Showing posts with label The Peninsula. Show all posts
Showing posts with label The Peninsula. Show all posts

Wednesday, September 16, 2015

Major-General John Sedgwick to his Sister, April 26, 1864

April 26, 1864.
My dear sister:

We are in daily expectation of orders for moving. The weather and roads are now favourable. We have had time enough to make the campaign a certain thing; but we have been engaged in winning political victories, when we should have been engaged in preparing for the rebels. We have to-day more soldiers in the Union States than we have in the rebel.

The news from all parts of the country is unfavourable, and will be so long as we divide our forces into small detachments and endeavour to hold places that are not of the least value to us, and we are now assembling a force on the Peninsula just large enough to be of no use, and it will certainly be gobbled up. The rebels are to-day as strong as we are, opposite to us. The picture will be sent in a few days. With much love, I am, as ever,

Your affectionate brother,
J. S.

SOURCE: George William Curtis, Correspondence of John Sedgwick, Major-General, Volume 2, p. 181-2

Friday, August 14, 2015

Major-General John Sedgwick to George Woodruff, October 1, 1863

Headquarters 6th Army Corps,
Culpeper, October 1, 1863.
To George Woodruff, Esq.

Dear sir:


I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 25th instant in regard to the services of your son, the late Lieutenant G. A. Woodruff, 1st Artillery, U. S. A. I will to-day forward your letter to Lieutenant-Colonel James H. Taylor, who was Chief of Staff of the late Major-General Sumner, under whose command the artillery of the division was directed. I assumed command of the division to which your son belonged in January, 1862, and had occasion to notice him expressly for the zeal and fidelity which he manifested in the discharge of his duties. Upon our arrival on the Peninsula we formed part of Sumner's corps. At the battle of Fair Oaks my division was the first of the corps to reach the field, and I placed the battery in position. I herewith enclose an extract from my report. I consider that the battery contributed essentially in the repulse of the rebels. At the battle of Glendale the battery was again in a prominent position. General Sumner and myself were both wounded inside the battery. I enclose an extract of my report. I presume General Sumner noticed more particularly its service, as was his promise. At the battle of Antietam I again had occasion to notice your son's gallantry, then in command of his battery. Whilst leaving the field, my horse having been killed, and badly wounded myself, I was left for some time within the battery, which was then engaged in repulsing and did repulse the column of the enemy that had broken my division. No veteran could have selected a better position, and no one could have shown more gallantry in defending it. I made no report of this battle, or I should have mentioned especially the services of your son and his battery. This was the last of my service with him; but I presume Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor will give you a more detailed and connected history of your son's service.

I would here remark that no General officer has authority to confer brevets; the President only has that right, with the sanction of the Senate. I have no means of knowing, but have no doubt your son's name went in to the Senate for two, perhaps three, brevets.

I am, very respectfully,
John Sedgwick,
Major-General.

SOURCE: George William Curtis, Correspondence of John Sedgwick, Major-General, Volume 2, p. 158-9

Saturday, July 25, 2015

Diary of Salmon P. Chase: Thursday, September 25, 1862

At Department as usual. The President sent for me to meet the Secretary of War. Found he had nothing to talk about except the supply of an additional sum to Gov. Gamble, of Missouri, to be used in defending the State against invasion and guerillaism. Agreed to confer with the Secretary of War on the subject. Enquired as to progress of the War. No information, and nothing satisfactory as to what is to be expected. Coming out Stanton told me that McClellan wants bridges built across the Potomac and Shenandoah, as preliminaries to movement; to which Halleck wont consent. Dan helps Zeke doing nothing.1

Delighted this morning by news of Gen. Wadsworth's nomination for Governor of New York, on the first ballot.

In the afternoon, went with Garfield to see Hooker, who was very free in his expressions about McClellan. He said it was not true that either the army or the officers were specially attached to him; that only two corps, whose commanders were special favorites and whose troops had special indulgences, could be said to care anything about him; that other officers — he himself certainly — thought him not fit to lead a great army; that he is timid and hesitating when decision is necessary; that the battle of Antietam was near being lost by his way of fighting it, whereas, had the attack been simultaneous and vigorous on the enemy's right, center and left, the rout would have been complete; that our force in the battle exceeded the enemy's by 30,000 men, and that the defeat of the enemy should have been final. He said also, that when Pope had drawn off a large part of the rebel force from Richmond and orders came to McClellan to withdraw, he urged him to give, on the contrary, orders for advance; that the orders were actually given and then revoked, much to his chagrin. This recalled to my mind a conversation with Gen. Halleck at that time. I said to him, that it seemed to me our people could now certainly take Richmond by a vigorous push, as Pope had 60,000 of the rebels before him, and at least half of the remaining 60,000 were south of the James, leaving only 30,000 with the fortifications on the north side; to which Gen. Halleck replied, that it was too dangerous an undertaking. I said, “If this cannot be done, why not return to Fredericksburgh, leaving Richmond on the left?” “This,” he said, “would be quite as dangerous — a flank movement, in which our army would be exposed to being cut off and totally lost.” Gen. Hooker said that the movement I suggested could have been executed with safety and success. He said, also, that he was somewhat reconciled to leaving the Peninsula by being told that it was a plan for getting rid of McClellan, and the only one which it was thought safe to adopt. This he thought so essential, that anything necessary to it was to be accepted.

Returning from Gen. Hooker's, as well as going, Gen. Garfield gave me some very interesting portions of his own experience. This fine officer was a laborer on a canal in his younger days. Inspired by a noble ambition, he had availed himself of all means to acquire knowledge — became a Preacher of the Baptist Church — was made the President of a flourishing Literary Institution on the Reserve — was elected to the Ohio Senate, and took a conspicuous part as a Republican leader. On the breaking out of the War he became a Colonel — led his regiment into Eastern Kentucky — fought Humphrey Marshall near Prestonburgh — gained position rapidly — was made at my instance, a Brigadier — fought under Buell at Shiloh — and was now in Washington by direction of the Secretary of War, who proposes to give him the Department of Florida. A large portion of his regiment, he said, was composed of students from his college.

Went to Seward's to dinner, where I met the Marquis of Cavendish, and his brother, Col. Leslie of the British Army; Mr. Stuart and Mr. Kennedy of the British Legation; Genl. Banks, and Mr. Everett. Gen. Banks earnest against more separation of forces until the rebel army is crushed.

Home. Found there Genl. and Mrs. McDowell. Soon after, Capt. and Mrs. Loomis came in. Could not help the Captain who wished to be Quartermaster of Genl. Sigel's Corps.

To bed tired and unwell
________________

1 A reference to the familiar story of Daniel Webster's boyhood.

SOURCE: Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 94-6

Thursday, July 23, 2015

Diary of Judith Brockenbrough McGuire: February 20, 1863

A letter this morning from Sister M., who has returned to her home on the Potomac. She gives me an account of many “excitements” to which they are exposed from the landing of Yankees, and the pleasure they take in receiving and entertaining Marylanders coming over to join us, and others who go to their house to “bide their time” for running the blockade to Maryland. “Among others,” she says, “we have lately been honoured by two sprigs of English nobility, the Marquis of Hastings and Colonel Leslie of the British army. The Marquis is the future Duke of Devonshire. They only spent the evening, as they hoped to cross the river last night. They are gentlemanly men, having no airs about them; but ‘my lord’ is excessively awkward. They don't compare at all in ease or elegance of manner or appearance with our educated men of the South. They wore travelling suits of very coarse cloth — a kind of pea-jacket, such as sailors wear. As it was raining, the boots of the Colonel were worn over his pantaloons. They were extremely tall, and might have passed very well at first sight for Western wagoners! We have also had the Rev. Dr. Joseph Wilmer with us for some days. He is going to Europe, and came down with a party, the Englishmen included, to cross the river. The Doctor is too High Church for my views, but exceedingly agreeable, and an elegant gentleman. They crossed safely last night, and are now en route for New York, where they hope to take the steamer on Wednesday next.” She does not finish her letter until the 17th, and gives an account of a pillaging raid through her neighbourhood. She writes on the 14th: “There had been rumours of Yankees for some days, and this morning they came in good earnest. They took our carriage horses, and two others, in spite of our remonstrances; demanded the key of the meat-house, and took as many of our sugar-cured hams as they wanted; to-night they broke open our barn, and fed their horses, and are even now prowling around the servants’ houses in search of eggs, poultry, etc. They have taken many prisoners, and all the horses they could find in the neighbourhood. We have a rumour that an infantry force is coming up from Heathsville, where they landed yesterday. We now see many camp-fires, and what we suppose to be a picket-fire, between this and the Rectory. My daughters, children and myself are here alone; not a man in the house. Our trust is in God. We pray not only that we may be delivered from our enemies, but from the fear of them. It requires much firmness to face the creatures, and to talk with them. The Eighth New York is the regiment with which we are cursed. The officers are polite enough, but are determined to steal every thing they fancy.” On the 15th she says: “This morning our enemies took their departure, promising to return in a few days. They visited our stable again, and took our little mare ‘Virginia.’ The servants behaved remarkably well, though they were told again and again that they were free.” Again, on the 17th, she writes: “I saw many of the neighbours yesterday, and compared losses. We are all pretty severely pillaged. The infantry regiment from Heathsville took their departure on Sunday morning, in the Alice Price, stopped at Bushfield, and about twelve took breakfast there. Mr. B. says the vessel was loaded with plunder, and many negroes. They took off all the negroes from the Mantua estate; broke up the beautiful furniture at Summerfield, and committed depredations everywhere. A company of them came up as far as Cary's on Saturday evening, and met the cavalry. They stole horses enough on their way to be pretty well mounted. They will blazon forth this invasion of a country of women, children, and old men, as a brilliant feat! Now that they are gone, we breathe more freely, but for how long a time?” We feel very anxious about our friends between the Rappahannock and Potomac, both rivers filled with belligerent vessels; but they have not yet suffered at all, when compared with the lower Valley, the Piedmont country, poor old Fairfax, the country around Richmond, the Peninsula; and, indeed, wherever the Yankee army has been, it has left desolation behind it, and there is utter terror and dismay during its presence.

SOURCE: Judith W. McGuire, Diary of a Southern Refugee, During the War, p. 192-4

Tuesday, June 23, 2015

Diary of Judith Brockenbrough McGuire: October 6, 1862

W., Hanover County. — We left the University on the 4th, and finding J. B. N. on the cars, on “sick-leave,” I determined to stop with him here to spend a few days with my sisters, while Mr. —— went on to Richmond and Ashland. I do nothing but listen — for my life during the last three months has been quiet, compared with that of others. J. gives most interesting accounts of all he has seen, from the time he came up the Peninsula with the army in May, until he was broken down, and had to leave it, in Maryland, after the battle of Sharpsburg. As a surgeon, his personal danger has not been so great as that of others, but he has passed through scenes the most trying and the most glorious. My sisters and M. give graphic descriptions of troubles while in the enemy's lines, but, with the exception of loss of property, our whole family has passed through the summer unscathed. Many friends have fallen, and one noble young relative, E. B., of Richmond County; and I often ask myself, in deep humility of soul, why we have been thus blessed, for since our dear W. P. and General Mcintosh fell, the one in December, the other in March, we have been singularly blessed. Can this last, when we have so many exposed to danger? O, God, spare our sons! Our friend, Dr. T., of this neighbourhood, lost two sons at Sharpsburg! Poor old gentleman! it is so sad to see his deeply-furrowed, resigned face.

McClellan's troops were very well-behaved while in this neighbourhood; they took nothing but what they considered contraband, such as grain, horses, cattle, sheep, etc., and induced the servants to go off. Many have gone — it is only wonderful that more did not go, considering the inducements that were offered. No houses were burned, and not much fencing. The ladies' rooms were not entered except when a house was searched, which always occurred to unoccupied houses; but I do not think that much was stolen from them. Of course, silver, jewelry, watches, etc., were not put in their way. Our man Nat, and some others who went off, have returned — the reason they assign is, that the Yankees made them work too hard! It is so hard to find both families without carriage horses, and with only some mules which happened to be in Richmond when the place was surrounded. A wagon, drawn by mules, was sent to the depot for us. So many of us are now together that we feel more like quiet enjoyment than we have done for months.

SOURCE: Judith W. McGuire, Diary of a Southern Refugee, During the War, p. 164-5

Monday, June 8, 2015

Colonel Charles Russell Lowell to Josephine Shaw Lowell, July 11, 1864

Tenallytown, July 11, 1864.

There is no end of confusion out here, and very little known of the enemy. I took over our 1st squadron, with a miscellaneous assortment from the Dismounted Camp, to within two miles of Rockville this morning, met a superior force of Rebs (nothing very fierce, however) and fell gradually back towards Tenallytown, they following with a gun and a gradually diminishing column. They are reported approaching similarly on the 7th St. road, — it looks at present more like a move to mask heavier movements than like a serious effort against this part of the fortifications. I gather from what I hear that you are cut off from Baltimore and cannot do otherwise than stay.

We had only two men wounded this morning, neither seriously, — several horses, among others Ruksh, very slightly, just across the back behind the saddle, injuring an overcoat for me as once before on the Peninsula. As Ruksh had a sore back before, it did not pay him to get this scratch.
Am I not “good” to write such narratives to you ? — it is attributable to the flies and the heat and the company I am in.1
_______________

1 On July 6th, General Early, arriving by the usual back door of the Shenandoah, crossed the Potomac, and soon after took Frederick, the second city in importance of Maryland. After defeating the small force of General Lew Wallace, he pushed on towards Washington, on July 11th. The day before, Lowell, ordered by General Augur to send one regiment of his brigade to the defence of Washington, sent the Second Massachusetts, and obtained leave to go with it. At 6.30 A.M. on the 11th, Colonel Lowell, now in command of all the available cavalry, began skirmishing, and caused the enemy's advance to fall back several miles, to their reserves, which in turn forced his command back to the infantry picket lines before Tennallytown, a suburb of Washington.

July 12. Colonel Lowell reported that, with three companies dismounted, he had turned the enemy's right flank and driven them back about one and a half miles, while Lieutenant-Colonel Crowninshield drove them one mile on the Rockville pike.

July 13. Early found Washington well defended by the Sixth and Nineteenth Army Corps, just arrived to the rescue, and began his retreat through Rockville, Md. He was followed up closely by the cavalry. Colonel Lowell, through the morning and up to 2.10 P.M., sends to headquarters frequent detailed reports of the enemy. At 2.30 he reports: “My despatch was here interrupted by the report of a large number of rebels being met just through the town [Rockville] by my advance-guard [part of Second Massachusetts under Crowninshield], who charged at once. My advance was then dismounted and, after a sharp skirmish there, checked a good strong charge of the rebels, after being driven nearly through the town by them. [This was his own brilliant saving of the day described in the biographical sketch.] We fell back to the edge of the town and established a strong dismounted skirmish line, holding them. Learning they were endeavouring to flank us, I retired to a situation two miles from Rockville, slowly. My regiment in the town, I fear, was mostly enveloped by the enemy, and are very severely whipped.'” Nevertheless, Lowell's men repulsed four charges in Rockville, and next day a great many of his “missing” rejoined the command.

Brigadier-General Hardin, U.S.A., in command in that part of the defences, reported in his despatches, “the information given by Colonel Lowell was always reliable.” Colonel Warner, commanding the First Brigade in the defences, in his reports gives Lowell high praise for intelligent activity.

The Second Massachusetts Cavalry, with provisional battalions, all under Lowell, accompanied the Sixth Corps, pursuing Early across the Potomac and through the Blue Ridge gaps to beyond the Shenandoah River. General Wright of this corps had, by General Grant's advice, been given command in this repulse of Early. The regiment, with its colonel, now went back to their camp at Falls Church, July 23 d.

SOURCE: Edward Waldo Emerson, Life and Letters of Charles Russell Lowell, p. 321-2, 455-6

Sunday, May 31, 2015

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, September 13, 1862

The country is very desponding and much disheartened. There is a perceptibly growing distrust of the Administration and of its ability and power to conduct the war. Military doubts were whispered on the Peninsula by McClellan's favorites before his recall, and when he was reinstated public confidence in the Administration throughout the country was impaired. Citizens and military, though from different causes, were distrustful. It is evident, however, that the reinstatement of McC. has inspired strength, vigor, and hope in the army. Officers and soldiers appear to be united in his favor and willing to follow his lead. It has now been almost a week since he left Washington, yet he has not overtaken the enemy, who are not distant. There is doubt whether he is thirty miles from Washington. Perhaps he ought not to be, until he has gathered up and massed the dispersed elements of his command. I shall not criticize in ignorance, but insist it is the duty of all to sustain him. I am not without hopes that his late experience and the strong pressure of public opinion will overcome his hesitancy and rouse him to thorough work. He is never rash. I fear he is not a fighting general. Stanton is cross and grouty. A victory for McClellan will bring no joy to him, though it would gladden the whole country.

Rev. Dr. Patton of Chicago, chairman of a committee appointed in northern Illinois, desired an introduction with his associates to the President, to advise with him on the subject of slavery and emancipation. The President assented cheerfully.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 129-30

Friday, May 1, 2015

Colonel Charles Russell Lowell to Josephine Shaw, Sunday, August 2, 1863 - Noon

Willard's Hotel, Washington,
Sunday noon, August 2d.

I found, when I reported in the evening, that I was ordered to take command of all the Cavalry in the Department (only three regiments, not very magnificent), headquarters to be at Fairfax Courthouse or Centreville.1

Everything that comes about Rob shows his death to have been more and more completely that which every soldier and every man would long to die, but it is given to very few, for very few do their duty as Rob had. I am thankful they buried him “with his niggers;” they were brave men and they were his men.2
_______________

1 Besides that already mentioned, other important reconnoissances, and escort duty to supply-trains, were performed by Colonel Lowell's command during July. In the end of the month, Mosby with his “Partisan” force made some very successful raids on the army wagon-trains, capturing near Alexandria between one and two hundred prisoners, with many horses, mules, wagons, etc. General King ordered Lowell to pursue, and he returned on the last day of July, with many men and horses recaptured. About the 1st of August, he was put in command of a brigade, consisting of the Second Massachusetts and Thirteenth and Sixteenth New York Cavalry regiments. The First Battalion now rejoined the Second Cavalry, after several months' service in the Peninsula.

2 In the Reminiscences of Mr. J. M. Forbes (privately printed) is a letter written to him by Mr. Frank G. Shaw, just after his son's death, from which I am allowed to quote : —

“He has gone from us, and we try not to think of our loss, but of his gain. We have had no doubt since the first news came. We had expected it.  . . . We thank God that he died without pain, in what was to him the moment of triumph; and we thank God especially for his happy life, and that he did not rise to his eminence through suffering, but through joy.”

Mr. Forbes adds, “I have seen no reference yet to our late friend's manly nobility [Mr. Shaw had recently died]. Every one remembers the brutal answer of the rebels to our flag of truce, when General Gilmore, after the assault on Fort Wagner, asked for Colonel Shaw's body: ‘We have thrown him into the ditch under his niggers.’ When we recaptured the fort, an attempt was made to find the sacred relics; and the general in command, or probably Secretary Stanton, wrote to Mr. Shaw asking some intimation as to what should be done in case of their recovery, and suggesting a monument recalling the indignity which had been offered. No thought of vengeance had ever been mixed up with Frank Shaw's patriotism or clouded his serene brow.  . . . The answer which now came — I think from both parents — was grand in its . . . simplicity. ‘We wish no search made, nor is there any monument so worthy of a soldier as the mound heaped over him by the bodies of his comrades.’”


SOURCE: Edward Waldo Emerson, Life and Letters of Charles Russell Lowell, p. 289, 432-3

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: August 9, 1861

Gen. Magruder commands on the Peninsula. President Tyler had a villa near Hampton, which the Yankees despoiled in a barbarous manner. They cut his carpets, defaced the pictures, broke the statues, and made kindling wood of the piano, sofas, etc.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 71

Friday, April 17, 2015

Major-General George B. McClellan to Edwin M. Stanton, January 31, 1862

Head Quarters of the Army
Washington January 31st 1862
Hon E M Stanton
Secty of War

Sir:

I ask your indulgence for the following paper, rendered necessary by circumstances. I assumed command of the troops in the vicinity of Washington on Saturday July 27 1861, 6 days after the battle of Bull Run.

I found no army to command, a mere collection of regiments cowering on the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited by their recent defeat.

Nothing of any consequence had then been done to secure the Southern approaches to the capital by means of defensive works; nothing whatever had been undertaken to defend the the [sic] avenues to the city on the northern side of the Potomac.

The troops were not only undisciplined, undrilled & dispirited – they were not even placed in military positions – the city was almost in a condition to have been taken by a dash of a single regiment of cavalry.

Without one day's delay I undertook the difficult task assigned to me – that task the Hon Secty knows was given to me without my solicitation or foreknowledge. How far I have accomplished it will best be shown by the past & present. The capital is secure against attack, – the extensive fortifications erected by the labor of our troops enable a small garrison to hold it against a numerous army; the enemy have been held in check; the State of Maryland is securely in our possession; the detached counties of Virginia are again within the pale of our laws, & all apprehension of trouble in Delaware is at an end; the enemy are confined to the positions they occupied before 21 July; – more than all this, I have now under my command a well drilled & reliable army to which the destinies of the country may be confidently committed. This army is young, & untried in battle, but it is animated by the highest spirit, & is capable of great deeds. That so much has been accomplished, & such an army created in so short a time from nothing will hereafter be regarded as one of the highest glories of the administration & the nation.

Many weeks, I may say many months, ago this Army of the Potomac was fully in condition to repel any attack; – but there is a vast difference between that & the efficiency required to make troops to attack successfully an army elated by victory, and entrenched in a position long since selected, studied, & fortified. In the earliest papers I submitted to the Presdt I asked for an effective movable force far exceeding the aggregate now on the banks of the Potomac – I have not the force I asked for. Even when in a subordinate position I always looked beyond the operations of the Army of the Potomac; I was never satisfied in my own mind with a barren victory, but looked to combined & decisive operations.

When I was placed in command of the armies of the U. S. I immediately turned my attention to the whole field of operations – regarding the Army of the Potomac as only one, while the most important, of the masses under my command.

I confess that I did not then appreciate the absence of a general plan which had before existed, nor did I know that utter disorganization & want of preparation pervaded the western armies. I took it for granted that they were ready, if not quite, in condition to move towards the fulfillment of my plans – I acknowledge that I made a great mistake.

I sent at once, with the approval of the Executive, officers I considered competent to command in Kentucky & Missouri – their instructions looked to prompt movements. I soon found that the labor of creation & organization had to be performed then – transportation, arms, clothing, artillery, discipline   all were wanting; these things required time to procure them; the Generals in command have done their work most creditably – but we are still delayed. I had hoped that a general advance could be made during the good weather of December – I was mistaken.

My wish was to gain possession of the Eastern Tennessee Railroads as a preliminary movement, – then to follow it up immediately by an attack on Nashville & Richmond as nearly at the same time as possible.

I have ever regarded our true policy as being that of fully preparing ourselves & then seeking for the most decisive results; – I do not wish to waste life in useless battles, but prefer to strike at the heart.

Two bases of operations seem to present themselves for the advance of the Army of the Potomac.—

I. That of Washington – its present position – involving a direct attack upon the enemy's entrenched positions at Centreville, Manassas etc, or else a movement to turn one or both flanks of those positions, or a combination of the two plans.

The relative force of the two armies will not justify an attack on both flanks.

An attack on his left flank alone involves a long line of wagon communication & cannot prevent him from collecting for the decisive battle all the detachments now on his extreme right & left.
Should we attack his right by the line of the Occoquan & a crossing of the Potomac below the Occoquan & near his batteries, we could perhaps prevent the junction of the enemy's extreme right with his centre (we might destroy the former), we would remove the obstructions to the navigation of the Potomac, reduce the length of wagon transportation by establishing new depots at the nearest points of the Potomac, & strike more directly his main railway communications.

The fords of the Occoquan below the mouth of Bull Run are watched by the rebels, batteries are said to be placed on the heights in rear (concealed by the woods), & the arrangement of his troops is such that he can oppose some considerable resistance to a passage of the stream. Information has just been received to the effect that the enemy are entrenching a line of heights extending from the vicinity of Sangster's (Union Mills?) towards Evansport. Early in Jany. Sprigg's ford was occupied by Genl Rhodes with 3600 men & 8 guns; there are strong reasons for beleiving that Davis' Ford is occupied.

These circumstances indicate, or prove, that the enemy anticipate the movement in question & are prepared to resist it. Assuming for the present that this operation is determined upon, it may be well to examine briefly its probable progress.

In the present state of affairs our columns (for the movement of so large a force must be made in several columns, at least 5 or 6) can reach the Accotinck without danger; during the march thence to the Occoquan our right flank becomes exposed to an attack from Fairfax Station, Sangster's & Union Mills; – this danger must be met by occupying in some force either the two first named places, or, better, the point of junction of the roads leading thence to the village of Occoquan – this occupation must be continued so long as we continue to draw supplies by the roads from this city, or until a battle is won.

The crossing of the Occoquan should be made at all the fords from Wolf's Run to the mouth, the points of crossing not being necessarily confined to the fords themselves. Should the enemy occupy this line in force we must, with what assistance the flotilla can afford, endeavor to force the passage near the mouth, thus forcing the enemy to abandon the whole line or be taken in flank himself.

Having gained the line of the Occoquan, it would be necessary to throw a column by the shortest route to Dumfries, partly to force the enemy to abandon his batteries on the Potomac, partly to cover our left flank against an attack from the direction of Acquia, & lastly to establish our communication with the river by the best roads, & thus give us new depots.

The enemy would by this time have occupied the line of the Occoquan above Bulls Run, holding Brentsville in force & perhaps extending his lines somewhat farther to the S. W.

Our next step would be to prevent the enemy from crossing the Occoquan between Bull Run & Broad Run, to fall upon our right flank while moving on Brentsville; this might be effected by occupying Bacon-race direct & the cross roads near the mouth of Bull Run, or still more effectually by moving to the fords themselves & preventing him from debouching on our side. These operations could probably be resisted, & would require some time to effect them. As nearly at the same time as possible we should gain the fords necessary to our purposes above Broad run.

Having secured our right flank it would become necessary to carry Brentsville at any cost, for we could not leave it between our right flank & main body. The final movement on the Railroad must be determined by circumstances existing at the time

This brief sketch brings out in bold relief the great advantage possessed by the enemy in the strong central position he occupies, with roads diverging in every direction, & a strong line of defence enabling him to remain on the defensive with a small force on one flank, while he concentrates everything on the other for a decisive action. Should we place a portion of our force in front of Centreville while the rest crosses the Occoquan or commit the error of dividing our army by a very difficult obstacle & by a distance too great to enable the two portions to support each other, should either be attacked by the masses of the enemy while the other is held in check.
I should perhaps have dwelled more decidedly on the fact that the force left near Sangster's must be allowed to remain somewhere on that side of the Occoquan, until the decisive battle is over, to cover our retreat in the event of disaster, unless it should be decided to select & entrench a new base somewhere near Dumfries – a proceeding involving much time.

After the passage of the Occoquan by the main army, this covering force could be drawn in to a more central & less exposed position, say Brimstone Hill or nearer the Occoquan. In this latitude the weather will for a considerable period be very uncertain, & a movement commenced in force on roads in tolerably fair condition will be liable, almost certain, to be much delayed by rains & snow. It will therefore be next to impossible to surprise the enemy, or take him at a disadvantage by rapid manoeuvres; – our slow progress will enable him to divine our purposes & take his measures accordingly. The probability is, from the best information we possess, that he has improved the roads leading to his lines of defence, while we must work as we advance.

Bearing in mind what has been said, & the present unprecedented & impassable condition of the roads, it will be evident that no precise period can be fixed upon for the movement on this line, nor can its duration be closely calculated; it seems certain that many weeks may elapse before it is possible to commence the march.

Assuming the success of this operation & the defeat of the enemy as certain, the question at once arises as to the importance of the results gained.

I think these results would be confined to the possession of the field of battle, the evacuation of the line of the upper Potomac by the enemy, & the moral effect of the victory – important results it is true, but not decisive of the war, nor securing the destruction of the enemy's main army; for he could fall back upon other positions, & fight us again & again, should the condition of his troops permit.

If he is in no condition to fight us again out of range of the entrenchments at Richmond we would find it a very difficult & tedious matter to follow him up there – for he would destroy the railroad bridges & otherwise impede our progress through a region where the roads are as bad as they well can be; & we would probably find ourselves forced at last to change the whole theatre of war, or to seek a shorter land route to Richmond with a smaller available force & at an expenditure of much more time than were we to adopt the short line at once.

We would also have forced the enemy to concentrate his forces & perfect his defensive measures at the very points where it is desirable to strike him when least prepared.

II. The second base of operations available for the Army of the Potomac is that of the lower Chesapeake Bay, which affords the shortest possible land routes to Richmond, & strikes directly at the heart of the enemy's power in the East.

The roads in that region are passable at all seasons of the year.

The country now alluded to is much more favorable for offensive operations than that in front of Washington (which is very unfavorable) – much more level – more cleared land – the woods less dense – soil more sandy – the spring some two or three weeks earlier.

A movement in force on that line obliges the enemy to abandon his entrenched position at Manassas, in order to hasten to cover Richmond & Norfolk.

He must do this, for should he permit us to occupy Richmond his destruction can be averted only by entirely defeating us in a battle in which he must be the assailant.

This movement if successful gives us the capital, the communications, the supplies of the rebels; Norfolk would fall; all the waters of the Chesapeake would be ours; all Virginia would be in our power; & the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee & North Carolina. The alternatives presented to the enemy would be to beat us in a position selected by ourselves; – disperse; – or pass beneath the Caudine Forks. Should we be beaten in a battle, we have a perfectly secure retreat down the Peninsula upon Fort Monroe, with our flanks perfectly secured by the fleet. During the whole movement our left flank is covered by the water, our right is secure for the reason that the enemy is too distant to reach us in time – he can only oppose us in front; or bring our fleet into full play.

After a successful battle our position would be – Burnside forming our left, Norfolk held securely, our centre connecting Burnside with Buell, both by Raleigh & Lynchburg, Buell in Eastern Tennessee & Northern Alabama, Halleck at Nashville & Memphis.

The next movement would be to connect with Sherman on the left, by reducing Wilmington & Charleston; to advance our centre into South Carolina & Georgia; to push Buell either towards Montgomery, or to unite with the main army in Georgia; to throw Halleck southward to meet the Naval Expedition from New Orleans.

We should then be in a condition to reduce at our leisure all the southern seaports; to occupy all the avenues of communication; to use the great outlet of the Mississippi; to reestablish our Gvt & arms in Arkansas, Louisiana & Texas; to force the slaves to labor for our subsistance instead of that of the rebels; – to bid defiance to all foreign interference.

Such is the object I have ever had in view; this is the general plan which I have hoped to accomplish. For many long months I have labored to prepare the Army of the Potomac to play its part in the programme; from the day when I was placed in command of all our armies, I have exerted myself to place all the other armies in such a condition that they too could perform their allotted duties. Should it be determined to operate from the lower Chesapeake, the point of landing which promises the most brilliant results is Urbana on the lower Rappahanock.

This point is easily reached by vessels of heavy draught, it is neither occupied nor observed by the enemy; it is but one long march from West Point, the key of that region, & thence but two marches to Richmond. A rapid movement from Urbana would probably cut off Magruder in the Peninsula, & enable us to occupy Richmond before it could be strongly reinforced. Should we fail in that we could, with the cooperation of the Navy, cross the James & throw ourselves in rear of Richmond, thus forcing the enemy to come out & attack us – for his position would be untenable, with us on the southern bank of the river.

Should circumstances render it not advisable to land at Urbana we can use Mob Jack Bay, – or – the worst coming to the worst – we can take Fort Monroe as a base, & operate with complete security, altho' with less celerity & brilliancy of results, up the Peninsula.

To reach whatever point may be selected as the base, a large amount of cheap water transportation must be collected – consisting mainly of canal boats, barges, wood boats, schooners etc towed by small steamers – all of a very different character from those required for all previous expeditions. This can certainly be accomplished within 30 days from the time the order is given.

I propose, as the best possible plan that can, in my judgment be adopted, to select Urbana as the landing place of the first detachments. To transport by water four (4) Divisions of Infantry, with their batteries, the Regular Infty, a few wagons one bridge train & a few squadrons of cavalry – making the vicinity of Hooker's position the place of embarkation for as many as possible. To move the Regular Cavalry, & Reserve Artillery, the remaining bridge trains, & wagons to a point somewhere near Cape Lookout, then ferry them over the river by means of North River ferry boats, march them over to the Rappahannock (covering the movement by an Infantry force placed near Keattsville), cross the Rappahannock in a similar way.

The expense & difficulty of the movement will thus be much diminished (a saving of transportation of about 10.000 horses!), & the result none the less certain.

The concentration of the cavalry etc in the lower counties of Maryland can be effected without exciting suspicion, & the movement made without delay from that cause.

This movement, if adopted, will not at all expose the city of Washington to danger. The total force to be thrown upon the new line would be (according to circumstances) from 110.000 to 140.000 – I hope to use the latter number, by bringing fresh troops into Washington, & still leaving it quite safe.

I fully realize that, in all projects offered, time is probably the most valuable consideration – it is my decided opinion that in that point of view the 2nd plan should be adopted. It is possible, very highly probable, that the weather & state of the roads may be such as to delay the direct movement from Washington, with its unsatisfactory results & great risks, far beyond the time required to complete the second plan. In the first case, we can fix no definite time for an advance – the roads have gone from bad to worse – nothing like their present condition has ever been known here before – they are impassable at present, we are entirely at the mercy of the weather! In the second plan, we can calculate almost to a day, & with but little regard to the season.

If at the expense of 30 days delay we can gain a decisive victory which will probably end the war, it is far cheaper than to gain a battle tomorrow that produces no final results, & may require years of warfare & expenditure to follow up.

Such, I think, is precisely the difference between the two plans discussed in this long letter. A battle joined at Manassas will result mainly in the possession of the field of combat – at best we can follow it up but slowly, unless we do what I now propose, viz; – change the line of operations.

On the Manassas line the rebels can, if well enough disciplined (& we have every reason to suppose that to be the case) dispute our advance, over bad roads, from position to position.

When we have joined the battle, if we do join it, the question will at once arise – “What are we to do next?” —

It is by no means certain that we can beat them at Manassas.

On the other line I regard success as certain by all the chances of war.

We demoralize the enemy, by forcing him to abandon his prepared position for one which we have chosen, in which all is in our favor, & when success must produce imminse results. My judgment as a General is clearly in favor of this project.

Nothing is certain in war – but all the chances are in favor of this movement.

So much am I in favor of the southern line of operations, that I would prefer the move from Fort Monroe as a base, as a certain, tho' less brilliant movement than that from Urbana, to an attack upon Manassas.

I know that his Excellency the President, you & I all agree in our wishes – & that our desire is to bring this war to as prompt a close as the means in our possession will permit. I believe that the mass of the people have entire confidence in us – I am sure of it – let us then look only to the great result to be accomplished, & disregard everything else.

In conclusion I would respectfully, but firmly, advise that I may be authorized to undertake at once the movement by Urbana.

I believe that it can be carried into execution so nearly simultaneously with the final advance of Buell & Halleck that the columns will support each other. I will stake my life, my reputation on the result – more than that, I will stake upon it the success of our cause.

I hope but little from the attack on Manassas; – my judgment is against it. Foreign complications may entirely change the state of affairs, & render very different plans necessary. In that event I will be ready to submit them

I am sir very respectfully
your obedient servant
Geo B McClellan
Maj Gnl Comdg U.S.A.

SOURCE: This letter can be found among the Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress.

Wednesday, April 15, 2015

Colonel Charles Russell Lowell to Josephine Shaw, July 23, 1863

Centreville, July 23, 1863.

People used to tell me, when I was at Cambridge, that those were to be the happiest years of my life. People were wrong. Dissatisfied as I have always been with myself, I have yet found that, as I grew older, I enjoyed more and more.

I picked a morning-glory (a white one) for you on the battlefield of Bull Run, the other day, but crushed it up and threw it away, on second thought, — the association was not pleasant; and yet it was pleasant to see that morning-glories could bloom on, right in the midst of our worries and disgraces. That reminds me that I haven't narrated where I went on Tuesday; we started very early and went over the whole Bull Run battleground down to Bull Run Mountains and Thoroughfare, thence to Warrenton, and back to near Manassas Junction, by the Orange and Alexandria R. R., — a killing march of between 52 and 54 miles on a scorching day and nothing learnt, except this, that there was nothing to learn. However, men and horses have stood it pretty well. At Manassas Junction I met General Gregg and his division of Cavalry. Gregg told me he had applied for my regiment some time ago; that he had a brigade of five regiments which he meant to give me, but the War Department didn't answer his application, — the Brigade was still waiting for me; — provoking, isn't it?1  However, I long ago gave up bothering about such things; I see so many good officers kept back, because they are too good to be spared, and so many poor ones put forward merely as a means of getting rid of them, that I never worry. Don't think that a piece of vanity, I don't mean it so. I don't call any cavalry officer good who can't see the truth and tell the truth. With an infantry officer, this is not [so] essential, but cavalry are the eyes and ears of the army and ought to see and hear and tell truly; — and yet it is the universal opinion that P—'s own reputation, and P—'s late promotions are bolstered up by systematic lying.
_______________

1 General David McM. Gregg had known Lowell in the Peninsula, having been a captain with him in the Sixth U. S. Cavalry.

SOURCE: Edward Waldo Emerson, Life and Letters of Charles Russell Lowell, p. 278-9, 429

Tuesday, April 7, 2015

Diary of Mary Boykin Chesnut: April 30, 1862

The last day of this month of calamities. Lovell left the women and children to be shelled, and took the army to a safe place. I do not understand why we do not send the women and children to the safe place and let the army stay where the fighting is to be. Armies are to save, not to be saved. At least, to be saved is not their raison d'être exactly. If this goes-on the spirit of our people will be broken. One ray of comfort comes from Henry Marshall. “Our Army of the Peninsula is fine; so good I do not think McClellan will venture to attack it.” So mote it be.

SOURCE: Mary Boykin Chesnut, Edited by Isabella D. Martin and Myrta Lockett Avary, A Diary From Dixie, p. 161

Thursday, April 2, 2015

Diary of Mary Boykin Chesnut: April 21, 1862

Have been ill. One day I dined at Mrs. Preston's, pâté de foie gras and partridge prepared for me as I like them. I had been awfully depressed for days and could not sleep at night for anxiety, but I did not know that I was bodily ill. Mrs. Preston came home with me. She said emphatically: “Molly, if your mistress is worse in the night send for me instantly.” I thought it very odd. I could not breathe if I attempted to lie down, and very soon I lost my voice. Molly raced out and sent Lawrence for Doctor Trezevant. She said I had the croup. The doctor said, “congestion of the lungs.”

So here I am, stranded, laid by the heels. Battle after battle has occurred, disaster after disaster. Every morning's paper is enough to kill a well woman and age a strong and hearty one.

To-day, the waters of this stagnant pool were wildly stirred. The President telegraphed for my husband to come on to Richmond, and offered him a place on his staff. I was a joyful woman. It was a way opened by Providence from this Slough of Despond, this Council whose counsel no one takes. I wrote to Mr. Davis, “With thanks, and begging your pardon, how I would like to go.” Mrs. Preston agrees with me, Mr. Chesnut ought to go. Through Mr. Chesnut the President might hear many things to the advantage of our State, etc.

Letter from Quinton Washington. That was the best tonic yet. He writes so cheerfully. We have fifty thousand men on the Peninsula and McClellan eighty thousand. We expect that much disparity of numbers. We can stand that.

SOURCE: Mary Boykin Chesnut, Edited by Isabella D. Martin and Myrta Lockett Avary, A Diary From Dixie, p. 157-8

Monday, March 23, 2015

Diary of Judith W. McGuire: April 11, 1862

The "Virginia" went out again to-day. The Federal Monitor would not meet her, but ran to Fortress Monroe, either for protection, or to tempt her under the heavy guns of the fortress; but she contented herself by taking three brigs and one schooner, and carrying them to Norfolk, with their cargoes. Soldiers are constantly passing through town. Every thing seems to be in preparation for the great battle which is anticipated on the Peninsula.

Fort Pulaski has surrendered to the enemy's gun-boats. The garrison fought until several breaches were made. They then surrendered, and are now prisoners. Lord, have them in thy holy keeping!

SOURCE: Judith W. McGuire, Diary of a Southern Refugee, During the War, p. 106

Friday, March 20, 2015

Diary of Judith W. McGuire: March 29, 1862

After much anxiety, more authentic information from the “Valley” received this morning. We gave them a good fight, but the field was left in the enemy's hand. Poor, noble Winchester, to what degradation is she brought! Our dear W. B. C.[1] was shot through the hip; the wound painful, but not mortal; he was carried to Staunton, and his mother has gone to him. The rest of our own peculiar “boys” are safe, but many lives were lost. It is thought that a great crisis is at hand. The Peninsula is the place appointed by rumour for a great battle. The croakers dread much from their numbers; my trust is in One who can save by many or by few.
______________

[1] William Brockenbrough Colston, son of Judith W. (Brockenbrough) McGuire’s sister, Sarah Jane Brockenbrough and her husband, Edward Colston.

SOURCE: Judith W. McGuire, Diary of a Southern Refugee, During the War, p. 103-4

Thursday, November 20, 2014

Captain Charles Russell Lowell to Henry Lee Jr., July 23, 1862

Harrison's Landing, July 23, '62.

I have no doubt I could get permission from the War Department to take a Massachusetts regiment, if offered me, and I should have no hesitation in making an application to Governor Andrew, if that is the proper course — unless you think that better men are likely to be appointed.

I have had my training in what I may now without boasting call a “crack” regiment, — through the whole campaign, I have commanded a squadron, though not by my regimental rank entitled to it, and in campaign you know a squadron of cavalry is quite as much an independent command as a regiment of infantry. I can safely refer to General Emory for testimony as to the discipline and efficiency of my squadron and as to my general qualifications,1 — and to General Stoneman for evidence as to what I have done.

Perhaps you think me too young — it is eight years to-day since I graduated — I have to apologize to myself for being so old. Younger men than I have done good service in command of regiments and even brigades during this campaign, witness my friend Barlow.2

I hear there is some chance of Henry's being ordered North: I hope he may come to the “Army of the Potomac,” — though I am convinced by observation that, here on the Peninsula, infantry is the arm for hard fighting.

Since we have been at this place I have been getting a little experience of Staff life and duty, being now Acting A. D. C. to General McClellan — it is an honourable position and valuable in the way of education, but I much prefer a command.
_______________

1 General Emory, formerly Lowell's colonel, regarded Lowell as the best officer appointed from civil life he had ever known.

2 Colonel Francis C. Barlow, a man of extraordinary gifts, who had graduated at Harvard the year after Lowell, — like him, first scholar in his class. He enlisted as a private, April 19, 1861, was married on the 20th, and sent to the seat of war on the 21st. Distinguishing himself on every field on which he fought, he rose rapidly in the service, and, though badly wounded again and again, returned to the field, and was at the close of the war Major-General of Volunteers. Lieutenant-General Miles said of him: “The clear and comprehensive intellect that had enabled him to pass his rivals in his educational race also enabled him to absorb the books on military affairs, and to acquire a useful knowledge of military history. Within a few months he had made himself absolute master of military tactics. It was as familiar to him as the alphabet or the multiplication table, and equally so were the Army Regulations. He not only knew what they required, but comprehended the principles and was enabled to comply with them, and also to instruct his subordinates.”  More will be said of General Barlow in a later note.

SOURCE: Edward Waldo Emerson, Life and Letters of Charles Russell Lowell, p. 222-3, 408-9

Wednesday, November 19, 2014

Captain Charles Russell Lowell to Anna Jackson Lowell, July 18, 1862

Harrison's Bar, July 18, 1862.

Your two last letters have told me more about Jimmy than I had learned from his friends here — they seem to bring me very near to him and also to you and Father — nearer than I might ever have been, had the little fellow lived. It is very pleasant to have had him with you so entirely last winter. I wish I had seen more of him on the Peninsula.

I think that the officers of his regiment feel his loss very much, for besides being a gallant officer, they all tell me he was a good one, which is much rarer—his noble behaviour after he received his wound has impressed them very much. George will tell you about this; — even Palfrey cannot speak of him without tears.1

Do, dear Mother, write to me a little oftener and try and help me to be a little more like what you saw me as a little child.

Your really loving Son.
_______________

1 Major Higginson, in giving the Soldiers' Field, said of James Lowell: —

“One of them was first scholar in his class — thoughtful, kind, affectionate, gentle, full of solicitude about his companions and about his duties. He was wounded in a very early fight in the war, and after his recovery and a hard campaign on the Peninsula, was killed at Glendale.  . . . Hear his own words: When the Class meets, in years to come, and honours its statesmen and judges, its divines and doctors, let also the score who went to fight for their country be remembered, and let not those who never returned be forgotten.’ If you had known James Lowell, you would never have forgotten him.”

I add this account of James Lowell's parting from life, given by Professor Francis J. Child in the Harvard Memorial Biographies:

When our troops moved on, and orders came for all who could to fall in, he insisted on Patten's (his 2d lieutenant) leaving him.  . . . ‘I have written them all. Tell them how it was, Pat.’ The officers of his regiment who went to bid him farewell tell us that the grasp of his hand was warm and firm and his countenance smiling and happy. He desired that his father might be told that he was struck while dressing the line of his men. Besides this he had no message but ‘Good-bye.’ He expressed a wish that his sword might not fall into the enemy's hands — a wish that was faithfully attended to by Colonel Palfrey,2 through whose personal care it was preserved and sent home. . . .

“Two of our surgeons, who had been left with the wounded at the farm, were much impressed with his behaviour, and one of them told the Rebel officers to talk with him, if they wished to know how a Northern officer thought and felt. . . .

"While the soul of this noble young soldier was passing slowly away, his sister, who had for some time been serving as volunteer nurse on a hospital steamer, which was lying at Harrison's Bar on the James River, only a few miles off, heard of his dangerous wound, and tried every expedient to get to him, but without success.”

2 Francis Winthrop Palfrey, Colonel of the Twentieth Massachusetts Infantry, and later brevetted Brigadier-General U. S. V., a good soldier, and the author of the volume Antictam and Fredericksburg, No. V, in “Campaigns of the Civil War.”

SOURCE: Edward Waldo Emerson, Life and Letters of Charles Russell Lowell, p. 221-2, 407-8

Monday, February 24, 2014

Major General George B. McClellan to Abraham Lincoln, April 5, 1862 – 7:30 p.m.

NEAR YORKTOWN, April 5, 18627.30 p.m.
 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President:

the enemy are in large force along our front, and apparently intend making a determined resistance. A reconnaissance just made by General Barnard shows that their line of works extends across the entire Peninsula from Yorktown to Warwick River. Many of them are very formidable. Deserters say they are being re-enforced daily from Richmond and from Norfolk. Under these circumstances I beg that you will reconsider the order detaching the First Corps from my command. In my deliberate judgment the success of our cause will be imperiled by so greatly reducing my force when it is actually under the fire of the enemy and active operations have commenced. Two or three of my divisions have been under fire of artillery most of the day. I am now of the opinion that I shall have to fight all the available force of the rebels not far from here. Do not force me to do so with diminished numbers. But whatever your decision may be, I will leave nothing undone to obtain success. If you cannot leave me the whole of the First Corps, I urgently ask that I may not lose Franklin and his division.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 11, Part 3 (Serial No. 14), p. 71

Sunday, February 16, 2014

General Robert E. Lee to Brigadier General G. W. Custis Lee, April 30, 1864

CAMP, 30th April, 1864.

MY DEAR CUSTIS:

Nothing of much interest has occurred during the past week. The reports of scouts all indicate large preparations on the part of the enemy, and a state of readiness for action. The Ninth Corps is reported to be encamped (or rather was on the 27th) on the O. & A. R. R., between Fairfax Ct. H. and Alexandria.

This is corroboration of information sent the President yesterday, but there may be some mistakes as to the fact or number of corps. All their troops north of the Rappahannock have been moved south, their guards called in, etc. The garrisons, provost guards, etc., in Northern cities have been brought forward and replaced by State troops. A battalion of heavy artillery is said to have recently arrived in Culpeper, numbering 3,000.

I presume these are the men stated in their papers to have been drawn from the forts in N. Y. Harbor. I wish we could make corresponding preparations. If I could get back Pickett, Hoke, and B. R. Johnson, I would feel strong enough to operate.

I have been endeavoring for the last eight or ten days to move Imboden against the B. & O. R. R. in its unprotected state, but have not been able. I presume he has his difficulties, as well as myself. I am afraid it is too late now. I cannot yet get the troops together for want of forage, and am looking for grass.

Endeavor to get accurate information from the Peninsula, James River, etc. My scouts have not returned from Annapolis, and may get back too late.

Your affectionate father,
R. E. LEE.
GEN. G. W. CUSTIS LEE.

SOURCE: John William Jones, Life and Letters of Robert Edward Lee: Soldier and Man, p. 305