No. 97
Reports of Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, U.S. Army, commanding
Twenty-third Army Corps, of operations November 30, 1864.
HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, TWENTY-THIRD ARMY CORPS,
Nashville, Tenn.,
December 2, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to make the following preliminary
report of the battle of Franklin, fought on the 30th ultimo:
My division reached Franklin an hour before daybreak on the
morning of the 30th of November, having marched from Columbia during the night
and being in advance of the army from Thompson's Station. At daybreak I
received orders from Major-General Schofield, commanding the army, to take
command of both divisions of the Twenty-third Corps and put them in position
covering the town and the passage of the army trains, &c., to the north
bank of the Harpeth River. The Third Division was put in on the left of the
Franklin pike, reaching from that road across the Lewisburg pike to the river,
Reilly's brigade on the right: Casement's in the center, and Henderson's (Col.
I. N. Stiles temporarily commanding) on the left. The Second Division occupied
the ground from the Franklin pike toward the right, reaching to the Carter's
Creek pike, Strickland's brigade on the left and Moore's on the right. About
noon General Kimball, commanding First Division, Fourth Corps, reported to me,
by order of the commanding general, and was put in on the right of the Second
Division, Twenty-third Corps, covering the ground to the river on the right,
having two brigades in line and one in reserve. At 1 o'clock General Wagner,
commanding Second Division, Fourth Corps, reported to me, his division being
then the rear guard of the army, two brigades (Bradley's and Lane's) being
deployed across the Columbia pike on which the enemy were advancing, and one
(Opdycke's) being in reserve in the town of Franklin. General Wagner informed
me that he was already under orders to keep out the two brigades till the enemy
should make an advance in line in force, when he was to retire skirmishing, and
become a reserve for the line established by me.
The artillery of my division, under Captain Cockerill,
Battery D, First Ohio Light Artillery, was in the fort on the north bank of the
Harpeth, and Captain Bridges was ordered by the commanding general to report to
me with three batteries of the Fourth Corps. These were stationed as follows:
One section light 12's commanding the Lewisburg pike, one section light 12's
and a battery of 3-inch ordnance guns on the left of the Columbia pike, and one
battery light 12's on the right of the Columbia pike. One other battery light
12's was subsequently sent to the Carter's Creek pike and worked on that part
of the line. At about 2 o'clock the enemy were seen advancing, deployed in
three lines, which, as they passed the range of hills before the town and came
into full view in the open ground, were plainly seen to extend from the river
on their right nearly or quite to the Carter's Creek pike on their left. The
fact was reported to the general commanding, as well as the dispositions of our
own troops as they then were, and his orders received in reference to holding
the position. At 3 o'clock the enemy engaged the two brigades of Wagner's
division, which, in accordance with orders, fell leisurely back within our
lines, and the action became general along the entire front. The left of
Strickland's brigade, Second Division, Twenty-third Corps, was somewhat
confused, some new troops there not understanding the movement of Wagner's
division, and one or two regiments partially retiring with them. The enemy were
at this time pressing vigorously in masses, and some of their troops reached
and passed the parapet at that point. Opdycke's brigade, Second Division,
Fourth Corps, was immediately ordered up and came gallantly on the charge,
driving the enemy back and restoring the line. Major-General Stanley, who had
been ill during the forenoon, came up with Opdycke's brigade and assumed
command of the troops of the Fourth Corps. At every other point of the line the
enemy were repulsed, though they renewed the charge again and again. They
stubbornly persisted in assaulting after dark, and at intervals the firing was
very hot till 10 o'clock in the evening. At midnight the command was quietly
withdrawn to the north bank of the Harpeth without opposition.
Very respectfully
your obedient servant,
J. D. COX,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Maj. J. A. CAMPBELL,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army
of the Ohio.
____________________
HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, TWENTY-THIRD ARMY CORPS,
Clifton, Tenn.,
January 10, 1865.
SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the
operations of the Twenty-third Army Corps in the battle between the U.S.
forces, under Major-General Schofield, and the rebel army, under General Hood,
at Franklin, Tenn., on the 30th day of November, 1864:
My own division (Third Division, Twenty-third Army Corps)
reached Franklin about an hour before daybreak on the morning of the 30th,
having marched from Columbia, twenty-two miles, during the night. The division
was halted and massed on the ground upon which the battle was fought, and the
men were allowed to cook their breakfast whilst the trains which were following
filed past into the town. General Schofield, being with the head of the column,
after an examination of the means of crossing the army to the north side of the
Harpeth River, informed me that the means were so inadequate as to demand his
immediate personal attention, and ordered that I assume command of the corps
and put it in position to cover the crossing of the remainder of the army to
the north bank of the river. The whole command was moving in from Columbia and
Spring Hill by the turnpike leading from those places to Franklin, and the
enemy was known to be following with his infantry by the same route, his
cavalry being chiefly upon the turnpike leading from Lewisburg to Franklin. A
reconnaissance of the position as soon as it was light showed that the ground
immediately south of the village was almost level and without any cover from
woods or orchards for a distance of nearly a mile from the outskirts of the
village, and even for a considerably longer distance on the Columbia pike.
A brick dwelling, belonging to a Mr. Carter, the
southernmost one of town, stands on the west side of the turnpike upon a slight
knoll over which the road runs as it leaves the village. This knoll has an
elevation of about ten feet above the lower ground around it, and even less
above that directly south, the slope then being so slight as to be scarcely
perceptible to one approaching from that direction. The crest of this elevation
is about 200 yards in length from right to left, and is divided nearly equally
by the Columbia pike. Two other turnpikes diverge from the village going
southward, the Lewisburg pike on the left (east) and the Carter's Creek pike on
the right (west). A curved line intersecting these two last-mentioned roads at
the edge of the village crossed each of them upon slight elevations of ground,
similar to that at Carter's house on the Columbia pike. This being the only
line apparently tenable near the outskirts of the town, and sufficiently short
to be occupied in reasonable strength by the two divisions of the corps (the
Second being weakened by the absence of the strongest brigade), and it being
also substantially the line indicated by the major-general commanding upon our
approach to the town, I ordered the troops into position upon it, and directed
that they throw up breastworks immediately. To completely understand the nature
of the field it is, however, necessary to notice that the railroad also passes
out of the town toward the southeast, and a little to the left of the Lewisburg
pike, and that the Harpeth River, running northwestwardly, is nearly parallel
to the railroad and quite near to it for some distance, whilst on our right it
opens a considerable space between it and the Carter's Creek pike. Upon the
north bank of the Harpeth and near the left of our line, as indicated, is a
fort, erected some two years since (Fort Granger), which commands a stretch of
the river to the left, and also a cut of the railroad, through which troops
might advance under cover toward the left of our line. Reilly's brigade
(First), of my own division, was placed with its right resting upon the
Columbia pike, its front line consisting of the One hundredth Ohio and One
hundred and fourth Ohio Volunteers, its second line of the Twelfth and
Sixteenth Kentucky and the Eighth Tennessee Volunteers. Its left extended
somewhat beyond a cotton gin, which stood in a slight angle of the line about
100 yards from the Columbia turnpike. The Second Brigade (Col. J. S. Casement,
One hundred and third Ohio, commanding) extended the line from Reilly's left to
the Lewisburg pike, the Sixty-fifth Indiana, Sixty-fifth Illinois, and One
hundred and twenty-fourth Indiana Volunteers forming his first line, and the
Fifth Tennessee Volunteers in the second line. The Third Brigade (Col. I. N.
Stiles, Sixty-third Indiana, temporarily commanding) continued the line from
Casement's left to the Harpeth River, the One hundred and twenty-eighth
Indiana, Sixty-third Indiana, and One hundred and twentieth Indiana Volunteers
in the first line, and One hundred and twelfth Illinois Volunteers in the
second line.
Upon the right of the pike I directed Brigadier-General
Ruger, commanding Second Division, Twenty-third Army Corps, to put his division
upon the line indicated, reaching as far to the right as he could firmly hold
the line. He accordingly placed Strickland's brigade (Third) upon his left,
being immediately on the right of the Columbia pike, the Fiftieth Ohio and
Seventy-second Illinois Volunteers in the first line, and the One hundred and
eighty-third Ohio and Forty-fourth Missouri Volunteers in the second line.
Moore's brigade (Second) was placed on the right of Strickland's, and in order
to cover the Carter's Creek pike was deployed in one line in the following
order: Eightieth Indiana, Twenty-third Michigan, One hundred and twenty-ninth
Indiana, and One hundred and eleventh Ohio Volunteers, numbering from right to
left, as in the cases of all the other brigades mentioned above. Moore's line
being still weak on account of its extent, General Ruger ordered fifty men of
the One hundred and eighty-third Ohio (Strickland's second line) to report to
him, and they were placed by Colonel Moore between the One hundred and
twenty-ninth Indiana and Twenty-third Michigan. By noon a tolerably good line
of breastworks had been erected along the front described, and in a portion of
the line a slight abatis had been constructed. A small locust grove and some
fruit trees in front of Ruger's division had been used for this purpose, and
some Osage orange hedges about a small inclosure in front of Stiles' brigade on
the left had also been made good use of. One line of this hedge parallel to Stiles'
left front wan slightly thinned out and left standing and in the end proved
most useful. The remainder of the hedge was used along the front of the Third
Division, but there was not sufficient material near at hand to make the line
continuous, nor was there time to stake it down, so that it amounted simply to
a slight obstruction of small branches and twigs that could offer no serious
obstacle to an advancing enemy, except as the thorny nature of the Osage orange
made it an unexpectedly troublesome thing to handle or remove under fire. The
artillery of the corps had been moved to the north side of the river early in
the morning, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Schofield, chief of
artillery, and a portion of it placed in the fort.
As the troops of the Fourth Corps came in, later in the
forenoon, four* batteries from that corps were ordered to report to me, and I
assigned them positions as follows: First Kentucky Light Artillery, four guns,
on the left of the Columbia pike, in the line of the One hundredth Ohio
Infantry; Sixth Ohio Light Artillery, four guns, on the right of the Columbia
pike, just west of Carter's house; and Battery B, Pennsylvania Volunteers, at
the Carter's Creek pike. Although not strictly in the order of occurrence, it
will tend to greater clearness to add that about 3 o'clock in the afternoon,
when an attack by the enemy in force had become more immediate, other batteries
of the Fourth Corps were placed in position by Lieutenant-Colonel Schofield and
Captain Bridges, chiefs of artillery of the Twenty-third and Fourth Corps,
respectively, viz: Battery M, Fourth U.S. Artillery, and Battery G, First Ohio
Light Artillery, were thus placed near the left of Stiles' brigade, Third
Division, Twenty-third Army Corps; Battery A, First Ohio Light Artillery, was
placed in reserve near the Columbia pike; and Bridges' Battery Illinois Light
Artillery, was placed near the center of Strickland's brigade, Second Division,
Twenty-third Corps. About noon, some appearance of the enemy's cavalry being
reported on the Carter's Creek pike, I called the attention of the commanding
general to the fact that Ruger's division could not reach any secure point at
which to rest on the right, and shortly after Brigadier-General Kimball, commanding
First Division, Fourth Corps, reported to me by order, and I directed him to go
into position on General Ruger's right, filling the space between the Carter's
Creek pike and the river.
At 2 o'clock I received orders to withdraw the command to
the north bank of the river at 6 o'clock, in case there should be no attack by
the enemy. At this time nearly the whole of the trains and Wood's (Third)
division, of the Fourth Corps, had crossed the Harpeth. Shortly after,
Brigadier-General Wagner, commanding Second Division, Fourth Corps, presented
in person his orders to report to me and act under my orders. He informed me
that one brigade (Opdycke's) of his division was already within the lines, and
that the other two, with a section of artillery, had been acting as rear guard
for the army and were then some two miles at the rear, where the Columbia pike
passes through a high range of hills before reaching the plateau on which the
village stands; that his orders then were to hold the enemy back until they
developed a heavy force manifestly superior to his own, and then slowly retire
within my lines. I directed Opdycke's brigade to be placed on the right of the
Columbia pike, about 200 yards in rear of our center, as a general reserve;
that the orders under which General Wagner was then acting as to the two
brigades serving as rear guard should be carried out, and that when the troops
were withdrawn within the lines they should be placed in position near
Opdycke's brigade and held in reserve awaiting further orders, and in readiness
to support any part of the line. At 3 o'clock the two brigades of Wagner's
division in front had fallen back to a position about half a mile in front of
the lines and reported the enemy developing in force in their front, whilst
they opened upon the rebels with the section of artillery which was with them.
The order was then reiterated to General Wagner to withdraw the brigades
whenever the enemy appeared to be advancing in decidedly superior force,
without allowing his troops to become seriously engaged. General Wagner was at
that time in person upon the Columbia pike near the Carter house, where my
headquarters had been during the day.
A slight depression beyond the lines held by Wagner's
advanced brigades prevented the enemy from being seen from our lines till about
4 o'clock, when the officers on the skirmish line reported him advancing in
several lines and in very great force. Almost simultaneously with this report
the two brigades of Wagner's division in front opened a brisk musketry fire,
and part of them were seen making a barricade of rails, &c., apparently
with a view of endeavoring to make a stand there, though the section of
artillery retired leisurely within our lines. Before an order could reach them
they were so hotly engaged that they could not be withdrawn in order. The enemy
wasted no time in firing, but charged them, and being enveloped on the flanks,
the two brigades, after a short and brave, though useless, struggle, broke to
the rear in confusion. The momentary check at the center brought the right wing
of the enemy farther forward, and they came on at a double-quick with trailed
arms, some pieces of artillery advancing and firing between brigade intervals.
As soon as they were seen the batteries on our left opened upon them, as well
as the guns in Fort Granger, and as they advanced into rifle range of our
infantry, Stiles' and Casement's brigades opened fire also. The rebel lines
could now be plainly seen, as well as the general disposition and apparent
purpose of their movement. Their heaviest masses were advancing on the line of
the Columbia pike, reaching quite to the river on our left, the two points of
assault at that time being apparently our center and our extreme left, the
latter being the point nearest to our bridges, which were necessarily much
nearer that flank (one of them being the railroad bridge), and that being the
line of movement by which they would most rapidly have cut us off from crossing
the river had our lines been broken. The extreme left was the portion of our
main line first warmly engaged. The enemy endeavored to pass up the railroad
cut above mentioned, but were enfiladed not only by the guns in Fort Granger
but by Battery M, Fourth U.S. Artillery, and driven from that shelter. Their
lines on either side, however, advanced steadily. On reaching the Osage orange
hedge in front of Stiles' left, they first endeavored to force their way
through it and pull it aside. The tough and thorny nature of the shrub foiled
them in this, and they attempted to file around the hedge by the flank, and
under a terrible, withering fire from Stiles' and Casement's brigades and the
batteries on that flank. They soon abandoned this effort, and most of those
remaining unhurt lay down behind the bridge [hedge], and after keeping up a
desultory fire for a time straggled to the rear, singly and in small squads.
In front of Stiles' right and Casement's left, the
obstructions being fewer and more insignificant, the enemy advanced rapidly and
in good order, though suffering very severely, up to the breast-works and made
desperate efforts to carry them. Their officers showed the most heroic example
and self-sacrifice, riding up to our lines in advance of the men, cheering them
on. One general officer (Adams) was shot down upon the parapet itself, his
horse falling across the breast-work. In all this part of the line our men
stood steadily without flinching, and repulsed the enemy, inflicting terrible loss
upon him and suffering but little in return. Meanwhile, in the center, the
enemy gained some temporary advantage. When the two brigades of Wagner's
division, Fourth Corps, broke, the enemy were close upon them and followed them
in, overtaking and capturing considerable numbers of the fugitives. Our own men
in the lines along the center were restrained from firing, in order not to
injure those who were retreating, and the enemy were thus enabled to come up to
the breast-works pell-mell with Wagner's men, without suffering loss or being
seriously exposed to fire. Immediately upon the pike the crowd of the
retreating troops and the advancing enemy overwhelmed the men at the
breast-works there, and a portion of the right of Reilly's brigade (Third
Division) and most of Strickland's brigade (Second Division) broke from the
first line. This was not due altogether to the pressure upon their immediate
front, but partly also to the fact that the orders given by their officers to
the rear of Wagner's division coming in from the front to rally at the rear
were supposed by many of the men in the lines to apply to them also. When the
two brigades of Wagner's were first seen to be compromised by getting seriously
engaged, as a provision against danger in the center I had ordered Opdycke's
brigade to be ready to charge up to the lines instantly, if there should be any
confusion there. This brigade was now ordered up, and came up the turnpike in
the most gallant manner; Reilly's rushed forward at the same moment.
Major-General Stanley, commanding Fourth Corps, who had been
ill during the prior part of the day, came on the field on hearing the sound of
battle, and arrived in time to take an active part in the effort to rally
Wagner's men, but was soon wounded and his horse shot under him. The most
strenuous efforts were made by all officers along that part of the line to
rally the men, and were so far successful that the line was quickly restored on
the left of the turnpike, and after a sharp struggle on the right of
Strickland's brigade also, though the enemy continued to occupy in some force a
portion of the outside of the parapet on Strickland's left for a distance of
about one regimental front. Opdycke's brigade occupied the second line which at
that point was not over twen-ty-five yards rear of the first, and under cover
of the smoke strengthened a barricade and breastwork which had been before
there. The One-hundred and seventy-fifth Ohio Volunteers, a new regiment,
unassigned to a brigade, had reported early in the afternoon by direction of
the commanding general, and was by me temporarily assigned to Reilly's brigade
and placed in reserve. It also advanced with the rest of the supporting troops
and did good service, behaving with great steadiness and courage. The attack
extended toward our right to the Carter's Creek pike. The enemy, being
apparently satisfied of the impracticability of advancing again upon our left
for the reason before stated, pressed farther to our right, and especially
after they had seemed to have gained some advantage in the center, their
efforts there and upon their own left were redoubled. Colonel Moore's brigade
held its ground firmly, and although it was in imminent danger at the moment
when the center wavered, repulsed a determined assault, and preserved its line
intact throughout the battle. The condition of the atmosphere was such that the
smoke settled upon the field without drifting off, and after the first half
hour's fighting it became almost impossible to discern any object along the
line at a few yards' distance. This state of things appeared to have deceived
Colonel Strickland in regard to his line, as he reported the first line
completely reoccupied along his entire front after the repulse of the enemy's
first assault, whilst in fact a portion of it at his left was not filled by our
troops, and Colonel Opdycke, not being personally acquainted with the lines,
was not aware for some time that he had not reached the first line in Colonel
Strickland's front, when the outbuildings of Carter's house prevented the line
from being distinctly seen from the turnpike even if the smoke had not formed
so dark a covering.
After a short lull the attack was resumed by the enemy with
the same audacity and determination as before, and Strickland's [brigade]
suffering considerably, and being reported by him a good deal weakened, I
withdrew the One hundred and twelfth Illinois Volunteers from the second line
of Stiles' brigade on the extreme left and ordered it to report to Colonel
Strickland and to aid in re-establishing the line in his front. It was led
forward very gallantly by Lieutenant-Colonel Bond commanding, who was wounded
in the advance. The smoke and growing darkness deceived also the enemy, who
apparently supposed they had gained full possession of our lines in the center
and continued to push in fresh masses of troops, only to be destroyed or
captured, for very few went back, insomuch that prisoners captured continually
expressed the utmost surprise, declaring that they supposed and had been
informed that our lines were occupied by their troops, which had assaulted
before, and of whom nothing since had been seen. The ditches in front of the
whole line of the corps, and particularly in the center, contained many of the
enemy who were unable to get back, and who, at the first opportunity,
surrendered and came over the breast-works as prisoners. The assaults on the
center extending considerably to the right of the Columbia pike and involving
Moore's brigade more or less, were obstinately repeated until night-fall, and
even as late as 9 o'clock attacks were made, which were, however, easily
repulsed, and the enemy withdrew the remnants of his shattered lines to the
position occupied at the opening of the battle by Wagner's division, in advance
of our lines about 800 yards, Alarms occurred frequently until 11 o'clock, and
frequently caused a general musketry fire on both sides from our center toward
the right, but I found no evidence that any real attack was made at so late an
hour, the demonstrations being manifestly made by the rebels to discover
whether our lines were being abandoned during the evening.
At midnight, all being quiet in the front, in accordance
with orders from the commanding general, I withdrew my command to the north
bank of the river, leaving a skirmish line in the earth-works an hour later,
when they also were withdrawn. The whole movement was made without interruption
or molestation from the enemy, the Third Division moving by the left flank and
crossing the river upon the railroad bridge, which had been planked, and the
Second Division (with Opdycke's brigade of the Fourth Corps) moving through the
town and crossing by a wagon bridge a little below the railroad crossing. Upon
making the north bank I took up the line of march with my own division for
Brentwood in advance of the army, by command of General Schofield. General
Wagner rallied the two brigades of his division at the river, but they were not
again brought into action. Kimball's division of the Fourth Corps, was to some
extent engaged upon its extreme left in the late attacks, which reached to and
somewhat beyond the Carter's Creek pike, and that command also suffered
somewhat from the diagonal fire of the enemy upon Ruger's division of this
corps. This, however, I state from my own casual observation alone, as I took
no control of the troops of the Fourth Corps (except Opdycke's brigade) after
General Stanley came upon the field, and have no official report of their part
in the engagement. The casualties of the corps during the engagement are
reported to me as follows:
Command
|
Killed
|
Wounded
|
Missing
|
Total
|
Aggregate
|
||||
O
|
M
|
O
|
M
|
O
|
M
|
O
|
M
|
||
Second
Division
|
|||||||||
Moore’s Brigade
|
3
|
18
|
8
|
81
|
0
|
12
|
11
|
111
|
122
|
Strickland’s Brigade
|
6
|
67
|
19
|
159
|
2
|
278
|
27
|
504
|
531
|
Total
|
9
|
85
|
27
|
240
|
2
|
290
|
38
|
615
|
653
|
Third
Division
|
|||||||||
Reilly’s Brigade
|
6
|
27
|
7
|
123
|
1
|
69
|
14
|
219
|
233
|
Casement’s Brigade
|
0
|
3
|
1
|
15
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
18
|
19
|
Stiles’ Brigade
|
3
|
9
|
5
|
46
|
1
|
20
|
9
|
75
|
84
|
Staff
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
Total
|
10
|
39
|
13
|
184
|
2
|
89
|
25
|
312
|
337
|
Total
in corps
|
19
|
124
|
40
|
424
|
4
|
379
|
63
|
927
|
990
|
[O = Officers, M = Men]
These lists were made up soon after the engagement, and I am
convinced that corrected ones, when procured, will show a considerable
diminution in the list of the missing. The loss of the enemy we are enabled to
approximate with some accuracy from the public admissions from their commander
as well as from the statements of prisoners, our own examination of the field
after it again came into our possession, and the statements of citizens and
hospital attendants remaining in Franklin. From all these sources the testimony
is abundant that the rebels lost 6 general officers killed, 6 wounded, and 1
captured; that they buried 1,800 men on the field, and that 3,800 were wounded.
The number of prisoners captured by this corps was 702. Thus, without estimating
the prisoners taken by any part of the Fourth Corps, or the stragglers and
deserters, who are known to have been numerous, the enemy's loss was not less
than 6,300. The attack was made by Stewart's and Cheatham's corps of Hood's
army, Lee's corps being in reserve, and it is only repeating what is proven by
the concurrent testimony of all officers and men of the rebel army who were
captured, when I assert that the two assaulting corps were so weakened in
numbers and broken in morale in this engagement as to lose for the rest
of the campaign the formidable character as opponents which these veteran
soldiers had before maintained. Their remarkable loss in general officers
attests sufficiently the desperate efforts to break our lines and the heroic
bravery of our own troops, who repulsed their repeated assaults.
1 beg leave to refer to the brigade and division reports,
forwarded herewith, for special mention of officers and men who particularly
distinguished themselves. I will here notice, however, the gallant conduct of
Col. Thomas J. Henderson, of the One hundred and twelfth Illinois Volunteers,
commander of the Third Brigade, Third Division, who, although so ill in the
morning as to be obliged to transfer the brigade command to Colonel Stiles,
could not remain absent from the field and was particularly noticeable by his
efforts to encourage the men and direct their fire throughout the heat of the
engagement. Lieut. James Coughlan, of the Twenty-fourth Kentucky Volunteers, my
aide-de-camp, was instantly killed while assisting to rally the men at the
center during the confusion incident to the first assault. He was a young
officer of peculiar promise, his intelligence and zeal being rarely matched;
his loss is a severe one to the army as well as to me personally. I beg leave
also to make special mention of Maj. T. T. Dow, acting assistant
inspector-general, upon my staff, and Lieuts. E. E. Tracy and D. C. Bradley, my
aides, whose activity and courage were conspicuous in rallying the troops at
the critical time referred to.
Among the trophies of the battle are twenty-two battle-flags
captured from the enemy, of which eighteen were taken by Reilly's brigade, of
the Third Division.
The transmission of this report has been delayed by reason
of waiting for reports of subordinate commanders, and the whole are now
submitted.
Very respectfully,
your obedient servant,
J. D. COX,
Brigadier-General,
Commanding.
Maj. J. A. CAMPBELL,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army
of the Ohio.
_______________
* Only three mentioned in the context. But Bridges’ report
(p. 320) adds the Twentieth Ohio.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume
45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 348-56
