Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: August 11, 1863

After all the applications of the railroad companies when Gen. Lee was in Pennsylvania, and the enemy had withdrawn from this side of the Potomac, it appears that the fine iron on the road from Fredericksburg to Aquia Creek was not removed! Mr. Seddon's subordinates must answer for this. The iron was wanted more than anything else but men. The want of men cannot be alleged for not securing it, because the railroad companies would have procured negroes enough for its removal.

Well, the first of August has passed, and the grand scheme of the War Office at Washington of a general servile insurrection did not take place. On the contrary, a large army of slaves might be organized to fight for their masters.

To-day, it must be confessed, I saw some of the booty (if, indeed, it was not fairly bought) of the recent invasion of the North. A number of boxes of fine stationery, brought from Carlisle, Chambersburg, etc., were opened at the War Department.

There is a controversy between the Secretary of War, Assistant Secretary, and Attorney-General on one side, and the Commissary-General, Col. L, B. Northrop, on the other. It appears that one of the assistant commissaries exchanged sugar for flour and rice in Alabama with a merchant or speculator, and then, after the lapse of a month or so, impressed the sugar. The party got the Attorney-General's opinion in his behalf, which was approved by the Assistant Secretary of War, and the Secretary issued an order for the release of the sugar. In response to this, Col. N. rebuts the arguments of the whole three (lawyers) by saying it is not good sense to exempt anything, under any circumstances, from impressment, when needed to carry on the war; and that the way to success is to do justice to the whole country — and not to please the people. A palpable hit at the politicians. He says if the Secretary insists on the sugar being released, it will be done against his (N.'s) judgment.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 10

Alexander K. McClure to Abraham Lincoln, June 30, 1863 – Received at 11:05 a.m.

PHILADELPHIA, June 30, 1863.    

(Received 11.05 a.m.)

His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN,

President of the United States:

SIR: Have been twenty-four hours hoping to hasten the organization of troops. It seems impossible to do so to an extent at all commensurate with the emergency. Our people are paralyzed for want of confidence and leadership, and, unless they can be inspired with hope, we shall fail to do anything worthy of our State or Government. I am fully persuaded that to call McClellan to a command here would be the best thing that could be done. He could rally troops from Pennsylvania, and I am well assured that New York and New Jersey would also respond to his call with great alacrity. With his efficiency in organizing men, and the confidence he would inspire, early and effective relief might be afforded us, and great service rendered to the Army of the Potomac.

Unless we are in some way rescued from the hopelessness now prevailing, we shall have practically an inefficient conscription, and be powerless to help either ourselves or the National Government.

After free consultation with trusted friends of the Administration, I hesitate not to urge that McClellan be called here. He can render us and you the best service, and in the present crisis no other consideration should prevail. Without military success we can have no political success, no matter who commands. In this request I reflect what seems to be an imperative necessity rather than any preference of my own.

 A. K. McCLURE.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 3 (Serial No. 45), p. 436; The Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Washington D. C.

Edwin M. Stanton to Governor David Tod, June 15, 1863 – 2 a.m.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

June 15, 1863 — 2 a.m.

Governor TOD,

Columbus, Ohio:

Reports received yesterday and last night have rendered it certain that Lee is advancing with his whole army to invade the States of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and probably Ohio. The President, to meet the exigency, has called for 100,000 militia, to serve for six months, unless sooner discharged. Of these, 50,000 are called from Pennsylvania, 30,000 from Ohio. I hope you will speedily have Ohio's proportion ready for Pittsburgh and Wheeling, or wherever required. Order has been made for the issue of arms and ammunition immediately.

EDWIN M. STANTON,

Secretary of War.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 3 (Serial No. 45), p. 144

Simon Cameron to Abraham Lincoln, June 15, 1863 – 3:50 p.m.

HARRISBURG, June 15, 1863.

(Received 3.50 p.m.)

Hon. ABRAHAM LINCOLN:

I do not believe that you can get troops in time under your call for six months, but if you authorize General Couch to accept them for the emergency, a very large force will be on hand immediately.

SIMON CAMERON.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 3 (Serial No. 45), p. 141

Edwin M. Stanton to Simon Cameron, June 15, 1863 – 7:30 p.m.

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 15, 1863 — 7.30 p.m.

Hon. SIMON CAMERON, Harrisburg:

The President has referred your telegram to me for answer. No one can tell how long the present emergency for troops in Pennsylvania may continue. The present movement is but the execution of Jeff. Davis' original plan to make Pennsylvania and the loyal States the theater of war. The rebels are encouraged by the hope of assistance and encouragement held out to them by opposition to the war and resistance to the enrollment in Pennsylvania. The law has fixed the period for which troops shall be called. If the emergency is over before that time, they can be discharged; but as human foresight cannot say how long it may take to drive out the rebels, especially if they should find aid and comfort in Pennsylvania, the President thinks he must obey the law.

EDWIN M. STANTON.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 3 (Serial No. 45), p. 141-2

Edwin M. Stanton to Governor Horatio Seymour, June 27, 1863

War Department, Washington City,

June 27th, 1863.

Dear Sir: I cannot forbear expressing to you the deep obligation I feel for the prompt and cordial support you have given the Government in the present emergency. The energy and patriotism you have exhibited I may be permitted personally and officially to acknowledge, without arrogating any personal claims on my part, to such service, or any service whatever.

I shall be happy always to be esteemed your friend.

Edwin M. Stanton.

His Excellency Horatio Seymour.

SOURCE: James D. McCabe, The Life and Public Services of Horatio Seymour, p. 66

Abraham Lincoln to Major-General Darius Couch, June 24, 1863 – 8:55 a.m.

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1863 — 8.55 a.m.

Major-General COUCH,

Harrisburg, Pa.:

Have you any reports of the enemy moving into Pennsylvania? And, if any, what?

A. LINCOLN.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 3 (Serial No. 45), p. 295

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: July 23, 1863

We have the following dispatch from Gen. Beauregard, which is really refreshing in this season of disasters:

Charleston, July 22d, 1863.

The enemy recommenced shelling again yesterday, with but few casualties on our part. We had, in the battle of the 18th inst., about 150 killed and wounded. The enemy's loss, including prisoners, was about 2000. Nearly 800 were buried under a flag of truce.

Col. Putnam, acting brigadier-general, and Col. Shaw, commanding the negro regiment, were killed.

G. T. Beauregard, General.

It is said the raiders that dashed into Wytheville have been taken; but not so with the raiders that have been playing havoc with the railroad in North Carolina.

Another letter from J. M. Botts, Culpepper County, complains of the pasturing of army horses in his fields before the Gettysburg campaign, and asks if his fields are to be again subject to the use of the commander of the army, now returning to his vicinity. If he knows that Gen. Lee is fallen back thither, it is more than any one here seems to know. We shall see how accurate Mr. B. is in his conjecture.

A letter from Mr. Goodman, president of Mobile and Charleston Railroad, says military orders have been issued to destroy, by fire, railroad equipments to the value of $5,000,000; and one-third of this amount of destruction would defeat the purpose of the enemy for a long time. The President orders efforts to be made to bring away the equipments by sending them down the road.

Col. Preston, commandant of conscripts for South Carolina, has been appointed Chief of the Bureau of Conscription; he has accepted the appointment, and will be here August 1st. The law will now be honestly executed — if he be not too indolent, sick, etc.

Archbishop Hughes has made a speech in New York to keep down the Irish.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 385-6

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: June 24, 1863

We have nothing additional from Vicksburg or from the Potomac, but there is a rumor of fighting near Leesburg.

The first installment of Winchester prisoners reached the city yesterday, 1600 in number, and there are over 4000 more on the way. So much for Milroy's 2000 or 3000!

To-day the President desired the Secretary of War to send him all the correspondence with Gen. Johnston, as he intends to write him a confidential letter touching reinforcements, and he wishes to inform him of the military situation of affairs everywhere.

This afternoon some excitement prevails in the city, caused by a notification of the Governor placarded at the corner of the streets, calling on the citizens to assemble at the Capitol Square at 7 o'clock P.M., and announcing that reliable information has been received of the landing of the enemy (how many is not stated) at Brandon, on the James River, and at the White House, on the York, some thirty-five miles below. There was also a meeting of the clerks of the departments, and it was agreed that at the sounding of the tocsin they should assemble (day or night) with arms at their respective offices.

This may be another Pawnee alarm of the government, and it may be the wolf. If some 30,000 of the enemy's troops make a dash at Richmond now, they may take it. But it will, of course, be defended with what means we have, to the last extremity.

Still, I think it nothing more than a strategical movement to save Washington or to embarrass Lee's operations, and it will fail to retard his movement. We shall soon see what it is

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 359-60

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: June 23, 1863

From the army on the Potomac we have a dispatch from Lee, saying there have been several cavalry engagements during the last week, wherein our arms were successful. Lee will soon electrify us with another movement of his grand army, — such is the general belief.

From the West we learn that on Saturday last, Grant, no doubt driven to desperation by our occupation of Milliken's Bend cutting off his supplies and reinforcements, made a more furious attempt than ever to take Vicksburg by assault, and was repulsed disastrously. His loss is estimated at between 7000 and 10,000 men. Pemberton is now greatly praised by many people, while some of our officers shake their heads and say he is fighting with the halter around his neck, and that if he were not to fight and hold out to the last, his own men would hang him.

Notwithstanding the immense amount of goods brought in daily, the prices keep high.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 359

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: June 9, 1863

There is rumor that the President has received bad news from the West. This may be without foundation; but it is a little strange that we are not in receipt of authentic accounts of transactions there. Time, however, will reveal all things.

Lee is “marching on,” Northward, utterly regardless of the demonstrations of Hooker on the Lower Rappahannock. This is a good omen; for no doubt the demonstrations are designed merely to arrest his advance. Lee has, perhaps, 70,000 fighting men with him — leaving some 15,000 behind to defend Richmond.

The people in the “Northern Neck” have been much harassed by the incursions of the invaders. I clip the following account from the Whig of this date:

“Nearly every house was visited, and by deceptive artifices, such as disguising themselves in Confederate gray clothes, stolen, or otherwise surreptitiously obtained, they imposed themselves upon our credulous and unsuspecting people; excited their sympathies by pretending to be wounded Confederate soldiers — won their confidence, and offered to hide their horses and take care of them for them, to prevent the Yankees from taking them, who, they said, were coming on. They thus succeeded in making many of our people an easy prey to their rapacity and cunning. In this foray, they abducted about 1000 negroes, captured from 500 to 700 horses and mules, a large number of oxen, carriages, buggies and wagons — stole meat, destroyed grain, and robbed gentlemen, in the public road, of gold watches and other property. There are some instances related of personal indignity and violence. They returned with their spoils to camp, after a week devoted by them in the Northern Neck, among our unhappy people, to the highly civilized, brave, and chivalrous exploits of theft, robbery, and almost every species of felony committed upon a defenseless, unarmed, and helpless population — chiefly consisting of women and children! It was an easy achievement — a proud conquest — the more glorious to the noble and heroic Yankee, because stained with crime and won without danger to his beastly carcass.”

This is but a fair specimen of their conduct whenever they have been permitted to devastate the country with impunity.

A few days ago I addressed a letter to the Secretary of War, suggesting that the department encourage voluntary organizations of non-conscripts for local defense, and that they be armed with every superfluous musket that the government may possess. If this be done, the army will not be so much embarrassed by vehement calls to protect the people from raids everywhere; and in the event of serious disaster, the people would still make resistance. But an unarmed people would have no alternative but submission. This plan would also effectually prevent servile insurrections, etc.

To-day I received the reply, saying it would be done. But will the arms be distributed among them?

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 343-4

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, July 20, 1863

Morgan's invasion of Ohio and Indiana is likely to terminate more creditably to the Union cause than Lee's excursion into Pennsylvania. It looks as if the fellow and his force would be captured.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 379

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, July 18, 1863

Have a letter from Governor Andrew, who in a matter misrepresented me; claims to have been led into error by the “Gloucester men,” and is willing to drop the subject.¹ I shall not object, for the Governor is patriotic and zealous as well as somewhat fussy and fanatical.

General Marston and others, a delegation from New Hampshire with a letter from the Governor, wanted additional defenses for Portsmouth. Letters from numerous places on the New England coast are received to the same effect. Each of them wants a monitor, or cruiser, or both. Few of them seem to be aware that the shore defenses are claimed by and belong to the War, rather than the Navy, Department, nor do they seem to be aware of any necessity for municipal and popular effort for their own protection.

Two delegations are here from Connecticut in relation to military organizations for home work and to preserve the peace. I went to the War Department in their behalf, and one was successful, perhaps both.

There is some talk, and with a few, a conviction, that we are to have a speedy termination of the war. Blair is confident the Rebellion is about closed. I am not so sanguine. As long as there is ability to resist, we may expect it from Davis and the more desperate leaders, and when they quit, as they will if not captured, the seeds of discontent and controversy which they have sown will remain, and the social and political system of the insurrectionary States is so deranged that small bodies may be expected to carry on for a time, perhaps for years, a bushwhacking warfare. It will likely be a long period before peace and contentment will be fully restored. Davis, who strove to be, and is, the successor of Calhoun, without his ability, but with worse intentions, is ambitious and has deliberately plunged into this war as the leader, and, to win power and fame, has jeopardized all else. The noisy, gasconading politicians of the South who figured in Congress for years and had influence have, in their new Confederacy, sunk into insignificance. The Senators and Representatives who formerly loomed up in Congressional debate in Washington, and saw their harangues spread before the country by a thousand presses, have all been dwarfed, wilted, and shriveled. The “Confederate Government,” having the element of despotism, compels its Congress to sit with closed doors. Davis is the great “I am.”

In the late military operations of the Rebels he has differed with Lee, and failed to heartily sustain that officer. It was Lee's plan to uncover Washington by inducing Hooker to follow him into Pennsylvania. Hooker fell into the trap and withdrew everything from here, which is surprising, for Halleck's only study has been to take care of himself and not fall into Rebel hands. But he felt himself safe if Hooker and the army were between him and Lee.

From the interrupted dispatches and other sources, it is ascertained that Lee's plan was the concentration of a force of 40,000 men at Culpeper to rush upon Washington when our army and the whole Potomac force was far away in the Valley of the Cumberland. But Davis, whose home is in Mississippi and whose interest is there, did not choose to bring Beauregard East. The consequence has been the frustration of Lee's plans, which have perished without fruition. He might have been disappointed, had he been fairly seconded. Davis has undoubtedly committed a mistake. It hastens the end. Strange that such a man as Davis, though possessing ability, should mislead and delude millions, some of whom have greater intellectual capacity than himself. They were, however, and had been, in a course of sectional and pernicious training under Calhoun and his associates, who for thirty years devoted their time and talents to the inculcation first of hate, and then of sectional division, or a reconstruction of the federal government on a different basis. Nullification was an outgrowth. When Calhoun closed his earthly career several men of far less ability sought to wear his mantle. I have always entertained doubts whether Calhoun intended a dismemberment of the Union. He aimed to procure special privileges for the South, — something that should secure perpetuity to the social and industrial system of that section, which he believed, not without reason, was endangered by the increasing intelligence and advancing spirit of the age. Many of the lesser lights — shallow political writers and small speech-makers — talked flippantly of disunion, which they supposed would enrich the South and impoverish the North. “Cotton is king,” they said and believed, and with it they would dictate terms not only to the country but the world. The arrogance begotten of this folly led to the great Rebellion.

Davis is really a despot, exercising arbitrary power, and the people of the South are abject subjects, demoralized, subdued, but frenzied and enraged, with little individual independence left, — an impoverished community, hurrying to swift destruction. “King Cotton” furnishes them no relief. Men are not permitted in that region of chivalry to express their views if they tend to national unity. Hatred of the Union, of the government, and of the country is the basis of the Confederate despotism. Hate, sectional hate, is really the fundamental teaching of Calhoun and his disciples. How is it to be overcome and when can it be eradicated? It has been the growth of a generation, and abuse of the doctrine of States' rights, — a doctrine sound and wholesome in our federal system when rightly exercised. But when South Carolina in 1832 assumed the sovereign right of nullifying the laws of the government of which she was a member, — defeating by State action the federal authority and setting it at defiance, — claiming to be a part of the Union but independent of it while yet a part, her position becomes absolutely contradictory and untenable. Compelled to abandon the power and absolute right of a State to overthrow the government which she helped to create, or destroy federal jurisdiction, the nullifiers, still discontented, uneasy, and ambitious, resorted to another expedient, that of withdrawing from the Union, and, by combining with other States, establishing power to resist the government and country. Sectionalism or a combination of States was substituted for the old nullification doctrine of States' rights. If they could not remain in the Union and nullify its laws, they could secede and disregard laws and government. Can it be extinguished in a day? I fear not. It will require time.

It is sad and humiliating to see men of talents, capacity, and of reputed energy and independence, cower and shrink and humble themselves before the imperious master who dominates over the Confederacy. Political association and the tyranny of opinion and of party first led them astray, and despotism holds them in the wrong as with a vise. The whole political, social, and industrial fabric of the South is crumbling to ruins. They see and feel the evil, but dare not attempt to resist it. There is little love or respect for Davis among such intelligent Southern men as I have seen.

Had Meade done his duty, we should have witnessed a speedy change throughout the South. It is a misfortune that the command of the army had not been in stronger hands and with a man of broader views, and that he had not a more competent superior than Halleck. The late infirm action will cause a postponement of the end. Lee has been allowed to retreat — to retire — unmolested, with his army and guns, and the immense plunder which the Rebels have pillaged. The generals have succeeded in prolonging the war. Othello's occupation is not yet gone.

_______________

1 This refers to the statement, in a letter of July 1, from Governor Andrew to Secretary Welles, that the Navy Department had sent no vessels to the defense of the Massachusetts coast till after the Confederate cruiser Tacony “had rioted along the Vineyard Sound for four days.” The Secretary, under date of July 11, showed the incorrectness of this allegation, and Governor Andrew, in his letter of the 16th, withdrew it and explained that it was made “upon the authority of municipal officers and citizens of Gloucester.”

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 375-9

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, July 3, 1863

I met the President and Seward at the War Department this morning. A dispatch from General Meade, dated 3 P.M. yesterday, is in very good tone. The Sixth Army Corps, he says, was just arriving entire but exhausted, having been on the march from 9 P.M. of the preceding evening. In order that they may rest and recruit, he will not attack, but is momentarily expecting an onset from the Rebels.

They were concentrating for a fight, and, unless Meade is greatly deceived, there will be a battle in the neighborhood of Gettysburg. I hope our friends are not deceived so that the Rebel trains with their plunder can escape through the valley.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 356-7

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, June 30, 1863

The President did not join us to-day in Cabinet. He was with the Secretary of War and General Halleck, and sent word there would be no meeting. This is wrong, but I know no remedy. At such a time as this, it would seem there should be free and constant intercourse and interchange of views, and a combined effort. The Government should not be carried on in the War or State Departments exclusively, nor ought there to be an attempt of that kind.

I understand from Chase that the President and Stanton are anxious that Dix should make a demonstration on Richmond, but Halleck does not respond favorably, — whether because he has not confidence in Dix, or himself, or from any cause, I do not know. This move on Richmond is cherished by Chase, and with a bold, dashing, energetic, and able general might be effective, but I agree with the President that Dix is not the man for such a movement. Probably the best thing that can now be done, is to bring all who can be spared from garrison duty to the assistance of General Meade.

Lee and his army are well advanced into Pennsylvania, and they should not be permitted to fall back and recross the Potomac. Halleck is bent on driving them back, not on intercepting their retreat; is full of zeal to drive them out of Pennsylvania. I don't want them to leave the State, except as prisoners. Meade will, I trust, keep closer to them than some others have done. I understand his first order was for the troops at Harper's Ferry to join him, which was granted. Hooker asked this, but it was denied him by the War Department and General Halleck.

Blair is much dissatisfied. He came from the Executive Mansion with me to the Navy Department and wrote a letter to the President, urging that Dix's command should be immediately brought up. Says Halleck is good for nothing and knows nothing. I proposed that we should both walk over to the War Department, but he declined; said he would not go where Stanton could insult him, that he disliked at all times to go to the War Department, had not been there for a long period, although the Government of which he is a member is in these days carried on, almost, in the War Department.

We have no positive information that the Rebels have crossed the Susquehanna, though we have rumors to that effect. There is no doubt the bridge at Columbia, one and a half miles long, has been burnt, and, it seems, by our own people. The officer who ordered it must have been imbued with Halleck's tactics. I wish the Rebel army had got across before the bridge was burnt. But Halleck's prayers and efforts, especially his prayers, are to keep the Rebels back, — drive them back across the “frontiers” instead of intercepting, capturing, and annihilating them. This movement of Lee and the Rebel forces into Pennsylvania is to me incomprehensible, nor do I get any light from military men or others in regard to it. Should they cross the Susquehanna, as our General-in-Chief and Governor Curtin fear, they will never recross it without being first captured. This they know, unless deceived by their sympathizing friends in the North, as in 1861; therefore I do not believe they will attempt it.

I have talked over this campaign with Stanton this evening, but I get nothing from him definite or satisfactory of fact or speculation, and I come to the conclusion that he is bewildered, that he gets no light from his military subordinates and advisers, and that he really has no information or opinion as to the Rebel destination or purpose.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 351-3

Diary of Gideon Welles: Sunday, June 28, 1863

The President convened the Cabinet at 10 A.M. and submitted his reply to the Vallandigham committee. Save giving too much notoriety and consequence to a graceless traitor who loves notoriety and office, and making the factious party men who are using him for the meanest purposes that could influence men in such a crisis conspicuous, the letter is well enough, and well conceived.

After disposing of this subject, the President drew from his pocket a telegram from General Hooker asking to be relieved. The President said he had, for several days as the conflict became imminent, observed in Hooker the same failings that were witnessed in McClellan after the Battle of Antietam, — a want of alacrity to obey, and a greedy call for more troops which could not, and ought not to be taken from other points. He would, said the President, strip Washington bare, had demanded the force at Harper's Ferry, which Halleck said could not be complied with; he (Halleck) was opposed to abandoning our position at Harper's Ferry. Hooker had taken umbrage at the refusal, or at all events had thought it best to give up the command.

Some discussion followed in regard to a successor. The names of Meade, Sedgwick, and Couch were introduced. I soon saw this review of names was merely a feeler to get an expression of opinion — a committal — or to make it appear that all were consulted. It shortly became obvious, however, that the matter had already been settled, and the President finally remarked he supposed General Halleck had issued the orders. He asked Stanton if it was not so. Stanton replied affirmatively, that Hooker had been ordered to Baltimore and Meade to succeed him. We were consulted after the fact.

Chase was disturbed more than he cared should appear. Seward and Stanton were obviously cognizant of what had been ordered before the meeting of the Cabinet took place, — had been consulted. Perhaps they had advised proceedings, but, doubtful of results, wished the rest to confirm their act. Blair and Bates were not present with us.

Instead of being disturbed, like Chase, I experienced a feeling of relief, and only regretted that Hooker, who I think has good parts, but is said to be intemperate at times, had not been relieved immediately after the Battle of Chancellorsville. No explanation has ever been made of the sudden paralysis which befell the army at that time. It was then reported, by those who should have known, that it was liquor. I apprehend from what has been told me it was the principal cause. It was so intimated, but not distinctly asserted, in Cabinet.

Nothing has been communicated by the War Department, directly, but there has been an obvious dislike of Hooker, and no denial or refutation of the prevalent rumors. I have once or twice made inquiries of Stanton, but could get no satisfactory reply of any kind. . . . The War Department has been aware of these accusations, but has taken no pains to disprove or deny them, — perhaps because they could not be, perhaps because the War Department did not want to. The President has been partial to Hooker in all this time and has manifested no disposition to give him up, except a casual remark at the last Cabinet-meeting.

Whether the refusal to give him the troops at Harper's Ferry was intended to drive him to abandon the command of the army, or is in pursuance of any intention on the part of Halleck to control army movements, and to overrule the general in the field, is not apparent. The President has been drawn into the measure, as he was into withholding McDowell from McClellan, by being made to believe it was necessary for the security of Washington. In that instance, Stanton was the moving spirit, Seward assenting. It is much the same now, only Halleck is the forward spirit, prompted perhaps by Stanton.

Of Meade I know very little. He is not great. His brother officers speak well of him, but he is considered rather a “smooth bore” than a rifle. It is unfortunate that a change could not have been made earlier.

Chase immediately interested himself for the future of Hooker. Made a special request that he should be sent to Fortress Monroe to take charge of a demonstration upon Richmond via James River. The President did not give much attention to the suggestion. I inquired what was done, or doing, with Dix's command, — whether that considerable force was coming here, going to Richmond, or to remain inactive. The President thought a blow might at this time be struck at Richmond; had not, however, faith much could be accomplished by Dix, but though not much of a general, there were reasons why he did not like to supersede him. Foster he looked to as a rising general who had maintained himself creditably at Washington, North Carolina. Chase admitted F. was deserving of credit, but claimed credit was due Sisson,¹ who relieved him, also.

Had two or three telegrams last night from Portland in relation to pirate privateers, which are cleared up to-day by information that Reed had seized the revenue cutter Calhoun, and was himself soon after captured.

The city is full of strange, wild rumors of Rebel raids in the vicinity and of trains seized in sight of the Capitol. They are doubtless exaggerations, yet I think not without some foundation. I am assured from men of truth that a Rebel scouting party was seen this morning in the rear of Georgetown. Just at sunset, the Blairs rode past my house to their city residence, not caring to remain at Silver Spring until the crisis is past.

A large portion of the Rebel army is unquestionably on this side the Potomac. The main body is, I think, in the Cumberland Valley, pressing on toward Harrisburg, but a small force has advanced toward Washington. The War Department is wholly unprepared for an irruption here, and J. E. B. Stuart might have dashed into the city to-day with impunity. In the mean time, Philadelphians and the Pennsylvanians are inert and inactive, indisposed to volunteer to defend even their own capital. Part of this I attribute to the incompetency of General Halleck to concentrate effort, acquire intelligence, or inspire confidence; part is due to the excitable Governor, who is easily alarmed and calls aloud for help on the remotest prospect of danger. He is very vigilant, — almost too vigilant for calm consideration and wise conclusion, or to have a commanding influence. Is not only anxious but susceptible, impressible, scary.

_______________

¹ Colonel Henry T. Sisson, with his Fifth Rhode Island Volunteers, reinforced General Foster in the siege of Washington, North Carolina.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 347-51

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, June 25, 1863

A special messenger from Mr. Felton, President of the Philadelphia & Baltimore Railroad, called on me this morning before breakfast, with a request I would send a gunboat to Havre de Grace to protect the ferryboat, railroad property, and public travel. He says Rebels are in the vicinity in disguise, concerting measures for mischief. The War Department and military authorities, who should know, are not informed on these matters, and I must exercise my own judgment. There is sensitiveness in the public mind, and security is sought sometimes unnecessarily, but my conviction is there may be cause for apprehension in this instance. I have therefore ordered a gunboat from the Potomac Flotilla to the point indicated and notified Mr. Felton.

Word is sent me by a credible person who left Hagerstown last evening that Ewell and Longstreet with their divisions passed through that place yesterday to invade Pennsylvania with sixty thousand men. The number is probably exaggerated, but I am inclined to believe there may be half that number, perhaps more. Where in the mean time is General Hooker and our army? I get nothing satisfactory from Headquarters or Stanton.

The President to-day approved my placing the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting in temporary charge of Commander Smith, and the Ordnance Bureau in charge of Commander Wise.

Mr. Stanton called on me this morning and stated he had made an arrangement with John C. Rives to publish a military journal which he proposed to call the Army and Navy Gazette. He wished it to embrace both branches of the service unless I objected. The entire expense, over and above the receipts, whatever they may be, should be borne by the War Department. I told him I of course could make no objection to the name, and if the orders, reports, official papers, and current news were regularly and correctly published there would be some conveniences attending it. The proposition was, however, novel to me, and I knew of no law to warrant it or of any appropriation to defray the expense. I should therefore decline any pecuniary, official, or personal responsibility, or any connection with it. He assured me he did not expect or wish me to incur any part of the expense or responsibility.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 343-4

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, June 17, 1863

Had a telegram at ten last night from Mr. Felton, President of the Philadelphia & Baltimore Railroad, requesting that a gunboat might be sent to Havre de Grace to protect the Company's ferryboat and property. Says he has information that the Rebels intend going down the river to seize it.

I went forthwith to the War Department to ascertain whether there was really any such alarming necessity, for it seemed to me, from all I had been able to learn, that it was a panic invocation. Found the President and Stanton at the War Department, jubilant over intelligence just received that no Rebels had reached Carlisle, as had been reported, and it was believed they had not even entered Pennsylvania. Stanton threw off his reserve, and sneered and laughed at Felton's call for a gunboat. Soon a messenger came in from General Schenck, who declares no Rebels have crossed the Potomac, that the stragglers and baggage-trains of Milroy had run away in affright, and squads of them, on different parallel roads, had alarmed each other, and each fled in terror with all speed to Harrisburg. This alone was asserted to be the basis of the great panic which had alarmed Pennsylvania and the country.

The President was relieved and in excellent spirits. Stanton was apparently feeling well, but I could not assure myself he was wholly relieved of the load which had been hanging upon him. The special messenger brought a letter to Stanton, which he read, but was evidently unwilling to communicate its contents, even to the President, who asked about it. Stanton wrote a few lines, which he gave to the officer, who left. General Meigs came in about this time, and I was sorry to hear Stanton communicate an exaggerated account of Milroy's disaster, who, he said, had not seen a fight or even an enemy. Meigs indignantly denied the statement, and said Milroy himself had communicated the fact that he had fought a battle and escaped. While he (Meigs) did not consider Milroy a great general, or a man of very great ability, he believed him to be truthful and brave, and if General Schenck's messenger said there had been no fight he disbelieved him. Stanton insisted that was what the officer (whom I think he called Payson) said. I told him I did not so understand the officer. The subject was then dropped; but the conversation gave me uneasiness. Why should the Secretary of War wish to misrepresent and belittle Milroy? Why exaggerate the false rumor and try to give currency to, if he did not originate, the false statement that there was no fight and a panic flight?

The President was in excellent humor. He said this flight would be a capital joke for Orpheus C. Kerr to get hold of. He could give scope to his imagination over the terror of broken squads of panic-stricken teamsters, frightened at each other and alarming all Pennsylvania. Meigs, with great simplicity, inquired who this person (Orpheus C. Kerr) was. “Why,” said the President, “have you not read those papers? They are in two volumes; any one who has not read them must be a heathen.” He said he had enjoyed them greatly, except when they attempted to play their wit on him, which did not strike him as very successful, but rather disgusted him. “Now the hits that are given to you, Mr. Welles, or to Chase, I can enjoy, but I dare say they may have disgusted you while I was laughing at them. So vice versa as regards myself.” He then spoke of a poem by this Orpheus C. Kerr which mythologically described McClellan as a monkey fighting a serpent representing the Rebellion, but the joke was the monkey continually called for “more tail,” “more tail,” which Jupiter gave him, etc., etc.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 332-3

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, June 15, 1863

Met Blair at the depot. Told him of the conversation I had last evening with the President and the appearance of things at the War Department. It affected him greatly. He has never had confidence in either Stanton, Halleck, or Hooker. He fairly groaned that the President should continue to trust them and defer to them, when the magnitude of the questions is considered. “Strange, strange,” he exclaimed, “that the President, who has sterling ability, should give himself over so completely to Stanton and Seward.”

Something of a panic pervades the city. Singular rumors reach us of Rebel advances into Maryland. It is said they have reached Hagerstown, and some of them have penetrated as far as Chambersburg in Pennsylvania. These reports are doubtless exaggerations, but I can get nothing satisfactory from the War Department of the Rebel movements, or of our own. There is trouble, confusion, uncertainty, where there should be calm intelligence.

I have a panic telegraph from Governor Curtin, who is excitable and easily alarmed, entreating that guns and gunners may be sent from the navy yard at Philadelphia to Harrisburg without delay. We have not a gunner that we can spare. Commodore Stribling can spare men, temporarily, from the navy yard. I went again, at a late hour, to the War Department, but could get no facts or intelligence from the Secretary, who either does not know or dislikes to disclose the position and condition of the army. He did not know that the Rebels had reached Hagerstown; did not know but some of them had; quite as likely to be in Philadelphia as Harrisburg. Ridiculed Curtin's fears. Thought it would be well, however, to send such guns and men as could be spared to allay his apprehension. I could not get a word concerning General Milroy and his command, — whether safe or captured, retreating or maintaining his position. All was vague, opaque, thick darkness. I really think Stanton is no better posted than myself, and from what Stanton says am afraid Hooker does not comprehend Lee's intentions nor know how to counteract them. Halleck has no activity; never exhibits sagacity or foresight, though he can record and criticize the past. It looks to me as if Lee was putting forth his whole energy and force in one great and desperate struggle which shall be decisive; that he means to strike a blow that will be severely felt, and of serious consequences, and thus bring the War to a close. But all is conjecture.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 329-30

Diary of Gideon Welles: Sunday, June 14, 1863

Farther reports of depredations. Got off vessels last night from New York and Hampton Roads. Sent to Boston for Montgomery to cruise off Nantucket.

Scary rumors abroad of army operations and a threatened movement of Lee upon Pennsylvania. No doubt there has been a change. I fear our friends are in difficulties. Went to the War Department this evening. Found the President and General Halleck with Secretary of War in the room of the telegraphic operator. Stanton was uneasy, said it would be better to go into another room. The President and myself went into the Secretary's office; the other two remained. The President said quietly to me he was feeling very bad; that he found Milroy and his command were captured, or would be. He (Milroy) has written that he can hold out five days, but at the end of five days he will be in no better condition, for he can't be relieved. “It is,” said the President, “Harper's Ferry over again.”

I inquired why Milroy did not fall back, — if he had not been apprised by Hooker, or from here, what Lee was doing, etc. I added, if Lee's army was moving, Hooker would take advantage and sever his forces, perhaps take his rear guard. The President said it would seem so, but that our folks appeared to know but little how things are, and showed no evidence that they ever availed themselves of any advantage.

How fully the President is informed, and whether he is made acquainted with the actual state of things is uncertain. He depends on the War Department, which, I think, is not informed and is in confusion. From neither of the others did I get a word. Stanton came once or twice into the room, where we were, in a fussy way. Halleck did not move from his chair where he sat with his cigar, the door being open between the two rooms. From some expressions which were dropped from H., I suspect poor Milroy is to be made the scapegoat, and blamed for the stupid blunders, neglects, and mistakes of those who should have warned and advised him.

I do not learn that any members of the Cabinet are informed of army movements. The President is kept in ignorance and defers to the General-in-Chief, though not pleased that he is not fully advised of matters as they occur. There is a modest distrust of himself, of which advantage is taken. For a week, movements have been going on of which he has known none, or very few, of the details.

I came away from the War Department painfully impressed. After recent events, Hooker cannot have the confidence which is essential to success, and all-important to the commander in the field. Halleck does not grow upon me as a military man of power and strength; has little aptitude, skill, or active energy. In this state of things, the able Rebel general is moving a powerful army, and has no one to confront him on whose ability and power the country relies. There was confidence in McClellan's ability to organize, to defend, and to repel, though he was worthless in attack, but there is no such feeling towards Hooker. He has not grown in public estimation since placed in command. If he is intemperate, as is reported, God help us! The President, who was the first person to intimate this failing to me, has a personal liking for Hooker, and clings to him when others give way.

The letter to Erastus Corning and others is published and well received.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 327-9