Department of State
Washington, 15th March, 1861.
The President submits to me the following question, namely, “Assuming
it to be possible to now provision Fort Sumter, under all the circumstances, is
it wise to attempt it?”
If it were possible to peacefully provision Fort Sumter, of course I
should answer that it would be both unwise and inhuman not to attempt it. But
the facts of the case are known to be, that the attempt must be made with the
employment of a military and marine force, which would provoke combat, and
probably initiate a civil war, which the Government of the United States would
be committed to maintain through all changes to some definite conclusion.
History must record that a sectional party practically constituting a
majority of the people of the fifteen Slave States, excited to a high state of
jealous apprehension for the safety of life and property, by impassioned,
though groundless appeals, went into the late election with a predetermined
purpose, if unsuccessful at the polls, to raise the standard of secession
immediately afterwards, and to separate the Slave States, or so many of them as
could be detached from the Union, and to organize them in a new, distinct, and
independent confederacy: that party was unsuccessful at the polls. In the
frenzy which followed the announcement of their defeat, they put the machinery of
the State Legislatures and conventions into motion, and within the period of
three months, they have succeeded in obtaining ordinances of secession by which
seven of the Slave States have seceded and organized a new Confederacy under
the name of the Confederated States of America. These States finding a large
number of the mints, customhouses, forts and arsenals of the United States
situate within their limits, unoccupied, undefended, and virtually abandoned by
the late Administration, have seized and appropriated them to their own use,
and under the same circumstances have seized and appropriated to their own use,
large amounts of money and other public property of the United States, found
within their limits. The people of the other Slave States, divided and
balancing between sympathy with the seceding slave States and loyalty to the
Union, have been intensely excited, but, at the present moment, indicate a
disposition to adhere to the Union, if nothing extraordinary shall occur to
renew excitement and produce popular exasperation. This is the stage in this
premeditated revolution, at which we now stand.
The opening of this painful controversy, at once raised the question
whether it would be for the interest of the country to admit the projected
dismemberment, with its consequent evils, or whether patriotism and humanity
require that it shall be prevented. As a citizen, my own decision on this
subject was promptly made, namely, that the Union is inestimable and even
indispensable to the welfare and happiness of the whole country, and to the
best interests of mankind. As a statesman in the public service, I have not
hesitated to assume that the Federal government is committed to maintain
preserve and defend the Union, peaceably if it can, forcibly if it must, to
every extremity. Next to Disunion itself, I regard civil war as the most
disastrous and deplorable of national calamities, and as the most uncertain and
fearful of all remedies for political disorders. I have therefore made it the
study and labor of the hour, how to save the Union from dismemberment by
peaceful policy and without civil war.
Influenced by these sentiments, I have felt that it is exceedingly
fortunate that, to a great extent, the Federal government occupies, thus far,
not an aggressive attitude, but, practically, a defensive one, while the
necessity for action, if civil war is to be initiated, falls on those who seek
to dismember and subvert this Union.
It has seemed to me equally fortunate that the Disunionists are
absolutely without any justification for their rash and desperate designs. The
administration of the Government had been for a long time virtually in their
own hands, and controlled and directed by themselves, when they began the work
of revolution. They had therefore no other excuse than apprehension of
oppression from the new and adverse administration which was about to come into
power
It seemed to me farther, to be a matter of good fortune that the new
and adverse administration must come in with both Houses of Congress containing
majorities opposed to its policy, so that, even if it would, it could commit no
wrong or injustice against the States which were being madly goaded into
revolution. Under the circumstances, Disunion could have no better basis to
stand upon than a blind unreasoning popular excitement, arising out of a simple
and harmless disappointment in a Presidential election – that excitement, if it
should find no new aliment, must soon subside and leave Disunion without any
real support. On the other hand, I have believed firmly that every where, even
in South Carolina, devotion to the Union is a profound and permanent national
sentiment which, although it may be suppressed and silenced by terror for a
time, could, if encouraged, be ultimately relied upon to rally the people of
the seceding States to reverse, upon due deliberation, all the popular acts of
legislatures and Conventions by which they were hastily and violently committed
to Disunion.
The policy of the time, therefore, has seemed to me to consist in conciliation,
which should deny to the Disunionists any new provocation or apparent offence,
while it would enable the Unionists in the slave states to maintain, with truth
and with effect, that the claims and apprehensions put forth by the
Disunionists, are groundless and false.
I have not been ignorant of the objection that the Administration was
elected through the activity of the Republican party, that it must continue to
deserve and retain the confidence of that party while conciliation towards the
Slave States tends to demoralize the Republican party itself, on which party
the main responsibility of maintaining the Union must rest.
But it has seemed to me a sufficient answer first, that the
Administration could not demoralize the Republican party without making some
sacrifice of its essential principles when no such sacrifice is necessary or is
any where authoritatively proposed; and secondly, if it be indeed true that
pacification is necessary to prevent dismemberment of the Union and civil war,
or either of them, no patriot and lover of humanity could hesitate to surrender
party for the higher interests of country and humanity.
Partly by design, partly by chance, this policy has been hitherto
pursued by the last Administration of the Federal government and by the
Republican party in its corporate action. It is by this policy thus pursued, I
think, that the progress of dismemberment has been arrested after the seven
Gulf States had seceded, and the Border States yet remain, although they do so
uneasily, in the Union.
It is to a perseverance in this policy for a short time longer that I
look as the only peaceful means of assuring the continuance of Virginia,
Maryland, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri and Arkansas, or most
of those States, in the Union. It is through their good and patriotic offices
that I look to see the Union sentiment revived and brought once more into
activity in the seceding States, and through this agency those states
themselves returning into the Union.
I am not unaware that I am conceding more than can reasonably be
demanded by the people of the Border States. They could, speaking justly,
demand nothing. They are bound by the federal obligation to adhere to the Union
without concession or conciliation just as much as the people of the Free
States are. But in administration we must deal with men, facts and
circumstances not as they ought to be, but as they are.
The fact then is that while the people of the Border States desire to
be loyal, they are at the same time sadly though temporarily demoralized by a
sympathy for the Slave States which makes them forget their loyalty whenever
there are any grounds for apprehending that the Federal Government will resort
to military coercion against the seceding States, even though such coercion
should be necessary to maintain the authority or even the integrity of the
Union. This sympathy is unreasonable, unwise and dangerous, and therefore
cannot, if left undisturbed, be permanent. It can be banished, however, only in
one way, and that is by giving time for it to wear out and for reason to resume
its sway. Time will do this, if it be not hindered by new alarms and
provocations.
South Carolina opened the revolution Apprehending chastisement by the
military arm of the United States, she seized all the Forts of the United
States in the harbor of Charleston, except Fort Sumter, which, garrisoned by
less than one hundred men, stands practically in a state of siege, but at the
same time defying South Carolina and, as the seceding States imagine, menacing
her with conquest. Every one knows, first, that even if Sumter were adequately
reinforced, it would still be practically useless to the Government, because
the administration in no case could attempt to subjugate Charleston or the
State of South Carolina.
It is held now only because it is the property of the United States and
is a monument of their authority and sovereignty. I would so continue to hold
it so long as it can be done without involving some danger or evil greater than
the advantage of continued possession. The highest military authority tells us
that without supplies the garrison must yield in a few days to starvation, that
its numbers are so small that it must yield in a few days to attack by the
assailants lying around it, and that the case in this respect would remain the
same even if it were supplied but not reinforced. All the military and naval
authorities tell us, that any attempt at supplies would be unavailing without
the employment of armed military and naval force. If we employ armed force for
the purpose of supplying the fort, we give all the provocation that could be
offered by combining reinforcement with supply.
The question submitted to me then, practically, is, Supposing it to be
possible to reinforce and supply Fort Sumter, is it wise now to
attempt it, instead of withdrawing the garrison. The most that could be done by
any means now in our hands, would be to throw 250 to 400 men into the garrison
with provisions for supplying it for six months. In this active and enlightened
country, in this season of excitement with a daily press, daily mails and
incessantly operating telegraph, the design to reinforce and supply the
garrison must become known to the opposite party at Charleston as soon, at
least, as preparation for it should begin. The garrison would then almost
certainly fall by assault before the expedition could reach the harbor of
Charleston. But supposing the secret kept, the expedition must engage in
conflict on entering the harbor of Charleston, suppose it to be overpowered and
destroyed, is that new outrage to be avenged or are we then to return to our
attitude of immobility? Shall we be allowed to do so? Moreover, in that event,
what becomes of the garrison?
Suppose the expedition successful– We have then a garrison in Fort
Sumter that can defy assault for six months. What is it to do then? Is it to
make war by opening its batteries and attempting to demolish the defences of
the Carolinians? Can it demolish them if it tries? If it cannot, what is the
advantage we shall have gained? If it can, how will it serve to check or
prevent Disunion? In either case, it seems to me that we will have inaugurated
a civil war by our own act, without an adequate object, after which reunion
will be hopeless, at least under this administration, or in any other way than
by a popular disavowal, both of the war and of the administration which
unnecessarily commenced it. Fraternity is the element of Union. War the very
element of disunion. Fraternity, if practiced by this administration, will
rescue the Union from all its dangers. If this administration, on the other
hand, take up the sword, then an opposition party will offer the olive branch
and will, as it ought, profit by the restoration of peace and Union.
I may be asked, whether I would in no case and at no time, advise force
– whether I propose to give up everything. I reply, no, I would not initiate a
war to regain a useless and unnecessary position on the soil of the seceding
States. I would not provoke war in any way now. I would resort to force
to protect the collection of the revenue, because this is a necessary as well
as a legitimate union object. Even then, it should be only a naval force that I
would employ, for that necessary purpose– While I would defer military action
on land until a case should arise when we would hold the defence. In that case,
we should have the spirit of the country and the approval of mankind on our
side. In the other, we should peril peace and Union, because we had not the
courage to practice prudence and moderation at the cost of temporary
misapprehension. If this counsel seems to be impassive and even unpatriotic, I
console myself by the reflection that it is such as Chatham gave to his country
under circumstances not widely different.
William H. Seward
