No. 9.
Report of Maj. Gen. David S.
Stanley, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Army Corps, of operations November
14—December 1, 1864.
On the 14th
[November] Major-General Schofield arrived and assumed command, by direction of
Major-General Thomas. On the 21st it became positively known, from a dispatch
intercepted by General Hatch's pickets and from other sources, that the enemy
were moving north and in the direction of Columbia The roads, however, off the
pikes were very bad, it having rained very heavily for some days, and then
frozen, but not hard enough to bear wagons. It was believed the enemy could
make but little speed, and the evacuation of Pulaski was made the afternoon of
the 23d. The corps marched to Lynnville that night, to which place the Second
Division (General Wagner) had moved the day before. During the night it was
learned that the enemy had made good use of his time, notwithstanding the bad
roads, and that Colonel Capron's brigade had been driven out of Mount Pleasant;
it was believed by an infantry force. This information was received about 1
o'clock at night, and the troops were immediately waked up and put in motion
for Columbia, twenty-one miles distant. General Cox's division, of the Twenty-third
Corps, was ten miles nearer Columbia, and marching at the same hour as
ourselves he arrived in time to save Capron's brigade of cavalry from
annihilation and perhaps the town of Columbia from capture. Turning west at a
point three miles south of Columbia, on the Pulaski pike, General Cox, by a
cross road, reached the Mount Pleasant pike, and immediately attacking the
advancing rebels, drove them back. As fast as the divisions of the Fourth Corps
arrived they were placed in line of battle and immediately intrenched
themselves. The First Division, Brigadier-General Whitaker, did not get into
position until after night. The enemy's cavalry made some demonstrations upon
our left flank during the march, but were easily driven off by a regiment of
infantry commanded by Colonel Knefler. During the 24th and 25th a very strong
and complete set of earth-works were constructed, but the line being very long,
and leaving no disposable troops after properly occupying it, two divisions of
the corps were withdrawn from it on the night of the 25th to occupy a short and
interior line, leaving General Wood's division to hold the front, formerly held
by the entire corps. Cox's division, of the Twenty-third Corps, at the same
time crossed to the north of Duck River, and General Ruger commenced the
construction of a bridge-head.
The enemy
undoubtedly deployed their whole force upon our front, and they made several
attacks upon our pickets; but it became evident very soon that Hood was moving
to the east, and most likely with a view of crossing Duck River above us. The
intentions of the enemy became so apparent that it was determined to cross the
entire of our force to the north bank of Duck River. The night of the 26th
orders were given accordingly, but the night was so dark and the rain poured
down so that no progress could be made crossing the artillery, and at midnight
the movement was given up and the artillery replaced in position. During the
night of the 27th the withdrawal to the north side of Duck River was made very
successfully, the pickets leaving the outside line and falling back to the
first line of works at 7 o'clock and remaining one hour, when they fell back to
the interior line abandoned by the troops, holding that line until near
daylight. The fort and magazine were fired, but the destruction was not very
complete. The morning of the 28th we occupied the high ground immediately north
of Duck River, from below the railroad bridge to about a mile above Columbia.
The railroad and pontoon bridges had been destroyed. The enemy could be seen in
full view across the river. The troops were employed on the 28th in
strengthening their position on the north bank of Duck River; one brigade,
Whitaker's, was sent back to Rutherford's Creek to protect all the trains of
the army parked near the crossing on the Franklin pike. About 3 p.m. it was
learned that Forrest's cavalry had driven Colonel Capron's brigade of cavalry
to the north bank of Duck River, eleven miles above, and that the rebel cavalry
had effected a crossing to the same side. Later in the evening the pickets of
Wood's division reported the enemy crossing cavalry at Huey's Mills, five miles
above Columbia. A reconnaissance sent after dark failed to find the enemy, but
early on the morning of the 29th General Wilson sent word that the enemy had
laid a pontoon bridge at Huey's Mills.
At 8 a.m. on the
29th I started to Spring Hill with the First and Second Divisions, all the
artillery that could be spared, and all trains and ambulances to follow; at the
same time a reconnaissance, consisting of Colonel Post's brigade, of Wood's
division, was sent up the river, and soon sent back word that the enemy was
crossing infantry and wagons and moving off rapidly to the north and parallel
to the turnpike. It being apprehended that the enemy might make a flank attack
upon the position of our force between Duck River and Rutherford's Creek, the
First Division, General Kimball commanding, was halted, and took up position to
cover the crossing of the creek. At 11.30 o'clock the head of the Second
Division was within two miles of Spring Hill. A cavalry soldier, who seemed
badly scared, was met here, who stated that a scout had come in from the
direction of Raleigh [Rally] Hill, and reported that Buford's division of rebel
cavalry was all way between Raleigh [Rally] Hill and Spring Hill, and on the
march to the latter place. The Second Division was pushed on, and, attracted by
the firing east of the village, double-quicked into the place and deployed the
leading brigade as they advanced, drove off a force of the enemy's cavalry
which was driving our small force of cavalry and infantry and would very soon
have occupied the town. General Wagner was ordered to deploy his division at
once; Opdycke's and Lane's brigades to cover as much space about the village as
would serve for room to park the trains; General Bradley's brigade was sent to
occupy a wooded knoll about three-quarters of a mile east of the pike, and
which commanded the approaches from that direction.
Up to this time it
was thought we had only cavalry to contend with, but a general officer and his
staff, at whom we sent some complimentary shells, were seen reconnoitering our
position, and very soon afterward General Bradley was assailed by a force which
the men said fought too well to be any dismounted cavalry. I received General
Schofield's dispatch about the same time, telling me that the rebels had been
crossing the river, and leaving no doubt but that we now confronted a superior
force of rebel infantry. About the same time an attack was made upon a small
wagon train, composed of some pressed wagons which had passed on, by rebel
cavalry, at Reynolds' [Thompson's] Station, three miles toward Franklin, and
simultaneously the rebel cavalry appeared west of us and threatened the railroad
station of Spring Hill. Thus we were threatened and attacked from every
direction, and it was impossible to send any re-enforcements to Bradley's
brigade, which had become quite severely engaged, lest in so doing we should
expose the train and artillery park to destruction. The enemy made two assaults
on Bradley's position, and were severely handled and repulsed; but finding his
flank the third time they overlapped him on his right,. and the general at the
time receiving a severe wound whilst encouraging his men, his brigade was
driven back to the outskirts of the village, where we rallied them and again
formed them in line. The enemy attempted to follow up his advantage, but coming
across the corn-field toward the village they fell under the fire of at least
eight pieces of artillery, at good range for spherical case-shot, and received
a fire in flank from a section of a battery which had been placed on the pike
south of the village. A part of the rebel force making the charge fled to their
rear, and a portion ran down into a ravine between their own and our lines and
concealed themselves in the bed of the small stream, neither able to crawl
forward or go back until night-fall. This was the condition of affairs when
night fell. General Bradley's brigade had lost about 150 men in killed,
wounded, and missing. We now know that the enemy lost, according to the
statement of one of their surgeons who was on the field, 500 men. Our greatest
loss was in the disabling of so intrepid an officer as General Bradley.
As night closed we
could see the enemy rapidly extending his lines, and by 8 o'clock it was
evident that at least a corps of Hood's army was formed in line of battle,
facing the turnpike, and at a near distance of but little more than a half a
mile from it. General Schofield arrived from Columbia at 7 o'clock in the
evening with Ruger's division. He found the enemy on the pike, and had quite a
skirmish in driving them off. My pickets had reported seeing rebel columns
passing east of our position as if to get possession of the hills at Thompson's
Station, and the anxious question arose whether we could force our way through
to Franklin. It was determined to attempt this, and General Schofield pushed on
with Ruger's division to ascertain the condition of affairs. He found that the
enemy did not attempt to hold the road. It was now 11 o'clock at night, and
Cox's division had just arrived from in front of Columbia; the division pushed
on at once for Franklin. From a rebel officer, captain and adjutant-general of
Cleburne's division, we learned that it was his division of the rebel army we
had been fighting. Wood's division, of the Fourth Corps, arrived just after
Cox. The enemy's skirmishers fired into the column frequently, and stampeded a
new regiment which had just joined the day before; but instructions were sent
to push on and not get into a fight if the enemy kept off the road, and in half
an hour after General Wood's division arrived I had the satisfaction of meeting
the head of General Kimball's column, which got through with some skirmishing.
So close were the enemy on our flank that, when a column was not passing, it
was difficult for a staff officer or an orderly to get through on the road.
General Cox's division was out of the way, and the train commenced to pull out
at 1 o'clock the morning of the 30th. The number of wagons, including artillery
and ambulances, was about 800. At the very starting point they had to pass
singly over a bridge, and it was exceedingly doubtful whether the train could
be put on the road by daylight. Unless this could be done, and the corps put in
motion, we were sure of being attacked at daylight and of being compelled to
fight under every disadvantage. I was strongly advised to burn the train, and
move on with the troops and such wagons as could be saved, but I determined to
make an effort to save the train. My staff officers were busily employed
hurrying up teamsters, and everything promised well, when we were again thrown
into despair by the report that the train was attacked north of Thompson's
Station, and that the whole train had stopped.
It was now 3 o'clock
in the morning. General Kimball was directed to push on with the First Division
and clear the road. General Wood's division, which had deployed in the night
north of Spring Hill and, facing the east, had covered the road, was directed
to move on, keeping off the road and on the right flank of the train, and
General Wagner's division, although wearied by the fighting of the day before,
was detailed to bring up the rear. Before Kimball's division could reach the
point at which the train was attacked, Major Steele, of my staff, had gotten up
a squad of our stragglers and driven off the rebels making the attack; they had
succeeded in burning about ten wagons. The trains moved on again, and at about
5 o'clock I had the satisfaction of seeing the last wagon pass the small
bridge. The entire corps was on the road before daylight. The rebel cavalry was
in possession of all the hills to our right, and made numerous demonstrations
upon our flank, but were easily driven off by General Wood's skirmishers, and
when finally a section of Canby's battery unlimbered and threw a few shells
into them the rebel cavalrymen disappeared and troubled us no more. Colonel
Opdycke's brigade formed the rear guard, and rendered excellent service,
skirmishing all the way with the rebel force following us and forcing our
stragglers and lame men, of whom there were many, to make a final effort to
reach Franklin. General Kimball's division reached Franklin soon after 9
o'clock and took up position on the right of the Twenty-third Corps, the right
flank of the division resting on the Harpeth below Franklin. The line selected
by General Schofield was about a mile and a half in length, and inclosed
Franklin, resting the flanks upon the river above and below the town. The
trains were all crossed over to the north side of the Harpeth; Wood's division
was also crossed and posted to watch the fords below the place. Colonel Opdycke
reached the heights two miles south of Franklin at 12 m. He was directed to
halt on the hills to observe the enemy. Croxton's brigade of cavalry was
steadily pushed back by the enemy's infantry column on the Lewisburg pike, and
at 1 o'clock General Wagner reported heavy columns of infantry approaching on
the Columbia and Lewisburg pikes. General Wagner was instructed to fall back
before the advance of the enemy, observing them. About the same time word was
received that the rebels were trying to force a crossing at Hughes' Ford, two
miles above Franklin.
From 1 o'clock until
4 in the evening the enemy's entire force was in sight and forming for attack,
yet in view of the strong position we held, and reasoning from the former
course of the rebels during this campaign, nothing appeared so improbable as
that they would assault. I felt so confident in this belief that I did not
leave General Schofield's headquarters until the firing commenced. About 4
o'clock the enemy advanced with his whole force, at least two corps, making a
bold and persistent assault, which, upon a part of the line, lasted about forty
minutes. When Wagner's division fell back from the heights south of Franklin,
Opdycke's brigade was placed in reserve in rear of our main line, on the
Columbia pike. Lane's and Conrad's brigades were deployed--the former on the
right, the other the left of the pike--about 300 yards in front of the main
line. Here the men, as our men always do, threw up a barricade of rails. By
whose mistake I cannot tell, it certainly was never a part of my instructions,
but these brigades had orders from General Wagner not to retire to the main
line until forced to do so by the fighting of the enemy. The consequence was
that the brigades stood their ground until the charging rebels were almost
crossing bayonets with them, but the line then broke--Conrad's brigade first,
then Lane's--and men and officers made the quickest time they could to our main
lines. The old soldiers all escaped, but the conscripts being afraid to run
under fire, many of them were captured. Conrad's brigade entered the main line
near the Columbia pike, Colonel Lane's several hundred yards to the right of
the pike. A large proportion of Lane's men came back with loaded muskets, and
turning at the breastworks, they fired a volley into the pressing rebels now
not ten steps from them. The part of the Twenty-third Corps stationed in the
works for a distance of about three [hundred] or four [hundred] yards to the
right of the Columbia pike, and which space took in the First Kentucky and
Sixth Ohio Batteries, broke and ran to the rear with the fugitives from
Conrad's brigade. To add to the disorder the caissons of the two batteries
galloped rapidly to the rear, and the enemy appeared on the breast-works and in
possession of the two batteries, which they commenced to turn upon us. It was
at this moment I arrived at the scene of disorder, coming from the town on the
Columbia pike; the moment was critical beyond ally I have known in any
battle--could the enemy hold that part of the line, he was nearer to our two
bridges than the extremities of our line. Colonel Opdycke's brigade was lying
down about 100 yards in rear of the works. I rode quickly to the left regiment
and called to them to charge; at the same time I saw Colonel Opdycke near the
center of his line urging his men forward. I gave the colonel no order, as I
saw him engaged in doing the very thing to save us, viz, to get possession of
our line again. The retreating men of Colonel Conrad's brigade, and, I believe,
the men of the Twenty-third Corps, seeing the line of Opdycke's brigade start
for the works, commenced to rally. I heard the old soldiers call out,
"Come on, men, we Call go wherever the general can," and making a
rush, our men immediately retook all the line, excepting a small portion just
in front of the brick house on the pike. A force of the rebels held out at this
point, and for fifteen or twenty minutes, supported by a rebel line fifty yards
to the rear, poured in a severe fire upon our men. So deadly was this fire that
it was only by the most strenuous exertions of the officers that our men could
be kept to the line; our exertions, however, succeeded, and in twenty minutes
our front was comparatively clear of rebels, who fell back to the position
formerly held by the two brigades of the Second Division in the commencement of
the fight, from whence they kept up a fire until midnight, when we withdrew.
Just after the retaking of the line by our troops, as I was passing toward the
left to General Cox's position, my horse was killed, and no sooner had I
regained my feet than I received a musket-ball through the back of my neck. My
wound, however, did not prevent my keeping the field, and General Cox kindly
furnished me a remount. The rapidity of the firing made it very difficult to
keep up the ammunition, the train being some two miles distant on the road to
Nashville when the battle commenced, and our greatest danger at one period of
the battle was that we would exhaust our ammunition. One hundred wagon-loads of
ammunition, artillery and musket cartridges, were expended in this short
battle, belonging to the ordnance train of the Fourth Army Corps; this train,
however, supplied in great part the wants of the Twenty-third Corps.
After the first
great attack and repulse the enemy made several feeble demonstrations, and
until 9 o'clock in the evening formed and advanced upon the Columbia pike three
or four times. I think these movements were made to keep us from moving, or to
ascertain the very moment we left. At the commencement of the engagement word
came that the enemy's cavalry had forced a crossing at Hughes' Ford, and
calling upon me for support for our cavalry. General Wood was directed to send
a brigade, and General Beatty's brigade had started, when information came that
our cavalry had driven the rebels back and the re-enforcements would not be
needed. General Kimball's division, holding the extreme right of the line, had
comparatively an easy thing of this fight; being well posted behind
breast-works, their volleys soon cleared their front of rebels. One brigade,
Colonel Kirby's, only had the opportunity to fire one volley, and this was a
very effective one, at a rebel brigade which endeavored to move obliquely
across our front to gain the right bank of the river. It having been determined
to withdraw the troops to Nashville, they were directed to leave the line at
midnight, the flanks withdrawing first and simultaneously, the pickets to be
withdrawn when all the troops had crossed. Some villain came very near
frustrating this plan by firing a house in Franklin; the flames soon spread,
and the prospect was that a large fire would occur, which, lighting up objects,
would make it impossible to move the troops without being seen. My staff
officers and General Wood's found an old fire engine, and getting it at work,
the flames were soon subdued and the darkness was found to be increased by the
smoke. At midnight the withdrawal was made successfully, although the enemy
discovered it and followed our pickets up closely.
General Wood's
division remained on the north side of the Harpeth until 4 o'clock in the
morning as rear guard, destroying the bridges before he left. The enemy
indulged in a furious shelling as soon as they found we had left. In the fight
of the day before their artillery had not come up, and but two batteries were
used upon us. These two batteries threw shells into the town during the entire
fight.
The march was
continued to Nashville without interruption; the troops made a short halt at
Brentwood to get breakfast and allow the trains to move on. Our men were more
exhausted physically than I have ever seen them on any other occasion. From
November the 23d, when we left Pulaski, until arriving at Nashville we had been
constantly in the immediate presence of an enemy we knew to be vastly superior
to us in numbers, closely watching to attack us at disadvantage. With us both
mind and body were kept at full stretch, and it was only by night marching and
the constant use of intrenchments that we could hope to save ourselves. Many of
our men were overtaxed and broke down; unable to travel any longer, they fell
into the hands of the enemy. On two occasions the enemy was very near obtaining
the advantage he sought of us--the first was when Cox drove back his advance,
just about entering Columbia; the second and greatest escape for us was at
Spring Hill, where, with a whole corps in line of battle, the left of the line
within 600 yards of the road, they allowed all our army, excepting Wagner's
division, which had fought them during the day, to pass them with impunity in
the night. Upon arriving at Nashville I turned the command of the Fourth Corps
over to Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood, and took advantage of leave of absence on
account of my wounds.
Before closing this
report I must mention the distinguished and faithful service rendered by some
of the officers of my command. To Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood I am under more
than ordinary obligations for advice, and for his success in selecting every
position we occupied from Pulaski to Franklin. To General Whitaker, who
commanded the First Division up to Columbia; to General Kimball, who succeeded
him, and to General Wagner, commanding the Second Division, I am under many
obligations for the zeal in carrying out my plans and orders.
To the members of my
staff much is due for the cheerful and thorough manner in which they discharged
their constant and severe duties during the campaign. Col. J. S. Fullerton,
assistant adjutant-general and chief of staff; Col. W. H. Greenwood, inspector
of the corps; Maj. William H. Sinclair, assistant adjutant-general; Maj. J. W.
Steele, aide-de-camp; Capt. S. J. Firestone, acting aide-de-camp, and Capt. L.
L. Taylor, aide-de-camp---all were most zealous in the discharge of their
duties. Colonel Greenwood's duties were particularly important and thoroughly
attended to.
To Capt. Lyman
Bridges, chief of artillery; to Colonel Hayes, chief quartermaster; to Surg. J.
T. Heard, medical director; Captain Hodgdon, chief commissary, and to Captain
Tousley, chief of ambulance corps, and Lieutenant Laubach, quartermaster at
corps headquarters, I am much indebted for the efficient manner in which they
discharged their respective duties.
Before closing this
report I will mention the names of Colonel Opdycke, One hundred and
twenty-fifth Ohio Volunteer Infantry; Colonel Conrad, Fifteenth Missouri
Veteran Volunteers; Lieut. Col. Arthur MacArthur, Twenty-fourth Wisconsin
Volunteers; Captain Morgan, assistant adjutant-general, and Captain Tinney, of
General Wagner's staff, as some of the officers whom I knew and whom I saw
behave most gallantly at the battle of Franklin. Colonel Opdycke's gallant
services on that occasion I have before noticed in a communication to
department headquarters.
Although Brig. Gen.
J. D. Cox was not in my command, he was my close neighbor in the battle of
Franklin, and I take this opportunity to express to him my thanks for his
gallant help at that time.
A list of casualties
has already been furnished. A recommendation for promotion will be forwarded.
Chief of Staff.
|
|
Killed. |
Wounded. |
Missing. |
Total. |
Aggregate. |
|||||||
|
Officers. |
Men. |
Total. |
Officers. |
Men. |
Total. |
Officers. |
Men. |
Total. |
Officers. |
Men. |
||
|
First
Division |
.... |
5 |
5 |
3 |
34 |
37 |
1 |
17 |
18 |
4 |
56 |
60 |
|
Second
Division |
5 |
47 |
52 |
31 |
488 |
519 |
13 |
657 |
670 |
49 |
1,192 |
1,241 |
|
Third
Division |
.... |
.... |
.... |
.... |
.... |
.... |
.... |
.... |
.... |
.... |
.... |
.... |
|
Artillery
Brigade |
.... |
10 |
10 |
3 |
48 |
51 |
.... |
6 |
6 |
3 |
64 |
67 |
|
Total
|
5 |
62 |
67 |
37 |
570 |
607 |
14 |
680 |
694 |
56 |
1,312 |
1,368 |
NASHVILLE, TENN., December
6, 1864.
ADDENDA.
Assistant Adjutant-General, Dept. of the Tennessee:
My report of the
battle of Franklin, November 30, 1864, was, from unavoidable circumstances, not
written until the 25th of February ensuing. In the notice of the services of my
staff on the day of battle I omitted mentioning the name of Capt. John D.
Moxley, First Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, one of my aides-de-camp. I take this
opportunity, though late, to correct my report. Captain Moxley did his duty
gallantly and well on that day, and was busy throughout the fight encouraging
and rallying our troops.
_______________
* For portion of
report here omitted, relating to operations in North Georgia and North Alabama,
see Vol. XXXIX, Part I, p. 907.
SOURCE: The
War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 112-9
