Diary of William Howard Russell: April 4, 1861

I had a long interview with Mr. Seward today at the State Department. He set forth at great length the helpless condition in which the President and the Cabinet found themselves when they began the conduct of public affairs at Washington. The last cabinet had tampered with treason, and had contained traitors; a miserable imbecility had encouraged the leaders of the South to mature their plans, and had furnished them with the means of carrying out their design. One Minister had purposely sent away the navy of the United States to distant and scattered stations; another had purposely placed the arms, ordnance, and munitions of war in undue proportions in the Southern States, and had weakened the Federal Government so that they might easily fall into the hands of the traitors and enable them to secure the war materiel of the Union; a Minister had stolen the public funds for traitorous purposes — in every port, in every department of the State, at home and abroad, on sea and by land, men were placed who were engaged in this deep conspiracy — and when the voice of the people declared Mr. Lincoln President of the United States, they set to work as one man to destroy the Union under the most flimsy pretexts. The President's duty was clearly defined by the Constitution. He had to guard what he had, and to regain, if possible, what he had lost. He would not consent to any dismemberment of the Union nor to the abandonment of one iota of Federal property— nor could he do so if he desired.

These and many more topics were presented to me to show that the Cabinet was not accountable for the temporizing policy of inaction, which was forced upon them by circumstances, and that they would deal vigorously with the Secession movement — as vigorously as Jackson did with nullification in South Carolina, if they had the means. But what could they do when such a man as Twiggs surrendered his trust and sacrificed the troops to a crowd of Texans; or when naval and military officers resigned en masse, that they might accept service in the rebel forces? All this excitement would come right in a very short time — it was a brief madness, which would pass away when the people had opportunity for reflection. Meantime the danger was that foreign powers would be led to imagine the Federal Government was too weak to defend its rights, and that the attempt to destroy the Union and to set up a Southern Confederacy was successful. In other words, again, Mr. Seward fears that, in this transition state between their forced inaction and the coup by which they intend to strike down Secession, Great Britain may recognize the Government established at Montgomery, and is ready, if needs be, to threaten Great Britain with war as the consequence of such recognition. But he certainly assumed the existence of strong Union sentiments in many of the seceded States, as a basis for his remarks, and admitted that it would not become the spirit of the American Government, or of the Federal system, to use armed force in subjugating the Southern States against the will of the majority of the people. Therefore if the majority desire Secession, Mr. Seward would let them have it — but he cannot believe in anything so monstrous, for to him the Federal Government and Constitution, as interpreted by his party, are divine, heaven-born. He is fond of repeating that the Federal Government never yet sacrificed any man's life on account of his political opinions; but if this struggle goes on, it will sacrifice thousands — tens of thousands, to the idea of a Federal Union. “Any attempt against us,” he said, “would revolt the good men of the South, and arm all men in the North to defend their Government.”

But I had seen that day an assemblage of men doing a goose-step march forth dressed in blue tunics and gray trousers, shakoes and cross-belts, armed with musket and bayonet, cheering and hurrahing in the square before the War Department, who were, I am told, the District of Columbia volunteers and militia. They had indeed been visible in various forms parading, marching, and trumpeting about the town with a poor imitation of French pas and élan, but they did not, to the eye of a soldier, give any appearance of military efficiency, or to the eye of the anxious statesman any indication of the animus pugnandi. Starved, washed-out creatures most of them, interpolated with Irish and flat-footed, stumpy Germans. It was matter for wonderment that the Foreign Minister of a nation which was in such imminent danger in its very capital, and which, with its chief and his cabinet, was almost at the mercy of the enemy, should hold the language I was aware he had transmitted to the most powerful nations of Europe. Was it consciousness of the strength of a great people, who would be united by the first apprehension of foreign interference, or was it the peculiar emptiness of a bombast which is called Buncombe? In all sincerity I think Mr. Seward meant it as it was written.

When I arrived at the hotel, I found our young artist waiting for me, to entreat I would permit him to accompany me to the South. I had been annoyed by a paragraph which had appeared in several papers, to the effect that “The talented young artist, our gifted countryman, Mr. Deodore F. Moses, was about to accompany Mr. &c. &c, in his tour through the South.” I had informed the young gentleman that I could not sanction such an announcement, whereupon he assured me he had not in any way authorized it, but having mentioned incidentally to a person connected with the press that he was going to travel southwards with me, the injudicious zeal of his friend had led him to think he would do a service to the youth by making the most of the very trifling circumstance.

I dined with Senator Douglas, where there was a large party, among whom were Mr. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Smith, Secretary of the Interior; Mr. Forsyth, Southern Commissioner; and several members of the Senate and Congress. Mrs. Douglas did the honors of her house with grace and charming good-nature. I observe a great tendency to abstract speculation and theorizing among Americans, and their after-dinner conversation is apt to become didactic and sententious. Few men speak better than Senator Douglas; his words are well chosen, the flow of his ideas even and constant, his intellect vigorous, and thoughts well cut, precise, and vigorous — he seems a man of great ambition, and he told me he is engaged in preparing a sort of Zollverein scheme for the North American continent, including Canada, which will fix public attention everywhere, and may lead to a settlement of the Northern and Southern controversies. For his mind, as for that of many Americans, the aristocratic idea embodied in Russia is very seductive; and he dwelt with pleasure on the courtesies he had received at the court of the Czar, implying that he had been treated differently in England, and perhaps France. And yet, had Mr. Douglas become President of the United States, his good-will towards Great Britain might have been invaluable, and surely it had been cheaply purchased by a little civility and attention to a distinguished citizen and statesman of the Republic. Our Galleos very often care for none of these things.

SOURCE: William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South, p. 60-3

John M. Forbes to Senator William P. Fessenden, February 13, 1862

Willard's Hotel, Washington,

February 13, 1862.

Mr. Gray has gone home not very well and rather discouraged. I gave him your message. . . .

Suppose the stain of bad faith hurts the eight hundred and fifty millions of bonds five per cent. by discrediting it at home, and keeping out of our reach the great reservoirs of European capital (which in my opinion is a very small estimate of the pecuniary damage), the nation loses by the operation five per cent. on eight hundred and fifty millions, say $42,500,000.

But this low and mean view of the case only discloses a small part of its mischief. We shall have the stain and irritation of repudiation of the many millions due to foreigners which we promised in specie and are to pay in paper, and if we are not successful during the few weeks for which time we purchase ease by this expedient, we may in consequence of it find such obstacles to our next financial move (beyond the one hundred and fifty millions) that the legal tender clause may terminate the war, a consummation which some of the bankers and others advocating it will not weep for!

I must say I shall consider it our financial Bull Run.

With our strong constitution we may get over this astounding quackery, but it is a trial I hope we may be spared.

On the other hand with Napoleon holding back from interference, with England reacting in our favor, with the navy pushing the war into the interior, and with Stanton waking up the army, and putting out a declaration of Independence of the Satanic Press, it only needs good Anglo-Saxon pluck in this the very pinch of the game of finance, to put us on firm ground.

The Senate bill, with the legal tender struck out, and with a good tax bill, will do this as surely as there is a sun in heaven.

I hope to get off this afternoon, having done my best against the monsters.

SOURCE: Sarah Forbes Hughes, Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes, Volume 1, p. 279-81

Diary of Gideon Welles: Sunday, August 24, 1862

Have a dispatch from General Burnside at Falmouth, calling earnestly for five or six gunboats in the Potomac at Acquia Creek. Mentions having made a personal application at the Navy Department. Nothing has been said to me by him or any one, nor has any requisition been made. I find, however, on inquiry, that in a general conversation in the room of the Chief Clerk he expressed something of the kind. The General feels that a heavy responsibility is upon him, and in case of disaster desires like others the protection of the gunboats. It is honorable to him that, unlike some other generals, he willingly gives credit to the Navy. The protection he now seeks is a wise precaution, perhaps, but, I apprehend, wholly unnecessary. I have, however, ordered Wilkes to send round five gunboats from James River. The War Department sends me a letter from Major-General Curtis to General Halleck, requesting more gunboats on the Western rivers. Wrote Admiral Davis that the navigation of the Mississippi should be kept unobstructed, not only between Memphis and Arkansas River but elsewhere, and to cooperate with and assist the army.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 91

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, August 16, 1862

With the President an hour or two this A.M., selecting candidates from a large number recommended for midshipmen at the naval school.

Finished a set of instructions for our naval officers in matters relating to prize captures and enforcing the blockade. Mr. Seward sent me a few days since in the name of the President some restraining points on which he wished the officers to be instructed, but I was convinced they would work injury. Have toned down and modified his paper, relieved it of its illegal features, added one or two precautionary points and sent the document to the State Department for criticism and suggestions.

Mem. It may be well, if I can find time, to get up a complete set of instructions, defining the points of international and statute law which are disputed or not well understood.

Have a long telegram from Wilkes, who informs me that the army has left, and asking for instructions what to do now that McClellan has gone. I have not been advised of army movements by either the Secretary of War or General Halleck. Both are ready at all times to call for naval aid, but are almost wholly neglectful of the Navy and of their own duties in regard to it, as in this instance.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 82-3

William Cullen Bryant to John M. Forbes, August 27, 1861

Office Of The Evening Post,

New York, August 27, 1861.

I do not much like the idea of putting Sherman into the Treasury Department. He would make, I think, a better secretary of war. The great objection I have to him in the Treasury Department is that, so far as I understand the matter, he is committed, as the saying is, to that foolish Morrill tariff. Yet I am very certain that it would be considered by the country an immense improvement of the Cabinet to place him in the War Department. The country has a high opinion of his energy and resolution and practical character.

Of Governor Andrew I do not know as much as you do, though I have formed a favorable judgment of his character and capacity — not a very precise one, however. . . .

They talk of H. here as they do with you, but I am persuaded that the disqualification I have mentioned would breed trouble in the end. The dissatisfaction with Cameron seems to grow more and more vehement every day. His presence taints the reputation of the whole Cabinet, and I think he should be ousted at once. I am sorry to say that a good deal of censure is thrown here upon my good friend Welles, of the Navy Department. He is too deliberate for the temper of our commercial men, who cannot bear to see the pirates of the rebel government capturing our merchant ships one after another and defying the whole United States navy. The Sumter and the Jeff Davis seem to have a charmed existence. Yet it seems to me that new vigor has of late been infused into the Navy Department, and perhaps we underrated the difficulties of rescuing the navy from the wretched state in which that miserable creature Toucey left it. There is a committee of our financial men at present at Washington, who have gone on to confer with the President, and it is possible that they may bring back a better report of the Navy Department than they expected to be able to make.

Rumor is unfavorably busy with Mr. Seward, but as a counterpoise it is confidently said that a mutual aversion has sprung up between him and Cameron. This may be so. The “Times,” I see, does not spare Cameron, nor the “Herald.” There is a good deal of talk here about a reconciliation between Weed and Bennett, and a friendly dinner together, and the attacks which the “Herald” is making upon the War and Navy Department, are said to be the result of an understanding between them. Who knows, or who cares much?

I have emptied into this letter substantially all I have to say. There are doubtless men in private life who would fill the War Department as well as any I have mentioned, but the world knows not their merits, and might receive their names with a feeling of disappointment.

P. S. — With regard to visiting Naushon, I should certainly like it, and like to bring my wife. I have another visit to make, however, in another part of Massachusetts; but I shall keep your kind invitation in mind and will write you again.

W. C. B.

SOURCE: Sarah Forbes Hughes, Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes, Volume 1, p. 242-4

Diary of Judith W. McGuire: August 10, 1861

The Briars. — Nothing new from the army. All seems quiet; no startling rumours within the past week. The family somewhat scattered: M. P. has gone to the “Hot Springs,” J. to Capon Springs, both in quest of health; E. P. and E. M. are at “Long Branch” (Mr. H. N's) on a visit to a young friend.

J. P. has just called, having resigned his commission in the United States Navy, and received one in the Confederate; he is on his way to Richmond for orders. He tells me that my dear W. B. P. has come in from Kentucky, with the first Kentucky Regiment, which is stationed near Centreville. It is right he should come; and I am glad he has, though it is another source of painful anxiety to me.

SOURCE: Judith W. McGuire, Diary of a Southern Refugee, During the War, p. 49

Major Rutherford B. Hayes to Lucy Webb Hayes, September 19, 1861

Cross Lanes, September 19, 1861.

Dearest: — It is a lovely moonlight evening. I mailed you a letter this morning, but as Lieutenant Wall of Captain McIlrath's company has resigned to go with the navy, and will go to Cincinnati tomorrow, I thought I would say a word further while our band plays its finest tattoo tunes. They are sweet, very. You see by the enclosed the scrape I am in. I have tried four or five cases on general orders, and here comes an order making me permanently a J. A. [judge-advocate]. It is not altogether agreeable. I shall get out of it after a while somehow. For the present I obey. It is pleasant in one respect as showing that in my line I have done well. Lieutenant Wall will, I hope, call and see you. He is a good soldier and we are sorry to lose him. If this reaches you before other letters from here and Birch River, you may know that two older and longer ones are after you.

One thing in the new appointment: If I can't get out of it, you may see me one of these days, sooner than you otherwise would, as it confers some privileges, and that would be sweet. Love to all.

Affectionately,

R. B. Hayes.

P. S. — We hear tonight of the death of Colonel Lorin Andrews at Kenyon.* We feel it more deeply than in most cases.  He was my classmate — a fellow student of Colonel Matthews. He took a great interest in our efforts to get a place in the war, and rejoiced with us when we got a fine regiment. McCook gave me Andrews' spurs when he left for home, to wear until his return. Alas! we are not to see him. He was an earnest, true man. Hail and farewell! We have been so full of humor tonight and this saddens us. Good-bye again, dearest.

R.

Mrs. Hayes.

_______________

* Lorin Andrews born at Ashland, Ohio, April 1, 1819. Studied law, but soon gave up the practice to devote himself to work of education. He was President of Kenyon College at the outbreak of the war and was the first man in Ohio to offer his services to the country. He was colonel of the Fourth O. V. I. in the first campaign of the war and “died, a martyr to the Union, September 18, 1861.”

SOURCE: Charles Richard Williams, editor, Diary and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes, Volume 2, p. 97-8

John M. Forbes to Charles Francis Adams, August 12, 1861

Boston, August 12, 1861.

My Dear Sir, — I have been hard at work for some weeks upon the organization of the new volunteer navy, and although it will be made an auxiliary, and a very useful one, to the navy, I regret to say I find great difficulties in giving it that efficiency which it ought to have, as a substitute for privateering. I am of course not going to give it up, and am looking to such changes in our law as will doubtless be adopted whenever an emergency really puts us to our trumps; but while it is yet an experiment, I am satisfied that we ought not to give up our right to issue letters of marque unless accompanied by Mr. Marcy's broader principle of exempting all private property on the sea from capture.

Even then I consider the time an unlucky one, and hope that some happy accident or some unreasonable demands on the part of the European powers may enable us to postpone the whole question. I need not, I hope, assure you that I have no disposition to interfere with your duties beyond giving you at the earliest moment the result of my personal observation upon the experiments we are trying now, and which of course has a direct bearing upon the questions which you are perhaps now discussing.

Pray make my best regards to Mrs. Adams and the rest of your family, and believe me,

Truly yours with high respect,

J. M. Foebes.

N. B. — Our hope was (and still is) to make the volunteer navy equally strong for attack — without the barbarism of privateering, but it is by no means so easy a task as we had supposed.

SOURCE: Sarah Forbes Hughes, Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes, Volume 1, p. 233-4

Gustavus V. Fox to John M. Forbes, July 30, 1861

Navy Department, July 30, 1861.

Sir, — I notice your letter to the Secretary of July 27. I think the Rover better be fitted for a long cruise towards the line, where her steam might enable her to pick up a privateer in calm latitudes. You must send forward nominations for all the officers, or there will be delay.  . . . Let us have the officers at once. The department will buy no ships east of New York, except through your board, and any other parties have no countenance from here. If the board jump clear of them, their act will be approved. We mean to have you act unfettered, to the best of your judgment, but I should try to keep inside of 1100 tons. . . .

Very truly yours,

G. V. Fox.

SOURCE: Sarah Forbes Hughes, Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes, Volume 1, p. 231-2

John M. Forbes to Moses H. Grinnell, July 6, 1861

Boston, July 6,1861.

Thank you for your telegram. I wrote you last Sunday in substance as follows: —

We are obliterating party lines, which is all the fashion, especially with the Outs. Why not do so with state lines? Of all the men who should go abroad, Lothrop Motley would do most credit to the administration. He was shut off by Adams and Burlingame, much to our regret, and to the loss of the country. He is a Republican from the start, a linguist, and the historian of the day. Now that Burlingame has been banished to China, why not send Motley to Vienna? It would be a delicate matter for Massachusetts to press, as she has two foreign missions, but if the suggestion came from you, upon considerations of public interest, I should think Mr. Seward would not hesitate to appoint him. We have not, outside of London and Sardinia, a very strong representation in Europe, and it does strike me this would strengthen the administration.

If you agree with me, and will push it, you can do it, and I know it will be applauded, as Mr. Irving's appointment, you remember, was universally. It would be a compliment to literature rather than to our State. . . .

I hope to see Congress organize a mercantile navy, and put you at the head of a commission to sit in New York, and see to it. Buy clipper ships, and commission the captains with good rank for the war!

SOURCE: Sarah Forbes Hughes, Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes, Volume 1, p. 225

John M. Forbes to Congressman Thomas Dawes Eliot*, July 4, 1861

Boston, July 4,1861.

My Dear Mr. Eliot, — I have yours of 2d, and note the doubts of Mr. Welles as to the safety of intrusting commissions to our merchant sailors. This is natural at first sight, but a little reflection must convince him that it is entirely unfounded.

During our two wars with England, when most of our merchant ships were of 200 to 400 tons and none above 700, our best commodores and captains came from the merchant service, and showed no inaptitude for carrying frigates into action. Look over Cooper's “Naval History” and see who won the laurels then!

If history were wanting as a guide, we should on general principles come to the same confidence in the skill and gallantry of our merchant sailors. I would make no invidious comparisons with our navy; but the crisis is a great one, and the navy can well afford to face the truth. It has glorious men and glorious memories, but they are so closely interwoven with those of our merchant marine that to lower the one it is almost inevitable that you lower the other. If I make a comparison, it is partly in the hope of making suggestions that will tend to raise the navy to its highest point of efficiency.

Let us for a moment examine the training of the two services now. Leaving out the Annapolis school as only just beginning to act upon the very youngest grade of commissioned officers, the youths intended for the navy have been selected at a very early age, with generally very insufficient education, from those families who have political influence, and from those young men who have a prejudice against rough sailor life. Under our system of promotion by seniority these young men live an easy life in the midshipman's mess, the wardroom, or on shore, with little responsibility and little actual work until, at the age of from forty to sixty, they get command of a vessel; they feel that they are in the public service for life, and that the ones that take the best care of their lives and healths are the most sure of the high honors of their profession! Considering their want of early training, of active experience, and of stimulus, it is only surprising that they are on the whole so fine a body of men.

Compare this training with that of our merchant officers. Taken from a class of young men, with somewhat fewer advantages and education, but all having access to our public schools, they are sent to sea to fight their own way up. Those who are capable soon emerge from the mass of common sailors (most of them common sailors for life), and are tried as mates, etc. They are chosen for their daring, their vigilance, their faculty for commanding; and those who prove to have these qualities soon get into command. In nine cases out of ten, the young American-born sailor who is fit for it gets command of a vessel by the time he is twenty-five years old, an age when our naval officers have, as a rule, had but little experience in navigating vessels, and but little responsibility put upon them.

Instead of the little vessels which our heroes of the old wars commanded, you will find these same merchant captains in command of vessels ranging from 700 tons (a small ship now), up to 1500 and 2000 tons, some as large as our seventy-fours, many as large as our first-class frigates! It is idle to talk of such men not being able to manœuvre sloops-of-war or frigates, either in action or in any circumstances where seamanship and daring are needed.

So much for a comparison of the training of the two services; now for one or two suggestions for raising the navy. First, let us go on with the naval school and carry its scientific requirements and rigid discipline as high as West Point. To go further back still; I would have the candidates for the school recommended, not by members of Congress, but by the boards of education of the different States, and taken from those who have proved themselves the best scholars in our public, schools, — at least a majority of them; leaving the minority to come from those more favored by fortune who use the private schools.

Once in service, I would have our navy actively employed in surveying foreign seas and making charts, as the English navy is doing to a considerable extent. Then let the President have some discretion to promote those who by gallantry or science distinguish themselves. Finally, a more liberal retiring list, and if possible some higher honors in the way of titles as a stimulus to our officers.

Perhaps there is not time for the reform of the service, but it is the time for beginning the organization of our volunteer navy. Do you note that the only privateer that we know has been taken has been by sailing brig Perry, though another is reported by the Niagara? I could say almost or quite as much in favor of half clipper ships, in comparison with the ordinary sloop-of-war, as I have said of our merchant sailors. Until we become converted to European ideas upon standing armies and navies, we cannot think of giving up our land or sea militia, and, if we give up privateering, we must have a substitute with all its strength and more.

Yours truly,

J. M. Forbes.

_______________

* Chairman of the Naval Committee of the House of Representatives.— Ed.

SOURCE: Sarah Forbes Hughes, Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes, Volume 1, p. 221-4

John M. Forbes to William H. Seward, June 12, 1861

Boston, June 12,1861.

I have just seen Lothrop Motley (Dutch Republic), who has landed from the steamer this morning, and gives very brilliant accounts of our English relations.

This is all very well while we are strong, and there is a prospect of our whipping the rebels before the next cotton crop; but I have seen letters from well-informed sources, not diplomatic, which have another color.

The aristocratic rulers of England do not like us, and the middle classes want cotton, and our safety lies, while talking smoothly of peace, and believing all we choose of their fair professions, in taking the most vigorous measures to strengthen our navy.  . . . We can get some weapons forged for those domestic enemies which will be useful for foreign ones, in case they get hungry for cotton, and try to bully us next fall. I hope you will not relax one iota for all the peace talk. France will act with England if we are caught weak next fall.

SOURCE: Sarah Forbes Hughes, Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes, Volume 1, p. 220-1

Governor Samuel J. Kirkwood to Senator James W. Grimes, March 24, 1862

How about our Brigadiers? You know I long ago recommended Crocker, Dodge and Perczel and I yet think them among our best colonels as you will find when they are tried. Dodge has been tried at Pea Ridge and has turned out just as I expected. I think him one of the very best military men in the State. Has Lauman been appointed? He acted manfully at Belmont and deserves it. Tuttles charge at Donelson is one of the most brilliant of this or any other war. I have been on the ground he charged over, and I believe that none but Iowa troops could have done it. Vandever did nobly at Pea Ridge, so far as I have learned, and all our colonels and all our men will do the same as they get the chance.

Can't we get some more Brigadiers? What is the situation about Washington generally? Don't things look more hopeful? Take time to write me a long letter showing just how things stand. I thank you for your speech on the navy and the gallant Foote. He is a man all over.

SOURCE: Henry Warren Lathrop, The Life and Times of Samuel J. Kirkwood, Iowa's War Governor, p. 214

Senator James W. Grimes to Admiral Samuel F. Du Pont, October 20, 1862

Burlington, October 20, 1862.

I found your very interesting letter of the 12th September awaiting my return to my home last week, after a month's absence in the interior of the State.

I judge, from what I see in the newspapers, that before this reaches you, you will be making preparations to attack Charleston. May God speed and protect you! I doubt not that an attack will be attended with great risk to our vessels and men; still, with the complete and thorough preparation that I know you will make, and the enterprise that I know you and your officers will exhibit, I am prepared to prophesy success. And what a glorious triumph it will be! It will thrill every loyal heart with delight. I wish it were possible for the Navy to take it unaided by the Army; but that cannot be expected.

I am in no wise deserving of the kind compliments you lavish upon me. I get credit for a great deal of knowledge upon naval subjects, from the simple fact that I am surrounded by the most profound ignorance. A very small light in such utter darkness attracts attention, and seems to excite surprise, especially when the little ray proceeds from the region that this does. For you know that up to my time it was supposed that all information in relation to your branch of the public service was confined to a select "guild" about the Atlantic cities, no man from the interior having presumed to know anything about it. If I have been of any real service, it has been in breaking down and eradicating that idea, and in assisting to nationalize the Navy, in making the frontiersman as well as the longshoreman feel that he was interested in it, and partook of its glory.

SOURCE: William Salter, The Life of James W. Grimes, p. 218

Senator James W. Grimes to Commodore Samuel F. Du Pont, June 29, 1862

Washington, June 29, 1862.

Your very kind letter inviting me to visit you at Port Royal was received yesterday, for which I am greatly indebted to you. At first, my friend Mr. Fessenden, of Maine, and myself about determined to accept your invitation, but my anxiety to see my home, where I have not been since last October, has constrained me to forego the pleasure which I am sure a visit to your fleet would afford me. Should you be in that vicinity in the autumn, I hope I may be able to make the trip.

We hope to adjourn next week. I shall return to Iowa thoroughly armed by your kind aid, prepared to kill all the deer, grouse, and other game that I may be able to hit.

I have sent you the bill for the government of the Navy, as it passed the Senate; also the grade bill as reported to the Senate. I am sorry to say that I am the only member of the Naval Committee who really desires to pass the bill to establish new grades, etc. By agreeing to two or three absurd amendments, I finally succeeded in “badgering” it through the committee, and got it reported to the Senate, with the understanding that every member of the committee might vote as he pleased; hoping and believing that I can carry it by dint of impudence and will.

SOURCE: William Salter, The Life of James W. Grimes, p. 201-2

Commodore Andrew H. Foote to Lieutenant Henry Augustus Wise, June 19, 1862

Cleveland, June 19, 1862.

My Dear Wise: I have written six letters in my bed this morning, and am exhausted; but you have been so kind to me, and so accommodating to our flotilla in its darkest days, that I must say a word in acknowledgment.

Mr. Everett called on me, and I told him how much the country owed you for invaluable services in the Ordnance Bureau, etc, which elicited the remark that he was happy to hear such testimony from me. Your brother is a noble fellow, and stood up to his arduous duties in a way that should insure him any berth he wants in case the flotilla, as it should be, is turned over to the Navy Department.

Do thank Mr. Grimes from me for his resolution to stop the grog-ration, and keep the ardents out of our ships. It will even add to his reputation as the true friend to the Navy. I am proud that he who advocated my vote of thanks should also have introduced the resolution to banish liquor from our ships.

Your faithful friend,

A. H. Foote.

SOURCE: William Salter, The Life of James W. Grimes, p. 197

Senator James W. Grimes to Elizabeth S. Nealley Grimes, May 4, 1862

Washington, May 4, 1862.

I have just returned from church; heard a good sermon from Dr. Channing, better than I ever heard from him, I think. The congregation is enlarging, and I am inclined to think that he will finally succeed in building up a good society here.

I met Miss Donelson yesterday. She returned from Port Royal three days ago. She speaks very favorably of the docility, obedience, and faithfulness, of the blacks at that place.

You observe that Mr. Wells has issued a circular, directing “contrabands,” as he calls them, to be enlisted in the naval service. This must be finally followed up by an army order, sooner or later, and then comes the end of slavery. I regard the employment of colored persons in the Army and Navy as of vastly more importance in putting an end to slavery than all of the confiscation acts that could be devised by the ingenuity of man.

I wish I were at home with you, wandering about the garden, as I should be at this hour.

SOURCE: William Salter, The Life of James W. Grimes, p. 196

Speech Of James W. Grimes On The Surrender Of Slaves By The Army, April 14, 1862

April 14, 1862.

It is, of course, to be expected that there will be great differences of opinion among the friends of the Government as to the manner in which the present war should be conducted. Such differences are the natural results of our various domestic institutions, systems of education, modes of thought, degrees of civilization, and of individual opinions of the necessities of our situation. But there are certain great fundamental principles upon which, one would think, all ought to agree. We certainly ought to do nothing and suffer nothing to be done calculated in any degree to repel or paralyze the efforts of our friends at home, who are doing everything in their power to encourage and sustain the soldiers in the field. While inculcating the necessity of the strictest obedience to military duty, it should be constantly borne in mind that ours are a citizen soldiery, soon to return to the bosom of civil society, and that the performance of no unsoldierly duty should be required of them that would be calculated to impair their self-respect, diminish their regard for their officers, incite them to rebel against discipline, or taint their reputations at home. It must not be expected that the natural instincts of humanity will be stifled by military orders, and surely our soldiers should not be required to assist in the perpetration of acts against which every enlightened sentiment of their hearts revolts. One would think that all men would agree in pronouncing that a cruel and despotic order, which repeals the divine precept, “Inasmuch as ye did it not to one of the least of these ye did it not to me,” and arbitrarily forbids the soldier to bestow a crust of bread or a cup of water upon a wretched, famishing fugitive escaping from our own as well as from his enemy. Yet, I grieve to say there are those high in rank in the service of the United States who have sought to break down the spirit of manhood, which is the crowning glory of true soldiers, by requiring them to do acts outside of their profession which they abhor, and to smother all impulses to those deeds of charity which they have been taught to believe are the characteristics of Christian gentlemen.

It was known to the country at an early day after the commencement of the war, that some military commanders were abusing the great power intrusted to them, and were employing the Army to assist in the capture and rendition of fugitive slaves, not in aid of any judicial process, but in obedience to their own unbridled will. The effect of this assumption of unauthorized power was to incite the soldiery to disobedience, and to arouse the people to the necessity of proper legislative restraints. It was in compliance with the popular sentiment on this subject that Congress enacted the additional article of war, which was approved on the 13th of March last, and which declared that “all officers or persons in the military or naval service of the United States are prohibited from employing any of the forces under their respective commands for the purpose of returning fugitives from service or labor, who may have escaped from any persons to whom such service or labor is claimed to be due, and any officer who shall be found guilty by court-martial of violating this article shall be dismissed from the service.”

It was intended by this article to prevent the military service from becoming odious to the people who support the war, and degrading to those who have volunteered to fight under our banners. It simply declares that the Army of the United States shall not be perverted from the legitimate use for which it was raised, while it interferes in no degree with the claim of any man to a person alleged to be a slave; it leaves questions of that character to be settled, and rights of that description to be enforced, by other than the military authority. The intention of those who voted for this article was not to abridge any man's rights, but to leave every one to his legal remedies as though no war existed.

How is this new article of war enforced? It has been promulgated to the army it is true. It may not be openly and avowedly violated. Soldiers may not hereafter be required to actually perform the humiliating office of fastening manacles upon the limbs of persons said to be slaves, nor to escort them to the residences of their masters; but the experience of the last few days has taught us that, notwithstanding the new article of war, our military officers suffer their camps to be invaded by armed detachments of slave-hunters, without the support of any process of law, who there attempt to shoot, maim, and kill with impunity those whom they claim to be slaves, while our soldiers are required to stand indifferently by and witness the inhuman work.

How long, think you, will this method of dealing with the rebels be endured by the freemen of this country? Are our brothers and sons to be confined within the walls of the tobacco-warehouses and jails of Richmond and Charleston, obliged to perform the most menial offices, subsisted upon the most stinted diet, their lives endangered if they attempt to obtain a breath of fresh air, or a beam of God's sunlight at a window, while the rebels, captured by these very men, are permitted to go at large upon parol[e], to be pampered with luxuries, to be attended by slaves, and the slaves guarded from escape by our own soldiers?

In the month of February last, an officer of the Third Regiment of Iowa Infantry, stationed at a small town in Missouri, succeeded in capturing several rebel bridge-burners, and some recruiting officers belonging to Price's army. The information that led to their capture was furnished by two or three remarkably shrewd and intelligent slaves, claimed by a lieutenant-colonel in the rebel army. Shortly afterward the master dispatched an agent with instructions to seize the slaves and convey them within the rebel lines, whereupon the Iowa officer seized them and reported the circumstances to headquarters. The slaves soon understanding the full import of General Halleck's celebrated Order No. 3, two of them attempted an escape. This was regarded as an unpardonable sin. The Iowa officer was immediately placed under arrest, and a detachment of the Missouri State militiamen, in the pay of the Government and under the command of General Halleck, were sent in pursuit of the fugitives. The hunt was successful. The slaves were caught and returned to their traitor master, but not until one of them had been shot by order of the soldier in command of the pursuing party.

Mr. President, how long shall we permit such conduct as this to go unrebuked? Does any one suppose that the people will quietly submit to the imposition of taxes to support a State militia in the field that is to be employed in the capture of slaves for the benefit of officers in the rebel army? Is it supposed that the Senators from Iowa will silently, patiently permit the gallant officers from that State to be outraged in the manner I have described?

It is quite time that some definite policy should be established for the treatment of escaped slaves; and I am of the opinion that Congress has been grossly derelict in permitting the evil to go so long unregulated and unchecked. We have almost as many diverse systems of dealing with this class of persons as we have military departments. In one, fugitive slaves have been pursued, flogged, and returned to their masters by our army; in another, they have been simply pursued and returned without flogging; in another, they have been pursued and shot in the attempt to return them; in another, they have been termed “contraband,” and received within our lines in the mixed character of persons and property. In the absence of any authoritative declaration of Congress, none of these modes may be held to be in conflict with law, other than the law of common-sense and common decency.¹

It is obvious that the article of war which I have quoted does not meet the case presented by Major-General Halleck in his Order No. 3. That celebrated manifesto declares in substance that all persons from the enemy's country shall be excluded from our lines. The plain purpose of the order is to prohibit fugitive slaves escaping from the rebellious district, and thereby securing freedom. It was doubtless competent for General Halleck to issue such an order, and it is equally competent for Congress, which has made and continues to make articles of war for the government of the army and navy, to countermand it. And it ought to be countermanded. I will not pause to discuss the humanitarian features of the question. Public policy, no less than popular feeling, demands that Order No. 3 be forever erased. There never was a war waged in the history of the world where the means of acquiring information of the enemy's position and numbers were more ample than here, and there never was one where the commanding officers have suffered more from lack of such information. Order No. 3 proposes to incorporate the fatuity and blindness which remained unwritten in other military departments into an historical record and a public advertisement. It proposes to warn all persons against bringing information of the enemy's movements to our camps, under penalty of being turned back to receive such punishment as the enemy may choose to inflict for betraying them, or for running away and betraying combined. No organization of secret service can meet all the requirements of an army operating in an enemy's country, unless aided by some portion of the inhabitants of the country. What folly, then, to wall out and repel the very inhabitants who might bring us the information we most need, and who have everywhere shown an eagerness to do so!

It is the undoubted right and the duty of every nation, when engaged in a righteous war — and no other than a righteous war is justifiable at all — to avail itself of every legitimate means known to civilized warfare to overcome its enemies. What will be thought by posterity of this nation, if, in the present emergency, we not only fail to employ the agencies which Providence seems to have placed at our disposal, but actually seek every opportunity to exasperate and drive from our support those who are anxious to serve us? Were the Russian nobles now engaged in a rebellion against their Government, would we not regard their emperor as guilty of the greatest folly, if he not only declined to enlist the serfs of his empire to aid in suppressing the insurrection, but repelled them from his service and allowed his generals to return them to his rebellious nobles, to be used by them in overthrowing his authority? And can anyone tell me the difference between the case I have put and our own?

The whole history of the world does not exhibit a nation guilty of such extreme fatuity as has marked the conduct of our Government in its treatment of the colored population since the present war began. It seems to be impossible to convince ourselves that war, with all of its attendant responsibilities and calamities, really exists, and that future generations will not hold those guiltless who refuse to use any of the means which God has placed in their hands to bring it to a speedy and successful termination. History will pronounce those men criminal who, in this crisis of the nation's fate, consult the prejudices of caste or color, and regard the interests of property of paramount importance to the unity of the nation.

It is useless to attempt to blink out of sight the great issues before us — issues that must be settled, and settled by us. It were wiser and more manly to meet them squarely and at once. We are in the midst of the greatest revolution that ever occurred in ancient or modern times. Such armies as are now marshaled in hostile array on this continent, in point of numbers, equipment, and expense, have been hitherto unknown in the annals of mankind. We are imposing burdens in the form of taxes that will be felt by unborn generations. We are suffering much now; we expect and are willing to suffer more. And why? Because we desire to preserve the integrity of our nation; because we believe that Heaven designed us to be one people with one destiny; the freest and happiest on earth. It was to preserve that unity of our national existence that our sons and brothers have gone forth to do battle. For this it was that the gallant men of Iowa have freely, triumphantly, laid down their lives at Wilson's Creek, Blue Mills, Belmont, Fort Donelson, Pea Ridge, and Pittsburg. And shall we, after these great sacrifices of life and treasure, hesitate about employing any of the instrumentalities in aid of the country that are known to civilized warfare? Shall we not be recreant to our high trust if we doubt or delay in this particular?

This war will go on until rebellion is subdued. Upon this point there need be no controversy. Rely upon it, the Northwestern States will submit to no temporizing or compromising policy. They are too much in earnest; they have suffered too much already; they know too well what they would be compelled to suffer in the future to allow treason to go unpunished. It is because they desire to prevent the recurrence of the rebellion that they demand that it shall now be thoroughly crushed out. Among things necessary to be done to fully accomplish this purpose, we must conquer and hold all the forts and strong positions on the South Atlantic and Gulf coasts. How shall they be garrisoned when captured? This is a question we shall soon be compelled to answer; and I am prepared for its solution. I answer it unhesitatingly that we should garrison them, in whole or in part, by soldiers of African descent; that instead of returning slaves to their rebel masters to fight against us, we should employ them in our own military service.

I know very well that this proposition encounters at once all the prejudices that have been engendered by differences of race, education, and social position; but let us look at it a moment soberly and practically. It is assumed as admitted by all that the Southern forts must be captured and strongly garrisoned for some years to come. They are situated in a warm and enervating climate, and the particular location of nearly all of them renders them more than usually unhealthy, even for that section of the country. In addition to the forts already established, we shall be compelled to build new ones. The rebels rely upon the diseases of their climate to decimate our Northern army in the summer and autumnal months; and their confidence is well placed. Our troops will wither before the fevers of the Gulf coast as vegetation does before the blast of the sirocco. Now, we have in our midst thousands of hardy, athletic colored men, fitted by nature to endure the heat and miasma of the tropics, and some of them accustomed to it, who are panting to be employed in the capacity of soldiers. Many of them having been in a state of bondage, have been abandoned by their masters, and are now thrown upon us for support. Some of them were forced by our enemies into their military service, and have deserted from it. They implore our protection, and we must give it, if we would not become a “scorn and derision” among the nations of the earth. They have shown on divers occasions, both on sea and land, that they belong to a warlike race. They are obedient and teachable. They can be subsisted much cheaper than white soldiers, can perform more labor, and are subject to fewer diseases in a warm climate.

Now, with these facts before us, shall we refuse to employ them? What substantial reason can be given for not doing so? Is it because they have not the proper capacity for command? Then give them white officers, as is done by the British Government to the same race, by the French Government to the Arabs, and by the Russian Government to the Tartars and other semi-barbarous soldiers within that empire. Is it because they do not possess the average courage of soldiers? In addition to the testimony in disproof of this, furnished a few days ago by the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Wilson), I refer you to your vessels-of-war, where you have hundreds of these men employed, and none more valiant. Is it because they are not obedient to command? The whole history of the race shows the contrary, for, if there is any one thing for which they are remarkable more than another, it is their confiding submission to the will of their superiors. Is it said that we have white soldiers enough for all of our purposes? True, we have a large army, composed of men of unsurpassed valor and patriotism, who, if we require it, will sacrifice their lives for their country, whether by the sword or by disease; but I would, if I could, recall a portion of them to their homes and to the industrial pursuits of life. Am I told that the enrollment of a few colored soldiers will be regarded by the Army as humiliating to them? Mr. President, those public men fail to comprehend the character of American soldiers who suppose that they are fighting for mere military glory, or that in this critical hour they are controlled by ignoble prejudice against color or race. They are citizens and taxpayers as well as soldiers. They want the rebellion speedily crushed and the supreme authority of the law established, leaving social and political questions to be settled afterward. They feel that the desertion of every colored soldier, artificer, or laborer, from the rebellious States, withdraws aid and support from the rebellion, and brings it so much nearer to an end. They cannot understand, nor can I, that refined casuistry that justifies us in converting the enemy's horse or ox to our use, and in turning their inanimate engines of destruction against themselves, but denies to us the right to turn their slaves, their animate hostile engines in human form, to the same purpose. They cannot imagine why it is that some gentlemen are so willing that men of the African race should labor for them, and so unwilling that they should fight for them.

What a wonderful difference of action and sentiment there is on this subject between the officers of the Army and Navy! While officers of the Army have disgraced themselves, annoyed and incensed their subordinates, dishonored the country, and injured the public service, by the promulgation of their ridiculous orders about slaves, no officer of the Navy, thank God, has ever descended to follow their example. Their noble, manly, generous hearts would revolt at the idea of having imposed upon them the humiliating duty of capturing and returning fugitive slaves. They serve their country, not rebel slave-owners. They think that duty to the country requires them to avail themselves of the services of these people, instead of driving them back to their masters, or suffering them to starve; and they act upon this conviction. At the taking of Hatteras, one of the large guns of the Minnesota was wholly manned and worked by persons called “contrabands,” and no gun on the ship was better served. These people are, it is well known, remarkable for the proficiency they soon acquire as cannoneers. On the same ship is a boat’s crew, every one of whom, including the cockswain, is a colored man, and there are none more skillful, or render more satisfactory service to the officers of the vessel. The whole country knows the services rendered by them to Commodore Du Pont and to the vessels under his command. They have acted as pilots, and in the most important positions, and I have the authority of the two superior officers of that fleet for saying that they have never been deceived or misled by any one of them. I am convinced that our expedition to the South Atlantic coast would not have been so perfect a success as it has been but for the slaves found there, and who were employed by our naval officers. There are more or less of them on all our vessels-of-war. They are efficient men, and their presence produces no discord among the crews.

Mr. President, I wish to be distinctly understood. I advocate no indiscriminate arming of the colored race, although I frankly confess that I would do so were it necessary to put down the rebellion. I do not favor this proposition merely because of its antislavery tendency. I approve it because it will result in a saving of human life, and in bringing the rebellion to a speedier termination. It is my business to aid in bringing this war to a close by conquering an unconditional peace in the least expensive and speediest manner possible. Acting upon this idea of my duty, and believing that humanity and the best interests of the country require the enrollment of a few colored regiments for garrisoning the Southern forts, I shall vote, whenever an opportunity shall be afforded me, for converting a portion of the colored refugees into soldiers, instead of forcing them back into servitude to their rebel masters and their rebel government. We may hesitate to do this. Our hesitation will cost us the valuable lives of many of our own race who are near and dear to us. Our hesitation to use the means which Providence seems to have placed in our hands for crushing the rebellion may carry desolation to many a loyal hearthstone. But we must adopt this policy sooner or later, and, in my opinion, the sooner we do it the better. The rebels have this day thousands of slaves throwing up intrenchments and redoubts at Yorktown, and thousands of them performing military duty elsewhere; and yet we hesitate and doubt the propriety of employing the same race of people to defend ourselves and our institutions against them. Mr. President, how long shall we hesitate?

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¹ “Up to that date (July, 1862), neither Congress nor the President had made any clear, well-defined rules touching the negro slaves, and the different generals had issued orders according to their own political sentiments.” — Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, written by Himself, Vol. I, p. 285.

SOURCE: William Salter, The Life of James W. Grimes, p. 184-93

Commodore Samuel F. Du Pont to Senator James W. Grimes, February 23, 1862

Wabash, Port Royal, February 23, 1862.

Your great kindness has made a deep impression on me. It has been no trait of mine to “court honor,” and I can truly say visions of distinction formed no part or lot in my motives of action. To serve my country, do my duty, and meet the expectations of those who had given me the opportunity, have been the incentives uppermost in my mind. Yet I believe this temperament and such impulses are in no way inconsistent with feelings of profound gratitude and pride at the high distinction which has been awarded me, and which I owe to your kind instrumentality.

I am off to-morrow with a large division of my squadron to complete my work on the lower coast, and, if God is with us, in some three weeks I hope to hold everything by an inside or outside blockade from Cape Canaveral to Georgetown, South Carolina. Our hearts have been gladdened by the news from the North. Porter came in to-day on his way to the Gulf, and gave us the account of the surrender of Fort Donelson. I have never permitted any invidious feelings of rivalry with our military brethren, but we are thrilled in our esprit de corps at the deeds of the Navy, and I am sure they must be agreeable to you, as offering some return to that disinterested sympathy, guidance, and support, which you have extended to that branch of the public service since you took your seat in the councils of the nation.

We hear fine accounts of the Northwestern army, and Captain Rodgers had a letter from some officer in the West, who spoke of the impression made by the Iowa regiments. I thought this item, traveling back to you from South Carolina, would not be unacceptable.

SOURCE: William Salter, The Life of James W. Grimes, p. 169-70

Senator James W. Grimes to Elizabeth S. Nealley Grimes, December 7, 1861

You will see by the proceedings of Congress that I am likely to have more business to do than anybody else; for all the labor of the two committees, of the District of Columbia and of the Navy, falls upon me.

SOURCE: William Salter, The Life of James W. Grimes, p. 159-60