John L. Motley Mary Benjamin Motley,* July 20, 1863

Monday, July 20, 1863.

My Dearest Mary: Hurray! I have just got the telegram. Vicksburg surrendered on the glorious Fourth. “Good,” as Turner Sargent says. The details are, of course, wanting. We shall not receive the papers containing the Gettysburg battle history until Thursday. There can be no doubt, however, that Lee has been tremendously licked. Meade occupied his headquarters after the battle, and has since been pursuing him for sixty miles.

Meade seems to me to be a trump, the man we have been looking for ever since the war began. What a tremendous responsibility it was for him to be placed at the head of the army at the eleventh hour, in the very face of the chief rebel general and their best army! So far as we can yet judge, he has acted with immense nerve, rapidity, skill, and I think has achieved a very great success. To us who know the country the telegram says simply, “Lee, after losing 30,000 men [probably 15,000], is trying to get off into Virginia as fast as he can. He may offer battle if he can't get across the Potomac before Meade catches him. If not, not, and if not, why not?” I have never felt so sanguine about our affairs since the very beginning. To be sure, I never believed, as you know, in the fudge about Baltimore and Washington, but one could n't help the fidgets when all the world in Europe was sounding the rebel trumpets in such a stunning way.

Now, if Lee is able to do us much damage, all I can say is that I shall be very much astonished. I suppose he will get back to Winchester, and so to the Rappahannock, with a good deal of bacon and other provender, and then claim a great victory. There is no meaning at all in that bit in the telegram about Buford and Kilpatrick's cavalry being repulsed. Obviously they were only reconnoitering in force to find out where the enemy was, and it could only have been an insignificant skirmish, such as happens daily. If there is any truth in the story about “Vice-President” Stephens wishing to come to Washington, it must have been something about negro troops. Now that we must have taken in Pennsylvania and Vicksburg at least 20,000 prisoners, I do hope the President will issue an unmistakable edict about that hanging officers of black troops. There couldn't be a better time.

Devotedly and affectionately,

J. L. M.

_______________

* During a short absence to meet their second daughter on her return from America. See p. 344.

SOURCE: George William Curtis, editor, The Correspondence of John Lothrop Motley in Two Volumes, Library Edition, Volume 2, p. 338-9

Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes to Sardis Birchard, July 16, 1863

Fayetteville, July 16, 1863.

Dear Uncle: — We are on our return from beyond Raleigh. Rebs we were after left their stronghold without a fight, and our troops destroyed their works. Shall probably return to Charleston soon. Morgan in Ohio! I wish we were there also. All things look well. The escape of Lee does not disappoint me. To get rid of him so easily is a success. We shall get him some day. I enjoyed this last little campaign very much indeed.

Sincerely,

R. B. Hayes.

S. BlRCHARD.

SOURCE: Charles Richard Williams, editor, Diary and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes, Volume 2, p. 419

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: September 12, 1863

Lieut.-Col. Lay, “Inspector,” reports from North Carolina that some twenty counties in that State are “disaffected;” that the deserters and “recusants” are organized and brigaded; armed, and have raised the flag of the United States. This is bad enough to cause the President some loss of sleep, if any one would show it to him.

Gen. Wise, it is said, is ordered away from the defense of Richmond with his brigade. I saw him to-day (looking remarkably well), and he said he did not know where he was going — waiting orders, I suppose.

C. J. McRae, agent of the loan in Europe, writes July 24th, 1863, that the bad news of Lee's failure in Pennsylvania and retreat across the Potomac, caused the loan to recede 3½ per cent, and unless better news soon reaches him, he can do nothing whatever with Confederate credits. He says Capt. Bullock has contracted for the building of two “iron-clads” in France, and that disbursements on account of the navy, hereafter, will be mostly in France. I fear the reports about a whole fleet of Confederate gun-boats having been built or bought in England are not well founded. Major Ferguson has also (several have done so before him) made charges against Major Huse, the agent of Col. Gorgas, Chief of Ordnance. Mr. McRae thinks the charges cannot be substantiated.

We have tidings of the bursting of the Blakely gun at Charleston. I fear this involves the fall of Charleston. Still Beauregard is there.

Gen. Pickett's division (decimated at Gettysburg) is to remain in this vicinity — and Jenkins's and Wise's brigades will leave. The hour now seems a dark one. But we must conquer or die.

It is said a deserter has already gone over from our lines and given information to the enemy of the large number of troops detached from the Army of Virginia. No doubt Gen. Meade will take advantage of their absence, and advance on Richmond again. Yet I am told the very name of Richmond is a terror to the foe.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 42

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: September 3, 1863

Night before last the heavens were illuminated, it is said, by the terrific bombardment of the batteries and forts in the vicinity of Charleston, and earth and sea trembled with the mighty vibrations. Yet no material injury was done our works, and there were not more than a dozen casualties. On the side of the enemy there is no means of ascertaining the effect.

N. S. Walker, Confederate States agent, Bermuda, writes that the steamer R. E. Lee was chased, on her last trip out, twelve hours, and was compelled to throw 150 bales government cotton overboard. He says the British crown officers have decided that British bottoms, with British owners of cargo, running out of blockaded ports, are liable to seizure anywhere on the high seas.

Some of the papers say Knoxville is in the hands of the enemy, and others deny it.

Hon. F. S. Lyon writes from Demopolis, Ala., that the Vicksburg army have not reported upon the expiration of the thirty days' leave, in large numbers, and that the men never can be reorganized to serve again under Pemberton.

Gen. Jos. E. Johnston writes from Morton, Miss., that he is disposing his force to oppose any raids of the enemy, and that he shall keep the Vicksburg troops (when exchanged) in Eastern Mississippi.

Gov. Jos. E. Brown telegraphs that the men (militia) in Georgia cannot be compelled to leave the State; but if the government will send them 5000 arms, he thinks he can persuade them to march out of it, provided he may name a commander. The President indorses on this: “If they are militia, I have no power to appoint; if C. S: troops, I have no power to delegate the authority to appoint.”

Gen. Lee is still here (I thought he had departed), no doubt arranging the programme of the fall campaign, if, indeed, there be one. He rode out with the President yesterday evening, but neither were greeted with cheers. I suppose Gen. Lee has lost some popularity among idle street walkers by his retreat from Pennsylvania. The President seeks seclusion. A gentleman who breakfasted with him this morning, tells me the President complained of fatigue from his long ride with Gen. Lee.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 31-2

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: September 1, 1863

Another letter from Gen. Whiting, urging the government by every consideration, and with all the ingenuity and eloquence of language at his command, to save Wilmington by sending reinforcements thither, else it must be inevitably lost. He says it will not do to rely upon what now seems the merest stupidity of the enemy, for they already have sufficient forces and means at their command and within reach to capture the fort and city. He has but one regiment for its defense!

I saw to-day a telegraphic correspondence between the Secretary of War and Gen. Buckner in regard to the invasion of Kentucky, the general agreeing to it, being sure that with 10,000 men he could compel Rosecrans to fall back, etc. But I suppose the fall of Vicksburg, and the retreat from Pennsylvania, caused its abandonment.

Hon. Wm. Capeton, C. S. Senate, writes the Secretary on the subject of compelling those who have hired substitutes now to serve themselves, and he advocates it. He says the idea is expanding that the rich, for whose benefit the war is waged, have procured substitutes to fight for them, while the poor, who have no slaves to lose, have not been able to procure substitutes. All will be required to fight, else all will be engulfed in one common destruction. He will endeavor to get an expression of' opinion from the Legislature, about to assemble, and after that he will advocate the measure in Congress, intimating that Congress should be convened at an early day.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 30-1

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: August 12, 1863

Letters from Georgia to-day assure the government that the grain crops of that State will afford a surplus sufficient for the army, cavalry and all, for 12 months.

Also one from P. Clayton, late Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, censuring the commissary agents in Georgia, who are sent thither from other States, who insult the farmers and encourage speculation.

Mr. Memminger is shipping gold from Wilmington, $20,000 by each steamer, to Bermuda and Nassau. Why is this? Cotton is quite as good as gold, and there are thousands of millions worth of that in the country, which Mr. Memminger might buy, certainly might have bought for Confederate notes, but, in his peculiar wisdom, he would not And now, the great financier is shipping gold out of the country, thinking, perhaps, it may arrest the depreciation of paper money!

Col. Northrop, Commissary-General, is still urging a diminution of rations, and as our soldiers taken by the enemy fare badly in the North, and as the enemy make a point of destroying all the crops they can when they invade us, and even destroy our agricultural implements and teams, he proposes, in retaliation, to stop meat rations altogether to prisoners in our hands, and give them instead oat gruel, corn-meal gruel, and pea soup, soft hominy, and bread. This the Secretary will not agree to, because the law says they shall have the same as our troops.

I read to-day Gen. Lee's report of his operations (an outline) in June and July, embracing his campaign in Maryland and Pennsylvania.

The enemy could not be attacked advantageously opposite Fredericksburg, and hence he determined to draw him out of his position by relieving the lower valley of the Shenandoah, and, if practicable, transfer the scene of hostilities north of the Potomac.

The movement began on the 3d of June. The divisions of McLaws and Hood (Longstreet's) marched for Culpepper C. H. They were followed on the 4th and 5th by Ewell's corps, A. P. Hill's still occupying our lines at Fredericksburg.

When the enemy discovered the movement (on the 5th), he sent an army corps across the Rappahannock, but this did not arrest Longstreet and Ewell, who reached Culpepper C. H. on the 8th, where they found Gen. Stuart and his cavalry. On the 9th the enemy's cavalry and a strong force of infantry crossed the Rappahannock and attacked Gen. Stuart, but they were beaten back, after fighting all day, with heavy loss, including 400 prisoners, 3 pieces artillery, and several colors.

Gens. Jenkins and Imboden had been sent in advance, the latter against Romney, to cover the former's movement against Winchester, and both were in position when Ewell left Culpepper C. H. on the 16th.

Gen. Early stormed the enemy's works at Winchester on the 14th, and the whole army of Milroy was captured or dispersed.

Gen. Rhodes, on the same day, took Martinsburg, Va., capturing 700 prisoners, 5 pieces artillery, and a large supply of stores.

More than 4000 prisoners were taken at Winchester; 29 pieces artillery; 270 wagons and ambulances; 400 horses, besides a large amount of military stores.

Precisely at this time the enemy disappeared from Fredericksburg, seemingly designing to take a position to cover Washington.

Gen. Stuart, in several engagements, took 400 more prisoners, etc.

Meantime, Gen. Ewell, with Gen. Jenkins's cavalry, etc., penetrated Maryland, and Pennsylvania as far as Chambersburg.

On the 24th, Lt-Gens. Longstreet and Hill marched to the Potomac, the former crossing at Williamsport and the latter at Shepherdstown, uniting at Hagerstown, Md., advancing into Pennsylvania, and encamping near Chambersburg on the 27th. Ewell's corps advanced as far as York and Carlisle, to keep the enemy out of the mountains, and to keep our communications open.

Gen. Imboden destroyed all the important bridges of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from Martinsburg to Cumberland, damaging the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal.

Preparations were made to march upon Harrisburg, when information was received of the approach of the army of the enemy, menacing communications with the Potomac, necessitating a concentration of our army at Gettysburg.

Hill became engaged with a superior force of the enemy on the 1st July, but Ewell, coming up by the Harrisburg road, participated in the engagement, and the enemy were driven through Gettysburg with heavy loss, including about 5000 prisoners and several pieces of artillery.

The enemy retired to a high range of hills, south and east of the town.

On the 2d, Gen. Ewell occupied the left, Gen. Hill the center, and Gen. Longstreet the right.

Longstreet got possession of the enemy's position in front of his corps after a severe struggle; Ewell also carried some strong positions. The battle ceased at dark.

The next day, 3d July, our batteries were moved forward to the positions we had gained, and it was determined to renew the attack.

Meantime the enemy had strengthened his line. The battle raged with great violence in the afternoon, until sunset. We got possession of some of the enemy's batteries, but our ammunition failing, our troops were compelled to relinquish them, and fall back to their original position with severe loss.

Our troops (the general says) behaved well in the protracted and sanguinary conflict, accomplishing all that was practicable.

The strong position of the enemy, and reduction of his ammunition, rendered it inexpedient for Gen. Lee to continue longer where he was. Such of the wounded as could be moved, and part of the arms collected on the field, were ordered to Williamsport.

His army remained at Gettysburg during the 4th, and began to retire at night, taking with it about 4000 prisoners, nearly 2000 having been previously paroled. The enemy's wounded that fell into his hands were left behind.

He reached Williamsport without molestation, losing but few wagons, etc., and arrived at Hagerstown 7th July.

The Potomac was much swollen by recent rains, that had fallen incessantly ever since he had crossed it, and was unfordable.

The enemy had not yet appeared, until the 12th, when, instead of attacking, Meade fortified his lines.

On the 13th Gen. Lee crossed at Falling Waters, the river subsiding, by fords and a bridge, without loss, the enemy making no interruption. Only some stragglers, sleeping, fell into the hands of the enemy.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 10-13

Edwin M. Stanton to Major-General John A. Dix, July 4, 1863 – 5 p.m.

WAR DEPARTMENT,         

Washington, D.C., July 4, 1863 — 5 p.m.

Major-General Dix,

Fort Monroe:

Advices just received represent Meade's victory complete, and that Lee commenced retreating toward Chambersburg at 3 o clock this morning. Whether he ever gets to Richmond may depend much upon your success in breaking his communication.

 EDWIN M. STANTON.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 3 (Serial No. 45), p. 529

Edwin M. Stanton to Major-General Benjamin F. Kelley, July 5, 1863 – Received 10:30 p.m.

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, July 5, 1863.  

(Received 10.30 p.m.)

Brigadier-General KELLEY, Clarksburg:

I have seen your dispatch to the Adjutant-General, and regret to hear you talk about "some days" to concentrate, when minutes are precious. The instructions and information given by the General-in-Chief this evening will show what an opportunity you have, by rapid and vigorous motion, to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy. It will be a matter of deep regret if, by tardy movement, you let the chance escape. There should be no rest, night or day. Why are you still at Clarksburg?

EDWIN M. STANTON,       

Secretary of War.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 3 (Serial No. 45), p. 550

Abraham Lincoln to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, July 6, 1863 – 7 p.m.

SOLDIERS’ HOME,

[Washington,] July 6, 1863 — 7 p.m.

Major-General HALLECK:

I left the telegraph office a good deal dissatisfied. You know I did not like the phrase, in Orders, No. 68, I believe, “Drive the invaders from our soil.” Since that, I see a dispatch from General French, saying the enemy is crossing his wounded over the river in flats, without saying why he does not stop it, or even intimating a thought that it ought to be stopped. Still later, another dispatch from General Pleasonton, by direction of General Meade, to General French, stating that the main army is halted because it is believed the rebels are concentrating “on the road toward Hagerstown, beyond Fairfield,” and is not to move until it is ascertained that the rebels intend to evacuate Cumberland Valley.

These things all appear to me to be connected with a purpose to cover Baltimore and Washington, and to get the enemy across the river again without a further collision, and they do not appear connected with a purpose to prevent his crossing and to destroy him. I do fear the former purpose is acted upon and the latter is rejected.

If you are satisfied the latter purpose is entertained and is judiciously pursued, I am content. If you are not so satisfied, please look to it.

Yours, truly,

A. LINCOLN.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 3 (Serial No. 45), p. 567

Major-General Henry W. Halleck to Major-General George G. Meade, July 7, 1863

WASHINGTON, D.C., July 7, 1863.

Major-General MEADE,

Frederick, Md.:

I have seen your dispatch to General Couch of 4.40 p.m. You are perfectly right. Push forward, and fight Lee before he can cross the Potomac.

H. W. HALLECK,    

General-in-Chief.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 1 (Serial No. 43), p. 83

Major-General George G. Meade to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, July 10, 1863 – 1 p.m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,            

July 10, 1863 — 1 p.m.          

(Received 3.10 p.m.)

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief:

The information received to-day indicates that the enemy occupy positions extending from the Potomac, near Falling Waters, through Downsville to Funkstown, and to the northeast of Hagerstown, Ewell's corps being to the northeast of Hagerstown, Longstreet at Funkstown, and A. P. Hill on their right. These positions they are said to be intrenching. I am advancing on a line perpendicular to the line from Hagerstown to Williamsport, and the army will this evening occupy a position extending from the Boonsborough and Hagerstown road, at a point 1 mile beyond Beaver Creek, to Bakersville, near the Potomac. Our cavalry advanced this morning, drove in the enemy's cavalry on the Boonsborough pike to within a mile of Funkstown, when the enemy displayed a large force, and opened a fire from heavy guns, 20-pounders. I shall advance cautiously on the same line to-morrow until I can develop more fully the enemy's force and position, upon which my future operations will depend.

General Smith is still at Waynesborough. A dispatch was received from him at that place this morning. Instructions similar to those of yesterday were sent to him.

GEO. G. MEADE,    

Major-General, Commanding.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 1 (Serial No. 43), p. 89

Major-General George G. Meade to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, July 12, 1863 – 4:30 p.m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

July 12, 1863 — 4.30 p.m.  (Received 8 p.m.)

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief:

Upon advancing my right flank across the Antietam this morning, the enemy abandoned Funkstown and Hagerstown, and my line now extends from the latter place to Fair Play. The advance of the cavalry on the right showed the enemy to be strongly posted on the Hagerstown and Williamsport road, about 1½ miles from Hagerstown. On the left, the cavalry advance showed them to be in position back of Saint James' College and at Downsville. Their position runs along the high ground from Downsville to near Hagerstown. This position they are intrenching. Batteries are established on it. It is my intention to attack them to-morrow, unless something intervenes to prevent it, for the reason that delay will strengthen the enemy and will not increase my force.

GEO. G. MEADE,    

Major-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 1 (Serial No. 43), p. 91

Major-General Henry W. Halleck to Major-General George G. Meade, July 13, 1863 – 9:30 p.m.

WASHINGTON, D.C., July 13, 1863 — 9.30 p.m.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE G. MEADE,

Army of the Potomac:

Yours of 5 p.m. is received. You are strong enough to attack and defeat the enemy before he can effect a crossing. Act upon your own judgment and make your generals execute your orders. Call no council of war. It is proverbial that councils of war never fight. Re-enforcements are pushed on as rapidly as possible. Do not let the enemy escape.

H. W. HALLECK,    

General-in-Chief.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 1 (Serial No. 43), p. 92

Edwin M. Stanton to Mayor George Opdyke, July 14, 1863 – 6:55 p.m.

WAR DEPARTMENT,         

Washington, July 14, 1863 — 6.55 p.m.

Hon. GEORGE OPDYKE,

Mayor of New York:

SIR: Five regiments are under orders to return to New York. The retreat of Lee having now become a rout, with his army broken and much heavier loss of killed and wounded than was supposed, will relieve a larger force for the restoration of order in New York.

Intelligence has just reached here of the auspicious commencement of General Gillmore's operations against Charleston. All but one fort on Morris Island have been captured, and that will be speedily reduced, after which Sumter must follow.

EDWIN M. STANTON,       

Secretary of War.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 2 (Serial No. 44), p. 916

Edwin M. Stanton to Major Edward S. Sanford, July 14, 1863 – 6:20 p.m.

WAR DEPARTMENT,         

Washington, July 14, 1863 — 6.20 p.m.

Maj. E. S. SANFORD,

New York:

SIR: The Government will be able to stand the test, even if there should be a riot and mob in every ward of every city. The retreat of Lee's army, now in a rout and utterly broken, will leave an ample force at the disposal of the Government.

EDWIN M. STANTON,       

Secretary of War.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 2 (Serial No. 44), p. 889

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, October 13, 1863

No news from the front. President read this noon a dispatch from Meade, written last night, in which he says if the Rebels do not attack him to-day, he will attack them. I doubt it. He cannot do much on the offensive except under orders. As second in command or in any capacity under an intelligent superior, I think Meade would do well. He will never have another such opportunity to do the Rebels harm as when he supinely let Lee and his army cross the Potomac and escape unmolested.

The elections in Ohio and Pennsylvania absorb attention. The President says he feels nervous. No doubts have troubled me. An electioneering letter of McClellan in favor of Woodward for Governor of Pennsylvania, written yesterday, is published. It surprises me that one so cautious and intelligent as McC. should have been so indiscreet and unwise. The letter can do him no good, nor can it aid Woodward, who is a party secessionist. It is a great mistake, and must have been extorted from McClellan by injudicious partisan friends, under the mistaken idea that his personal influence might control the election. What errors prevail in regard to personal influence among party men! A good and wise man can do but little on the day of election, particularly in a bad cause. He can often aid in a good one by confirming the rightminded who are timid and may hesitate and doubt. McClellan lost balance when he wrote this letter.

Preston King spent the evening with me. Young Ulric Dahlgren called. The gallant fellow lost a leg at Gettysburg and is just recovering, so that he gets around on crutches. It is the first of his calls, and King was wonderfully interested in him — affected to tears — and listened to his modest accounts with the earnestness of a child.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 469-70

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, August 14, 1863

Had a call from Governor Tod of Ohio, who says he is of Connecticut blood. Governor Tod is a man of marked character and of more than ordinary ability; has a frank and honest nature that wins confidence and attaches friends.

General Meade called at the Executive Mansion whilst the Cabinet was in session. Most of the members, like myself, had never met him. Blair and he were classmates at West Point, but they have never met since they graduated until to-day. He has a sharp visage and a narrow head. Would do better as second in command than as General-in-Chief. Is doubtless a good officer, but not a great and capable commander. He gave some details of the battle of Gettysburg clearly and fluently. Shows intelligence and activity, and on the whole I was as well or better pleased with him than I expected I should be, for I have had unfavorable impressions, prejudiced, perhaps, since the escape of Lee. This interview confirms previous impressions of the calibre and capacity of the man.

Seward leaves to-day for a rambling excursion with the foreign ministers. Stanton did not come to the meeting whilst I remained. Chase left early, followed by Mr. Bates and myself.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 403-4

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, July 18, 1863

Have a letter from Governor Andrew, who in a matter misrepresented me; claims to have been led into error by the “Gloucester men,” and is willing to drop the subject.¹ I shall not object, for the Governor is patriotic and zealous as well as somewhat fussy and fanatical.

General Marston and others, a delegation from New Hampshire with a letter from the Governor, wanted additional defenses for Portsmouth. Letters from numerous places on the New England coast are received to the same effect. Each of them wants a monitor, or cruiser, or both. Few of them seem to be aware that the shore defenses are claimed by and belong to the War, rather than the Navy, Department, nor do they seem to be aware of any necessity for municipal and popular effort for their own protection.

Two delegations are here from Connecticut in relation to military organizations for home work and to preserve the peace. I went to the War Department in their behalf, and one was successful, perhaps both.

There is some talk, and with a few, a conviction, that we are to have a speedy termination of the war. Blair is confident the Rebellion is about closed. I am not so sanguine. As long as there is ability to resist, we may expect it from Davis and the more desperate leaders, and when they quit, as they will if not captured, the seeds of discontent and controversy which they have sown will remain, and the social and political system of the insurrectionary States is so deranged that small bodies may be expected to carry on for a time, perhaps for years, a bushwhacking warfare. It will likely be a long period before peace and contentment will be fully restored. Davis, who strove to be, and is, the successor of Calhoun, without his ability, but with worse intentions, is ambitious and has deliberately plunged into this war as the leader, and, to win power and fame, has jeopardized all else. The noisy, gasconading politicians of the South who figured in Congress for years and had influence have, in their new Confederacy, sunk into insignificance. The Senators and Representatives who formerly loomed up in Congressional debate in Washington, and saw their harangues spread before the country by a thousand presses, have all been dwarfed, wilted, and shriveled. The “Confederate Government,” having the element of despotism, compels its Congress to sit with closed doors. Davis is the great “I am.”

In the late military operations of the Rebels he has differed with Lee, and failed to heartily sustain that officer. It was Lee's plan to uncover Washington by inducing Hooker to follow him into Pennsylvania. Hooker fell into the trap and withdrew everything from here, which is surprising, for Halleck's only study has been to take care of himself and not fall into Rebel hands. But he felt himself safe if Hooker and the army were between him and Lee.

From the interrupted dispatches and other sources, it is ascertained that Lee's plan was the concentration of a force of 40,000 men at Culpeper to rush upon Washington when our army and the whole Potomac force was far away in the Valley of the Cumberland. But Davis, whose home is in Mississippi and whose interest is there, did not choose to bring Beauregard East. The consequence has been the frustration of Lee's plans, which have perished without fruition. He might have been disappointed, had he been fairly seconded. Davis has undoubtedly committed a mistake. It hastens the end. Strange that such a man as Davis, though possessing ability, should mislead and delude millions, some of whom have greater intellectual capacity than himself. They were, however, and had been, in a course of sectional and pernicious training under Calhoun and his associates, who for thirty years devoted their time and talents to the inculcation first of hate, and then of sectional division, or a reconstruction of the federal government on a different basis. Nullification was an outgrowth. When Calhoun closed his earthly career several men of far less ability sought to wear his mantle. I have always entertained doubts whether Calhoun intended a dismemberment of the Union. He aimed to procure special privileges for the South, — something that should secure perpetuity to the social and industrial system of that section, which he believed, not without reason, was endangered by the increasing intelligence and advancing spirit of the age. Many of the lesser lights — shallow political writers and small speech-makers — talked flippantly of disunion, which they supposed would enrich the South and impoverish the North. “Cotton is king,” they said and believed, and with it they would dictate terms not only to the country but the world. The arrogance begotten of this folly led to the great Rebellion.

Davis is really a despot, exercising arbitrary power, and the people of the South are abject subjects, demoralized, subdued, but frenzied and enraged, with little individual independence left, — an impoverished community, hurrying to swift destruction. “King Cotton” furnishes them no relief. Men are not permitted in that region of chivalry to express their views if they tend to national unity. Hatred of the Union, of the government, and of the country is the basis of the Confederate despotism. Hate, sectional hate, is really the fundamental teaching of Calhoun and his disciples. How is it to be overcome and when can it be eradicated? It has been the growth of a generation, and abuse of the doctrine of States' rights, — a doctrine sound and wholesome in our federal system when rightly exercised. But when South Carolina in 1832 assumed the sovereign right of nullifying the laws of the government of which she was a member, — defeating by State action the federal authority and setting it at defiance, — claiming to be a part of the Union but independent of it while yet a part, her position becomes absolutely contradictory and untenable. Compelled to abandon the power and absolute right of a State to overthrow the government which she helped to create, or destroy federal jurisdiction, the nullifiers, still discontented, uneasy, and ambitious, resorted to another expedient, that of withdrawing from the Union, and, by combining with other States, establishing power to resist the government and country. Sectionalism or a combination of States was substituted for the old nullification doctrine of States' rights. If they could not remain in the Union and nullify its laws, they could secede and disregard laws and government. Can it be extinguished in a day? I fear not. It will require time.

It is sad and humiliating to see men of talents, capacity, and of reputed energy and independence, cower and shrink and humble themselves before the imperious master who dominates over the Confederacy. Political association and the tyranny of opinion and of party first led them astray, and despotism holds them in the wrong as with a vise. The whole political, social, and industrial fabric of the South is crumbling to ruins. They see and feel the evil, but dare not attempt to resist it. There is little love or respect for Davis among such intelligent Southern men as I have seen.

Had Meade done his duty, we should have witnessed a speedy change throughout the South. It is a misfortune that the command of the army had not been in stronger hands and with a man of broader views, and that he had not a more competent superior than Halleck. The late infirm action will cause a postponement of the end. Lee has been allowed to retreat — to retire — unmolested, with his army and guns, and the immense plunder which the Rebels have pillaged. The generals have succeeded in prolonging the war. Othello's occupation is not yet gone.

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1 This refers to the statement, in a letter of July 1, from Governor Andrew to Secretary Welles, that the Navy Department had sent no vessels to the defense of the Massachusetts coast till after the Confederate cruiser Tacony “had rioted along the Vineyard Sound for four days.” The Secretary, under date of July 11, showed the incorrectness of this allegation, and Governor Andrew, in his letter of the 16th, withdrew it and explained that it was made “upon the authority of municipal officers and citizens of Gloucester.”

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 375-9

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, July 17, 1863

At the Cabinet council Seward expressed great apprehension of a break-up of the British Ministry. I see in the papers an intimation that should Roebuck's motion for a recognition of the Confederacy prevail, Earl Russell would resign. I have no fears that the motion will prevail. The English, though mischievously inclined, are not demented. I wish the policy of our Secretary of State, who assumes to be wise, was as discreet as theirs. He handed me consular dispatches from Mr. Dudley at Liverpool and is exceedingly alarmed; fears England will let all the ironclads and rovers go out, and that the sea robbers will plunder and destroy our commerce. Mr. Dudley is an excellent consul, vigilant, but somewhat, and excusably, nervous, and he naturally presents the facts which he gets in a form that will not do injustice to the activity and zeal of the consul. Seward gives, and always has given, the fullest credit to the wildest rumors.

Some remarks on the great error of General Meade in permitting Lee and the Rebel army with all their plunder to escape led the President to say he would not yet give up that officer. “He has committed,” said the President, “a terrible mistake, but we will try him farther.” No one expressed his approval, but Seward said, “Excepting the escape of Lee, Meade has shown ability.” It was evident that the retention of Meade had been decided.

In a conversation with General Wadsworth, who called on me, I learned that at the council of the general officers, Meade was disposed to make an attack, and was supported by Wadsworth, Howard, and Pleasonton, but Sedgwick, Sykes, and the older regular officers dissented. Meade, rightly disposed but timid and irresolute, hesitated and delayed until too late. Want of decision and self-reliance in an emergency has cost him and the country dear, for had he fallen upon Lee it could hardly have been otherwise than the capture of most of the Rebel army.

The surrender of Port Hudson is undoubtedly a fact. It could not hold out after the fall of Vicksburg. We have information also that Sherman has caught up with and beaten Johnston.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 374-5

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, July 16, 1863

It is represented that the mob in New York is about subdued. Why it was permitted to continue so long and commit such excess has not been explained. Governor Seymour, whose partisans constituted the rioters, and whose partisanship encouraged them, has been in New York talking namby-pamby. This Sir Forcible Feeble is himself chiefly responsible for the outrage.

General Wool, unfitted by age for such duties, though patriotic and well-disposed, has been continued in command there at a time when a younger and more vigorous mind was required. In many respects General Butler would at this time have best filled that position. As a municipal and police officer he has audacity and certain other qualities in which most military men are deficient, while as a general in the field he is likely to accomplish but little. He, or any one else, would need martial law at such a time, and with such element, in a crowded and disorderly city like New York. Chase tells me there will probably be a change and that General Dix will succeed General Wool. The selection is not a good one, but the influences that bring it about are evident. Seward and Stanton have arranged it. Chase thinks McDowell should have the position. He is as good, perhaps, as any of the army officers for this mixed municipal military duty.

Lee's army has recrossed the Potomac, unmolested, carrying off all its artillery and the property stolen in Pennsylvania. When I ask why such an escape was permitted, I am told that the generals opposed an attack. What generals? None are named. Meade is in command there; Halleck is General-in-Chief here. They should be held responsible. There are generals who, no doubt, will acquiesce without any regrets in having this war prolonged.

In this whole summer's campaign I have been unable to see, hear, or obtain evidence of power, or will, or talent, or originality on the part of General Halleck. He has suggested nothing, decided nothing, done nothing but scold and smoke and scratch his elbows. Is it possible the energies of the nation should be wasted by the incapacity of such a man?

John Rodgers of the Weehawken was here to-day. He is, I think, getting from under the shadow of Du Pont's influence.

Mr. Hooper and Mr. Gooch have possessed themselves of the belief — not a new one in that locality — that the Representatives of the Boston and Charlestown districts are entitled to the custody, management, and keeping of the Boston Navy Yard, and that all rules, regulations, and management of that yard must be made to conform to certain party views of theirs and their party friends.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 372-4