Showing posts with label Buell. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Buell. Show all posts

Saturday, May 30, 2020

Major-General Benjamin F. Butler to Edwin M. Stanton, April 29, 1862

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,                  
Forts Jackson and Saint Philip, April 29, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in obedience to my instructions I remained on the Mississippi River, with the troops named in my former dispatch, awaiting the action of the fleet engaged in the bombardment of Forts Jackson and Saint Philip. Failing to reduce them after six days of incessant fire, Flag-Officer Farragut determined to attempt their passage with his whole fleet, except that part thereof under the immediate command of Captain Porter, known as the Mortar Fleet.

On the morning of the 24th instant the fleet got under way, and twelve vessels, including the four sloops of war, ran the gauntlet of fire of the forts and were safely above. Of the gallantry, courage, and conduct of this heroic action, unprecedented in naval warfare, considering the character of the works and the river, too much cannot be said. Of its casualties and the details of its performance the flag-officer will give an account to the proper Department. I witnessed this daring exploit from a point about 800 yards from Fort Jackson and unwittingly under its fire, and the sublimity of the scene can never be exceeded. The fleet pressed on up the river to New Orleans, leaving two gunboats to protect the quarantine station, 5 miles above.

In case the forts were not reduced, and a portion of the fleet got by them, it had been arranged between the flag-officer and myself that I should make a landing from the Gulf side on the rear of the forts at the quarantine, and from thence attempt Fort Saint Philip by storm and assault, while the bombardment was continued by the fleet. I immediately went to Sable Island with my transports, 12 miles in the rear of Saint Philip, the nearest point at which a sufficient depth of water could be found for them.

Captain Porter put at my disposal the Miami, drawing 7½ feet, being the lightest-draught vessel in the fleet, to take the troops from the ship, as far as the water would allow. We were delayed twenty-four hours by her running ashore at Pass à l'Outre. The Twenty-sixth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers, Colonel Jones, were then put on board her and carried within 6 miles of the fort, where she again grounded. Captain Everett, of the Sixth Massachusetts Battery, having very fully reconnoitered the waters and bayous in that vicinity, and foreseeing the necessity, I had collected and brought with me some 30 boats, into which the troops were again transshipped and conveyed, by a most fatiguing and laborious row, some 4½ miles farther, there being within 1 mile of the steamer only 2½ feet of water. A large portion of this passage was against a heavy current, through a bayou. At the entrance of Manuel's Canal, a mile and a half from the point of landing, rowing became impossible, as well from the narrowness of the canal as the strength of the current, which ran like a mill-race. Through this the boats could only be impelled by dragging them singly, with the men up to their waists in water. It is due to this fine regiment and to a portion of the Fourth Wisconsin Volunteers and Twenty-first Indiana, who landed under this hardship without a murmur, that their labors should be made known to the Department, as well as to account for the slowness of our operations. The enemy evidently considered this mode of attack impossible, as they had taken no measures to oppose it, which might very easily have been successfully done. We occupied at once both sides of the river, thus effectually cutting them off from all supplies, information, or succor while we made our dispositions for the assault.

Meantime Captain Porter had sent into the bayou in the rear of Fort Jackson two schooners of his mortar fleet to prevent the escape of the enemy from the fort in that direction. In the hurry and darkness of the passage of the forts the flag-officer had overlooked three of the enemy's gunboats and the iron-clad battery Louisiana, which were at anchor under the walls of the fort. Supposing that all the rebel boats had been destroyed (and a dozen or more had been) he passed on to the city, leaving these in his rear. The iron steam battery being very formidable, Captain Porter deemed it prudent to withdraw his mortar fleet some miles below, where he could have room to maneuver it if attacked by the iron monster, and the bombardment ceased.

I had got Brigadier-General Phelps in the river below with two regiments to make demonstrations in that direction if it became possible. In the night of the 27th, learning that the fleet had got the city under its guns, I left Brigadier General Williams in charge of the landing of the troops and went up the river to the flagship to procure light-draught transportation. That night the larger portion (about 250) of the garrison of Fort Jackson mutinied, spiked the guns bearing up the river, came up and surrendered themselves to my pickets, declaring that as we had got in their rear resistance was useless, and they would not be sacrificed. No bomb had been thrown at them for three days nor had they fired a shot at us from either fort. They averred that they had been impressed and would fight no longer.*

On the 28th the officers of Forts Jackson and Saint Philip surrendered to Captain Porter, he having means of water transportation to them. While he was negotiating, however, with the officers of the forts under a white flag the rebel naval officers put all their munitions of war on the Louisiana, set her on fire and adrift upon the Harriet Lane, but when opposite Fort Saint Philip she blew up, killing one of their own men by the fragments which fell into that fort.

I have taken possession of the forts, and find them substantially as defensible as before the bombardment—Saint Philip precisely so, it being quite uninjured. They are fully provisioned, well supplied with ammunition, and the ravages of the shells have been defensibly repaired by the labors of the rebels. I will cause Lieutenant Weitzel, of the Engineers, to make a detailed report of their condition to the Department I have left the Twenty-sixth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers in garrison, and am now going up the river to occupy the city with my troops and make further demonstrations in the rear of the enemy, now at Corinth.

The rebels have abandoned all their defensive works in and around New Orleans, including Forts Pike and Wood, on Lake Pontchartrain, and Fort Livingston from Barataria Bay. They have retired in the direction of Corinth, beyond Manchac Pass, and abandoned everything up the river as far as Donaldsonville, some 70 miles beyond New Orleans. I propose to so far depart from the letter of my instructions as to endeavor to persuade the flag-officer to pass up the river as far as the mouth of Red River, if possible, so as to cut off their supplies, and make there a landing and a demonstration in their rear as a diversion in favor of General Buell if a decisive battle is not fought before such movement is possible.

Mobile is ours whenever we choose, and we can better wait.

I find the city under the dominion of the mob. They have insulted our flag—torn it down with indignity. This outrage will be punished in such manner as in my judgment will caution both the perpetrators and abettors of the act, so that they shall fear the stripes if they do not reverence the stars of our banner.

I send a marked copy of a New Orleans paper, containing an applauding account of the outrage.

Trusting my action may meet the approbation of the Department, I am; most respectfully, your obedient servant,

BENJ. F. BUTLER,              
Major-General, Commanding.
Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
_______________

* See Butler to Stanton, June 1, 1862 in Chapter XXVII.
† Not found.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 6 (Serial No. 6), p. 503-6

Thursday, April 23, 2020

Major-General William T. Sherman to Major-General Ulysses S. Grant, August 17, 1862

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,                 
Memphis, August 17, 1862.
Major-General GRANT, Corinth:

DEAR SIR: A letter from you of August 4, asking me to write more freely and fully on all matters of public interest, did not reach me till yesterday.

I think since the date of that letter you have received from me official reports and copies of orders telling almost everything of interest hereabouts; but I will with pleasure take every occasion to advise you of everything that occurs here.

Your order of arrest of newspaper correspondent is executed, and he will be sent to Alton by the first opportunity. He sends you by mail to-day a long appeal and has asked me to stay proceedings till you can be heard from. I have informed him I would not do so; that persons writing over false names were always suspected by honorable men, and that all I could hold out to him was that you might release him if the dishonest editor who had substituted his newspaper name to the protection of another would place himself in prison in his place. I regard all these newspaper harpies as spies and think they could be punished as such.

I have approved the arrest of the captain and seizure of the steamboat Saline for carrying salt down the river without permit and changing it off for cotton. I will have the captain tried by a military commission for aiding and abetting the public enemy by furnishing them salt wherewith to cure bacon, a contraband article; also for trafficking on the river without license or permit. I hope the court will adopt my views and stop this nefarious practice. What use in carrying on war while our people are supplying arms and the sinews of war? We have succeeded in seizing a good deal of Confederate clothing, percussion caps, &c., some mails, &c.

At our last regular muster I caused all absentees to be reported “deserted,” whereby they got no pay; but inasmuch as the order for the muster for to-morrow, August 18, is universal, I will have the muster to-morrow and all absent then will be treated as deserters, and I will remit the former penalties as they are incurred under my orders.

I have sent out several infantry parties, as also cavalry, and am certain there is nothing but guerrillas between this and Senatobia and Tallahatchie. All the people are now guerrillas, and they have a perfect understanding. When a small body gets out they hastily assemble and attack, but when a large body moves out they scatter and go home.

Colonel Jackson commands at Senatobia, Jeff. Thompson having been ordered away. Villepigue is at Abbeville Station, 18 miles south of Holly Springs. They have guards all along the railroad to Grenada and cavalry everywhere. I think their purpose is to hold us and Curtis here while they mass against you and Buell or New Orleans. Price has been reported coming here, but of this we know nothing. If he comes he can and will take care that we know nothing of it till the last moment. I feel certain that no force save guerrillas have thus far passed north toward McClernand.

All the people here were on the qui vive for Baton Rouge and Nashville, but there seems to be a lull in their talk. I find them much more resigned and less presumptuous than at first. Your orders about property and mine about "niggers" make them feel that they can be hurt, and they are about as sensitive about their property as Yankees. I believe in universal confiscation and colonization. Some Union people have been expelled from Raleigh. I have taken some of the richest rebels and will compel them to buy and pay for all the land, horses, cattle, and effects, as well as damages, and let the Union owner deed the property to one or more of them. This they don't like at all. I do not exact the oath universally, but assume the ground that all within our lines are American citizens, and if they do any act or fail in any duty required of them as such then they can and will be punished as spies.

Instead of furnishing a permanent provost guard I give Colonel Anthony two good officers to assist him and change the regiment weekly. All are in tents and have their transportation ready to move. I am also in tents. I think 4,000 men could land opposite Helena, march rapidly to Panola, destroy that bridge, then to Oxford and Abbeville and destroy that, thus making the Tallahatchie the northern limits of their railroad. Afterward, Grenada, Jackson, and Meridian must be attacked. Break up absolutely and effectually the railroad bridges, mills, and everything going to provide their armies and they must feel it. The maintenance of this vast army must soon reduce their strength.

The lines of the Mississippi must be under one command. As it is, Curtis and I are perfectly independent of each other. He was here the other day. I know him well; he is very jealous of interference and will do nothing at another's suggestion. If you want him to do anything you must get Halleck to order it. Fort progresses too slow; 1,300 negroes at work on it. One installment of guns received; balance expected every hour. Weather heretofore unbearably hot, but now pretty cool.

Yours, truly,
W. T. SHERMAN,                
Major-general.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 17, Part 2 (Serial No. 25), p. 178-9

Friday, February 14, 2020

George S. Denison to Salmon P. Chase, February 26, 1863

(Private)
New Orleans, February 26th, 1863.

Dear Sir: The military movements lately in contemplation, have, I think, been given up. This opinion may be incorrect, but is based upon the best information I can gather. The authorities attempt to maintain great secrecy in all their steps. All the contortions of the Sybil are presented without any of her inspiration. Thus far, except in preparation, the accomplishments of Gen. Banks amount to nothing. It is my opinion that a grand attack direct upon Port Hudson, is intended. If so, it may come off in four or five weeks, and I should think the chances of failure and of success will be about equal.

I do not think Gen. Banks favors the enlistment of negroes. There has been some trouble about Butler's three regiments, because most of their officers are colored, and the New England soldier could not consent to present arms to a colored officer and treat him with necessary respect. The good sense of the negroes themselves would have obviated this difficulty, if Gen. Banks had followed their suggestions. They presented to him a petition asking that the three Regiments be brigaded together, and not be mingled with the other troops, but, as they have often requested, be assigned to some post of danger where they might be able to establish a good name for themselves. This request has not been granted.

The 4th. Reg't. Native Guards, authorized by Gen. Banks, is nearly full. I understand he has permitted a Fifth to be raised. But this is nothing compared with what can and should be done. Gen. Banks seems to be much guided by his West Point officers, most of whom for some reason or other, have prejudices against negro troops. Gen. Phelps is a distinguished exception. I am glad to see his nomination as Major General. Except Gen. Phelps no officer in this Department came near Gen. Butler in ability. And this was the real ground, 1 believe, of their disagreement. The Department of the Gulf was not large enough for two such men. Each was of too emphatic character, too self willed and determined in opinion, to get along well with the other. The fortifications built by the Rebels about the city are being strengthened and guns mounted on them. We never used to think the recapture of the City possible, defended by only a few thousand men and Gen. Butler.

I used to have great admiration for McClellan, based on opinions formed among the rebels, who always spoke of him with respect—as well as of Buell. Gen. Banks is regarded by them as a gentleman. This is not a good sign. But they hated Lyon, and hate Rosecrans and Hunter and Butler and Phelps, and all who do not believe in conciliation. They like to be conciliated.

The Department of the Gulf is too big a machine to be run by any one except B. F. Butler. 1 am afraid from late accounts that he is not to return here. Perhaps Mr. Seward is hostile to him.

This is less a Union City now than when Gen. Banks came here. There is more manifestation of disloyalty than at any time during the Summer. And the reason is that no punishment, or insufficient punishment, follows offenses. It won't do, you know, to be hard on a gentleman for exercising his constitutional right of abusing the United States. Judge Peabody of the Provisional Court, is also Provost Judge. Judge Peabody is a mistake. As Provost Judge, he is only a small magistrate. A man throws up his hat and hurrahs for Jeff. Davis in the street. Judge P. fines him five dollars. An enthusiastic rebel does not repent that price for so great a privilege. Butler would have sent the offender to Fort Jackson and neither he nor any acquaintance of his, would have committed the offense again.

The policy of conciliation, in whatever form, is useless, absurd and hurtful, and whoever adopts it may justly be accused of expecting a nomination for the Presidency. I expect Mr. Bullitt on Sunday the 1st. of March. We shall work well together, and nothing shall be wanting on my part, to make the management of the Custom House as efficient as heretofore.

SOURCE: Diary and correspondence of Salmon P. ChaseAnnual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 360-2

Thursday, December 5, 2019

Diary of Colonel Jacob Ammen, April 5, 1862

Marched 9½ miles over bad roads, and reached Savannah, Tenn., before 12 m. General Grant was not at his headquarters (Savannah), and no one to give orders. General Nelson ordered me to go into camp. The-Tenth Brigade encamped on the southwest side of the town, about half to three-fourths of a mile from the brick house on the river (headquarters). About 3 p. m. General Grant and General Nelson came to my tent. General Grant declined to dismount, as he had an engagement. In answer to my remark that our troops were not fatigued and could march on to Pittsburg Landing, Tenn., if necessary, General Grant said, “You cannot march through the swamps; make the troops comfortable; I will send boats for you Monday or Tuesday, or some time early in the week. There will be no fight at Pittsburg Landing; we will have to go to Corinth, where the rebels are fortified. If they come to attack us, we can whip them, as I have more than twice as many troops as I had at Fort Donelson. Be sure and call at the brick house on the river to-morrow evening, as I have an engagement for this evening.” He and General Nelson then rode off. General Buell arrived about sundown. I called on him at his headquarters, about a quarter of a mile from my tent. The Nineteenth and Twenty-second Brigades encamped near the road before reaching the town. I was not at these camps. As the division is to remain here some days, I issue orders to the Tenth Brigade for review and inspection, to take place Sunday, April 6, 9 a. m.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 10, Part 1 (Serial No. 10), p. 330-1

Saturday, October 26, 2019

Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell to Major-General George B. McClellan, February 8, 1862—9 a.m.

LOUISVILLE, February 8, 18629 a.m.
Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN:

I am concentrating and preparing, but will not decide definitely yet.
D.C. BUELL,
Brigadier-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 7 (Serial No. 7), p. 594

Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell to Major-General George B. McClellan, February 7, 1862—9 p.m.

LOUISVILLE, February 7, 18629 p.m.
Major-General MCCLELLAN:

I cannot, on reflection, think a change of my line would be advisable. I shall want eighteen rifled siege guns and four companies of experienced gunners to man them. I hope General Grant will not require further re-enforcements. I will go, if necessary.

D.C. BUELL,
Brigadier-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 7 (Serial No. 7), p. 593

Friday, October 25, 2019

Major-General Henry W. Halleck to Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell, February 7, 1862

SAINT Louis, February 7, 1862.
Brig. Gen. D.C. BUELL, Louisville, Ky.:

GENERAL: My telegrams of to-day are so full that I have very little to add in answer to your letter of the 5th. You say you regret that we could not have consulted on this move earlier. So do I, most sincerely. I had no idea of commencing the movement before the 15th or the 20th instant till I received General McClellan's telegram about the re-enforcement sent to Tennessee or Kentucky with Beauregard. Although not ready, I deemed it important to move instantly. I believe I was right. We must hold. Fort Henry must be held at all hazards. I am sending there every man I can get hold of, without regard to the consequences of abandoning posts in this State. If the rebels rise, I will put them down afterwards. Grant's force is small—only 15,000. Eight thousand more are on the way to re-enforce him. If we can sustain ourselves and advance up the Cumberland or Tennessee, Bowling Green must be abandoned. I suppose the mud there, as it is here, is too deep for movements outside of railroads and rivers.

The enemy has the railroads, and we must use the rivers—at least for the present. Unfortunately our gunboats are badly disabled. They will be repaired as soon as possible. In the mean time we must push on with infantry and artillery on transports I have no train, and most of the regiments are without means of transportation on land. I hope you will help us all you can. I deem the holding of Fort Henry of vital importance to both of us.

I write in great haste, but you will understand the purport of what I wish to express.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 H. W. HALLECK,   
 Major-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 7 (Serial No. 7), p. 593

Major-General George B. McClellan to Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell, February 7, 1862 — 7:15 p.m.


HEADQUARTERS ARMY, February 7, 18627.15 p. m.
 Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL,  Louisville, Ky.:

Why not take the line of the Tennessee with your command and operate on Nashville, while Halleck turns Union City and Columbus?

I have directed him to destroy bridge at Decatur if possible to reach it.

After carrying Nashville and Columbus a combined attack on Memphis could be made; it would easily fall if bridge at Decatur destroyed. Call for all available troops in Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan.

Please number and give hour of transmittal of telegraphic dispatches.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,       
Major-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 7 (Serial No. 7), p. 593

Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, February 5, 1862

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,       
Louisville, Ky., February 5, 1862.
Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Commanding Department of Missouri:

GENERAL: My plan of operations was sketched in the letter which I wrote you on the — ultimo. You have, I learn from your letter and dispatches, entered upon what would have concerned it on your side, and that is a very important part of it. I regret that we could not have consulted upon it earlier, because my work must at first be slow. Besides, since I wrote you those plans have been changed, or at least suspended, in consequence of the diversion of a large part of my efficient force for other objects, which the General-in-Chief urged as of primary importance, namely, our advance into East Tennessee. I have, however, in consequence of the want of transportation, and, more than all, the impassable condition of the roads, urged him to allow me to resume my original plan, and, if I am not restricted, shall enter upon its execution at once. My troops have, however, been thrown somewhat out of position, and it will take some days to get them into place. My progress, too, must be slow, for we are dependent upon the railroad for supplies, and that we must repair as we go, the enemy having very much damaged it between Green River and Bowling Green, 40 miles. That will take ten or twelve days. I must go provided with a siege train, because the enemy is strongly intrenched with heavy artillery behind a river, and the condition of the roads will, I fear, effectually bar any plan of attack which will depend on celerity of movement.

I think it is quite plain that the center of the enemy's line—that part which you are now moving against— is the decisive point of his whole front, as it is also the most vulnerable. If it is held, or even the bridges on the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers destroyed and your force maintains itself near those points, Bowling Green will speedily fall and Columbus will soon follow. The work which you have undertaken is therefore of the very highest importance, without reference to the injurious effects of a failure. There is not in the whole field of operations a point at which every man you can raise can be employed with more effect or with the prospect of as important results.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
D.C. BUELL,
Brigadier-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 7 (Serial No. 7), p. 936-7

Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, February 7, 1862

FEBRUARY 7, 1862.
General HALLECK, Saint Louis, Mo.:

I congratulate you on your success. Considering the uncertainty of forming a junction, I ordered the brigade from Green River to go up the Tennessee. The boats start to-night to take them on board.

I have no light batteries to send you now.
D.C. BUELL,
Brigadier-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 7 (Serial No. 7), p. 592

Major-General Henry W. Halleck to Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell, February 7, 1862

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,         
Saint Louis, February 7, 1862.
Brig. Gen. D.C. BUELL, Louisville:

Your letter of the 5th just received.* I agree with you entirely. Bowling Green must be given up if we can hold our position. The enemy will concentrate at Nashville, Clarksville, or Paris, or will attempt to regain his lost advantage at Fort Henry or Dover—I think the latter. It is all-important that we hold our position and advance toward Nashville. I fear I may not be able to do this without more troops. If from the condition of the roads you can neither threaten nor attack Bowling Green nor follow him to the Cumberland, I advise the sending of every man not necessary to sustain your line on Green River down the Ohio, to operate up the Cumberland or Tennessee. If we can hold Fort Henry and move up these rivers, you will have no further difficulty about Bowling Green. The enemy must abandon it and fall back. If he moves all his forces against me on the Tennessee I may not be able to resist him, but will do everything in my power. I have only 15,000 men at Fort Henry and Dover. I throw out these suggestions for your consideration. If you can help me still further I know you will do so.

H. W. HALLECK,    
Major-General.
_______________

* See p. 936.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 7 (Serial No. 7), p. 592

Thursday, October 24, 2019

Major-General Henry W. Halleck to Major-General George B. McClellan, February 7, 1862

SAINT LOUIS, February 7, 1862.
Major-General McCLELLAN:

Fort Henry will be held at all hazards. It is said that the enemy is concentrating troops by railroad to recover his lost advantage. If General Buell cannot either attack or threaten Bowling Green on account of the roads, I think every man not required to defend Green River should be sent to the Tennessee River or Cumberland River. We can hold our ground and advance up these rivers. The enemy must abandon Bowling Green. If he does not, he is completely paralyzed. He will concentrate at Dover, Clarksville, or Paris, or fall back on Nashville. In either case Bowling Green will be of little importance. He ought to concentrate at Dover, and attempt to retake Fort Henry. It is the only way he can restore an equilibrium. We should be prepared for this. If you agree with me, send me everything you can spare from General Buell's command or elsewhere. We must hold our ground and cut the enemy's lines. I am sending everything I can rake and scrape together from Missouri.

H. W. HALLECK,    
Major-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 7 (Serial No. 7), p. 590-1

Major-General George B. McClellan to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, February 7, 1862 — 7:15 p.m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, February 7, 18627.15 p.m.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Saint Louis, Mo.:

Dispatch received. I congratulate you upon the result of your operations. They have caused the utmost satisfaction here. I would not undertake a dash at Columbus now. Better devote everything towards turning it; first collecting a sufficient force near Forts Henry and Donelson to make success sure.

Either Buell or yourself should soon go to the scene of operations. Why not have Buell take the line of Tennessee and operate on Nashville, while your troops turn Columbus? Those two points gained, a combined movement on Memphis will be next in order. The bridges at Tuscumbia and Decatur should at all hazards be destroyed at once.

Please number telegraphic dispatches and give hour of transmittal. Thank Grant, Foote, and their commands for me.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,       
Major-General, Commanding.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 7 (Serial No. 7), p. 591

Major-General Henry W. Halleck to Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell, February 7, 1862

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,         
Saint Louis, February 7, 1862.
Brig. Gen. D.C. BUELL, Louisville, Ky.:

Fort Henry is ours. The enemy is retreating on Paris, pursued by our cavalry. He has been compelled to abandon a part of his artillery. The gunboats will proceed up the river as far as may be safe. It is believed that the enemy is concentrating his forces at Paris, to operate on our flank. It will require every man we can get to hold him in check there, while a column is sent up the Tennessee or Cumberland, or both, to destroy bridges. We are much in want of artillery. Send down as many light batteries as you can spare. General Grant expects to take Fort Donelson (at Dover) to-morrow. If troops are sent up the Cumberland they will be preceded by gunboats.

H. W. HALLECK,    
Major-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 7 (Serial No. 7), p. 592

Wednesday, October 23, 2019

Major-General Henry W. Halleck to Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell, February 13, 1862

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,         
Saint Louis, February 13, 1862.
Brigadier-General BUELL, Louisville:

The attack will be made on Fort Donelson to-day by the joint land and naval forces, or if not to-day certainly to-morrow. Would it not be possible to make a cavalry demonstration on Bowling Green? A mere feint might help. I have no maps other than the general ones in book-stores. Why not come down and take the immediate command of the Cumberland column yourself? If so, I will transfer Sherman and Grant to the Tennessee column.

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 7 (Serial No. 7), p. 609

Tuesday, October 15, 2019

Diary of Colonel Jacob Ammen, March 27, 1862

Late in the evening General Nelson in returning from General Buell’s headquarters, informed me that he had General Buell’s permission to take the advance, and gave me a verbal order to cross Duck River at daylight the 29th.  I inquired if the bridge would be done.  He answered “No.” “Are there any boats?” He said “No, but the river is falling; and damn you, get over, for we must have the advance and get the glory.”  He enjoined secrecy, lest we should be prevented from taking the advance.

SOURCE: Allen Nevins, “The War for the Union: War Becomes Revolution 1862—1863,” p. 80

Major-General Henry W. Halleck to Major-General Don Carlos Buell, March 18, 1862

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,      
Saint Louis, March 16, 1862.
Major-General BUELL, Nashville:

Move your forces by land to the Tennessee as rapidly as possible. Our troops have destroyed the railroad at Purdy, but find the enemy in strong force at Eastport and Corinth, reported 60,000. Grant's army is concentrating at Savannah. You must direct your march on that point, so that the enemy cannot get between us. He still holds on to Island No. 10. We bombarded him yesterday and renew it again today. The detention of your boats at Paducah is without my orders. It will not be repeated.

H. W. HALLECK,    
Major-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 10, Part 2 (Serial No. 11), p. 42

Major-General Henry W. Halleck to Major-General Don Carlos Buell, March 14, 1862

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSISSPPI,        
Saint Louis, March 14, 1862.
Major-General BUELL, Nashville:

A diving-boat will be sent up the Cumberland as soon as possible. The enemy has a large force at Island No. 10, and holds on with great tenacity. The position is turned, and will soon be attacked.

I am satisfied that the enemy's present line of defense extends from Decatur to Island No. 10. We must attack it in the center, say at Corinth or Jackson. General Smith has established himself at Savannah. I think all your available force not required to defend Nashville should be sent up the Tennessee. This seems to be the best line of operations, as it leads directly to the enemy's center, and is easily supplied. Give me your views.

H. W. HALLECK,    
Major-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 10, Part 2 (Serial No. 11), p. 38

Major-General Don Carlos Buell to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, March 15, 1862

NASHVILLE, TENN., March 15, 1862.
Major-General HALLECK:

Your dispatch of yesterday received this morning. Undoubtedly we should use the river to get supplies, but I am decidedly of opinion that my force should strike it by marching. It can move in less time, in better condition, and with more security to our operations than by the river. It will have also the advantage of driving out the scattered force of the enemy this side of the river, and operate powerfully on the minds of the people. I had designed to commence moving to-morrow. We will have to repair our road somewhat as we go. It is important to choose the point of crossing so that it shall be safe, and yet not too far from the enemy; if, then, we could by a possibility effect it by surprise or at all at Florence, getting in between Decatur and Corinth, it would have many advantages. As for the point of attack, wherever that may be we will be pretty sure to meet the principal force of the enemy, and if we threaten him low down I am confident the island and New Madrid will be abandoned. I hope I can certainly see you in regard to those points.

Parson Brownlow has just arrived from Knoxville. Kirby Smith is there, with eighteen regiments from Manassas, and has seven more at Cumberland Gap.

 D. C. BUELL.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 10, Part 2 (Serial No. 11), p. 39

Saturday, October 12, 2019

Andrew Hickenlooper, Sr., April 11, 1862

Pittsburgh, Tenn., April 11th, 1862.

My Dear Family:—Andy and father are both well, which you will be glad to hear. We both went through a severe ordeal on the bloody field of battle on last Sunday and Monday, from 6:00 A. M. until dark of both days, and a bloody field it was.

Poor Andy acted gallantly all the time, and lost two of his guns, a large portion of his horses and all his personal effects, papers, etc. He has no clothing but that he has on his back, as all our camps fell into the hands of the enemy. Our forces were gradually driven back about four miles to less than a mile from the river.

About 4:00 P. M., on Sunday, all appeared lost, and it seemed to me it was Bull Run over again. While many gallant men freely shed their blood for their country, a large portion—say, 10,000—ingloriously fled back to the river, and no entreaties could prevail upon them to return. They sheltered themselves under the steep hillside next the river, where they were out of the range of shot and shell.

Colonel Taylor, early on Sunday morning, detailed a Lieutenant and a portion of his command to act as a bodyguard to General Grant, and I was one of the number. We continuously rode along the line of battle, through the hottest of their fire, for the whole distance of about five miles. The battlefield was about as large as a township in Ohio, say five or six miles square, and a greater part of it wild forest land with thick underbrush, and occasionally a small field of cleared land.

Andy had fifty-nine horses killed in their harness, all within a few minutes of each other. I was at his camp yesterday; his battery wagon has two six-pounder shot and sixty-five grape and canister shot through it, and is shattered all to pieces.

Strange to say, I have never been able to see Andy since the battle, although I have all the time hunted for him, and I know he is well.

The last time I saw him was on Sunday, in the forenoon, on the field of battle. He was riding a white horse, whose back, neck and forelegs were all covered with blood, it having received three bullets in its neck without killing it. As we were all driven from our camps, and had to rally where we could, it was impossible to find each other.

I never tasted anything but a few picked-up crackers to eat from early on Sunday morning until Tuesday morning; stood both nights in the rain and mud, protected only by my jacket, all of my clothing having been stolen while we were absent from our camp — my overcoat and poncho with the rest.

About 4 or 5 p. M., when all seemed lost, General Buell's forces appeared upon the opposite side of the river, crossed over as fast as they could, and moved up the hill right into action, which changed the fate of the battle.

Although hostilities were renewed early in the morning, and fought obstinately all day, we gradually and steadily drove them back a distance of six miles, when, about noon, they were completely routed and abandoned the field. It was too late to pursue them far, and the next morning they were beyond our reach, and we got back into our camp.

Many of the dead are not yet (Friday morning, the 11th) buried, and many never will be. Of the number killed and wounded I have no means of estimating; it must, however, be very large, as the field of battle was heavily timbered, and five or six miles square, and twice fought over, with dead scattered everywhere.

From what I saw of the field of battle yesterday I never want to contemplate another.

Your husband and father,
A. HlCKENLOOPER.

SOURCE: W. H. Chamberun, A. M. Van Dyke & George A. Thayer, Editors, Sketches of War History, 1861-1865: Papers Read Before the Ohio, Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, Vol. 5, p. 435-6