Showing posts with label Yorktown VA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Yorktown VA. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 3, 2015

Brigadier-General John Sedgwick to his Sister, April 14, 1862

Camp Near Yorktown,
April 14, 1862.
My dear sister:

Your two letters have been received. I think I have made arrangements so that all your letters will come safely. We receive a mail every other day, which brings the New York papers of the preceding day.

We are patiently waiting for the siege-train to be put in position before anything can be done, and the roads are such that it is as much as can be done to bring up supplies. Two and three thousand men are daily at work conveying them, but the work is slow. Every one is impatient for a move, and none more so than the General himself, but I trust he will not venture anything till he is fully prepared. It seems that this must be their last stand, and if beaten here they must leave Virginia to her fate. I think by Thursday we shall be ready to commence the attack, which may last two or three days, but I cannot say that I have any apprehensions of the result. The Merrimac seems to be the great bugbear at this time, and she is an ugly customer, but I trust not as dangerous as many fear.

I mean to stand or fall with McClellan. He has been very kind to me, giving me a large command without my asking for it, and I am afraid too large for my deserts; and I believe they are determined to crush him. With much love,

Yours affectionately,
J. s.

SOURCE: George William Curtis, Correspondence of John Sedgwick, Major-General, Volume 2, p. 43-4

Sunday, April 26, 2015

Captain William Francis Bartlett to Harriett Plummer Bartlett, April 10, 1862

Camp Before Yorktown, April 10, 1862.

Dear Mother: — I have been through some danger safely since I wrote you Sunday. Monday morning our regiment, with the Nineteenth Massachusetts, went out on a reconnoissance towards Yorktown. We marched three or four miles through the woods and mud, when we came to a rebel entrenchment on the opposite side of a swamp, which they had made by damming a stream.

The engineer who went with the General reconnoitered it, covered by our skirmishers. We exchanged perhaps a hundred shots with them, without doing any damage to any one, and, the engineer having accomplished his object, we left, and kept to the left; about two miles. We came to another battery on the same stream. Here they opened on us with shell from a thirty-two-pounder. Three men of the Nineteenth were wounded. One died that night. We got under the cover of some woods and covered the engineer while he reconnoitered. It looked pretty squally when they opened on us with shell, as we had no artillery with us. We withdrew about dark, having effected the object of the reconnoissance. We had to march home in the dark, through the woods, in mud up to our knees. It had rained hard all day.

I had the fortune to wear my rubber coat, so that I wasn't much wet above my waist. I walked, and wore my shoes. We were pretty tired when we got back. The Colonel and I had a tent to sleep in, but the men had nothing to do but lie down in the mud and let it rain. Most of them stood up round the fires all night to keep warm. I managed to get two dozen bottles of whiskey from the sutler, which he had brought for officers, and distributed it so that each man got a small drink of hot whiskey and water. I stayed out till eleven o'clock in the rain doing it. I then came in, took off my stockings and pants, which were wet through, rubbed my feet dry, and lay down and slept soundly enough. I woke all right in the morning. It was still raining, and is today, the third day. I hope it will stop soon. This has delayed the advance very much, as it is impossible to move artillery.

John Putnam is going back to Fort Monroe; he can't stand this, it is too rough for him. Riddle, the same.

Two or three of the officers are sick, but I am as well as ever. Arthur is a little unwell to-day, but you needn't tell his mother, because he will be all right tomorrow, and she would be only worried. General Sumner arrived to-day with the rest of his corps. I haven't seen General McClellan since he passed on the road. He is here. Colonel Lee is at the fort. He will not join us at present, he thinks.

Love to all.
W.

SOURCE: Francis Winthrop Palfrey, Memoir of William Francis Bartlett, p. 37-8

Monday, March 30, 2015

Diary of Judith W. McGuire: May 3, 1862

It is distressing to see how many persons are leaving Richmond, apprehending that it is in danger; but it will not — I know it will not — fall. It is said that the President does not fear; he will send his family away, because he thinks it is better for men, on whom the country's weal is so dependent, to be free from private anxiety. General Johnston is falling back from Yorktown, not intending to fight within range of the enemy's gun-boats. This makes us very anxious about Norfolk.

SOURCE: Judith W. McGuire, Diary of a Southern Refugee, During the War, p. 110

Thursday, March 26, 2015

Diary of Judith W. McGuire: April 21, 1862

The ladies are now engaged making sand-bags for the fortifications at Yorktown; every lecture-room in town crowded with them, sewing busily, hopefully, prayerfully. Thousands are wanted. No battle, but heavy skirmishing at Yorktown. Our friend, Colonel McKinney, has fallen at the head of a North Carolina regiment. Fredericksburg has been abandoned to the enemy. Troops passing through towards that point. What does it all portend? We are intensely anxious; our conversation, while busily sewing at St. Paul's Lecture-Room, is only of war. We hear of so many horrors committed by the enemy in the Valley — houses searched and robbed, horses taken, sheep, cattle, etc., killed and carried off, servants deserting their homes, churches desecrated!

SOURCE: Judith W. McGuire, Diary of a Southern Refugee, During the War, p. 107-8

Saturday, November 29, 2014

Theodore Winthop to L., May 31st, 1861 – 10 p.m.

Fortress Monroe, May 31st, 1861.

Dear L., — Thanks for your kind letter and the hamper. I saw Gen. Butler at Washington. He invited me here when the Seventh should return, and here am I, acting as his Military Sec'y pro tem. He will find me something to do. He is a character, and really was the man who saved Washington by devising the march to Annapolis — a place which nobody had ever heard of.

By Liberty! but it is worth something to be here at this moment, in the center of the center! Here we scheme the schemes! Here we take the secession flags, the arms, the prisoners! Here we liberate the slaves — virtually. I write at ten P. M. We have just had a long examination of a pompous Virginian, secessionist and slave owner, who came under safe conduct to demand back his twenty niggers who had run over to us. Half of his slaves he had smuggled over to Alabama for sale a week ago. But he was not lively enough with the second score. He said, with a curious mock pathos — “One boy, sir, staid behind, sir, and I said to him, John, they're all gone, John, and you can go if you like; I can't hold you. No, master, says John, I'll stay by you, master, till I die! But, sir, in the morning John was gone, and he'd taken my best horse with him! Now, Colonel,” said the old chap, half pleading and half demanding, “I'm an invalid, and you have got two of my boys, young boys, sir, not over twelve — no use to you except perhaps to black a gentleman's boots. I would like them very much, sir, if you would spare them. In fact, Colonel, sir, I ought to have my property back.”

It would have done Gay's heart good to have heard what Gen. Butler said, when this customer was dismissed. Then we had an earnest, simple fellow, black as the ace of spades, with whites of eyes like holes in his head, and sunshine seen through; who had run away from the batteries at Yorktown, and came to tell what they were doing there. It is prime, and growing primer all the time. I wish I could write more, but I am at hard work most of the day. In the afternoon I ride about, and the sentries present arms, though I am still in my uniform of a private. I left Billy in Washington. It broke my heart to leave the boy, but I shall work with him again. Dearest love to all in the house and region,

Yours,
T. W.

SOURCE: Laura Winthrop Johnson, Editor, The Life and Poems of Theodore Winthrop, p. 288-90

Saturday, November 15, 2014

Diary of Josephine Shaw Lowell: April 21, 1862

Letters today from Rob for Mother and me, dated 11th and 16th instant. He seems rather blue, owing, I suppose, to his doing nothing, and the feeling that at Corinth and Yorktown laurels may be won. We hear today that Banks pushes on and has occupied New Market. I hope for the boys' sake that they may be in action before the war is finished, for they would feel dreadfully to come home without seeing a battle. George read his new lecture this eve, “The Way of Peace,” and it is splendid.

SOURCE: William Rhinelander Stewart, The Philanthropic Work of Josephine Shaw Lowell, p. 25

Wednesday, November 12, 2014

Diary of Josephine Shaw Lowell: April 15, 1862

A year since Lincoln's Proclamation, in which he says that the object of the 75,000 men was to repossess the forts of the United States, and today we hear of the unconditional surrender of Pulaski, one of the strongest, and the defense of Savannah. Yorktown is still untaken and we hear nothing of the Merrimac, except reported bursting of shells, running ashores, etc., etc., none of which are probably true. I heard today of Wendell's promotion to a captaincy. He told me in Boston that he only wanted to be captain for the sake of leading the men in battle, and now he will soon have his wish. Poor Mother is very low spirited and of course must be, for Rob is in continual danger, as his Regiment is acting as skirmishers, scouts, etc. She was speaking yesterday of not being able to do anything “until she had heard.” I suppose it is to hear that Rob is shot.

SOURCE: William Rhinelander Stewart, The Philanthropic Work of Josephine Shaw Lowell, p. 24-5

Sunday, September 28, 2014

Speech Of James W. Grimes On The Surrender Of Slaves By The Army, April 14, 1862

April 14, 1862.

It is, of course, to be expected that there will be great differences of opinion among the friends of the Government as to the manner in which the present war should be conducted. Such differences are the natural results of our various domestic institutions, systems of education, modes of thought, degrees of civilization, and of individual opinions of the necessities of our situation. But there are certain great fundamental principles upon which, one would think, all ought to agree. We certainly ought to do nothing and suffer nothing to be done calculated in any degree to repel or paralyze the efforts of our friends at home, who are doing everything in their power to encourage and sustain the soldiers in the field. While inculcating the necessity of the strictest obedience to military duty, it should be constantly borne in mind that ours are a citizen soldiery, soon to return to the bosom of civil society, and that the performance of no unsoldierly duty should be required of them that would be calculated to impair their self-respect, diminish their regard for their officers, incite them to rebel against discipline, or taint their reputations at home. It must not be expected that the natural instincts of humanity will be stifled by military orders, and surely our soldiers should not be required to assist in the perpetration of acts against which every enlightened sentiment of their hearts revolts. One would think that all men would agree in pronouncing that a cruel and despotic order, which repeals the divine precept, “Inasmuch as ye did it not to one of the least of these ye did it not to me,” and arbitrarily forbids the soldier to bestow a crust of bread or a cup of water upon a wretched, famishing fugitive escaping from our own as well as from his enemy. Yet, I grieve to say there are those high in rank in the service of the United States who have sought to break down the spirit of manhood, which is the crowning glory of true soldiers, by requiring them to do acts outside of their profession which they abhor, and to smother all impulses to those deeds of charity which they have been taught to believe are the characteristics of Christian gentlemen.

It was known to the country at an early day after the commencement of the war, that some military commanders were abusing the great power intrusted to them, and were employing the Army to assist in the capture and rendition of fugitive slaves, not in aid of any judicial process, but in obedience to their own unbridled will. The effect of this assumption of unauthorized power was to incite the soldiery to disobedience, and to arouse the people to the necessity of proper legislative restraints. It was in compliance with the popular sentiment on this subject that Congress enacted the additional article of war, which was approved on the 13th of March last, and which declared that “all officers or persons in the military or naval service of the United States are prohibited from employing any of the forces under their respective commands for the purpose of returning fugitives from service or labor, who may have escaped from any persons to whom such service or labor is claimed to be due, and any officer who shall be found guilty by court-martial of violating this article shall be dismissed from the service.”

It was intended by this article to prevent the military service from becoming odious to the people who support the war, and degrading to those who have volunteered to fight under our banners. It simply declares that the Army of the United States shall not be perverted from the legitimate use for which it was raised, while it interferes in no degree with the claim of any man to a person alleged to be a slave; it leaves questions of that character to be settled, and rights of that description to be enforced, by other than the military authority. The intention of those who voted for this article was not to abridge any man's rights, but to leave every one to his legal remedies as though no war existed.

How is this new article of war enforced? It has been promulgated to the army it is true. It may not be openly and avowedly violated. Soldiers may not hereafter be required to actually perform the humiliating office of fastening manacles upon the limbs of persons said to be slaves, nor to escort them to the residences of their masters; but the experience of the last few days has taught us that, notwithstanding the new article of war, our military officers suffer their camps to be invaded by armed detachments of slave-hunters, without the support of any process of law, who there attempt to shoot, maim, and kill with impunity those whom they claim to be slaves, while our soldiers are required to stand indifferently by and witness the inhuman work.

How long, think you, will this method of dealing with the rebels be endured by the freemen of this country? Are our brothers and sons to be confined within the walls of the tobacco-warehouses and jails of Richmond and Charleston, obliged to perform the most menial offices, subsisted upon the most stinted diet, their lives endangered if they attempt to obtain a breath of fresh air, or a beam of God's sunlight at a window, while the rebels, captured by these very men, are permitted to go at large upon parol[e], to be pampered with luxuries, to be attended by slaves, and the slaves guarded from escape by our own soldiers?

In the month of February last, an officer of the Third Regiment of Iowa Infantry, stationed at a small town in Missouri, succeeded in capturing several rebel bridge-burners, and some recruiting officers belonging to Price's army. The information that led to their capture was furnished by two or three remarkably shrewd and intelligent slaves, claimed by a lieutenant-colonel in the rebel army. Shortly afterward the master dispatched an agent with instructions to seize the slaves and convey them within the rebel lines, whereupon the Iowa officer seized them and reported the circumstances to headquarters. The slaves soon understanding the full import of General Halleck's celebrated Order No. 3, two of them attempted an escape. This was regarded as an unpardonable sin. The Iowa officer was immediately placed under arrest, and a detachment of the Missouri State militiamen, in the pay of the Government and under the command of General Halleck, were sent in pursuit of the fugitives. The hunt was successful. The slaves were caught and returned to their traitor master, but not until one of them had been shot by order of the soldier in command of the pursuing party.

Mr. President, how long shall we permit such conduct as this to go unrebuked? Does any one suppose that the people will quietly submit to the imposition of taxes to support a State militia in the field that is to be employed in the capture of slaves for the benefit of officers in the rebel army? Is it supposed that the Senators from Iowa will silently, patiently permit the gallant officers from that State to be outraged in the manner I have described?

It is quite time that some definite policy should be established for the treatment of escaped slaves; and I am of the opinion that Congress has been grossly derelict in permitting the evil to go so long unregulated and unchecked. We have almost as many diverse systems of dealing with this class of persons as we have military departments. In one, fugitive slaves have been pursued, flogged, and returned to their masters by our army; in another, they have been simply pursued and returned without flogging; in another, they have been pursued and shot in the attempt to return them; in another, they have been termed “contraband,” and received within our lines in the mixed character of persons and property. In the absence of any authoritative declaration of Congress, none of these modes may be held to be in conflict with law, other than the law of common-sense and common decency.1

It is obvious that the article of war which I have quoted does not meet the case presented by Major-General Halleck in his Order No. 3. That celebrated manifesto declares in substance that all persons from the enemy's country shall be excluded from our lines. The plain purpose of the order is to prohibit fugitive slaves escaping from the rebellious district, and thereby securing freedom. It was doubtless competent for General Halleck to issue such an order, and it is equally competent for Congress, which has made and continues to make articles of war for the government of the army and navy, to countermand it. And it ought to be countermanded. I will not pause to discuss the humanitarian features of the question. Public policy, no less than popular feeling, demands that Order No. 3 be forever erased. There never was a war waged in the history of the world where the means of acquiring information of the enemy's position and numbers were more ample than here, and there never was one where the commanding officers have suffered more from lack of such information. Order No. 3 proposes to incorporate the fatuity and blindness which remained unwritten in other military departments into an historical record and a public advertisement. It proposes to warn all persons against bringing information of the enemy's movements to our camps, under penalty of being turned back to receive such punishment as the enemy may choose to inflict for betraying them, or for running away and betraying combined. No organization of secret service can meet all the requirements of an army operating in an enemy's country, unless aided by some portion of the inhabitants of the country. What folly, then, to wall out and repel the very inhabitants who might bring us the information we most need, and who have everywhere shown an eagerness to do so!

It is the undoubted right and the duty of every nation, when engaged in a righteous war — and no other than a righteous war is justifiable at all — to avail itself of every legitimate means known to civilized warfare to overcome its enemies. What will be thought by posterity of this nation, if, in the present emergency, we not only fail to employ the agencies which Providence seems to have placed at our disposal, but actually seek every opportunity to exasperate and drive from our support those who are anxious to serve us? Were the Russian nobles now engaged in a rebellion against their Government, would we not regard their emperor as guilty of the greatest folly, if he not only declined to enlist the serfs of his empire to aid in suppressing the insurrection, but repelled them from his service and allowed his generals to return them to his rebellious nobles, to be used by them in overthrowing his authority? And can anyone tell me the difference between the case I have put and our own?

The whole history of the world does not exhibit a nation guilty of such extreme fatuity as has marked the conduct of our Government in its treatment of the colored population since the present war began. It seems to be impossible to convince ourselves that war, with all of its attendant responsibilities and calamities, really exists, and that future generations will not hold those guiltless who refuse to use any of the means which God has placed in their hands to bring it to a speedy and successful termination. History will pronounce those men criminal who, in this crisis of the nation's fate, consult the prejudices of caste or color, and regard the interests of property of paramount importance to the unity of the nation.

It is useless to attempt to blink out of sight the great issues before us — issues that must be settled, and settled by us. It were wiser and more manly to meet them squarely and at once. We are in the midst of the greatest revolution that ever occurred in ancient or modern times. Such armies as are now marshaled in hostile array on this continent, in point of numbers, equipment, and expense, have been hitherto unknown in the annals of mankind. We are imposing burdens in the form of taxes that will be felt by unborn generations. We are suffering much now; we expect and are willing to suffer more. And why? Because we desire to preserve the integrity of our nation; because we believe that Heaven designed us to be one people with one destiny; the freest and happiest on earth. It was to preserve that unity of our national existence that our sons and brothers have gone forth to do battle. For this it was that the gallant men of Iowa have freely, triumphantly, laid down their lives at Wilson's Creek, Blue Mills, Belmont, Fort Donelson, Pea Ridge, and Pittsburg. And shall we, after these great sacrifices of life and treasure, hesitate about employing any of the instrumentalities in aid of the country that are known to civilized warfare? Shall we not be recreant to our high trust if we doubt or delay in this particular?

This war will go on until rebellion is subdued. Upon this point there need be no controversy. Rely upon it, the Northwestern States will submit to no temporizing or compromising policy. They are too much in earnest; they have suffered too much already; they know too well what they would be compelled to suffer in the future to allow treason to go unpunished. It is because they desire to prevent the recurrence of the rebellion that they demand that it shall now be thoroughly crushed out. Among things necessary to be done to fully accomplish this purpose, we must conquer and hold all the forts and strong positions on the South Atlantic and Gulf coasts. How shall they be garrisoned when captured? This is a question we shall soon be compelled to answer; and I am prepared for its solution. I answer it unhesitatingly that we should garrison them, in whole or in part, by soldiers of African descent; that instead of returning slaves to their rebel masters to fight against us, we should employ them in our own military service.

I know very well that this proposition encounters at once all the prejudices that have been engendered by differences of race, education, and social position; but let us look at it a moment soberly and practically. It is assumed as admitted by all that the Southern forts must be captured and strongly garrisoned for some years to come. They are situated in a warm and enervating climate, and the particular location of nearly all of them renders them more than usually unhealthy, even for that section of the country. In addition to the forts already established, we shall be compelled to build new ones. The rebels rely upon the diseases of their climate to decimate our Northern army in the summer and autumnal months; and their confidence is well placed. Our troops will wither before the fevers of the Gulf coast as vegetation does before the blast of the sirocco. Now, we have in our midst thousands of hardy, athletic colored men, fitted by nature to endure the heat and miasma of the tropics, and some of them accustomed to it, who are panting to be employed in the capacity of soldiers. Many of them having been in a state of bondage, have been abandoned by their masters, and are now thrown upon us for support. Some of them were forced by our enemies into their military service, and have deserted from it. They implore our protection, and we must give it, if we would not become a “scorn and derision” among the nations of the earth. They have shown on divers occasions, both on sea and land, that they belong to a warlike race. They are obedient and teachable. They can be subsisted much cheaper than white soldiers, can perform more labor, and are subject to fewer diseases in a warm climate.

Now, with these facts before us, shall we refuse to employ them? What substantial reason can be given for not doing so? Is it because they have not the proper capacity for command? Then give them white officers, as is done by the British Government to the same race, by the French Government to the Arabs, and by the Russian Government to the Tartars and other semi-barbarous soldiers within that empire. Is it because they do not possess the average courage of soldiers? In addition to the testimony in disproof of this, furnished a few days ago by the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Wilson), I refer you to your vessels-of-war, where you have hundreds of these men employed, and none more valiant. Is it because they are not obedient to command? The whole history of the race shows the contrary, for, if there is any one thing for which they are remarkable more than another, it is their confiding submission to the will of their superiors. Is it said that we have white soldiers enough for all of our purposes? True, we have a large army, composed of men of unsurpassed valor and patriotism, who, if we require it, will sacrifice their lives for their country, whether by the sword or by disease; but I would, if I could, recall a portion of them to their homes and to the industrial pursuits of life. Am I told that the enrollment of a few colored soldiers will be regarded by the Army as humiliating to them? Mr. President, those public men fail to comprehend the character of American soldiers who suppose that they are fighting for mere military glory, or that in this critical hour they are controlled by ignoble prejudice against color or race. They are citizens and taxpayers as well as soldiers. They want the rebellion speedily crushed and the supreme authority of the law established, leaving social and political questions to be settled afterward. They feel that the desertion of every colored soldier, artificer, or laborer, from the rebellious States, withdraws aid and support from the rebellion, and brings it so much nearer to an end. They cannot understand, nor can I, that refined casuistry that justifies us in converting the enemy's horse or ox to our use, and in turning their inanimate engines of destruction against themselves, but denies to us the right to turn their slaves, their animate hostile engines in human form, to the same purpose. They cannot imagine why it is that some gentlemen are so willing that men of the African race should labor for them, and so unwilling that they should fight for them.

What a wonderful difference of action and sentiment there is on this subject between the officers of the Army and Navy! While officers of the Army have disgraced themselves, annoyed and incensed their subordinates, dishonored the country, and injured the public service, by the promulgation of their ridiculous orders about slaves, no officer of the Navy, thank God, has ever descended to follow their example. Their noble, manly, generous hearts would revolt at the idea of having imposed upon them the humiliating duty of capturing and returning fugitive slaves. They serve their country, not rebel slave-owners. They think that duty to the country requires them to avail themselves of the services of these people, instead of driving them back to their masters, or suffering them to starve; and they act upon this conviction. At the taking of Hatteras, one of the large guns of the Minnesota was wholly manned and worked by persons called “contrabands,” and no gun on the ship was better served. These people are, it is well known, remarkable for the proficiency they soon acquire as cannoneers. On the same ship is a boat’s crew, every one of whom, including the cockswain, is a colored man, and there are none more skillful, or render more satisfactory service to the officers of the vessel. The whole country knows the services rendered by them to Commodore Du Pont and to the vessels under his command. They have acted as pilots, and in the most important positions, and I have the authority of the two superior officers of that fleet for saying that they have never been deceived or misled by any one of them. I am convinced that our expedition to the South Atlantic coast would not have been so perfect a success as it has been but for the slaves found there, and who were employed by our naval officers. There are more or less of them on all our vessels-of-war. They are efficient men, and their presence produces no discord among the crews.

Mr. President, I wish to be distinctly understood. I advocate no indiscriminate arming of the colored race, although I frankly confess that I would do so were it necessary to put down the rebellion. I do not favor this proposition merely because of its antislavery tendency. I approve it because it will result in a saving of human life, and in bringing the rebellion to a speedier termination. It is my business to aid in bringing this war to a close by conquering an unconditional peace in the least expensive and speediest manner possible. Acting upon this idea of my duty, and believing that humanity and the best interests of the country require the enrollment of a few colored regiments for garrisoning the Southern forts, I shall vote, whenever an opportunity shall be afforded me, for converting a portion of the colored refugees into soldiers, instead of forcing them back into servitude to their rebel masters and their rebel government. We may hesitate to do this. Our hesitation will cost us the valuable lives of many of our own race who are near and dear to us. Our hesitation to use the means which Providence seems to have placed in our hands for crushing the rebellion may carry desolation to many a loyal hearthstone. But we must adopt this policy sooner or later, and, in my opinion, the sooner we do it the better. The rebels have this day thousands of slaves throwing up intrenchments and redoubts at Yorktown, and thousands of them performing military duty elsewhere; and yet we hesitate and doubt the propriety of employing the same race of people to defend ourselves and our institutions against them. Mr. President, how long shall we hesitate?
_______________

1 “Up to that date (July, 1862), neither Congress nor the President had made any clear, well-defined rules touching the negro slaves, and the different generals had issued orders according to their own political sentiments.” — Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, written by Himself, Vol. I, p. 285.

SOURCE: William Salter, The Life of James W. Grimes, p. 184-93

Thursday, April 10, 2014

Major-General George B. McClellan to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, August 12, 1862 – 11 p.m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, August 12, 1862 11 p.m.

Your dispatch of noon to-day received. It is positively the fact that no more men could have been embarked hence than have gone, and that no unnecessary delay has occurred. Before your orders were received Colonel Ingalls directed all available vessels to come from Monroe. Officers have been sent to take personal direction. Have heard nothing here of Burnside’s fleet.

There are some vessels at Monroe, such as Atlantic and Baltic, which draw too much to come here. Hospital accommodations exhausted this side of New York. Propose filling Atlantic and Baltic with serious cases for New York, and to encamp slight oases for the present at Monroe. In this way can probably get off the 3,400 sick still on hand by day after to-morrow night.

I am sure that you have been misinformed as to the availability of vessels on hand. We cannot use heavily-loaded supply vessels for troops or animals, and such constitute the mass of those here which have been represented to you as capable of transporting this army.

I fear you will find very great delay in embarking troops and material at Yorktown and Monroe, both from want of vessels and of facilities of embarkation. At least two additional wharves should at once be built at each place. I ordered two at the latter some two weeks ago, but you countermanded the order.

I learn that wharf accommodations at Aquia are altogether inadequate for landing troops and supplies to any large extent. Not an hour should be lost in remedying this.

Great delay will ensue that from shallow water. You will find a vast deficiency in horse transports. We had nearly two hundred when we came here; I learn of only twenty provided slow; they carry about 50 horses each. More hospital accommodations should be provided. We are much impeded here because our wharves are used night and day to land current supplies. At Monroe a similar difficulty will occur.

With all the facilities at Alexandria and Washington six weeks, about, were occupied in embarking this army and its material.

Burnside's troops are not a fair criterion for rate of embarkation. All his means were in hand, his outfit specially prepared for the purpose, and his men habituated to the movement.

There shall be no unnecessary delay, but I cannot manufacture vessels. I state these difficulties from experience, and because it appears to me that we have been lately working at cross purposes because you have not been properly informed by those around you, who ought to know the inherent difficulties of such an undertaking. It is not possible for any one to place this army where you wish it, ready to move, in less than a month. If Washington is in danger now this army can scarcely arrive in time to save it. It is in much better position to do so from here than from Aquia.

Our material can only be saved by using the whole army to cover it if we are pressed. If sensibly weakened by detachments the result might be the lees of much material and many men. I will be at the telegraph office to-morrow morning to talk with you.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major General.
Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Washington, D.C.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 11, Part 1 (Serial No. 12), p. 87-8

Friday, February 28, 2014

Major General George B. McClellan to Abraham Lincoln, April 20, 1862

Private
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac
Camp Winfield Scott, April 20 1862
His Excellency The  President

My dear Sir

I enclose herewith a copy of the first reliable map we have prepared of this vicinity – it will give you a good general idea of positions. In a day or two we will have one on a larger scale which will be more satisfactory to you.

I will soon send you one of the immediate front of Yorktown on which I will mark the batteries now being constructed & send such information as will enable you to put down the new works as they progress.

We are now actually at work, & nearly through, with 6 batteries for guns, have commenced a series for 10 13" mortars, & commence tomorrow morning another gun battery. As soon as these are armed we will open the first parallel & other batteries for 8" & 10" mortars & more heavy guns. Everything is going on admirably & we shall soon open with a terrific fire. I hope to hear hourly of the arrival of Franklin's Division, & shall lose no time in placing him in position. I hope the Galena will be here to assist us very soon. Gnl Robt Lee is in command in our front – Johnston is under him! I learn that there has been quite a struggle on the subject between Davis and his Congress, Davis insisting upon Johnston. I prefer Lee to Johnston – the former is too cautious and weak under given responsibility – personally brave and energetic to a fault, he yet is wanting in moral firmness when pressed by heavy responsibility & is likely to be timid & irresolute in action.

The difficulties of our position are undeniable, that is the enemy is in a very strong position – but I never expected to get to Richmond without a hard fought battle, & am just as willing to fight it here as elsewhere – I am confident of success, not only of success but of brilliant success. I think that a defeat here substantially breaks up the rebel cause.

They are making great efforts – enforcing the conscription with the utmost vigor, & now have their regiments full – whether the infusion of raw & perhaps unwilling men will benefit them remains to be seen – I doubt whether it is a disadvantage to us.

I am, sir, most respectfully
and sincerely your friend

Geo B McClellan

Tuesday, February 25, 2014

Major General George B. McClellan to Edwin M. Stanton, about April 20, 1862

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
BEFORE YORKTOWN.
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

SIR: I received to-day a note from Assistant Secretary Watson enclosing an extract from a letter the author of which is not mentioned. I send a copy of the extract with this. I hope that a copy has also been sent to Gen. McDowell, whom it concerns more nearly, perhaps, than it does me.

At the risk of being thought obtrusive I will venture upon some remarks which perhaps my position does not justify me in making, but which I beg to assure you are induced solely by my intense desire for the success of the government in this struggle. You will, I hope, pardon me if I allude to the past, not in a captious spirit, but merely so far as may be necessary to explain my own course and my views as to the future.

From the beginning I had intended, so far as I might have the power to carry out my own views, to abandon the line of Manassas as the line of advance. I ever regarded it as an improper one; my wish was to adopt a new line, based upon the waters of the lower Chesapeake. I always expected to meet with strong opposition on this line, the strongest that the rebels could offer, but I was well aware that upon overcoming this opposition the result would be decisive and pregnant with great results.

Circumstances, among which I will now only mention the uncertainty as to the power of the Merrimac, have compelled me to adopt the present line, as probably safer, though far less brilliant, than that by Urbana. When the movement was commenced I counted upon an active and disposable force of nearly 150,000 men, and intended to throw a strong column upon West Point either by York river or, if that proved impracticable, by a march from the mouth of the Severn, expecting to turn in that manner all the defences of the Peninsula. Circumstances have proved that I was right, and that my intended movements would have produced the desired results.

After the transfer of troops had commenced from Alexandria to Fort Monroe, but before I started in person, the division of Blenker was detached from my command — a loss of near 10,000 men. As soon as the mass of my troops were fairly started I embarked myself. Upon reaching Fort Monroe I learned that the rebels were being rapidly reinforced from Norfolk and Richmond. I therefore determined to lose no time in making the effort to invest Yorktown, without waiting for the arrival of the divisions of Hooker and Richardson and the 1st corps, intending to employ the 1st corps in mass to move upon West Point, reinforcing it as circumstances might render necessary.

The advance was made on the morning of the second day after I reached Fort Monroe. When the troops reached the immediate vicinity of Yorktown the true nature of the enemy's position was for the first time developed. While my men were under fire I learned that the 1st corps was removed from my command. No warning had been given me of this, nor was any reason then assigned. I should also have mentioned that the evening before I left Fort Monroe I received a telegraphic despatch from the War Department informing me that the order placing Fort Monroe and its dependent troops under my command was rescinded. No reason was given for this, nor has it been to this day. I confess that I have no right to know the reason. This order deprived me of the support of another division which I had been authorized to form for active operations from among the troops near Fort Monroe.

Thus when I came under fire I found myself weaker by five divisions than I had expected when the movement commenced. It is more than probable that no general was ever placed in such a position before.

Finding myself thus unexpectedly weakened, and with a powerful enemy strongly entrenched in my front, I was compelled to change my plans and become cautious. Could I have retained my original force I confidently believe that I would now have been in front of Richmond instead of where I now am. The probability is that that city would now have been in our possession.

But the question now is in regard to the present and the future rather than the past.

The enemy, by the destruction of the bridges of the Rappahannock, has deprived himself of the means of a rapid advance on Washington. Lee will never venture upon a bold movement on a large scale.

The troops I left for the defence of Washington, as I fully explained to you in the letter I wrote the day I sailed, are ample for its protection.

Our true policy is to concentrate our troops on the fewest possible lines of attack; we have now too many, and an enterprising enemy could strike us a severe blow.

I have every reason to believe that the main portion of the rebel forces are in my front. They are not "drawing off" their troops from Yorktown.

Give me McCall's division and I will undertake a movement on West Point which will shake them out of Yorktown. As it is, I will win, but I must not be blamed if success is delayed. I do not feel that I am answerable for the delay of victory.

I do not feel authorized to venture upon any suggestions as to the disposition of the troops in other departments, but content myself with stating the least that I regard as essential to prompt success here. If circumstances render it impossible to give what I ask, I still feel sure of success, but more time will be required to achieve the result.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Maj.-Gcn. Commanding.

SOURCE: George B. McClellan, McClellan’s Own Story, p. 281-3

General Joseph E. Johnston to General Robert E. Lee, April 22, 1862

HEADQUARTERS,
Lee's Farm, April 22, 1862.
General R. E. LEE:

GENERAL: Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, commanding at Yorktown, reports that the enemy used signal lights across the river and fired signal guns last night. He thinks that this may indicate a dash at Richmond from West Point or Urbana, and suggests that the North Carolina army be brought to that place. The report from Norfolk that ten steam transports left Fort Monroe with troops the day before is more indicative of such a move.

I have heard neither from Jackson nor Field. Ewell's last letter, dated 18th, informed me that he was hourly expecting a summons to Jackson's aid. Stationed here, I can obtain no information except from or through Richmond. Should the enemy's movements on the north or south of you require the withdrawal of these troops you will have to give me notice.

Labor enough has been expended here to make a very strong position, but it has been wretchedly misapplied by the young engineer officers. No one but McClellan could have hesitated to attack. The defensive line is far better for him than for us.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. E. JOHNSTON,
General.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 11, Part 3 (Serial No. 14), p. 455-6

Major General George B. McClellan to Abraham Lincoln, April 9, 1862 – 9 p.m.

CAMP WINFIELD SCOTT,
Near Yorktown,  April 14 [1862]9 p.m.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN:

I have seen General Franklin, and beg to thank you for your kindness and consideration. I now understand the matter, which I did not before.

Our field guns annoyed the enemy considerably to-day. Roads and bridges now progressing rapidly. Siege guns and ammunition coming up very satisfactorily. Shall have nearly all up to-morrow.

The tranquillity of Yorktown is nearly at an end.

 GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 11, Part 3 (Serial No. 14), p. 98

Monday, February 24, 2014

Major General George B. McClellan to Abraham Lincoln, April 5, 1862 – 7:30 p.m.

NEAR YORKTOWN, April 5, 18627.30 p.m.
 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President:

the enemy are in large force along our front, and apparently intend making a determined resistance. A reconnaissance just made by General Barnard shows that their line of works extends across the entire Peninsula from Yorktown to Warwick River. Many of them are very formidable. Deserters say they are being re-enforced daily from Richmond and from Norfolk. Under these circumstances I beg that you will reconsider the order detaching the First Corps from my command. In my deliberate judgment the success of our cause will be imperiled by so greatly reducing my force when it is actually under the fire of the enemy and active operations have commenced. Two or three of my divisions have been under fire of artillery most of the day. I am now of the opinion that I shall have to fight all the available force of the rebels not far from here. Do not force me to do so with diminished numbers. But whatever your decision may be, I will leave nothing undone to obtain success. If you cannot leave me the whole of the First Corps, I urgently ask that I may not lose Franklin and his division.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 11, Part 3 (Serial No. 14), p. 71

Abraham Lincoln to Major General George B. McClellan, April 6, 1862 – 8 p.m.

WASHINGTON, April 6, 18628 p.m.
General GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

Yours of 11 a.m. to-day received.* Secretary of War informs me that the forwarding of transportation, ammunition, and Woodbury's brigade, under your orders, is not, and will not, be interfered with. You now have over 100,000 troops with you, independent of General Wool's command. I think you better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick River at once. This will probably use time as advantageously as you can.

A. LINCOLN,
President.
____________

* See “Correspondence, etc.,” Part III.
† See Reply on Page 11.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 11, Part 1 (Serial No. 12), p. 14

Major General George B. McClellan to Edwin M. Stanton, March 19, 1862

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Theological Seminary, Va., March 19, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following notes on the proposed operations of the active portion of the Army of the Potomac.

The proposed plan of campaign is to assume Fort Monroe as the first base of operations, taking the line of Yorktown and West Point upon Richmond as the line of operations, Richmond being the objective point. It is assumed that the fall of Richmond involves that of Norfolk and the whole of Virginia; also that we shall fight a decisive battle between West Point and Richmond, to give which battle the rebels will concentrate all their available forces, understanding, as they will, that it involves the fate of their cause. It therefore follows –

1st. That we should collect all our available forces and operate upon adjacent lines, maintaining perfect communication between our columns.

2d. That no time should be lost in reaching the field of battle.

The advantages of the Peninsula between York and James Rivers are too obvious to need explanation. It is also clear that West Point should as soon as possible be reached and used as our main depot, that we may have the shortest line of land transportation for our supplies and the use of the York River.

There are two methods of reaching this point:

1st: By moving directly from Fort Monroe as a base, and trusting to the roads for our supplies, at the same time landing a strong corps as near Yorktown as possible, in order to turn the rebel lines of defense south of Yorktown; then to reduce Yorktown and Gloucester by a siege, in all probability involving a delay of weeks, perhaps.

2d. To make a combined naval and land attack upon Yorktown the first object of the campaign. This leads to the most rapid and decisive results. To accomplish this, the Navy should at once concentrate upon the York River all their available and most powerful batteries. Its reduction should not in that case require many hours. A strong corps would be pushed up the York, under cover of the Navy, directly upon West Point, immediately upon the fall of Yorktown, and we could at once establish our new base of operations at a distance of some 25 miles from Richmond, with every facility for developing and bringing into play the whole of our available force on either or both banks of the James.

It is impossible to urge too strongly the absolute necessity of the full co-operation of the Navy as a part of this programme. Without it the operations may be prolonged for many weeks, and we may be forced to carry in front several strong positions, which by their aid could be turned without serious loss of either time or men.

It is also of first importance to bear in mind the fact, already alluded to, that the capture of Richmond necessarily involves the prompt fall of Norfolk, while an operation against Norfolk, if successful, as the beginning of the campaign, facilitates the reduction of Richmond merely by the demoralization of the rebel troops involved, and that after the fall of Norfolk we should be obliged to undertake the capture of Richmond by the same means which would have accomplished it in the beginning, having meanwhile afforded the rebels ample time to perfect their defensive arrangements; for they would well know, from the moment the Army of the Potomac changed its base to Fort Monroe, that Richmond must be its ultimate object.

It may be summed up in few words, that for the prompt success of this campaign it is absolutely necessary that the Navy should at once throw its whole available force, its most powerful vessels, against Yorktown. There is the most important point – there the knot to be cut. An immediate decision upon the subject-matter of this communication is highly desirable, and seems called for by the exigencies of the occasion.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
 Major-General.
Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 5 (Serial No. 5), p. 57-8

Wednesday, February 5, 2014

Beauregard’s Address

The following address has just been issued to our troops, who are confident of victory:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE FORCES AT
CORINTH, Miss, May 8, 1862.
Soldiers of Shiloh and Elkhorn:

We are about to meet once more, in the shock of battle, the invaders of our soil, the despoilers of our homes, the disturbers of our family ties, face to face, hand to hand, we are to decide whether we are to be freemen or vile slaves, of those who are only free in name, and who but yesterday were vanquished, although in largely superior numbers, in their own encampments, on the ever memorable field of Shiloh.  Let the impending battle decide our fate, and add a more illustrious page to the history of our revolution – one to which our children will point with noble pride, saying, “Our fathers were at the battle of Corinth.”  I congratulate you on your timely junction.  With your mingled banners, for the first time during this war, we shall meet our foe in strength that should give us victory.  Soldiers, can the result be doubtful?  Shall we not drive back in Tennessee the presumptuous mercenaries collected for our subjugation?  One more manly effort, and trusting in God and the justness of our cause, we shall recover more than we lately lost.  Let the sound of our victorious guns be re-echoed by those of the army of Virginia on the historic battlefield of Yorktown.

G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General Commanding.
J. M. OTEY, Acting Ass’t Adj. Gen.
Southern Paper.

– Published in The Davenport Daily Gazette, Davenport, Iowa, Tuesday Morning, May 20, 1862, p. 2

Thursday, December 26, 2013

General Robert E. Lee to Colonel G. W. Custis Lee, June 13, 1863

Richmond, Virginia,
June 13, 1863.

I send down Colonel Long to see if possible what this move of the enemy up the Peninsula is. I believe it to be a raid to destroy our crops and lay waste our country. All the accounts I get agree in stating that the enemy has sent off his troops from Suffolk, Yorktown, Gloucester, etc., to reinforce General Hooker.

He can only have a small force in that region, which he has wholly collected for this expedition. We must do the same and beat him back at all hazards. General Hooker's army has not moved in that direction as far as I can be certain of anything in war. It is extending now up the Rappahannock.

I hope Fitzhugh is doing well. Let me know how he gets on. Give much love to your mother and sisters and remember me to all friends.

God bless you all.

SOURCES:  John William Jones, Life and Letters of Robert Edward Lee: Soldier and Man, p. 246-7; For the date of this letter and a full transcription see Clifford Dowdey and Louis H. Manarin, Editors,The Wartime Papers of R. L. Lee, p. 514.

Thursday, December 19, 2013

Brigadier General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, May 10, 1862

CAMP NEAR FREDERICKSBURG, May 10, 1862.

The recent act of Congress in reference to command of troops is, I understand, construed by the Secretary of War into an entire destruction of rank in the army. It is now decided that the Secretary can put any officer wherever he pleases, over the heads of his seniors, and no one has the right, or will be permitted, to protest or contest this right. Ord has been made a major general for his Dranesville fight, and if McCall is superseded, I think it probable Ord will be given this division. I think the promotion of Ord just and deserved; for if I had had the good luck to have been in command at Dranesville, I should have claimed the benefit of it. War is a game of chance, and besides the chances of service, the accidents and luck of the field, in our army, an officer has to run the chances of having his political friends in power, or able to work for him. First we had Cameron, Scott (General), with Thomas (adjutant general) and McDowell, who ruled the roost, distributed appointments and favors. Bull Run put Scott's and McDowell's noses out of joint, and brought in McClellan. Then Stanton took Cameron's place, fell out with McClellan, whose nose was therefore put out of joint, and now McDowell again turns up, and so it goes on from one to another. A poor devil like myself, with little merit and no friends, has to stand aside and see others go ahead. Upon the whole, however, I have done pretty well, and ought not to complain.

Of course you have exulted over McClellan's successful dislodgment of the enemy at Yorktown and his brilliant pursuit of and defeat of them at Williamsburg. To-day we hear his gunboats have gone up the James River, and we now look forward to his beating them back from the Chickahominy and forcing them to fight, either at Richmond, or to abandon that place and Virginia. His progress has been so rapid that it seems useless for us to do any more work on the railroad on this line, and I look daily for orders for our column to take shipping at Acquia Creek and go down to West Point to reinforce McClellan. There is where we ought always to have been, and there is where we ought now to go. As it is, we are hard at work rebuilding the railroad to this point, and will have to do it all the way hence to Richmond, fifty-five miles. They have a force in our front some twelve miles off, and say they are going to fight us; but McClellan's operations will stop all that, and they will be out of our way before we can get at them.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1, p. 265-6

Wednesday, December 18, 2013

Brigadier General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, May 5, 1862

CAMP OPPOSITE FREDERICKSBURG, May 5, 1862.

I am very glad you saw Mrs. McClellan and were pleased with her. Although I don't think General McClellan thought much of me after I was appointed, yet I am quite sure my appointment was due to him, and almost entirely to him. At that time his will was omnipotent and he had only to ask and it was given. He told me himself that he had simply presented my name to the President, to which I replied that I considered that the same as appointing me; which I do, and for which I am not only grateful but proud, being prouder of such an appointment than if all the politicians in the country had backed me.

Since writing you, great events have taken place. Fort Macon fallen, New Orleans taken, and now we hear Yorktown and the Peninsula are evacuated.

I believe our movement to this place has been magnified, and they saw the danger to their rear and got away before it was too late. I think I wrote you, when in Alexandria, that this was the place for us to come to, and never could understand what we were sent to Manassas for, except because the enemy had been there before us. Great efforts are being made to repair the railroad, so as to bring up supplies, and I think we will be pushed on as fast as the road is completed.

McClellan will push on from West Point, at the head of York River, from whence there is also a railroad. He has a shorter distance, only forty miles, and we have sixty, but he will have one hundred thousand men to move and we only forty thousand, so that we will progress about evenly. We don't know whether they intend to abandon Virginia entirely, or whether they have only withdrawn from the Peninsula, between the York and James Rivers, and have taken up a position nearer Richmond.

Day before yesterday General McDowell invited me to meet at his quarters the Secretaries of State, Treasury and War, all of whom had come on a trip from Washington, and whom he very judiciously put into a wagon and drove them over the fifteen miles of road from Acquia Creek to this place, during which ride they were almost jolted to death and their lives endangered, owing to the dreadful condition of the road. He said to them: “Gentlemen, you can see for yourselves the character of the roads we have to draw our artillery and supplies over, and I assure you they are infinitely better now than they have been at any previous period of our operations since the frost began to leave the ground.” I was introduced to all of them and they were quite civil. I did not recall to Mr. Chase's1 recollection that I was a ci-devant pupil of his, not knowing how such reminiscences might be taken. After lunch we all crossed the river on a boat-bridge we have built, and took a turn through Fredericksburg. The place seemed deserted by all who could get away, there being but few white people, and they mostly old women and children. There are some very pretty residences in the town, though we only saw the outside of them. The papers will have informed you that Ord has been made a major general. They also state he is to have this division, but I think that is a mistake. The idea that McCall will voluntarily retire is absurd, and I don't see how with any show of justice they can put him aside.
__________

1 Secretary of the treasury.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1, p. 263-5