HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Camp on Big Black, Miss., September 17, 1863.
Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief, Washington, D.C.:
DEAR GENERAL: I have
received your letter of August 29, and with pleasure confide to you fully my
thoughts on the important matters you suggest, with absolute confidence that
you will use what is valuable and reject the useless or superfluous.
That part of the
continent of North America known as Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas is in
my judgment the key to the whole interior. The Valley of the Mississippi is
America, and although railroads have changed the economy of intercommunication,
yet the water channels still mark the lines of fertile land and afford carriage
to the heavy products of it. The inhabitants of the country on the Monongahela,
the Illinois, the Minnesota, the Yellowstone, and Osage are as directly
concerned in the security of the Lower Mississippi as are those who dwell on its
very banks in Louisiana, and now that the nation has recovered its possession
this generation of men would commit a fearful mistake if we again commit its
charge to a people liable to mistake their title, and assert, as was recently
done, treat because they dwell by sufferance on the banks of this mighty stream
they had a right to control its navigation.
I would deem it very
unwise at this time, or for years to come, to revive the State Governments of
Louisiana, &c., or to institute in this quarter any civil government in
which the local people have much to say. They had a government, and so mild and
paternal that they gradually forgot they had any at all, save what they
themselves controlled; they asserted absolute right to seize public moneys,
forts, arms, and even to shut up the natural avenues of travel and commerce.
They chose war; they ignored and denied all the obligations of the solemn
contract of government and appealed to force. We accepted the issue, and now
they begin to realize that war is a two-edged sword, and, it may be, that many
of the inhabitants cry for peace. I know them well and the very impulses of
their nature; and to deal with the inhabitants of that part of the South which
borders the great river we must recognize the classes into which they have
naturally divided themselves.
First, the large
planters owning lands, slaves, and all kinds of personal property. These are on
type whole the ruling class. They are educated, wealthy, and easily approached.
In some districts they are as bitter as gall, and have given up slaves,
plantations, and all, serving in the armies of the Confederacy, whereas in
others they are conservative. None dare admit a friendship to us, though they
say freely that they were opposed to war and disunion. I know we can manage
this class, but only by action; argument is exhausted, and words have not their
usual meaning. Nothing but the logic of events touches their understanding, but
of late this has worked a wonderful change. If our country were like Europe,
crowded with people, I would say it would be easier to replace this population
than to reconstruct it subordinate to the policy of the nation; but as this is
not the case, it is better to allow them, with individual exceptions, gradually
to recover their plantations, to hire any species of labor, and adapt
themselves to the new order of things. Still their friendship and assistance to
reconstruct order out of the present ruin cannot be depended on. They watch the
operations of our armies, and hope still for a Southern Confederacy that will
restore to them the slaves and privileges which they feel are otherwise lost
forever. In my judgment we have two more battles to win before we should even
bother our minds with the idea of restoring civil order, viz, one near Meridian
in November, and one near Shreveport in February and March, when Red River is
navigable by our gunboats. When these are done, then, and not until then, win
the planters of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Mississippi submit. Slavery is already
gone, and to cultivate the land negro or other labor must be hired. This of
itself is a vast revolution, and time must be afforded to allow men to adjust
their minds and habits to the new order of things. A civil government of the
representative type would suit this class far less than a pure military rule,
one readily adapting itself to actual occurrences and able to enforce its laws
and orders promptly and emphatically.
Second, the smaller
farmers, mechanics, merchants, and laborers. This class will probably number
three-fourths of the whole, have in fact no real interest in the establishment
of a Southern Confederacy, and have been led or driven into war on the false
theory that they were to be benefited somehow, they knew not how. They are
essentially tired of the war, and would slink back home if they could. These
are the real tiers-état of the South, and are hardly worthy a thought,
for they swerve to and fro according to events they do not comprehend or
attempt to shape. When the time for reconstruction comes they will want the old
political system of caucuses, legislatures, &c., something to amuse them
and make them believe they are achieving wonders, but in all things they will
follow blindly the lead of the planter. The Southern politicians, who understand
this class, use them as the French use their masses. Seemingly consulting their
prejudices, they make their orders and enforce them. We should do the same.
Third, the Union men
of the South. I must confess I have little respect for this class. They allowed
a clamorous set of demagogues to muzzle and drive them as a pack of curs.
Afraid of shadows, they submit tamely to squads of dragoons, and permit them,
without a murmur to burn their cotton, take their horses, corn, and everything,
and when we reach them they are full of complaints if our men take a few fence
rails for fire or corn to feed our horses. They give us no assistance or
information, and are loudest in the complaints at the smallest excess of our
soldiers. Their sons, horses, arms, and everything useful are in the army
against us, and they stay at home, claiming all the exemptions of peaceful
citizens. I account them as nothing in this great game.
Fourth, the young
bloods of the South, sons of planters, lawyers about towns, good billiard players,
and sportsmen—men who never did work nor never will. War suits them, and the
rascals are brave; fine riders, bold to rashness, and dangerous subjects in
every sense. They care not a sou for niggers, land, or anything. They hate
Yankees per se, and don't bother their brains about the past, present,
or future. As long as they have good horses, plenty of forage, and an open
country, they are happy. This is a larger class than most men supposed, and are
the most dangerous set of men which this war has turned loose upon the world.
They are splendid riders, shots, and utterly reckless. Stuart, John Morgan,
Forrest, and Jackson are the types and leaders of this class. This class of men
must all be killed or employed by us before we can hope for peace. They have no
property or future, and therefore cannot be influenced by anything except
personal considerations. I have two brigades of these fellows to my front,
commanded by Cosby, of the old army, and Whitfield, of Texas, Stephen D. Lee in
command of the whole. I have frequent interviews with the officers and a good
understanding. Am inclined to think when the resources of their country are
exhausted we must employ them. They are the best cavalry in the world, but it
will tax Mr. Chase's genius of finance to supply them with horses. At present
horses cost them nothing, for they take where they find and don't bother their
brains who is to pay for them. Some of the corn-fields which have, as they
believe, been cultivated by a good-natured people for their special benefit, we
propose to share with them the free use of these corn-fields planted by willing
hands that will never gather it.
Now that I have
sketched the people who inhabit the district of country under consideration, I
will proceed to discuss the future. A civil government for any part of it would
be simply ridiculous. The people would not regard it, and even the military
commanders of the antagonistic party would treat it lightly. Governors would be
simply petitioners for military assistance to protect supposed friendly
interests, and military commanders would refuse to disperse and weaken their
armies for military reasons. Jealousies would arise between the two conflicting
powers, and instead of contributing to the end we all have in view, would
actually defer it. Therefore I contend that the interests of the United States
and of the real parties concerned demand the continuance of the simple military
rule till long after all the organized armies of the South are dispersed,
conquered, and subjugated. All this region is represented in the Army of
Virginia, Charleston, Mobile, and Chattanooga. They have sons and relations in
each, and naturally are interested in their fate. Though we hold military
possession of the key-points of this country, still they contend, and
naturally, that should Lee succeed in Virginia or Bragg at Chattanooga, a
change will occur here also. We cannot for this reason attempt to reconstruct
parts of the South as we conquer it till all idea of the establishment of a
Southern Confederacy is abandoned. We should avail ourselves of the lull here
to secure the geographical points that give us advantage in future military
movements, and should treat the idea of civil government as one in which we as
a nation have a minor or subordinate interest. The opportunity is good to
impress on the population the truth that they are more interested in civil
government than we are, and that to enjoy the protection of laws they must not
be passive observers of events, but must aid and sustain the constituted
authorities in enforcing the laws; they must not only submit themselves, but
pay their taxes and render personal services when called on. It seems to me, in
contemplating the past two years history, all the people of our country, North,
South, East, and West have been undergoing a salutary political schooling,
learning lessons which might have been taught all by the history of other
people, but we had all become so wise in our own conceit that we would only
learn by actual experience of our own.
The people, even of
small and unimportant localities, North as well as South, had reasoned
themselves into the belief that their opinions were superior to the aggregated
interest of the whole nation. Half our territorial nation rebelled on a
doctrine of secession that they themselves now scout, and a real numerical
majority actually believed that a little State was endowed with such
sovereignty that it could defeat the policy of the great whole. I think the
present war has exploded that notion, and were this war to cease now, the
experience gained, though dear, would be worth the expense.
Another great and
important natural truth is still in contest and can only be solved by war.
Numerical majorities by vote is our great arbiter. Heretofore all have submitted
to it in questions left open, but numerical majorities are not necessarily
physical majorities. The South, though numerically inferior, contend they can
whip the Northern superiority of numbers, and therefore by natural law are not
bound to submit. This issue is the only real one, and in my judgment all else
should be deferred to it. War alone can decide it, and it is the only question
left to us as a people. Can we whip the South? If we can, our numerical
majority has both the natural and constitutional right to govern. If we cannot
whip them, they contend for the natural right to select their own government,
and they have the argument. Our armies must prevail over theirs. Our officers,
marshals, and courts must penetrate into the innermost recesses of their land
before we have the natural right to demand their submission.
I would banish all
minor questions and assert the broad doctrine, that as a nation the United
States has the right, and also the physical power, to penetrate to every part of
the national domain, and that we will do it; that we will do it in our own
time, and in our own way; that it makes no difference whether it be in one year
or two, or ten or twenty; that we will remove and destroy every obstacle—if
need be, take every life, every acre of land, every particle of property,
everything that to us seems proper; that we will not cease until the end is
attained. That all who do not aid are enemies, and we will not account to them
for our acts. If the people of the South oppose, they do so at their peril; and
if they stand by mere lookers-on the domestic tragedy, they have no right to
immunity, protection, or share in the final result.
I even believe, and
contend further, that in the North every member of the nation is bound by both
natural and constitutional to "maintain and defend the Government against
all its opposers whomsoever." If they fail to do it they are derelict.,
and can be punished or deprived of all advantage arising from the labors of
those who do. If any man, North or South, withholds his share of taxes or
physical assistance in this crisis of our history, he should and could be
deprived of all voice in the future elections of this country, and might be
banished or reduced to the condition of a denizen of the land.
War is upon us; none
can deny it. It is not the act of the Government of the United States but of a
faction. The Government was forced to accept the issue or submit to a
degradation fatal and disgraceful to all the inhabitants. In accepting war it
should be pure and simple as applied to the belligerents. I would keep it so
till all traces of the war are effaced; till those who appealed to it are sick
and tired of it, and come to the emblem of our nation and sue for peace. I
would not coax them or even meet them half way, but make them so sick of war
that generations would pass before they would again appeal to it.
I know what I say
when I repeat that the insurgents of the South sneer at all overtures looking
to their interest. They scorn the alliance with copperheads. They tell me to my
face that they respect Grant, McPherson, and our brave associates who fight
manfully and well for a principle, but despise the copperheads and sneaks who
profess friendship for the South and opposition to the war as mere covers for
their knavery and poltroonery.
God knows that I
deplored this fratricidal war as much as any man living; but it is upon us, a
physical fact, and there is only one honorable issue from it. We must fight it
out, army against army and man against man, and I know and you know and
civilians begin to realize the fact that reconciliation and reconstruction will
be easier through and by means of strong, well-equipped and organized armies
than through any species of conventions that can be framed. The issues are
made, and all discussion is out of place and ridiculous.
The section of
30-pounder Parrott rifles now drilling before my tent is a more convincing
argument than the largest Democratic meeting the State of New York could
assemble at Albany, and a simple order of the War Department to draft enough
men to fill our skeleton regiments would be more convincing as to our national
perpetuity than an humble pardon to Jeff. Davis and all his misled host.
The only government
now needed or deserved by the States of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Mississippi
now exists in Grant's army. It needs simply enough privates to fill its ranks;
all else will follow in due season. This army has its well-defined code of laws
and practice, and can adapt itself to the wants and necessities of a city, the
country, the rivers, the sea; indeed, to all parts of this land. It better
subserves the interest and policy of the General Government, and the people
prefer it to any weak or servile combination that would at once, from force of
habit, revive and perpetuate local prejudices and passions. The people of this
country have forfeited all right to a voice in the councils of the nation. They
know it and feel it, and in after years they will be the better citizens from
the dear-bought experience of the present crisis. Let them learn now, and learn
it well, that good citizens must obey as well as command. Obedience to law—absolute,
yea, even abject—is the lesson that this war, under Providence, will teach the
free and enlightened American citizen; as a nation we will be the better for
it. I never have apprehended foreign interference in our family quarrel. Of
course governments founded on a different, and it may be antagonistic,
principle with ours, would naturally feel a pleasure at our complications, but
in the end England and France will join with us in jubilations in the triumph
of a constitutional government over faction; even now the English manifest
this.
I do not profess to
understand Napoleon's design in Mexico, but I do not see that his taking
military possession of Mexico concerns us. We have as much territory as we
want. The Mexicans have failed in self-government, and it was a question to
what nation she would fall a prey. That is solved, and I don't see that we are damaged.
We have the finest part of the North American continent, all we can people and
take care of, and if we can suppress rebellion in our land and compose the
strife generated by it, we will have people, resources, and wealth which, if
well combined, can defy interference from any and every quarter.
I therefore hope the
Government of the United States will continue as heretofore in collecting in
well-organized armies the physical strength of the nation; apply it as
heretofore in asserting the national authority, persevering without relaxation
to the end. This, whether near or far off, is not for us to say, but,
fortunately, we have no choice. We must succeed; no other choice is left us but
degradation. The South must be ruled or will rule. We must conquer them
ourselves or be conquered. There is no middle course. They ask and will have
nothing else, and all the talk of compromise is bosh, for we know they would
even now scorn the offer. I wish the war could have been deferred for twenty
years, till the superabundant population of the North should flow in and
replace the losses sustained by war, but this could not be, and we are forced
to take things as they arise.
All therefore I can
now venture to advise is the pushing the draft to its maximum, fill the present
regiments to as large a standard as possible, and push the war, pure and
simple.
Great attention
should be paid to the discipline of our armies, for on them will be founded the
future stability of our Government. The cost of the war is of course to be
considered, but finances will adjust themselves to the-actual state of affairs,
and even if we would we could not change the cost. Indeed, the larger the cost
now the less will it be in the end, for the end must be attained somehow,
regardless of cost of life and treasure, and is merely a question of time.
Excuse so long a
letter.
With great respect,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-general.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume
30, Part 3 (Serial No. 52), p. 694-700
