to the end of maintaining the guaranty mentioned; and when an end is lawful and obligatory the indispensable means to it are also lawful and obligatory.

It was with the deepest regret that the Executive found the duty of employing the war power, in defense of the Government, forced upon him. He could but perform this duty or surrender the existence of the Government. No compromise by public servants could, in this case, be a cure; not that compromises are not often proper, but that no popular Government can long survive a marked precedent, that those who carry an election can only save the Government from immediate destruction by giving up the main point upon which the people gave the election. The people themselves, and not their servants, can safely reverse their own deliberate decisions.

As a private citizen the Executive could not have consented that these institutions shall perish; much less could he in betrayal of so vast and so sacred a trust as these free people had confided to him. He felt that he had no moral right to shrink, nor even to count the chances of his own life, in what might follow. In full view of his great responsibility he has, so far, done what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according to your own judgment, perform yours. He sincerely hopes that your views and your action may so accord with his as to assure all faithful citizens who have been disturbed in their rights of a certain and speedy restoration to them, under the Constitution and the laws.

And having thus chosen our course, without guile and with pure purpose, let us renew our trust in God, and go forward without fear and with manly hearts.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
JULY 4, 1861.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series III, Volume 1 (Serial No. 122), p. 311-21; Abstracted in Samuel Wylie Crawford’s The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 466-9.