HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the Field, Kingston, Ga., November 6, 1864.
Lieut. Gen. U.S.
GRANT,
Commander-in-Chief, City Point, Va.:
DEAR GENERAL: I have
heretofore telegraphed and written you pretty fully, but I still have some
thoughts in my busy brain that should be confided to you as a key to future
developments. The taking of Atlanta broke upon Jeff. Davis so suddenly as to
disturb the equilibrium of his usually well-balanced temper, so that at
Augusta, Macon, Montgomery, and Columbia, S. C., he let out some of his
thoughts which otherwise he would have kept to himself. As he is not only the
President of the Southern Confederacy but also its Commander-in-Chief, we are
bound to attach more importance to his words than we would to those of a mere
civil chief magistrate. The whole burden of his song consisted in the statement
that Sherman's communications must be broken and his army destroyed. Now, it is
a well-settled principle that if we can prevent his succeeding in his threat we
defeat him and derive all the moral advantages of a victory. Thus far Hood and
Beauregard conjointly have utterly failed to interrupt my supplies or
communications with my base. My railroad and telegraph are now in good order
from Atlanta back to the Ohio River. His losses at Allatoona, Resaca, Ship's
Gap, and Decatur exceed in number (his losses in men) ours at the block-houses
at Big Shanty, Allatoona Creek, and Dalton; and the rapidity of his flight from
Dalton to Gadsden takes from him all the merit or advantage claimed for his
skillful and rapid lodgment made on my railroad. The only question in my mind
is whether I ought not to have dogged him far over into Mississippi, trusting
to some happy accident to bring him to bay and to battle. But I then thought
that by so doing I would play into his hands by being drawn or decoyed too far
away from our original line of advance. Besides, I had left at Atlanta a corps
and railroad guards back to Chattanooga, which might have fallen an easy prey
to his superior cavalry. I felt compelled to do what is usually a mistake in
war, divide my forces, send a part back into Tennessee, retaining the balance
here. As I have heretofore informed you, I sent Stanley back directly from
Gaylesville and Schofield from Rome, both of whom have reached their
destinations, and thus far Hood, who had brought up at Florence, is farther
from my communications than when he started, and I have in Tennessee a force
numerically greater than his, well commanded and well organized, so that I feel
no uneasiness on the score of Hood reaching my main communications. My last
accounts from General Thomas are to 9.30 last night, when Hood's army was about
Florence in great distress about provisions, as he well must be. But that devil
Forrest was down about Johnsonville and was making havoc among the gun-boats
and transports. But Schofield's troops were arriving at Johnsonville and a
fleet of gun-boats reported coming up from below, able to repair that trouble.
But you know that that line of supplies was only opened for summer use when the
Cumberland is not to be depended upon. We now have abundant supplies at
Atlanta, Chattanooga, and Nashville, with the Louisville and Nashville Railroad
and the Cumberland River unmolested, so that I regard Davis' threat to get his
army on my rear, or on my communications, as a miserable failure. Now as to the
second branch of my proposition, I admit that the first object should be the
destruction of that army, and if Beauregard moves his infantry and artillery up
into that pocket about Jackson and Paris, I will feel strongly tempted to move
Thomas directly against him and myself move rapidly by Decatur and Purdy to cut
off his retreat. But this would involve the abandonment of Atlanta and a
retrograde movement, which would be very doubtful of expediency or success;
for, as a matter of course, Beauregard, who watches me with his cavalry and his
friendly citizens, would have timely notice and would slip out and escape to
regain what we have earned at so much cost. I am more than satisfied that
Beauregard has not the men to attack fortifications or meet me in battle, and
it would be a great achievement for him to make me abandon Atlanta by mere
threats and maneuvers. These are the reasons which have determined my former
movements. I have employed the last ten days in running to the rear the sick
and wounded and worthless, and all the vast amount of stores accumulated by our
army in the advance, aiming to organize this branch of my army into four
well-commanded corps, encumbered by only one gun to 1,000 men, and provisions
and ammunition which can be loaded up in our mule teams, so that we can pick up
and start on the shortest notice. I reckon that by the l0th instant this end
will be reached, and by that date I also will have the troops all paid, the
Presidential election over and out of our way, and I hope the early storms of
November, now prevailing, will also give us the chance of a long period of fine
healthy weather for campaigning. Then the question presents itself, What shall
be done? On the supposition always that Thomas can hold the line of the
Tennessee, and very shortly be able to assume the offensive as against
Beauregard, I propose to act in such a manner against the material resources of
the South as utterly to negative Davis' boasted threat and promises of
protection. If we can march a well-appointed army right through his territory,
it is a demonstration to the world, foreign and domestic, that we have a power
which Davis cannot resist. This may not be war, but rather statesmanship,
nevertheless it is overwhelming to my mind that there are thousands of people
abroad and in the South who will reason thus: If the North can march an army
right through the South, it is proof positive that the North can prevail in
this contest, leaving only open the question of its willingness to use that
power.
Now, Mr. Lincoln's
election, which is assured, coupled with the conclusion thus reached, makes a
complete, logical whole. Even without a battle, the result operating upon the
minds of sensible men would produce fruits more than compensating for the
expense, trouble, and risk. Admitting this reasoning to be good, that such a
movement per se be right, still there may be reasons why one route would be
better than another. There are three from Atlanta, southeast, south, and
southwest, all open, with no serious enemy to oppose at present. The first
would carry me across the only east and west railroad remaining in the
Confederacy, which would be destroyed and thereby sever the communications
between the armies of Lee and Beauregard. Incidentally, I might destroy the
enemy's depots at Macon and Augusta and reach the seashore at Charleston or
Savannah, from either of which points I could re-enforce our armies in Virginia.
The second and easiest route would be due south, following substantially the
valley of the Flint River, which is very fertile and well supplied, and
fetching up on the navigable waters of the Appalachicola, destroying en
route the same railroad, taking up the prisoners of war still at
Andersonville, and destroying about 400,000 bales of cotton near Albany and
Fort Gaines. This, however, would leave the army in a bad position for future
movements. The third, down the Chattahoochee to Opelika and Montgomery, thence
to Pensacola or Tensas Bayou, in communication with Fort Morgan. This latter
route would enable me at once to co-operate with General Canby in the reduction
of Mobile and occupation of the line of the Alabama. In my judgment the first
would have a material effect upon your campaign in Virginia, the second would
be the safest of execution, but the third would more properly fall within the
sphere of my own command and have a direct bearing upon my own enemy,
Beauregard. If, therefore, I should start before I hear further from you or
before further developments turn my course, you may take it for granted that I
have moved via Griffin to Barnesville; that I break up the road between
Columbus and Macon good, and then, if I feint on Columbus, will move, via Macon
and Millen, to Savannah, or if I feint on Macon you may take it for granted I
have shot off toward Opelika, Montgomery, and Mobile Bay or Pensacola. I will
not attempt to send couriers back, but trust to the Richmond papers to keep you
well advised. I will give you notice by telegraph of the exact time of my
departure. General Steedman is here to clear the railroad back to Chattanooga,
and I will see that the road is broken completely between the Etowah and the
Chattahoochee, including their bridges, and that Atlanta itself is utterly
destroyed.
I am, with respect,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume
39, Part 3 (Serial No. 79), p. 658-61
