Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: July 15, 1864

Clear and cool; subsequently cloudy.

The Washington Chronicle of the 12th, received yesterday, indicates that Washington or Baltimore, or both, were in danger of falling into our possession.

Lieut.-Col. G. W. Lay said, this morning, in my office, that Grant would not leave—that he held a most important position—that he would not fail in his campaign; that our operations beyond the Potomac were not of sufficient magnitude to produce important results; and, finally, that Germany and Ireland would replenish the armies of the United States, while our last reserves were now in the field.

The colonel had come into my office more than a month ago and said Grant had outgeneraled Pemberton, and would capture Vicksburg. I reminded him of this to-day, and asked his opinion on the present aspect of affairs. He has been recently on Gen. Beauregard's staff, and is irritated at the supposed hard treatment which that general receives from the President. He is a little bitter against the President, and is no special admirer of Lee, who, he thinks, committed a blunder in not fighting Grant at Hanover Junction. And he thinks, if Gen. Johnston forbears to fight Sherman, in pursuance of orders from Richmond, disaster will ensue. But neither he nor any one is capable of sounding the profound plans of Lee. Grant's forces are now far away from Washington.

2½ o'clock P.M. An officer just from Petersburg, arrived at the War Department with the intelligence that a Washington paper of the 13th inst. had been received at headquarters, announcing the capture of BALTIMORE by our troops! The inhabitants within, or a large proportion of them, co-operated with our army! Our people are in ecstasies! This is the realization of the grand conception of a great general, and Lee is immortalized if it only be true.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 248-9

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: July 21, 1864

Clear and warm. Bought fifty cabbage-plants and set them out before breakfast

Gen. Early met Gen. Hunter at Snicker's Gap, and whipped him.

All quiet at Petersburg. Grant must be dead, sure enough.

Gen. Bragg left the city some days ago. The following is a verbatim dispatch received from him yesterday:

MONTGOMERY, ALA., July 19th, 1864.

COL. J. B. SALE:—The enemy still hold West Point Railroad Forces are moving forward to dislodge them. Gen. S. D. Lee in forms me 5000 (13th Army Corps) passed Vicksburg on the 16th, supposed to be going to White River. Reported Memphis, 19th Army Corps, Franklin left New Orleans on the 4th for Fort Monroe, 13,000 strong. Ought not Taylor's forces to cross the Mississippi?

I hear nothing from Johnston.

Telegraph me to Columbus, Ga.

B. BRAGG, General.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 252

Major-General Ulysses S. Grant to Major-General William T. Sherman, June 23, 1863

NEAR VICKSBURG, MISS., June 23, 1863.

Maj. Gen. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN,

        Commanding Fifteenth Army Corps:

In addition to the troops with you and at Snyder's, I have notified Herron's and A. J. Smith's divisions to be in readiness to move at a moment's notice. In addition to this, two more brigades can be taken from your corps without breaking the line investing Vicksburg. Should Johnston come, we want to whip him, if the siege has to be raised to do it.

Use all the forces indicated above as you deem most advantageous; and should more be required, call on me, and they will be furnished, to the last man here and at Young's Point.

U.S. GRANT.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 3 (Serial No. 38), p. 430-1

Major-General William T. Sherman to Major-General Ulysses S. Grant, June 23, 1863—11 a.m.

AT McCALL'S, June 23, 1863—11 a.m.

DEAR GENERAL: Parke, with Smith's division and one brigade of his Yankee troops, is on the river road from Neily's to Post Oak Ridge, with orders to feel forward to the bridge across Bear Creek, 6 miles beyond Post Oak Ridge. My cavalry is now down at Little Bear Creek, on the Birdsong road. Tuttle's division is close up to the cavalry, and McArthur's is near here, and we are waiting for his troops to come up. I will put them on the Birdsong road. Parke and I can communicate by the ridge from McCall's to Neily's. After nooning I propose to go forward to the Big Black. I hear nothing of Johnston at all; no trace of him or signs of his approach. The country is ill-adapted to large masses. It is cut up by impracticable ravines, and all the roads are on narrow ridges, where a regiment will find difficulty in forming a front. A small force can oppose a large one, and as to getting at Johnston unless he crosses to this side of Big Black, I think it cannot be done. If he crosses Big Black and comes by any road, I shall, of course, meet him and oppose him, calling for all the help I may deem necessary. If he crosses Big Black, I think this is the place to fight him. Order Osterhaus to be certain to blockade all roads from Big Black toward Vicksburg, between Clear Creek and this road. After satisfying myself that there is, or is not, a purpose on his part to cross over, I will communicate the fact; but, no matter what his strength, he must come by narrow roads, and I have as many men as can be handled on such grounds. If I conclude he does not design to come in by Birdsong Ferry or the ford above, I will blockade it, so as to force him to come on the main ridge within striking distance of Haynes' Bluff, so that we won't care if he comes or not.

Yesterday four companies of my cavalry (Fourth Iowa) had gone to Big Black River on the road to obstruct it. They had felled many trees, and must have been off their guard when their pickets came in from three directions, giving notice of the approach of the enemy. Quite a fight ensued, in which our men got the worst, and were forced to fly. As soon as the news reached camp, Colonel Swan went to the ground with his regiment, and found 8 dead, 12 wounded, and about 20 missing. From the people he heard the attack came from Wirt Adams' cavalry, which had gone off in the direction of Mechanicsburg. Colonel Swan buried the dead, and brought off all the wounded except one, who was left well cared for at a house. He could hear of but about 12 prisoners in the hands of the enemy, so that he expects some 8 more will have gone down to Osterhaus, and will come in to-day.

The party lost that 2-pounder gun we captured at Jackson, but before abandoning it they disabled it by taking out the breech-pin. The fact of our coming out today is attributed by the secesh to our purpose to punish the perpetrators of this action.

I will send you positive intelligence to-night if Johnston be coming or not this side of Big Black River. On the best evidence now procurable, he is not coming this way, or at this time.

I take it for granted you do not want me to attempt to follow him across that river unless after a defeat. If he comes to this side, I can hold him till re-enforced, and then I know we can whip him. In the mean time look out toward Baldwin's and Hankinson's, though I do not believe he will put himself in such a pocket.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,        

Major-General, Commanding Expedition.

General GRANT.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 2 (Serial No. 37), p. 245-6

Major-General Ulysses S. Grant too Brigadier-General Elias S. Dennis, June 27

HDQRS. DEPT. OF THE TENN., Near Vicksburg, June 27, 1863.

Brig. Gen. E. S. DENNIS,
        Comdg. District of Northeastern Louisiana:

GENERAL: There is now a probability that [E. K.] Smith will come into the point opposite Vicksburg, for the purpose of aiding the rebel garrison in their escape or to furnish them supplies. Should you discover any attempt of the kind, concentrate your whole force, black and white, from Lake Providence, down at Young's Point, or the most suitable place for resisting them. With Johnston in my rear, I cannot detach troops for that purpose. Should such a move become necessary, notify the negro commissioners of the fact, so that they can warn the planters in time to drive in their stock and hands within our lines for safety.

You had better notify the commissioners at once that such a course may become necessary.

Respectfully,

U.S. GRANT.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 3 (Serial No. 38), p. 444-5

Major-General Ulysses S. Grant to Major-General Stephen A. Hurlbut, June 27, 1863

HDQRS. DEPT. OF THE TENN., Near Vicksburg, June 27, 1863.

Maj. Gen. STEPHEN A. HURLBUT,

        Comdg. Sixteenth Army Corps:

GENERAL: Your idea of massing as many troops as possible at the important bridges in the case of an attack is right. If it should become necessary, you can go further, and hold only Memphis and Corinth. As much of the railroad should be held as possible, however.

The troops from Bragg's Army that are threatening you, are probably [doing] it to cover a further movement from his army to re-enforce Johnston. I have information that Johnston expects 10,000 men from there in a few days. There is scarcely a shadow of doubt but I will be attacked by next Wednesday or Thursday, unless Vicksburg should fall in the mean time.

It will be impossible for me to send troops from here in the mean time. Should I learn that Johnston was moving off, I will send all my surplus force to counteract his movements, whether it be to East or West Tennessee. Should more troops become absolutely necessary for the maintenance of your position before I can send them, telegraph immediately to the General-in-Chief for them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U.S. GRANT.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 3 (Serial No. 38), p. 444-5

Major-General William T. Sherman to Lieutenant Colonel John A. Rawlins, June 27, 1863

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,        

Camp at Bear Creek, June 27, 1863.

SIR: It was my purpose to have come to headquarters yesterday, but the importance of knowing the ground in this quarter, so broken and complicated, induced me to continue what I had begun, and I continued my exploration. Big Black River is so easily passable at many points that I am forced to extend my lines to watch all, and the result of my personal observations is contained in an order made last night, which is now being carried into effect. I found the enemy watching with cavalry an easy ford at Messinger's house. The family consisting of many women, whose husbands and brothers were evidently serving an easy purpose of keeping up communications, so I moved them all by force, leaving a fine house filled with elegant furniture and costly paintings to the chances of war. Also the family of Hill, with other war widows, at a place on the Birdsong road, is removed to a harmless place within our lines. These may appeal to the tender heart of our commanding general, but he will not reverse my decision when he knows a family accessible to the enemy—keen scouts—can collect and impart more information than the most expert spies. Our volunteer pickets and patrols reveal names and facts in their innocence which, if repeated by these women, give the key to our points.

As a general thing, the valley of Big Black River above the bridge has a wide fertile valley on this side, the hill coming down rather abrupt from the other. The ground slopes easily and gradually from the ridge, marked on Wilson's map from Oak Ridge, Neily's, McCall's, Wixon's, and Tiffintown. Innumerable roads and cross-roads intersect the country, which cannot be obstructed, but which, running on narrow ridges, with narrow corn-fields, admit of easy defense. It is only by familiarity with the country, its ugly ravines, its open, narrow ridges all coming to a common spur, that a comparatively small force can hold in check a large one.

If the enemy crosses at one point, he must take some days to get over his men and matériel, and then would have to feel his way, as he knows full well that many of them have been made impassable to his wagons and artillery. This will give us time to fall on him or await his attack. Should he cross at several points, our tactics would be to hold small forces in obstruction at the several points named in my order, and a heavy force fall on one or other of his detachments. If the enemy forces us back, Wixon's will be the grand battle-field, or somewhere on Clear Creek.

I think, unless General Grant thinks my services more useful elsewhere, I had better remain, as naturally all look to me for orders. Please ask the general to read the inclosed order* carefully, and, if any part is open to objection, to state it, that I may modify in time. I sent 800 cavalry, under Colonel Bussey, up the Ridge road toward Mechanicsville, last night, to sweep back by the lower Benton road. They went to Post Oak Ridge, and have not yet reported.

Yesterday our pickets skirmished a little at Messinger's. I was there, and did not see more than 15 or 20 men, on horseback, as curious to watch us as we them. One man, near Hill's, was shot through the head by a scamp from the bushes, who could not be found. As usual, my cavalry are not bold, but the infantry go in without any hesitation.

Not a sound, syllable, or sign to indicate a purpose of crossing Big Black River toward us, but I still enjoin on all that our enemy is too wary to give us notice a minute too soon. Every possible motive exists for them to come to the relief of Vicksburg, and we should act on that supposition rather than the mere signs of movements which are known only to Johnston, and will not be revealed, even to his own troops, till the last moment.

In order that you may understand any future communication, mark your map as follows: One and a half miles east of Young's, where the road comes in from Markham, mark Hill's; 1½ miles southeast of Hill's, Jones' plantation; 2 miles below Birdsong Ferry, Jones' Ford; 1½ miles southeast of Cameron, Messinger's plantation and Ford; 1 mile east of Fox, mark Parson Fox; 3 miles east of Tiffin, on the Bridgeport road, Brook. All these points may become of note. I still regard the country at Tiffin, Brant, Cowan, W. Wixon, and Hardaway as the key-points of this region.

I still have my headquarters by the roadside, in front of Tribbs', where the road forks to Young's and Markham's.

When this letter is read, please send it to my adjutant, to be copied in my letter-book, and returned to you for file.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,        

Major-General, Commanding.

Col. JOHN A. RAWLINS,
        Assistant Adjutant-General.

_______________

* See General Orders, No. 49, June 29, Part III, p. 449

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 2 (Serial No. 37), p. 246-8

Major-General Ulysses S. Grant to Julia Dent Grant, June 29, 1863

June 29th 1863

Dear Julia,

During the present week I think the fate of Vicksburg will be decided. Johnston is still hovering beyond the Black river and will attack before you receive this or never. After accumulating so large an army as he has, at such risk of loosing other points in the Confederacy by doing it, he cannot back out without giving battle or loosing prestige. I expect a fight by Wednsday or Thursday. There may be much loss of life but I feel but little doubt as to the result.—Saturday or Sunday next I set for the fall of Vicksburg. You can come down then and bring the children with you. We will have to make some arrangement for them to go to school as soon as schools open after vacation. You will have to stay with them as a general thing but by selecting a good place for you and them to board you can visit me a part of the time, when I am still. I do not expect to be still much however whilst the war lasts. Fred, has returned from his uncles. He does not look very well but is not willing to go back until Vicksburg falls. I think I will send him a trip as far North as St. Paul after the fall of Vicksburg. Remember me to all at home. You do not say whether you have leased the farm or not. I do not want White to hold it. Kiss the children for me.

Ulys.

SOURCE: John Y. Simon, Editor, The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Volume 8, p. 444-5

General Joseph E. Johnston to Lieutenant-General John C. Pemberton, July 3, 1863

CAMP NEAR BIRDSONG FERRY, July 3, 1863.

Lieutenant-General PEMBERTON:

Your dispatches of June 28 were destroyed by messenger. He states that General Smith's troops were driven back to Monroe. This statement and his account of your condition make me think it necessary to create a diversion, and thus enable you to cut your way out, if the time has come for you to do this. Of that time I cannot judge; you must, as it depends upon your condition. I hope to attack the enemy in your front about the 7th, and your co-operation will be necessary. The manner and the proper point for you to bring the garrison out must be determined by you from your superior knowledge of the ground and distribution of the enemy's forces. Our firing will show you where we are engaged. If Vicksburg cannot be saved, the garrison must.

J. E. JOHNSTON.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 3 (Serial No. 38), p. 987

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: July 3, 1864

Clear and dry; pleasant temperature.

I learn that Petersburg has not been much injured by the enemy's batteries, and that Gen. Lee has ordered the casting of mortars for use immediately.

To morrow being the anniversary of the surrender of Vicksburg to Grant, I should not be surprised if that general let off some fire-works, not only in commemoration of that event, but in pursuance of some desperate enterprise against Richmond. I don't see how he can feel any veneration for the day of Independence for the “rebels” of 1776, without sympathy for the “rebels” of 1864, struggling also for independence.

After the failure of the enemy's next move, I think the tempest of war will rapidly abate. Nearly every movement in this (I think final) effort to capture Richmond bas failed. Sheridan failed to destroy the Central, Hunter the South Side, and Wilson the Danville Railroad—each losing about half his men and horses. Grant himself, so far, has but “swung round" a wall of steel, losing 100,000 men, and only gaining a position on the James River which he might have occupied without any loss. On the other hand, Lee wields a larger army than he began with, and better armed, clothed, and fed.

This ought to end the vain attempt at subjugation. But if not, the Confederate States, under the new policy (defensive), might maintain the contest against a half million of invaders. Our crop of wheat is abundant, and the harvest over; our communications will be all re-established in a few days, and the people being armed and drilled everywhere, the enemy's raiders will soon be checked in any locality they may select as the scene of operations. All the bridges will be defended with fortifications. Besides, Lee is gathering rapidly an army on the Potomac, and may not only menace the enemy's capital, but take it. Early and Breckinridge, Imboden and Morgan, may be at this moment inflicting more serious injury on the enemy's railroads and canals than we have sustained in Virginia. And it is certain the stores of the Federal army in Georgia have been captured or destroyed to a very serious extent.

Still, in this hour of destitution and suffering among certain classes of the people, we see no beggars in the streets.

Likewise, notwithstanding the raiding parties penetrate far in the rear of our armies, there has been no instance of an attempt on the part of the slaves to rise in insurrection.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 243-4

Major-General Ulysses S. Grant to Major-General Henry W. Hallack, June 8, 1863

NEAR VICKSBURG, MISS., June 8, 1863.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
        General-in-Chief:

Vicksburg is closely invested. I have a spare force of about 30,000 men with which to repel anything from the rear. This includes all I have ordered from West Tennessee. Johnston is concentrating a force at Canton, and now has a portion of it west of Big Black River. My troops have been north as far as Satartia, and on the ridge back of that point there is no force yet. I will make a waste of all the country I can between the two rivers. I am fortifying Haynes' Bluff, and will defend the line from here to that point at all hazards.

U.S. GRANT,        

Major-general.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 1 (Serial No. 36), p. 41

Major-General Ulysses S. Grant: Special Orders, No. 143, May 28, 1863

SPECIAL ORDERS, No. 143.}

HDQRS. DEPT. OF THE TENNESSEE,        

In Field, near Vicksburg, Miss., May 28, 1863.

*          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *

IV. Army corps commanders and commanders of detached forces before Vicksburg will picket all roads, respectively, in rear of their respective positions, by which their camps or the city of Vicksburg can be approached, and prohibit all persons coming into or going out of our lines without special authority from the corps of commanders of detached forces whose pickets they desire to pass or the authority of the general commanding, The pickets will be placed sufficiently far out as to prevent sunrise from any raid the enemy may attempt to make, and each commander will notify the others of the position of his pickets.

V. All that portion of the State of Louisiana now in the occupancy of the Army of the Tennessee will constitute the District of Northeastern Louisiana, and be commanded by Brig. Gen. J. C. Sullivan. During the absence of Brig. Gen. J. P. Hawkins, all troops of African descent in the District of Northeastern Louisiana will be under the immediate command of Col. Isaac F. Shepard.

*          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *

By order of Maj. Gen. U.S. Grant:

[JNO. A. RAWLINS,]        

Assistant Adjutant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 3 (Serial No. 38), p. 356-7

Major-General William T. Sherman: General Orders, No. 44, June 9, 1863

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 44.}

HDQRS. FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,        

Walnut Hills, Miss., June 9, 1863.

To prevent communication between the enemy, now closely invested in Vicksburg, and their friends and adherents without, the following rules must be observed on the north front:

A continuous chain of sentinels must extend from the Mississippi River to the main Jackson road, along our front trenches. These sentinels will act as sharpshooters or pickets, and must be posted daily, and be instructed that no human being must pass into or out of Vicksburg, unless on strictly military duty, or as prisoners.

These sentinels must connect, one with another, the whole line; but division commanders may prescribe the posts, so that the length of line for each sentinel will depend on its nature.

All the ground, no matter how seemingly impracticable, must be watched.

The reserves and reliefs will be by brigades or divisions, according to the nature of the ground; but the post of his reserve must be known to each sentinel, and be within call.

I. General Steele will be held responsible for the front, from the Mississippi to the valley now occupied by General Thayer, to be known as "Abbott's Valley."

II. General Tuttle, from Abbott's Valley to the Graveyard road, at the point near the head of our "sap," to be known as "Washington Knoll?

III. General Blair, from Washington Knoll to where he connects with General McPherson's troops, at or near the point now occupied by General Ransom's advanced rifle-pits, to be known as "Ransom's Hill."

IV. The battalion of regulars, commanded by Captain Smith, will keep guards along all the roads leading to the front, and will arrest all soldiers absent from their regiments without proper authority, and turn back all officers not provided with written orders or passes from the commanders of their brigades or divisions.

Soldiers or citizens (not regular sutlers within the proper limits of their regiments) found peddling will be put under guard, and set to work on roads or trenches, and their wares turned into the hospital or distributed among the soldiers on duty.

Horses, mules, or any species of property found in possession of stragglers or absentees from duty, will be turned in to the corps quartermaster, a memorandum receipt taken, and sent to the corps inspector-general.

V. Colonel Eldridge, One hundred and twenty-seventh Illinois, will guard the Yazoo City road, at Chickasaw Creek, and also the bridges across the bayou, and will enforce at those points the same general orders as above prescribed.

VI. Colonel Judy, of the One hundred and fourteenth Illinois, will guard the road at the picket station near Templeton's, with vedettes on the by-roads leading therefrom north and east, and enforce similar general orders.

VII. In every regiment, troop, or company there must be at least three roll-calls daily—at reveille, retreat, and tattoo, and any commander who cannot account for every man in his command, at all times, will be liable for neglect of duty. He cannot shift his responsibility to an orderly sergeant.

The inspector-general of the corps may, and will, frequently visit camps, call for the rolls, and see that captains and colonels can account for every man.

VIII. Surgeons in charge of corps and division hospitals will notify regimental commanders of the admission and discharge of men at their hospitals, and furnish lists of men so admitted or discharged to the proper military commander.

Corps and division inspector-generals may, and will, frequently visit such hospitals, and satisfy themselves that no officers or soldiers are in hospital, except such as are admitted for treatment or regularly detailed as nurses.

IX. All commanders of divisions, brigades, regiments, and detached companies will be held responsible that their camps are not encumbered with surplus wagons, tents, horses, mules, tools, sutlers' trash, or anything that will prevent their raising camp at a moment's notice and taking up the march against an enemy to our front, flank, or rear.

X. The magnificent task assigned to this army should inspire every officer and soldier to sacrifice everything of comfort, ease, or pleasure to the one sole object, "success," now apparently within our grasp. A little more hard work, great vigilance, and a short struggle, and Vicksburg is ours.

By order of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman:

R. M. SAWYER,        

Assistant Adjutant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 3 (Serial No. 38), p. 394-5

Major-General Henry W. Halleck to Major-General Ulysses S. Grant, June 12, 1863—11:30 a.m.

WAR DEPARTMENT,        

Washington, June 12, 1863—11.30 a.m.

Major-General GRANT, Via Memphis, Tenn.:

I hope you fully appreciate the importance of time in the reduction of Vicksburg. The large re-enforcements sent to you have opened Missouri and Kentucky to rebel raids. The siege should be pushed night and day with all possible dispatch.

H. W. HALLECK,        

General-in- Chief.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 1 (Serial No. 36), p. 42

Major-General Ulysses S. Grant to Julia Dent Grant, June 9 1863

June 9th 1863.

DEAR JULIA,

I wrote to you by every courier I was sending back up to the Capture of Jackson. Having written to you to start for Vicksburg as soon as you heard the place was taken, and thinking that would be before another letter would reach you, I wrote no more. You may start down as soon as you receive this letter. If Vicksburg is not in our hands then you can remain on board the steamer at the landing with the prospect of my calling to gee you occationally. I have enjoyed most excellent health during the campaign, so has Fred. Fred, has enjoyed his campaign very much. He has kept a journal which I have never read but suppose he will read to you. The Pony, "Little Rebel," which I have got for Miss & Jess, is the smallest horse I ever saw. I want you to get saddles for both the children. The saddle I had for Jess was a very old one and being rode by persons too large for it it broke to pieces and had to be thrown away. I can tell you but little about matters here. We are up close to the enemy's forts and so far as the present force is concerned we must capture them. The enemy however may make a desperate effort to get a force outside of me to relieve the present garrison. If they do I occupy one of the strongest imaginable positions. I have ordered all the troops from West Tennessee that can possibly be spared from there. In addition to this other troops are coming from Kentucky and Mo. With the whole of them there is but little doubt but that I can hold out against anything likely to be brought against me. I want to see you very much dear Julia and also our dear little children.

Good bye

Ulys.

SOURCE: John Y. Simon, Editor, The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Volume 8, p. 332

Major-General Ulysses S. Grant to Colonel George G. Pride, June 15, 1863

Walnut Hills Miss.

June 15th 1863.

DEAR PRIDE,

I received your very welcom[e] letter and should have answered it sooner but find my time very much taxed.—I will avail myself of your offer should there be another movement made under my command. I missed you wonderfully in [getting] our wagons, baggage and everything over the river with the limited means at hand. I felt that you would have expedited matters one half. All is going on here now just right. We have our trenches pushed up so close to the enemy that we can throw Hand Grenades over into their forts. The enemy do not dare show their heads above the parapets at any point so close and so watchful are our sharpshooters. The town is completely invested. My position is so strong that I feel myself abundantly able to leave it so and go out twenty or thirty miles with force enough to whip two such garrisons. If Johnstone [sic] should come here he must do it with a larger Army than the Confederacy have now at any one place. This is what I think but do not say it boastingly nor do I want it repeated or shown.

Yours Truly

U. S. Grant

SOURCE: John Y. Simon, Editor, The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Volume 8, p. 379

Major-General William T. Sherman to Major-General Ulysses S. Grant, June 2, 1863

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,        

Walnut Hill, June 2, 1863.

Major-General GRANT,
        Present:

DEAR GENERAL: I would most respectfully suggest that you use your personal influence with President Lincoln to accomplish a result on which it may be the ultimate peace and security of our country depends. I mean to his use of the draft to fill up our old regiments.

I see by the public journals that a draft is to be made, and that 100,000 men are to be assigned to fill up the old regiments, and 200,000 to be organized as new troops. I do not believe that Mr. Lincoln, or any man, would at this critical period of our history repeat the fatal mistakes of last year. Taking this army as a fair sample of the whole, what is the case? The regiments do not average 300 men, nor did they exceed that strength last fall when the new regiments joined us in November and December. Their rolls contained about 900 names, whereas now their ranks are even thinner than the older organizations. All who deal with troops in fact instead of theory know that the knowledge of the little details of camp life is absolutely necessary to keep men alive. New regiments for want of this knowledge have measles, mumps, diarrhea, and the whole catalogue of infantile diseases, whereas the same number of men distributed among the older regiments would learn from the sergeants and corporals and privates the art of taking care of themselves, which would actually save their lives and preserve their health against the host of diseases that invariably attack the new regiments. Also, recruits distributed among older companies catch up, from close and intimate contact, a knowledge of drill, the care and use of arms, and all the instruction which otherwise it would take months to impart. The economy, too, should recommend the course of distributing all the recruits as privates to the old regiments, but these reasons appear to me so plain that it is ridiculous for me to point them out to you, or even to suggest them to an intelligent civilian.

I am assured by many that the President does actually desire to support and sustain the Army, and that he desires to know the wishes and opinions of the officers who serve in the wood instead of the "salon." If so, you would be listened to.

It will take at least 600 good recruits per regiment to fill up the present army to the proper standard. Taking 1,000 as the number of regiments in actual existence, this would require 600,000 recruits. It may be the industrial interests of the country will not authorize such a call, but how much greater the economy to make an army and fight out this war at once. See how your success is checked by the want of prompt and adequate enforcement to guard against a new enemy gathering to the rear. Could your regiments be filled up to even the standard of 700 men for duty, you would be content to finish quick and well the work so well begun. If a draft be made, and the men be organized into new regiments instead of filling up the old, the President may satisfy a few aspiring men, but will prolong the war for years and allow the old regiments to die of natural exhaustion. I have several regiments which have lost honestly in battle and by disease more than half their original men, and the wreck or remainder, with colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major, ten captains, lieutenants, &c., and a mere squad of men, remind us of the army of Mexico—all officers and no men. It would be an outrage to consolidate these old, tried, and veteran regiments and bring in the new and comparatively worthless bodies. But fill up our present ranks, and there is not an officer or man of this army but would feel renewed hope and courage to meet the struggles before us.

I regard this matter as more important than any other that could possibly arrest the attention of President Lincoln, and it is for this reason that I ask you to urge it upon him at this auspicious time. If adopted, it would be more important than the conquest of Vicksburg and Richmond together, as it would be a victory of common sense over the popular fallacies that have ruled and almost ruined our country.

With great respect, your friend and servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,        

Major-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series III, Volume 3 (Serial No. 124), p. 386-8

Major-General Ulysses S. Grant to Acting Rear Admiral David D. Porter, June 21, 1863

Head Quarters Dept of the Tennessee        

Near Vicksburg June 21st 1863

Admiral D. D. Porter Comdg Miss Squadron.

Admiral:—

Information received from Vicksburg last night confirms your theory of the probable method Pemberton will take for escaping in the last extremity. One of our Pickets and one of the enemy by mutual consent laid down their arms, met half way and had a long conversation. The rebel said that our cannonading killed and wounded a great many in the rifle pits, otherwise done no great damage. They fully counted upon an assault as being intended and were prepared for it. Finding that no assault was made, the feelings of the troops was canvassed to see if they could be got out to attack the Yankees They not only declined this, but those on the right and left almost mutinied because their officers would not surrender. They were only reassured and persuaded to continue on duty by being told that they had provisions enough on hand to last seven days. In that time they would have 2000 boats finished, and they could make their escape by the river. The rebel said they were tearing down houses to get the material out of which to build boats. I will direct Mower (Gen) to keep a strong Picket in the river in front of Vicksburg at night, to place his battery behind the levees or hold it in some good position to be used if an attempt should be made to escape in that way. If possible fix up Material to light and illuminate the river should a large number of boats attempt to cross. I will direct Gen Mower to call on you, and consult as to the best plan for defeating this method of escape. You will find Gen Mower an intelligent and gallant officer, capable of carrying out any plan that may be adopted

Very truly your Obt Servt

U. S. Grant 

Maj. Genl.

SOURCE: John Y. Simon, Editor, The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Volume 8, p. 398-9

Major-General John A. McClernand to Edwin M. Stanton, September 5, 1863

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., September 5, 1863.

Hon. E. M. STANTON,
        Secretary of War:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 29th ultimo.* By it I am advised that the President has declined to order a court of inquiry. If the reason for this determination was because my application contemplated an investigation extending beyond my own official conduct, I beg to obviate the objection by requesting a court of inquiry simply to investigate my own conduct. If the court be granted, I would prefer that its jurisdiction be extended to my entire conduct as an United States officer in the present war; or, if that may not be, to my conduct in connection with the Mississippi River expedition; or, if that may not be, to my conduct in connection with the late campaign from Milliken's Bend around to Vicksburg, and resulting in the fall of that place.

Pardon this further intrusion upon your attention, which is made in no improper spirit, but to ascertain the intended effect of the President's determination, and to ask of you to further oblige me by early advising me in the premises.

Your obedient servant,

JOHN A. McCLERNAND,        

Major General.

_______________

* Not found.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 1 (Serial No. 36), p. 168

Major-General John A. McClernand to Major-General Ulysses S. Grant, June 4, 1863

HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,        

Battle-field near Vicksburg, Miss., June 4, 1863.

[Maj. Gen. U.S. GRANT:]

GENERAL: What appears to be a systematic effort to destroy my usefulness and character as a commander makes it proper that I should address you this note. It is reported, among other things, as I understand, that I attacked on the 22d ultimo without authority; again, that I attacked too late; again, that I am responsible for your failure and losses; again, that I am arrested and being sent North; again, that my command is turned over to another officer, and, again, that you have personally assumed command of it. These reports are finding their way from the landings up the river. I hardly need say to you that all these reports are false; that I obeyed orders in attacking; that my attack was prompt and in a larger measure more successful than any other; that the ultimate failure of the general attack and the losses attending it were, under the circumstances, unavoidable consequences of obstacles found to be unsurmountable, and [notwithstanding] a determined effort, at least on my part, to carry and hold the works in obedience to your express and peremptory order. You know that I am not yet under arrest, or being sent away, or superseded in my command. All these things being known to you, and these false reports being brought to your notice, it remains for you to determine whether truth, justice, and generosity do not call on you for such a declaration as will be conclusive in the matter.

Your obedient servant,

JOHN A. McCLERNAND,        

Major-general, Commanding.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 1 (Serial No. 36), p. 165-6