Diary of Private Daniel L. Ambrose: Tuesday, May 6, 1862

The latest northern papers, with flaming bulletins, are circulated in the army to-day. “All quiet on the Potomac—McClellan and Halleck before Yorktown and Corinth with mighty armies." The world seems to be standing still, watching and waiting to see the triumph of freedom and self-government against the combined fronts of hell-originated treason. Would that these great leaders would move forward and let the old flag go flying on and give the reins to these impatient armies. But it is perhaps well that they are held in check.

SOURCE: Daniel Leib Ambrose, History of the Seventh Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry, p. 69

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, August 2, 1864

Judge Thomas and Mr. Train, counsel for Smith Brothers of Boston, had an interview of nearly two hours with me on Saturday, wishing the trial postponed, a different court, and that the trial should take place in Boston. They called and were with me half an hour yesterday. Finally arranged that the trial should be postponed four weeks, until Tuesday the 30th, although their friends had urged a speedy trial, but declined other changes. Two hours later the President sent for me and also for Mr. Fox. On going to the Executive Mansion, I found Messrs. Thomas and Train with the President, where they had gone over the whole subject that they had previously discussed with me. The President heard them kindly and then said he could not act without consulting me. I remarked that I had given the subject a hearing and examination, and supposed it was disposed of. The President said he could not interfere, but should be glad if it could be arranged so as to give them time and also a trial at Boston.

I wrote a letter to Pickering, Winslow & Co., who, with certain Bostonians, wish to do something to assist the blockade. They hardly know what or how.

At the Cabinet, Messrs. Blair, Bates, and myself were present. Fessenden and Usher are absent. Seward and Stanton had been there in advance. There is design in all this. Went over proceedings of the armies at Atlanta and Petersburg. Stanton dislikes to meet Blair in council, knowing that B. dislikes and distrusts him. Seward and Stanton move together in all matters, yet Seward fears a quarrel with Blair, and he tries to keep in with him and at the same time preserve his intimacy with Stanton. Both mouse about the President, who, in his intense interest and inquisitiveness, spends much of his time at the War Department, watching the telegraph. Of course, opportunities like these are not lost by Stanton, and, General Halleck being placed here indorsed by General Scott as the military adviser of the President, he has equal or greater advantages to play the sycophant, and does so.

The explosion and assault at Petersburg on Saturday last appears to have been badly managed. The results were bad and the effect has been disheartening in the extreme. There must have been some defect or weakness on the part of some one or more. I have been waiting to get the facts, but do not yet get them to my satisfaction. It is stated in some of the letters written that lots were cast as to which corps and which officers should lead in the assault. I fear there may be truth in the report, but if so, and Grant was in it or cognizant of it, my confidence in him — never very great — would be impaired. I should not be surprised to learn that Meade committed such an act, for I do not consider him adequate to his high position, and yet I may do him injustice. My personal acquaintance with him is slight, but he has in no way impressed me as a man of breadth and strength or capabilities, and instead of selecting and designating the officer for such a duty, it would be in accordance with my conceptions of him to say, Let any one, Cast lots, etc., but I shall be reluctant to believe this of Grant, who is reticent and, I fear, less able than he is credited. He may have given the matter over to Meade, who has done this. Admiral Porter has always said there was something wanting in Grant, which Sherman could always supply, and vice versa, as regards Sherman, but that the two together made a very perfect general officer and they ought never to be separated. If Grant is confiding in Meade, relying on him, as he did on Sherman,— Grant will make a failure, I fear, for Meade is not Sherman, nor the equal of Sherman. Grant relies on others, but does not know men, — can't discriminate. I feel quite unhappy over this Petersburg matter, — less, however, from the result, bad as it is, than from an awakening apprehension that Grant is not equal to the position assigned him. God grant that I may be mistaken, for the slaughtered thousands of my countrymen who have poured out their rich blood for three months on the soil of Virginia from the Wilderness to Petersburg under his generalship can never be atoned in this world or the next if he without Sherman prove a failure. A blight and sadness comes over me like a dark shadow when I dwell on the subject, a melancholy feeling of the past, a foreboding of the future. A nation's destiny almost has been committed to this man, and if it is an improper committal, where are we?

The consequence of the Petersburg failure, and the late successful raid of the Rebels, will embolden them to our injury. They will take courage, keep fewer troops to man their batteries at Richmond, and send more to harass our frontiers, perhaps to strengthen Hood in opposing Thomas and Sherman.

In the mean time, where is Halleck and what is he doing? I hear nothing of him, do not see him. The President goes to advise with him, but I do not think he is ever wiser or better for these interviews.

Seward and Stanton make themselves the special confidants of the President, and they also consult with Halleck, so that the country is in a great degree in the hands of this triumvirate, who, while they have little confidence in each other, can yet combine to control or influence the President, who is honest.

Attorney-General Bates, who spent last evening with me, opened his heart freely as regards the Cabinet. Of Blair he thought pretty well, but said he felt no intimacy with, or really friendly feelings for, any one but me; that I had his confidence and respect, and had from our first meeting. Mr. Seward had been constantly sinking in his estimation; that he had much cunning but little wisdom, was no lawyer and no statesman. Chase, he assures me, is not well versed in law principles even, - is not sound nor of good judgment. General Halleck he had deliberately charged with intentional falsehood and put it in writing, that there should be no mistake or claim to have misapprehended him. He regretted that the President should have such a fellow near him.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 90-3

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, August 8, 1864

Going into the War Department yesterday morning to inquire if any tidings had been received concerning Colonel Stedman of the 11th Connecticut Infantry, who was wounded, probably mortally, on Friday, I found the President with General Grant, Stanton, and General Halleck in the Secretary's room. I proposed leaving on making the single inquiry, provided they were in secret council, but the President and General Grant declared they were not, for me. Learning that poor Stedman was dead, and that some little intelligence had been received from Mobile, I soon left, for there was, it appeared to me, a little stiffness as if I had interrupted proceedings. General Grant has been to Frederick and placed Sheridan in command of the forces on the upper Potomac instead of Hunter, which is a good change, for H., though violently earnest, is not exactly the man for that command. I think him honest and patriotic, which are virtues in these days, but he has not that discretion and forbearance sufficient to comprehend rightly the position that was given him.

Mr. Seward sent me to-day some strange documents from Raymond, Chairman of the National Executive Committee. I met R. some days since at the President's, with whom he was closeted. At first I did not recognize Raymond, who was sitting near the President conversing in a low tone of voice. Indeed, I did not look at him, supposing he was some ordinary visitor, until the President remarked, “Here he is; it is as good a time as any to bring up the question.” I was sitting on the sofa but then went forward and saw it was Raymond. He said there were complaints in relation to the Brooklyn Navy Yard; that we were having, and to have, a hard political battle the approaching fall, and that the fate of two districts and that of King's County also depended upon the Navy Yard. It was, he said, the desire of our friends that the masters in the yard should have the exclusive selection and dismissal of hands, instead of having them subject to revision by the Commandant of the yard. The Commandant himself they wished to have removed. I told him such changes could not well be made and ought not to be made. The present organization of the yard was in a right way, and if there were any abuses I would have them corrected.

He then told me that in attempting to collect a party assessment at the yard, the Naval Constructor had objected, and on appealing to the Commandant, he had expressly forbidden the collection. This had given great dissatisfaction to our party friends, for these assessments had always been made and collected under preceding administrations. I told him I doubted if it had been done—certainly not in such an offensive and public manner; that I thought it very wrong for a party committee to go into the yard on pay-day and levy a tax on each man as he received his wages for party purposes; that I was aware parties did strange things in New York, but there was no law or justice in it, and the proceeding was, in my view, inexcusable and indefensible; that I could make no record enforcing such assessment; that the matter could not stand investigation. He admitted that the course pursued was not a politic one, but he repeated former administrations had practiced it. I questioned it still, and insisted that it was not right in itself. He said it doubtless might be done in a more quiet manner. I told him if obnoxious men, open and offensive opponents of the Administration, were there, they could be dismissed. If the Commandant interposed to sustain such men, as he suggested might be the case, there was an appeal to the Department; whatever was reasonable and right I was disposed to do. We parted, and I expected to see him again, but, instead of calling himself, he has written Mr. Seward, who sent his son with the papers to me. In these papers a party committee propose to take the organization of the navy yard into their keeping, to name the Commandant, to remove the Naval Constructor, to change the regulations, and make the yard a party machine for the benefit of party, and to employ men to elect candidates instead of building ships. I am amazed that Raymond could debase himself so far as to submit such a proposition, and more that he expects me to enforce it.

The President, in a conversation with Blair and myself on the Wade and Davis protest, remarked that he had not, and probably should not read it. From what was said of it he had no desire to, could himself take no part in such a controversy as they seemed to wish to provoke. Perhaps he is right, provided he has some judicious friend to state to him what there is really substantial in the protest entitled to consideration without the vituperative asperity.

The whole subject of what is called reconstruction is beset with difficulty, and while the executive has indicated one course and Congress another, a better and different one than either may be ultimately pursued. I think the President would have done well to advise with his whole Cabinet in the measures he has adopted, not only as to reconstruction or reëstablishing the Union, but as to this particular bill and the proclamation he has issued in regard to it.

When the Rebellion shall have been effectually suppressed, the Union government will be itself again, union will speedily follow in the natural course of events, - but there are those who do not wish or intend reunion on the principle of political equality of the States. Unless they can furnish the mode and terms, and for fear they may not be successful, various schemes are projected.

The issuing of the proclamation with reasons for not signing the bill, and yet expressing his acquiescence in the policy if any of the States adopt it, is denounced as anomalous; so is the condition of the country, and so will be reunion, whenever and however it may take place. I have never asked who was the adviser and counsellor of the President in issuing the proclamation. It is sufficient that I was not. There is one who was, and how many more is not material. There may have been one, possibly two, but the project is wholly the President's.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 96-9

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, July 25, 1864

There has been a little ferment in military circles, as newspaper correspondents write. Blair told me a few days since that Cutts came on his steps to sympathize and express his regret that the vandals should have burnt his (Blair's) house. Blair said that nothing better could be expected while poltroons and cowards had the management of military affairs. Cutts left abruptly. I now hear it stated that General Halleck reported the remark to Stanton, and Stanton forwarded Halleck's letter to the President, who remarked that men would speak their minds freely in this country. I have no idea that either Halleck or Stanton will press the subject farther. It would please Blair, I think, if they would.

Mr. Solicitor Whiting spent an hour at my house last evening. The principal topic of discussion was that of Reconstruction. He maintains that the States which have seceded have no rights, - that they cannot resume position in the Union without consent, and the formation of a new constitution in each which excludes slavery. I denied the right of Congress to impose that condition on a State, like North Carolina for instance, and insisted that the States must be equal in political rights, — that if Massachusetts or any of the old States reserved and retained that power, it belonged as well to North Carolina. An amendment of the Constitution would be necessary abolishing slavery in all. Without meeting that point, he expressed a disbelief in the reserved right of Massachusetts on that subject. He denied that a majority, or the whole people, of North Carolina could establish or reëstablish a government and continue to be or to become a member of the Union after having been in rebellion, except by consent or permission. “Then," said I, "you recognize the right and the fact of secession.” This he was unwilling to admit, but dwelt on international law, belligerent attitudes, and matters outside of the Constitution to punish States inside. I asked what he would do with loyal citizens in Rebel States, those who had never borne arms or done any act to forfeit their allegiance, men like John Minor Botts or Andrew Johnson, for instance. He maintained that being in States that rebelled they were to be treated like the Rebels.

Solicitor Whiting is self-sufficient but superficial, with many words, some reading, but no very sound or well-founded political views. Yet he considers himself a pater conscriptus, a teacher learned in the law and wise on the subject of government. Seward consults him, and Stanton uses him. He writes letters and opinions to order, gets up pamphlets; is serving without pay, and is careful to tell that fact. One of these years, sooner or later, let no one be surprised to find all his services fully compensated. Men who profess to serve the government gratuitously are usually better paid than others.

Met General Emory at Blair's. Has just come in from pursuit of the raiders, without overtaking them. Had quite a talk concerning matters on the Red River and our disaster there. He gives an interesting detail. Tells the old story of a multitude of fussy men who accompanied Banks with little carpet-bags filled with greenbacks, etc.

Donald McKay publishes a letter defending the Navy Department from newspaper attacks on the subject of the monitors. It is very well done and unexpected. The Evening Post publishes it, and so does the Times copy it, but not yet the Tribune.

Blair is sore and vexed because the President frequently makes a confidant and adviser of Seward, without consulting the rest of the Cabinet. I told him this had been the course from the beginning; Seward and Chase had each striven for the position of Special Executive Counsel; that it had apparently been divided between them, but Seward had outgeneraled or outintrigued Chase. The latter was often consulted when others were not, but often he was not aware of things which were intrusted to Seward (who was superserviceable) and managed by him.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 84-6

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, July 13, 1864

It is no doubt true that the Rebels have left. I called on General Halleck on a matter of business, and while there, about 11, he had a telegram saying the Rebels passed through Rockville to the northwest about 3 this A.M. They are making, I remarked, for Edwards Ferry and will get off with their plunder if we have no force there to prevent. He said it was by no means certain they would cross at Edwards Ferry. We looked over the map together, and he, like myself, thought it probable they had taken that course. I remarked that they appeared not to have concentrated their force at any one place. Halleck asked by what authority I said that. There was harshness and spite in his tone. I coolly said by my own judgment and the observation of almost any one who had any intelligence on the subject. He said he did not think I had heard so from any military man who knew anything about it. I said no military man or any other had been able to tell me where they were concentrated to the amount of five thousand. Nor have I found any except Halleck, Hitchcock, and a few around the Department express an opinion that there was a large number, or that they were concentrated. They were defiant and insolent, our men were resolute and brave, but the Bureau generals were alarmed and ignorant, and have made themselves and the Administration appear contemptible.

The Rebels, before leaving, burnt the house of Judge Blair, Postmaster-General. This they claimed to have done in retaliation for the destruction of the house of Governor Letcher, — a disgraceful act and a disgraceful precedent. I have no idea that General Hunter or any officer authorized the burning of Letcher's house. It was doubtless done by some miscreants, hangers-on, stragglers, who ought to be punished. But men in authority appear to have had direction in burning Blair's house.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 76

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, July 15, 1864

We had some talk at Cabinet-meeting to-day on the Rebel invasion. The President wants to believe there was a large force, and yet evidently his private convictions are otherwise. But the military leaders, the War Office, have insisted there was a large force. We have done nothing, and it is more gratifying to our self-pride to believe there were many of them, especially as we are likely to let them off with considerable plunder scot-free.

The National Intelligencer comments with a good deal of truth and ability on our national humiliation, as exemplified in this late affair. There is no getting away from the statements and facts presented.

Seward and Stanton seem disturbed. There is something which does not suit them. Seward followed Stanton out, and had a talk in the anteroom. I met Solicitor Whiting as I left the White House, who was very anxious to talk. Deplored the miserable military management. Imputes the whole folly and scare to General Halleck. Says Stanton has disapproved his policy, but [that] the President clings to Halleck, who is damaging him and the Administration greatly; that Halleck and Blair are both injuring the President. “Why,” said I, “you do not mean to identify Blair with this pitiful business.” “Oh no,” said he, “but Blair is so perverse on the slavery question that he is getting all the radical element of the country against the Administration.” As I did not care to enter into controversy on that topic, and it was late, I left him. But the conversation indicates that Stanton intends to throw off responsibility on to Halleck.

Grant and the Army of the Potomac are reposing in immense force near Richmond. Our troops have been sent from here and drawn from all quarters to reinforce the great army, which has suffered immense losses in its march, without accomplishing anything except to reach the ground from which McClellan was withdrawn. While daily reinforced, Grant could push on to a given point, but he seems destitute of strategy or skill, while Lee exhibits tact. This raid, which might have taken Washington and which has for several days cut off our communications with the North, was devised by Lee while beleaguered at Richmond, and, though failing to do as much as might have been accomplished, has effected a good deal.

The deportment of Stanton has been wholly different during this raid from any former one. He has been quiet, subdued, and apparently oppressed with some matter that gave him disquiet. On former occasions he has been active, earnest, violent, alarmed, apprehensive of danger from every quarter. It may be that he and Halleck have disagreed. Neither of them has done himself credit at this time.

The arrest of Henderson, Navy Agent, and his removal from office have seriously disturbed the editors of the Evening Post, who seem to make his cause their own. This subject coming up to-day, I told the President of the conduct of his District Attorney, Delafield Smith, who, when the case was laid before him by Mr. Wilson, attorney for the Department, remarked that it was not worth while to prosecute, that the same thing was done by others, at Washington as well as New York, and no notice was taken of it. Wilson asked him if he, the prosecuting law officer of the Government, meant to be understood as saying it was not worth while to notice embezzlement, etc. I related this to the President, who thereupon brought out a correspondence that had taken place between himself and W. C. Bryant. The latter averred that H. was innocent, and denounced Savage, the principal witness against him, because arrested and under bonds. To this the President replied that the character of Savage before his arrest was as good as Henderson’s before he was arrested. He stated that he knew nothing of H.’s alleged malfeasance until brought to his notice by me, in a letter, already written, for his removal; that he inquired of me if I was satisfied he was guilty; that I said I was; and that he then directed, or said to me, “Go ahead, let him be removed.” These are substantially the facts. I said to him that the attorneys who had investigated the subject expressed a full conviction of his guilt; that I had come to the same conclusion, and did not see how a prosecution and summary proceedings could be avoided. The Evening Post manifests a belligerent spirit, and evidently intends to make war upon the Navy Department because I will not connive at the malfeasance of its publisher. In a cautious and timid manner they have supported the policy of the Navy Department hitherto, though fearful of being taunted for so doing. Because their publisher was Navy Agent they have done this gently. But they now, since Henderson's arrest and trial, assail the monitors and the monitor system, which they have hitherto supported, and insidiously and unfairly misrepresent them and the Department. I am surprised at the want of judgment manifested in hastening to make this assault. It would have been more politic, certainly, to have delayed, for the motive which leads them to make this abrupt turn cannot be misunderstood. They know it is painful for me to prosecute one of their firm, that it pains me to believe him guilty, but that when the facts are presented, they should know me well enough to be aware that I would not cover or conceal the rascality even to oblige them. I claim no merit, but I deserve no censure for this plain and straightforward discharge of my duty. I hear it said to-day that there has been disagreement between Stanton and Grant; that the latter had ordered General Hinks to Point Lookout and Stanton countermanded the order for General Barnes.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 77-80

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, July 12, 1864

The Rebels captured a train of cars on the Philadelphia and Baltimore Road, and have burnt the bridges over Gunpowder and Bush Rivers. It is said there were 1500 of these raiders.

Governor Bradford's house, a short distance out of Baltimore, was burnt by a small party. General demoralization seems to have taken place among the troops, and there is as little intelligence among them as at the War Office in regard to the Rebels. General Wallace and his force were defeated, and panic and folly have prevailed.

Admiral Goldsborough and some of our naval officers tendered their services, if required. It seemed to me unneccessary, for I do not believe the Rebels have a large concentrated force in this vicinity, or that they design to make an attack on the city, but for the Navy to hold back when all are being called out would appear bad. I therefore requested Fox to see General Halleck, who much wanted aid, and Goldsborough and the men were therefore ordered and have gone to Fort Lincoln. It would be much better to keep them at work.

We have no mails, and the telegraph lines have been cut; so that we are without news or information from the outer world.

Went to the President's at 12, being day of regular Cabinet-meeting. Messrs. Bates and Usher were there. The President was signing a batch of commissions. Fessenden is absent in New York. Blair informs me he had been early at the council chamber and the President told him no matters were to be brought forward. The condition of affairs connected with the Rebels on the outskirts was discussed. The President said he and Seward had visited several of the fortifications. I asked where the Rebels were in force. He said he did not know with certainty, but he thought the main body at Silver Spring.

I expressed a doubt whether there was any large force at any one point, but that they were in squads of from 500 to perhaps 1500 scattered along from the Gunpowder to the falls of the Potomac, who kept up an alarm on the outer rim while the marauders were driving off horses and cattle. The President did not respond farther than to again remark he thought there must be a pretty large force in the neighborhood of Silver Spring.

I am sorry there should be so little accurate knowledge of the Rebels, sorry that at such a time there is not a full Cabinet, and especially sorry that the Secretary of War is not present. In the interviews which I have had with him, I can obtain no facts, no opinions. He seems dull and stupefied. Others tell me the same.

It was said yesterday that the mansions of the Blairs were burned, but it is to-day contradicted.

Rode out this P.M. to Fort Stevens. Went up to the summit of the road on the right of the fort. There were many collected. Looking out over the valley below, where the continual popping of the pickets was still going on, though less brisk than yesterday, I saw a line of our men lying close near the bottom of the valley. Senator Wade came up beside me. Our views corresponded that the Rebels were few in front, and that our men greatly exceeded them in numbers. We went together into the fort, where we found the President, who was sitting in the shade, his back against the parapet towards the enemy.

Generals Wright and McCook informed us they were about to open battery and shell the Rebel pickets, and after three discharges an assault was to be made by two regiments who were lying in wait in the valley.

The firing from the battery was accurate. The shells that were sent into a fine mansion occupied by the Rebel sharpshooters soon set it on fire. As the firing from the fort ceased, our men ran to the charge and the Rebels fled. We could see them running across the fields, seeking the woods on the brow of the opposite hills. It was an interesting and exciting spectacle. But below we could see here and there some of our own men bearing away their wounded comrades. I should judge the distance to be something over three hundred yards. Occasionally a bullet from some long-range rifle passed above our heads. One man had been shot in the fort a few minutes before we entered.

As we came out of the fort, four or five of the wounded men were carried by on stretchers. It was nearly dark as we left. Driving in, as was the case when driving out, we passed fields as well as roads full of soldiers, horses, teams, mules. Camp-fires lighted up the woods, which seemed to be more eagerly sought than the open fields.

The day has been exceedingly warm, and the stragglers by the wayside were many. Some were doubtless sick, some were drunk, some weary and exhausted. Then men on horseback, on mules, in wagons as well as on foot, batteries of artillery, caissons, an innumerable throng. It was exciting and wild. Much of life and much of sadness. Strange that in this age and country there is this strife and struggle, under one of the most beneficent governments which ever blessed mankind and all in sight of the Capitol.

In times gone by I had passed over these roads little anticipating scenes like this, and a few years hence they will scarcely be believed to have occurred.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 73-6

Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, May 12, 1864 – 6:30 p.m.

NEAR SPOTSYLVANIA COURT-HOUSE,                     

May 12, 1864—6.30 p.m.

The eighth day of battle closes, leaving between 3,000 and 4,000 prisoners in our hands for the day's work, including 2 general officers and over 30 pieces of artillery. The enemy are obstinate and seem to have found the last ditch. We have lost no organization, not even that of a company, while we have destroyed and captured one division (Johnson's), one brigade (Doles'), and one regiment entire of the enemy.

U.S. GRANT,            

Lieutenant-General.

Major-General HALLECK,

Washington, D.C.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 36, Part 1 (Serial No. 67), p. 4

Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, May 11, 1864 – 8:30 a.m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,                      

Near Spotsylvania Court-House, May 11, 1864—8.30 a.m.

We have now ended the sixth day of very heavy fighting. The result to this time is much in our favor. But our losses have been heavy, as well as those of the enemy. We have lost to this time 11 general officers killed, wounded, and missing, and probably 20,000 men. I think the loss of the enemy must be greater, we having taken over 4,000 prisoners in battle, while he has taken but few, except stragglers. I am now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer. The arrival of re-enforcements here will be very encouraging to the men, and I hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and in as great numbers. My object in having them sent to Belle Plain was to use them as an escort to our supply train. If it is more convenient to send them out by train to march from the railroad to Belle Plain or Fredericksburg send them so. I am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to the mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers, and by keeping them intrenched in every position they take. Up to this time there is no indication of any portion of Lee's army being detached for the defense of Richmond.

U.S. GRANT,            

Lieutenant-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,

Chief of Staff.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 36, Part 1 (Serial No. 67), p. 4

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, July 11, 1864

The Rebels are upon us. Having visited upper Maryland, they are turning their attention hitherward. General Wallace has been defeated, and it was yesterday current that General Tyler and Colonel Seward were prisoners, the latter wounded. But it seems only the last is true of the latter.

There is now a call from the War Department for gunboats at Havre de Grace, Gunpowder and Bush Rivers. Have ordered off three, but was afraid they would not arrive in season, for the call was not made and its necessity was scouted at Headquarters until the Rebels had cut the York and Baltimore Road. We have word by telegram this P.M. that the bridge over Gunpowder has been burned but a gunboat was on hand. Have no particulars.

Tom G. Welles was this day appointed to the staff of General McCook. I regret his passion for the service and his recklessness and youth.

The Rebel pickets appear in strength in front of Forts Stevens and DeRussy on the borders and within the District lines. Went to Stanton, but got from him nothing at all. He exhibits none of the alarm and fright I have seen in him on former occasions. It is evident he considers the force not large, or such that cannot be controlled, and yet he cannot tell their number nor where they are.

I rode out this evening to Fort Stevens, latterly called Fort Massachusetts. Found General Wright and General McCook with what I am assured is an ample force for its defense. Passed and met as we returned three or four thousand, perhaps more, volunteers under General Meigs, going to the front. Could see the line of pickets of both armies in the valley, extending a mile or more. There was continual firing, without many casualties so far as I could observe, or hear. Two houses in the vicinity were in flames, set on fire by our own people, because they obstructed the range of our guns and gave shelter to Rebel sharpshooters. Other houses and buildings had also been destroyed. A pretty grove nearly opposite the fort was being cut down. War would not spare the tree, if the woodman had.

I inquired where the Rebel force was, and the officers said over the hills, pointing in the direction of Silver Spring. Are they near Gunpowder or Baltimore? Where are they? Oh! within a short distance, a mile or two only. I asked why their whereabouts was not ascertained, and their strength known. The reply was that we had no fresh cavalry.

The truth is the forts around Washington have been vacated and the troops sent to General Grant, who was promised reinforcements to take Richmond. But he has been in its vicinity more than a month, resting, apparently, after his bloody march, but has effected nothing since his arrival on the James, nor displayed any strategy, while Lee has sent a force threatening the National Capital, and we are without force for its defense. Citizens are volunteering, and the employees in the navy yard are required to man the fortifications left destitute. Stanton and Halleck, who scouted Fenton's application and bluffed my inquiries, are now the most alarmed men in Washington.

I am sorry to see so little reliable intelligence. It strikes me that the whole demonstration is weak in numbers but strong in conception that the Rebels have but a small force. I am satisfied no attack is now to be apprehended on the city; the Rebels have lost a remarkable opportunity. But on our part there is neglect, ignorance, folly, imbecility, in the last degree. The Rebels are making a show of fight while they are stealing horses, cattle, etc., through Maryland. They might easily have captured Washington. Stanton, Halleck, and Grant are asleep or dumb.

The waste of war is terrible; the waste from imbecility and mismanagement is more terrible and more trying than from the ravages of the soldiers. It is impossible for the country to bear up under these monstrous errors and wrongs.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 71-3

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, July 8, 1864

The War Department keeps very close as to matters at Harper’s Ferry and vicinity. There is either little knowledge of what is doing, or a very great reluctance to communicate. Mr. Felton, President of the Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore R. R. sends me a, letter by private hands, stating that while he was not alarmed, he desired a gunboat at Gunpowder Creek, etc., to protect railroad property. Sent Fox to inquire of General Halleck as to the necessity. General H. thinks it unnecessary; but will advise us in season if wanted. Beyond this nothing is communicated.

Stanton tells me that he has no idea the Rebels are in any force above, and should not give them a serious thought, but that Grant says he thinks they are in force, without, however, giving his reasons or any facts. The President has been a good deal incredulous about a very large army on the upper Potomac, yet he begins to manifest anxiety. But he is under constraint, I perceive, such as I know is sometimes imposed by the dunderheads at the War Office, when they are in a fog, or scare, and know not what to say or do. It is not natural or the way of the President to withhold information, or speculation at such times, and I can always tell how things are with Halleck and Stanton when there are important movements going on. The President is now enjoined to silence, while Halleck is in a perfect maze, bewildered, without intelligent decision or self-reliance, and Stanton is wisely ignorant. I am inclined to believe, however, that at this time profound ignorance reigns at the War Department concerning the Rebel raid in the Shenandoah Valley; that they absolutely know nothing of it, — its numbers, where it is, or its destination. It has to me appeared more mischievous than to others. I think we are in no way prepared for it, and a fierce onset could not well be resisted. It is doubtful, however, whether the onset will be made, for it is the nature of man to lose his opportunities. The true course of the Rebels is to strike at once at this point.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 69-70

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, July 9, 1864

The Rebel invasion of Maryland, if not so large or formidable as last year and year before, looks to me very annoying, the more so because I learn nothing satisfactory or reliable from the War Office, and am persuaded there is both neglect and ignorance there. It is evident there have not been sufficient preparations, but they are beginning to move. Yet they hardly have any accurate information. Stanton seems stupid, Halleck always does. I am not, I believe, an alarmist, and, as I have more than once said, I do not deem this raid formidable if rightly and promptly met, but it may, from inattention and neglect, become so. It is a scheme of Lee’s strategy, but where is Grant’s?

The Blairs have left, strangely, it appears to me, at this time, on a fishing excursion among the mountain streams of interior Pennsylvania, and the ladies have hastily run off from Silver Spring to Cape May, leaving their premises at a critical moment.

Our Alabama news comes in opportunely to encourage and sustain the nation’s heart. It does them as well as me good to dwell upon the subject and the discomfiture of the British and Rebels. The perfidy of the former is as infamous as the treason of the latter. Both were whipped by the Kearsarge, a Yankee ship with a Yankee commander and a Yankee crew.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 70-1

Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, August 1, 1864

CITY POINT, VA., August 1, 1864.

The loss in the disaster of Saturday last foots up about 3,500, of whom 450 men were killed and 2,000 wounded. It was the saddest affair I have witnessed in the war. Such opportunity for carrying fortifications I have never seen and do not expect again to have. The enemy with a line of works five miles long had been reduced by our previous movements to the north side of James River to a force of only three divisions. This line was undermined and blown up, carrying a battery and most of a regiment with it. The enemy were taken completely by surprise and did not recover from it for more than an hour. The crater and several hundred yards of the enemy's line to the right and left of it and a short detached line in front of the crater were occupied by our troops without opposition. Immediately in front of this and not 150 yards off, with clear ground intervening, was the crest of the ridge leading into town, and which, if carried, the enemy would have made no resistance, but would have continued a flight already commenced. It was three hours from the time our troops first occupied their works before the enemy took possession of this crest. I am constrained to believe that had instructions been promptly obeyed that Petersburg would have been carried with all the artillery and a large number of prisoners without a loss of 300 men. It was in getting back to our lines that the loss was sustained. The enemy attempted to charge and retake the line captured from them and were repulsed with heavy loss by our artillery; their loss in killed must be greater than ours, whilst our loss in wounded and captured is four times that of the enemy.

U.S. GRANT,            

Lieutenant-General.

Major-General HALLECK,

Washington, D. C.

_______________

See Addenda.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 40, Part 1 (Serial No. 80), p. 17-8

Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, August 2, 1864 — 9:30 p.m.

CITY POINT, August 2, 1864—9.30 p.m.

Major-General HALLECK,

Chief of Staff:

I have the honor to request that the President may direct a court of inquiry, to assemble without delay at such place as the presiding officer may appoint, to examine into and report upon the facts and circumstances attending the unsuccessful assault on the enemy's position in front of Petersburg on the morning of July 30, 1864, and also to report whether, in their judgment, any officer or officers are censurable* for the failure of the troops to carry into successful execution the orders issued for the occasion, and I would suggest the following detail: Maj. Gen. W. S. Hancock, Brig. Gen. R. B. Ayres, Brig. Gen. N. A. Miles, Volunteer service; Col. E. Schriver, inspector-general and recorder.

U. S. GRANT,                       

Lieutenant-General.

_______________

* As received by Halleck this word is answerable.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 40, Part 1 (Serial No. 80), p. 18

Abraham Lincoln to Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant, July 10, 1864 — 2:30 p.m.

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1864 — 2.30 p.m.

Lieutenant-General GRANT:

Your dispatch to General Halleck referring to what I may think in the present emergency is shown me. General Halleck says we have absolutely no force here fit to go to the field. He thinks that with the 100-days' men and invalids we have here we can defend Washington, and scarcely Baltimore. Besides these there are about 8,000, not very reliable, under Howe, at Harper's Ferry, with Hunter approaching that point very slowly, with what number I suppose you know better than I. Wallace, with some odds and ends and part of what came up with Ricketts, was so badly beaten yesterday at Monocacy that what is left can attempt no more than to defend Baltimore. What we shall get in from Pennsylvania and New York will scarcely be worth counting, I fear. Now, what I think is that you should provide to retain your hold where you are, certainly, and bring the rest with you personally, and make a vigorous effort to destroy the enemy's force in this vicinity. I think there is really a fair chance to do this if the movement is prompt. This is what I think, upon your suggestion, and is not an order.

A. LINCOLN,                       

President of the United Slates.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 37, Part 2 (Serial No. 71), p. 155

Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, August 1, 1864—11:30 a.m.

CITY POINT, VA., August 1, 1864—11.30 a.m.                 

(Received 10.20 p.m.)

Major-General HALLECK,

Washington:

I am sending General Sheridan for temporary duty whilst the enemy is being expelled from the border. Unless General Hunter is in the field in person, I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes let our troops go also. Once started up the Valley they ought to be followed until we get possession of the Virginia Central Railroad. If General Hunter is in the field give Sheridan direct command of the Sixth Corps and cavalry division. All the cavalry I presume will reach Washington in the course of to-morrow.

U. S. GRANT,                                   

Lieutenant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 37, Part 2 (Serial No.71 ), p. 558

Major-General Henry W. Halleck to Major-General William T. Sherman, July 16, 1864

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,                     

Washington, July 16, 1864.

General SHERMAN,

Georgia, via Chattanooga:

MY DEAR GENERAL: Yours of the 9th is just received. If I have written you no “encouragement or advice” it has been mainly because you have not wanted either. Your operations thus far have been the admiration of all military men; and they prove what energy and skill combined can accomplish, while either without the other may utterly fail. In the second place, I must be exceedingly cautious about making military suggestions not through General Grant. While the general himself is free from petty jealousies, he has men about him who would gladly make difficulties between us. I know that they have tried it several times, but I do not think they will succeed. Nevertheless, I think it well to act with caution. I therefore make all suggestions to him and receive his orders. In my present position I cannot assume responsibility except in matters of mere administration or in way of advice. The position is not an agreeable one, but I am willing to serve wherever the Government thinks I can be most useful.

As you will learn from the newspapers, we have just escaped another formidable raid on Baltimore and Washington. As soon as Hunter retreated southwest from Lynchburg the road to Washington was open to the rebels, and I predicted to General Grant that a raid would be made. But he would not believe that Ewell's corps had left his front till it had been gone more than two weeks and had already reached Maryland. He was deceived by the fact that prisoners captured about Petersburg represented themselves as belonging to Ewell's old corps, being so ordered no doubt by their officers. We had nothing left for the defense of Washington and Baltimore but militia, invalids, and convalescents, re-enforced by armed clerks and quartermaster's employes. As the lines about Washington alone are thirty-seven and a half miles in length, laid out by McClellan for an army of 150,000, you may judge that with 15,000 such defenders we were in no little danger of losing the capital or Baltimore, attacked by a veteran force of 30,000. Fortunately the Sixth Corps, under Wright, arrived just in the nick of time, and the enemy did not attempt an assault.

Entre nous. I fear Grant has made a fatal mistake in putting himself south of James River. He cannot now reach Richmond without taking Petersburg, which in strongly fortified, crossing the Appomattox and recrossing the James. Moreover, by placing his army south of Richmond he opens the capital and the whole North to rebel raids. Lee can at any time detach 30,000 or 40,000 men without our knowing it till we are actually threatened. I hope we may yet have full success, but I find that many of Grant's general officers think the campaign already a failure. Perseverance, however, may compensate for all errors and overcome all obstacles. So mote it be.

Be assured, general, that all your friends here feel greatly gratified with your operations, and I have not heard the usual growling and fault-finding by outsiders. I have twice presented in writing your name for major-general regular army, but for some reason the matter still hangs fire.

Best regards to Thomas and McPherson.

Yours, truly,

H. W. HALLECK.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 38, Part 5 (Serial No.76 ), p. 150-1

Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant to Major-General Henry Wager Halleck, July 14, 1864

CITY POINT, VA., July 14, 1864.

Major-General HALLECK,

Washington, D.C.:

It would seem from dispatches just received from Mr. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, that the enemy are leaving Maryland. If so, Hunter should follow him as rapidly as the jaded condition of his men will admit. The Sixth and Nineteenth Corps should be got here without any delay, so that they may be used before the return of the troops sent into the Valley by the enemy. Hunter moving up the Valley will either hold a large force of the enemy or he will be enabled to reach Gordonsville and Charlottesville. The utter destruction of the road at and between these two places will be of immense value to us. I do not intend this as an order to bring Wright back while he is in pursuit of the enemy with any prospect of punishing him, but to secure his return at the earliest possible moment after he ceases to be absolutely necessary where he is.

Colonel Comstock, who takes this, can explain to you fully the  situation here. The enemy have the Weldon road completed, but are very cautious about bringing cars through on it. I shall endeavor to have it badly destroyed, and for a long distance, within a few days. I understand from a refugee that they have twenty-five miles of track yet to lay to complete the Danville road. If the enemy has left Maryland, as I suppose he has, he should have upon his heels veterans, militiamen, men on horseback, and everything that can be got to follow to eat out Virginia clear and clean as far as they go, so that crows flying over it for the balance of this season will have to carry their provender with them.

U.S. GRANT,            

Lieutenant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 37, Part 2 (Serial No. 88), p. 300-1

Colonel Theodore S. Bowers to Brigadier-General John Rawlins, August 10, 1864

. . . I have tried to induce the General to remove Halleck. While he confesses to having been deceived in him and having now his eyes open as to Halleck's position and conduct, he will not bring himself at present to take the step we urge. He has, however, settled Halleck down into a mere staff officer for Stanton. Halleck has no control over troops except as Grant delegates it. He can give no orders and exercise no discretion. Grant now runs the whole machine independently of the Washington directory. I am glad to say he is fully himself, works vigorously and will soon devise another plan for discomfiting the enemies of the country. . . .

James Harrison Wilson, The Life of John A. Rawlins, p. 257

Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, August 15, 1864—9 p.m.

CITY POINT, VA., August 15, 1864—9 p.m.                       

(Received 6.30 a.m. 17th.)

Major-General HALLECK,

Washington, D. C.

If there is any danger of an uprising in the North to resist the draft or for any other purpose our loyal Governors ought to organize the militia at once to resist it. If we are to draw troops from the field to keep the loyal States in harness it will prove difficult to suppress the rebellion in the disloyal States. My withdrawal now from the James River would insure the defeat of Sherman. Twenty thousand men sent to him at this time would destroy the greater part of Hood's army, and leave us men wherever required. General Heintzelman can get from the Governors of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois a militia organization that will deter the discontented from committing any overt act. I hope the President will call on Governors of States to organize thoroughly to preserve the peace until after the election.

U.S. GRANT,            

Lieutenant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 42 (Serial No. 88), p. 193