Called this morning on General Halleck, who had forgotten or
was not aware there was a naval force in the James River cooperating with the
army. He said the army was withdrawn and there was no necessity for the naval
vessels to remain. I remarked that I took a different view of the question,
and, had I been consulted, I should have advised that the naval and some army
forces should hold on and menace Richmond, in order to compel the Rebels to
retain part of their army there while our forces in front of Washington were
getting in position. He began to rub his elbows, and, without thanking me or
acknowledgment of any kind, said he wished the vessels could remain. Telegraphed
Wilkes to that effect. Strange that this change of military operations should
have been made without Cabinet consultation, and especially without
communicating the fact to the Secretary of the Navy, who had established a
naval flotilla on the James River by special request to cooperate with and
assist the army. But Stanton is so absorbed in his scheme to get rid of
McClellan that other and more important matters are neglected.
A difficulty has existed from the beginning in the military,
and I may say general, management of the War. At a very early day, before even
the firing on Sumter and the abandonment of Norfolk, I made repeated
applications to General Scott for one or two regiments to be stationed there.
Anticipating the trouble that subsequently took place, and confident that, with
one regiment well commanded and a good engineer to construct batteries, with the
cooperation of the frigate Cumberland and such small additional naval force as
we could collect, the place might be held at least until the public property
and ships could be removed, I urged the importance of such aid. The reply on
each occasion was that he not only had no troops to spare from Washington or
Fortress Monroe, both of which places he considered in great danger, but that
if he had, he would not send a detachment in what he considered enemy's
country, especially as there were no intrenchments. I deferred to his military
character and position, but remonstrated against this view of the case, for I
was assured, and, I believe, truly, that a majority of the people in the navy
yard and in the vicinity of Norfolk were loyal, friends of the Union and
opposed to Secession. He said that might be the political, but was not the
military, aspect, and he must be governed by military considerations in
disposing of his troops.
There was but one way of overcoming these objections and
that was by peremptory orders, which I could not, and the President would not,
give, in opposition to the opinions of General Scott. The consequence was the
loss of the navy yard and of Norfolk, and the almost total extinguishment of
the Union sentiment in that quarter. Our friends there became cool and were
soon alienated by our abandonment. While I received no assistance from the
military in that emergency, I was thwarted and embarrassed by the secret
interference of the Secretary of State in my operations. General Scott was for
a defensive policy, and the same causes which influenced him in that matter,
and the line of policy which he marked out, have governed the educated officers
of the army and to a great extent shaped the war measures of the Government. “We
must erect our batteries on the eminences in the vicinity of Washington,” said
General Mansfield to me, “and establish our military lines; frontiers between
the belligerents, as between the countries of Continental Europe, are
requisite.” They were necessary in order to adapt and reconcile the theory and
instruction of West Point to the war that was being prosecuted. We should,
however, by this process become rapidly two hostile nations. All beyond the
frontiers must be considered and treated as enemies, although large sections,
and in some instances whole States, have a Union majority, occasionally in some
sections approximating unanimity.
Instead of halting on the borders, building intrenchments,
and repelling indiscriminately and treating as Rebels — enemies — all, Union as
well as disunion, men in the insurrectionary region, we should, I thought,
penetrate their territory, nourish and protect the Union sentiment, and create
and strengthen a national feeling counter to Secession. This we might have done
in North Carolina, western Virginia, northern Alabama and Georgia, Arkansas,
Texas, and in fact in large sections of nearly every seceding State. Instead of
holding back, we should be aggressive and enter their territory. Our generals act
on the defensive. It is not and has not been the policy of the country to be
aggressive towards others, therefore defensive tactics, rather than offensive
have been taught, and the effect upon our educated commanders in this civil war
is perceptible. The best material for commanders in this civil strife may have
never seen West Point. There is something in the remark that a good general is “born
to command.” We have experienced that some of our best-educated officers have
no faculty to govern, control, and direct an army in offensive warfare. We have
many talented and capable engineers, good officers in some respects, but
without audacity, desire for fierce encounter, and in that respect almost
utterly deficient as commanders. Courage and learning are essential, but
something more is wanted for a good general, — talent, intuition, magnetic
power, which West Point cannot give. Men who would have made the best generals
and who possess innately the best and highest qualities to command may not have
been so fortunate as to be selected by a Member of Congress to be a cadet.
Jackson and Taylor were excellent generals, but they were not educated
engineers, nor were they what would be considered in these days accomplished
and educated military men. They detailed and availed themselves of engineers,
and searched out and found the needed qualities in others.
We were unused to war when these present difficulties
commenced, and have often permitted men of the army to decide questions that
were more political than military. There is still the same misfortune, — for I
deem it such.
From the beginning there was a persistent determination to
treat the Rebels as alien belligerents, — as a hostile and distinct people, —
to blockade, instead of closing, their ports. The men “duly accredited by the
Confederate States of America” held back-door intercourse with the Secretary of
State, and lived and moved in ostentatious style in Washington for some weeks.
Thus commencing, other governments had reason to claim that we had initiated
them into the belief that the Federal Government and its opponents were two
nations; and the Union people of the South were, by this policy of our
Government and that of the army, driven, compelled against their wishes, to be
our antagonists.
No man in the South could avow himself a friend of the Union
without forfeiting his estate, his liberty, and perhaps his life under State
laws of the Confederates. The Federal Government not only afforded him no
protection, but under the military system of frontiers he was treated as a
public enemy because he resided in his own home at the South.
SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864,
p. 83-6
