Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, March 31, 1866

I had an interview with the President concerning Semmes, as understood yesterday. Showed him the papers, and, after some conversation, he proposed to see Judge-Advocate-General Bolles, Solicitor of the Navy Department; said he would on the whole prefer him to the Attorney-General in this matter, and named Monday next.

By the President's request I went into the library and was introduced to Doctor Norris, with whom the President desired me to have some conversation. Doctor N. said he believed that the President and I had had some consultation in relation to a sea voyage for Robert, the President's son. He supposed I knew the circumstances. I told him I was aware of the young man's infirmity, that he had once spoken to me himself on the subject in a manner to touch my sympathy in his behalf. That I had also conversed with his father, as he seemed to be aware, and as he (the father) had doubtless advised him. He said that was so, and proceeded to tell me that R. had been beguiled into intemperance after he became of age, through his generous qualities, goodness of heart, and friendly disposition. He, therefore, thought it possible to reclaim him.

I had very little expectation of such a result, but it is important, for his father's sake and for the country's, that the President should in these days be relieved of the care and anxiety which his excesses and passions involve. To send him abroad in a public ship is the best disposition that can be made of him, and a voyage to the East Indies would be better than any other, and such a voyage was now in preparation. Doctor Norris thought this desirable.

I subsequently saw the President and told him what had taken place and that I could make the arrangement with little trouble to him. It seemed to give him consolation.

Letters from Connecticut do not speak with confidence of the result of the election next Monday. But my impressions are that the Union Party with Hawley will be successful. The battle will not be on the strict political issues before the country. On these issues, if well defined and the candidates were squarely presented, I have no doubt that the Administration would be triumphantly sustained. It would be union against disunion, the President versus Congress under the lead of Stevens. But politics and parties have become strangely mixed. Hawley, I am apprehensive, leans to the Congressional policy at present, but I trust observation and reflection will bring him right.

The true Union men who sustain the President feel that the defeat of Hawley would be a triumph to Toucey, Seymour, Eaton, and others who opposed the Government in war and whom they, for that reason, detest, and they will band together to support Hawley from matters of the past rather than issues of the present. Moreover Hawley has popular qualities. For ten years he has fought the Union battles in our political contests and in the field, and though he may be touched with Radicalism, he has good reasoning faculties and a sense of right within him on which I rely. The people have correct instincts in these matters, and I therefore feel pretty sure he will succeed. The worst is, should that be the case, the curse of party will claim that it is a triumph over the Administration. No harm will come of it, perhaps, but it is annoying and vexatious to have results to which men have contributed turned against themselves. But it cannot be helped. The distinction cannot now be drawn. Parties are in a transition state.

Sumner tells me this P.M. that his committee will go against the use of naval vessels for the French Exhibition. This will be counter to Banks, who laid himself out largely in this matter, and Sumner will not be grieved to have Banks disappointed. There is obviously no special love between these two gentlemen. They are opposites in many respects. Banks has thought to gain popularity in this move, which was concocted by himself and Seward, to use naval vessels and naval appropriations for a purpose not naval. To make their scheme appear less expensive, I am told that General Butler has succeeded in inducing the Secretary of the Treasury to interfere in the matter of the Grey Jacket, condemned as prize. If so, I regret it. McCulloch has been imposed upon. Butler is reckless, avaricious, unscrupulous. He knows there is neither law nor justice in his course on this question, but he has the promise of large fees. For three months he has been annoying me on this subject. He then went to the Attorney General and for a time made some headway. Failing there, he has now imposed upon McCulloch, who has been deceived by Butler's cunning and browbeaten by his audacity.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 467-70 

Isaac Toucey to George Douglas, Schuyler Livingston, Esqs., and others, Committee, &c., June 15, 1850

 NEW HAVEN, June 15, 1850.

GENTLEMEN—I acknowledge with great pleasure the invitation which you have done me the honor to extend to me, to be present at the public dinner to be given by the Democrats of New York, at Tammany Hall, on Monday, the 17th inst., to their distinguished Senator, the Hon. Daniel S. Dickinson.

It would be out of place, even for those who have had the best opportunity of knowing intimately and appreciating most fully the extent and value of his services, to speak of them in terms of merited commendation, because they have been performed in the face of the whole country, on its most conspicuous theatre.

At the present crisis, full of difficulty and danger—the very crisis which the Father of his Country foresaw and foretold, and, in his farewell address to his countrymen, warned us to beware of—it is a source of the highest gratification to observe the strong "evidences of popular approval" manifested towards those who comprehend the interests of the whole country, and stand firm and faithful amidst all the clamors of faction.

I regret that my duties here will necessarily prevent me from being present on the occasion, and I beg you will accept the time-honored sentiment which I annex.

I am, gentlemen,
        With the highest respect,

Your fellow-citizen,

ISAAC TOUCEY.

The Union of the States—Not formed or upheld by force, but by concession and compromise, and a just regard to the interests of the whole country and every part of it.

To GEORGE DOUGLAS, SCHUYLER LIVINGSTON, Esqs., and others, Committee, &c.

SOURCE: John R. Dickinson, Editor, Speeches, Correspondence, Etc., of the Late Daniel S. Dickinson of New York, Vol. 2, p. 442

Diary of Gideon Welles: September 28, 1865

I have been absent during most of the month of September in my native State and among the scenes of my childhood and youth. Change is there. Of the companions who fifty years ago it was my pleasure to love, and who I truly believe loved me, few, only few, remain, while of those who were in middle life or more advanced age, men who encouraged and stood by me, who voluntarily elected me to the Legislature when I was but twenty-four, scarcely one remains. Their children and grandchildren to some extent occupy their places, but a different class of persons have come into the old town and much altered its character.

Little of importance has transpired during the month. The rebellious States are reorganizing their governments and institutions, — submitting to results they could not arrest or avert. In the Free States, political conventions have been held and movements made to revivify old parties, and, on the part of the extremists, or Radicals, an exhibition of intense hate towards the Rebels which bodes mischief has manifested itself.

In New York an extraordinary step, a coup d'état, was taken by the Democratic organization, which indorsed President Johnson and nominated Union men to some of the most important places on the ticket. A counter move was made by the Union party, which nominated an entire new ticket, and passed resolutions not remarkable in any respect.

The Massachusetts Republican convention did not like to take ground antagonistic to the Administration, although the leaders, particularly Sumner and his friends, cannot suppress their hostile feelings. Their resolutions, adopted at Worcester, are very labored, and abound more in words than distinct ideas, reminding one of the old woman who wished to scream but dared not.

In Connecticut the question of amending the State Constitution so as to erase the word "white" is pending. Some feeling among the old Abolitionists and leading politicians was exhibited, and they may, and probably will, work up some feeling in its favor; but generally the people are indifferent or opposed to it. But for the national questions before the country, the amendment would be defeated; the probabilities appeared to me in its favor. I avoided interfering in the question or expressing an opinion on the subject, but the partisans are determined to draw me out. It is asserted in the Times that I am opposed to negro suffrage. Two of the editors deny this and have so written me. I replied in a hasty note that no one was authorized to say I had expressed opposition to it. Since then I have had a telegram from the editor of the Press, Warner, asking if I am in favor of negro suffrage. Disliking to be catechized in this way and not disposed to give a categorical answer, I replied that I was in favor of intelligence, not of color for qualification for suffrage. The truth is I have little or no feeling on the subject, and as we require that the electors shall read, and have few negroes in Connecticut, I acquiesce in, rather than advocate, the amendment. I would not enslave the negro, but his enfranchisement is another question, and until he is better informed, it is not desirable that he should vote. The great zeal of Sumner and the Abolitionists in behalf of the negro voting has no responsive sympathy with me. It is a species of fanaticism, zeal without discretion. Whenever the time arrives that he should vote, the negro will probably be permitted. I am no advocate for social equality, nor do I labor for political or civil equality with the negro. I do not want him at my table, nor do I care to have him in the jury-box, or in the legislative hall, or on the bench. The negro does not vote in Connecticut, nor is he taxed. There are but a few hundreds of them. Of these perhaps not half can read and consequently cannot vote, while, if the restriction is removed, all will be taxed.

Judge Blair came to see me the day after I came back. He is preparing a reply to Judge Holt. During my absence the papers have published a statement made by Mr. Fox in relation to the Sumter expedition, which was sent to the Senate as an appendix to my reply to a call of the Senate, but that body declined to receive F.'s statement. It comes in now, aptly, with Blair's speech, and will doubtless be considered a part of the scheme. General Meigs hastened too fast to reply in order to assure Mr. Seward.

There are serious mistakes or blunders in Meigs's letter, which, however, will doubtless be corrected. Blair wished to get the armistice signed by Holt, Toucey, and Mallory, and asked if I remembered it. I told him I did, and that we had it on our files. But on sending for the volume I find it is only a copy. Yet my convictions were as positive as Blair's that the original was in the Navy Department. I thought I remembered the paper distinctly, its color and general appearance, but the copy does not correspond with my recollection, yet I cannot doubt it is the paper which I saw. From this difference I am admonished of the uncertainty and fallibility of human testimony.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 372-4

Speech of Senator Andrew Butler, March 2, 1854

I wish to say one or two words at this point of the debate, and to bring the attention of the Senate distinctly to the issue made by the senator from Wisconsin, (Mr. WALKER.) I understand, in any point of view in which this subject can be regarded, that if you obliterate or abolish what is called the Missouri Compromise line, you at least place upon an equality Nebraska, Utah, and New Mexico.

Now, northern gentlemen—I do not speak of the senator from Wisconsin particularly, but many gentlemen of the North—were reconciled to vote for the territorial governments given to Utah and New Mexico upon the ground that the Spanish law excluded slavery there. Suppose we ask to have the Missouri line obliterated, and give to the territorial government of Nebraska the right to determine this subject for themselves, and by that obliteration the old French law should be restored; would that not be fair? Gentlemen were willing to restore the old law when it excluded slavery and were willing to trust the territorial legislation under that law. But they are not willing to prohibit this Missouri restriction and confer upon the territorial legislature of Nebraska the power to regulate slavery when the old law, which it's said will be here revived, admits slavery. Congress, as the representative of sovereignty, has all the constitutional power over the subject; and, in parting with it to a territorial legislature, it appoints an administrator to discharge legislative functions, controllable by the constitution.

This, sir, is a fair and practical view of the subject. In Utah and New Mexico, the Mexican law, it was said, excluded slavery, and gentlemen then were willing to give exactly the same provisions to those Territories which are given in the bill under consideration. In Nebraska and Kansas, according to the view of the gentleman—I do not admit it, I do not believe one word of it—the French law is revived, and will establish slavery; and that being so, they are not willing to trust the people of these Territories at all upon the same subject. They are willing to make fish of one and flesh of another. I have not the least idea that the effect would be such as the gentleman supposes; but I am only showing the manner in which these issues are made. So long as the law is one way they are willing to go for one system; and when, in their opinion, it is another way, they are not willing to apply the same system. It is not fair to apply the same provisions in both cases.

Now, sir, I have not the least idea that, under the plenitude of the language of this bill, the territorial legislature may not act. The honorable senator from Connecticut [Mr. TOUCEY] put that in a very clear point of view. The truth is that both the Utah and New Mexico bills, and this bill, as I understand, are designed to make a blank leaf, and to give to the territorial legislature all the authority on the subject, whether there is French or Mexican law intervening. That is the fair meaning of it. Yet, though gentlemen were willing to give this power to a territorial government under Mexican law, they are not willing to give a territorial government the same power under the French law. Gentlemen cannot escape these two positions.

Sir, when I stand here as a southern man, I feel humiliated when I hear threats made that, unless we come to the terms of gentlemen, they will reopen this agitation until they expel us from every Territory of the Union, and even abolish the slave trade between the States. Sir, I am her to legislate to the best of my ability, in good faith, to preserve the institutions of the country; and yet I am threatened that if I do not do so and so the North will abolish slavery in the District of Columbia; and that they will assume a jurisdiction equal to their numerical power and strength; and that northern justice is not to be trusted. I do not believe one word of it.

But, sir, no man can stand up and read what I read in a paper this morning without indignation. It does not emanate, I know, from the gentleman who sits near me, [Mr. WALKER] for he has a heart incapable of it. But sir, I read this morning, what made my blood boil, that if this discussion went on and this bill were passed, the South should not only be prepared to give up all their power and surrender every inch of territory which they might claim for slavery, but that the scenes of San Domingo should be introduced, and their wives and daughters subjected to the lust of the black man. Sir, to such a state of things would the spirit of demonic agitation be reconciled. I read that statement in a New York paper to-day. I say to my neighbor, and senator from Wisconsin, who sits near me and for whom I have great respect, let him not make threats of that kind to me. I am willing to conduct this discussion in harmony, but when I am told that the scenes of San Domingo are to be opened to all the southern States, and our wives and daughters are to be subjected to the lust of the black man—my God! can it be that I sand in the Senate of the United States?

Mr. CASS. Will the honorable senator allow me to ask him if he does not give too much importance to these matters? Did not the very paper to which he refers abuse us all like pickpockets and rascals, over and over again? It does not speak for the North.

Mr. BUTLER.  I believe it.

Mr. CASS.  As a western man, I disavow its authority in toto.

Mr. BUTLER.  I know you do, sir. You are a statesman, and have the sentiments of a Christian, and look to events with the views of an American statesman, and I know that my neighbor from Wisconsin has no such idea. No statesman could utter such sentiments, or dare to carry them out. But when the threat is made, and I am required to legislate under duress, per minas, I do feel that it was unfortunately introduced. I say this in all kindness; for though my manner may be impetuous, I have nothing but a kind feeling towards those who differ from my honestly. I have thus far endeavored to control my language. I have used none except upon general topics, and I have used no language of personal resentment towards any one, believing it would defeat its end. I must say, however that these are not matters which are to be lightly passed over. Whatever may be the fate of this bill—and I do not much care what it may be—my deliberate judgment is, that if this discussion is conducted fairly, the North and South will be reconciled to return to the original principles on which this government was administered; and the sooner their differences are reconciled the better.

Now, what could the North gain by excluding us from these Territories? If two States should ever come into the union from them, it is very certain that not more than one of them could, in any possible event, be a slaveholding state; and I have not the least idea that even one would be. Perhaps some good people will go there, and carry with them their old negroes and a few personal servants. Now, who would go and disturb a poor old negro reposing happily under the government of a hereditary master? Who would disturb the relation existing between a good master and his personal servant, willing to live contented with those whose habits and principles and feelings he understood? None, sir, but a criminal agitator, and one who does not understand the responsibility of his position when he undertakes to agitate matters of this kind.

I shall make no unkind remarks in reference to the senator from Ohio. He has disavowed that he had any knowledge of the resolution which was so justly commented upon by my friend from North Carolina this morning. Sir, this is enough for me. I never ask of a senator on this floor anything but a disavowal. He has said so, and, I believe it; and that is enough. Allow me to say, however, although he may not have the design of putting the torch to the temple of this confederacy, and becoming the incendiary himself, yet there is a crassa negligentia which, in using fire, may burn it down by his agency, though without his consent. How did that document come here? Through his hands. Did he revise it? He has said not; yet a paper of that kind was presented in the Senate of the United States, and an extract from it made and published in an abolition paper. How did that abolition paper get that extract? Not from the senator, of course, for he says not.

Mr. President, these are topics which have always touched me more deeply than anything like sectional power. As far as I am concerned, I must say that I do not expect this bill is to give us of the South anything, but merely to accommodate something like the sentiment of the South. It will, however, I hope, reconcile both the North and the South; and when that desirable end can be effected, why should it not be? The honorable senator from Wisconsin objects to the application of this law to territory acquired from France. Was he not willing to apply it to territory acquired from Mexico? What difference is there, except that the previous law in once case excluded, and in the other admitted slavery? Now, I believe that, under the provisions of this bill, and of the Utah and New Mexico bills, there will be a perfect carté-blanche given to the territorial legislature to legislate as they may think proper. I am willing, as I have said before, to trust discretion, and honestly, and good faith of the people upon whom we devolve this power; but I can never consent that they can take it of themselves, or that it belongs to them without our delegating it; for I think they are our deputies—limited, controllable deputies—not squatter sovereigns.

I am willing to say that the people of the territories of Nebraska and Kansas shall be deputed by Congress to pass such laws as may be within their constitutional competency to pass, and nothing more. Is not that an honorable, fair, liberal trust to an intelligent people? I am willing to trust them. I have been willing to trust them in Utah and New Mexico, where the Mexican law prevailed, and I am willing to trust them in Nebraska and Kansas, where the French law, according to the ideas of the gentleman, may possibly be revived.

But the gentleman said that he would sooner cut off his right arm than allow this institution to be revived in these territories, under the operation of the Spanish law, as I understood him. Now, I am willing to trust the territorial Legislatures to that extent; not, I must say, because I concur in the proposition that that delegation, that deputization, that  lieutenancy of power which we confer on them shall not be controllable. I think that justice to myself requires that I should say that, if their action was flagrantly in violation of the constitution of the United States, I should insist upon its being controlled. I have said, however, as a southern man, that I am willing to make this advance towards restoring something like the harmony which once existed in this glorious republic. I do not believe it is anything but an advance to the sentiment of honor. I do not believe it is going to confer on the South any power. The North have the power, and we cannot take it from them; but if they had magnanimity with it, they would not use the language of reproach and threats and contumely. The belief that a deluded people cannot be informed is a mistake—that a tainted sentiment may not be saved from the putrefaction.

The senator has told us what dire consequences are to come in the future. Let them come. The sooner I know my fate under the threats which are made here the better for me. I shall not live, perhaps, to see the day when they will be fulfilled; but I have those dear to me who may be affected by them; and if I were upon my death-bed, I should inculcate upon them the necessity of standing true to the lessons of self-respect. I would tell every child, I would tell every relations I have, to perish sooner than to submit to the injustice which many seem disposed to heap upon them. But, sir, enough of this. I have not the least idea that the northern people, if fairly appealed to, would confirm the verdict indicated by some of their representatives. I have confidence in the public mind when it is fairly enlightened by intelligence and free discussion. I have read history, sir, and I know that any one who has peculiar notions, and cannot elevate his mind above the prevailing sentiment of the day, is not capable of understanding the distinctions of society. I am not one of those who are so partial as to make an ex parte decision. I had not the least idea of making this speech, Mr. President, but when I thought it fair, after what my neighbor [Mr. WALKER] had said, to say that much.

Mr. WALKER.  Mr. President, I fear that hereafter when this debate shall be read, great injustice will be done to me, unless the senator from South Carolina Corrects his remarks; and I ask him to do it.

Mr. BUTLER.  Not one word, as far as I think now.

Mr. WALKER.  But I will satisfy the senator that, in justice to me, he ought to do it.

Mr. BUTLER.  Certainly, then, I would do so.

Mr. WALKER.  Any one who will read the senator’s remarks as he has delivered them, without reading what I said, would come to the conclusion that I had threatened him and his southern colleagues in the Senate. Now, what did I let fall from my lips which sounded like it? I, in the kindest terms which I knew how to use, spoke in warning to the South. I spoke in warning of what I thought might arise, and what I endeavored to express my great deprecation of, and which, as I said, I would greatly deplore. Yet the senator’s speech will appear as charging me with having stood up here and threatened men that, if they passed this bill, slavery should be abolished in the District of Columbia, the internal slave-trade between the States should be abolished, and the Wilmot proviso set up in the Territories. I never made any such threat, or intimated for an instant that I would be an advocate of any such thing. That, however, will be the construction of the senator’s speech.

Mr. BUTLER.  Then allow me to put that right. I wish to be understood exactly in this way; that I expressly said I did not believe it of him, but that he was one of those who was beating the drum to make others fight.

Mr. WALKER.  No; you did not say that at all, nor intimate it.

Mr. BUTLER.  I said that the gentleman did not undertake to say that he would do the things which he mentioned; for I do not believe he would. I do not undertake to say that the North would do them; but he said that you might introduce such a state of things as would induce the North to do them. Is not that so?

Mr. WALKER.  I said, what I shall continue to say, that I fear the result of this agitation being opened again. I fear it for myself—

Mr. BUTLER.  I am not afraid of it.

Mr. WALKER.  I fear it for those who are disposed to stand by the peace which was made in 1850. Why, sir, what harm was being done to our southern friends at the opening of this session of Congress? What agitation existed? Who was proposing any agitation? I am not threatening the honorable senator; God forbid that I should I never threaten. I know he is the last man to be moved by threats. He need not have posted of that here, for I know it was well as he.

Let me state another fact, however, to show how necessary it is for him to revise his remarks. Who that will read them will not suppose that I, who am his nearest neighbor in the Senate, expressly stated that I was willing to sacrifice my right arm rather than establish slavery, when in fact, I was simply quoting the language of Mr. Clay himself a slaveholder.

Mr. BUTLER.  Did you not adopt it?

Mr. WALKER.  You do not ask it expressly, I know, but you do impliedly.

SOURCES:  The Congressional Globe, Vol. 23 (1854), p. 292-3; The Daily Union, Washington, D. C., Thursday Morning, March 23, 1854, p. 8

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, July 2, 1863

A telegram this morning advises me of the death of General R. C. Hale, the brother of Mrs. Welles, at Reedsville in the County of Mifflin, Pennsylvania. He was the efficient Quartermaster-General of Pennsylvania, a good officer and capable and upright man. The public never had a more faithful and honest officer.

Met Sumner and went with him to the War Department. The President was there, and we read dispatches received from General Meade. There was a smart fight, but without results, near Gettysburg yesterday. A rumor is here that we have captured six thousand prisoners, and on calling again this evening at the War Department I saw a telegram which confirms it. General Reynolds is reported killed. The tone of Meade's dispatch is good.

Met the elder Blair this evening at his son's, the Postmaster-General. The old gentleman has been compelled to leave his pleasant home at Silver Spring, his house being in range of fire and Rebel raiders at his door. He tells me McClellan wrote Stanton after the seven days' fight near Richmond that he (Stanton) had sacrificed that army. Stanton replied cringingly, and in a most supplicating manner, assuring McClellan he, Stanton, was his true friend. Mr. F. P. Blair assures me he has seen the letters. He also says he has positive, unequivocal testimony that Stanton acted with the Secessionists early in the War and favored a division of the Union. He mentions a conversation at John Lee's house, where Stanton set forth the advantages that would follow from a division.

Mr. Montgomery Blair said Stanton was talking Secession to one class, and holding different language to another; that while in Buchanan's Cabinet he communicated Toucey's treason to Jake Howard and secretly urged the arrest of Toucey. During the winter of 1860 and 1861, Stanton was betraying the Buchanan Administration to Seward, disclosing its condition and secrets, and that for his treachery to his then associates and his becoming the tool of Seward, he was finally brought into the present Cabinet.

These things I have heard from others also, and there have been some facts and circumstances to corroborate them within my own knowledge. Mr. Seward, who has no very strong convictions and will never sacrifice his life for an opinion, had no belief that the insurrection would be serious or of long continuance. Familiar with the fierce denunciations and contentions of parties in New York, where he had, from his prominent position and strong adherents, been accustomed to excite and direct, and then modify, the excesses roused by anti-Masonry and anti-rent outbreaks by pliable and liberal action, he entertained no doubt that he should have equal success in bringing about a satisfactory result in national affairs by meeting exaction with concessions. He was strengthened in this by the fact that there was no adequate cause for a civil war, or for the inflammatory, excited, and acrimonious language which flowed from his heated associates in Congress. Through the infidelity of Stanton he learned the feelings and designs of the Buchanan Administration, which were not of the ultra character of the more impassioned Secession leaders. One of the Cabinet already paid court to him; Dix¹ and some others he knew were not disunionists; and, never wanting faith in his own skill and management, he intended, if his opponents would not go with him, as the last alternative to go with them and call a convention to remodel the Constitution. Until some weeks after Mr. Lincoln's inauguration Seward never doubted that he could by some expedient — a convention or otherwise — allay the storm. Some who ultimately went into the Rebellion also hoped it. Both he and they overestimated his power and influence. Stanton in the winter of 1861 whispered in his ear state secrets, it was understood, because Seward was to be first in the Cabinet of Lincoln, who was already elected. The Blairs charge Stanton with infidelity to party and to country from mere selfish considerations, and with being by nature treacherous and wholly unreliable. Were any overwhelming adversity to befall the country, they look upon him as ready to betray it.

______________

¹ John A. Dix, Secretary of the Treasury In 1861.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 354-6

Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott to Abraham Lincoln, March 12, 1861

The President has done me the honor to propose certain military questions, concerning Fort Sumter to which he desires replies.

“1st.” To what point of time can Major Anderson maintain his position at Fort Sumter without fresh supplies or reinforcements?

Answer. In respect to subsistence he has bread, flour, and rice for about 26 days, and salt meat (pork) for about forty eight days. Without additional supplies of provisions he may hold out some forty days without much suffering from hunger.

The besiegers are understood to be about 3,500 men, now somewhat disciplined, and they have four powerful batteries on land, and one floating battery, all mounting guns and mortars of large calibre and of the best patterns, bearing on Fort Sumter. Supposing Major Anderson not to be reinforced and the means of the assailants to be skilfully and vigorously employed – Fort Sumter being defended by less than 100 men, including common laborers and musicians – it might be taken, at any time, by a single assault, and easily, if previously harassed, perseveringly, for many days and nights; the assailants having the ability (by the force of numbers) of converting one out of every three or four of those demonstrations, into a real attack.

“2d.” Can you, with all the means now in your control, supply or reinforce Fort Sumter within the period you specify as the time, within which Major Anderson may hold out without fresh supplies?”

Answer. No, not within many months; But not to speak of October or November, when the proposition was first made, and repeated, in writing, the third time, December 30th – it would have been easy to reinforce Fort Sumter, with war vessels, down to about the 12th of February. In this long delay, twice that time, Fort Moultrie has been re-armed and greatly strengthened, in every way, and many powerful new land batteries (besides rafts) have been constructed. Hulks have also been sunk in the principal channel, so as to render access to Fort Sumter, from the sea, impractical, without first carrying all the batteries of the secessionists. The difficulty of reinforcing has thus, by delay, been increased 1[0] or 12 fold. First, the late President refused to allow any attempt to be made, because he was holding negotiations with South Carolina Commissioners. Afterwards, Secretary Holt and myself endeavored to obtain a ship of war for the purpose; but failing in this we were obliged to employ the steamer Star of the West. That vessel, but for the hesitation of the commander, might then have landed, it is generally believed, men and subsistence. That attempt having failed, I next, before the late Cabinet, submitted, orally, either that succor be sent by ships of war, fighting their way to the Fort, or, that Major Anderson should ameliorate his condition by the muzzles of his guns; that is, enforcing supplies by bombardment, and by bringing-to merchant vessels and helping himself (giving orders for payment) or else should be allowed to surrender, as, sooner or later, had then become inevitable.

But before any resolution was taken – the late Secretary of the Navy making difficulties about the want of suitable vessels; – another commissioner from South Carolina arrived, causing further delay. When that had passed away, Secretaries Holt & Toucy, Capt. Ward of the Navy and myself, with the knowledge of President Buchanan, settled upon the employment, under the Captain (who was eager for the expedition) of four or more small steamers belonging to the Coast Survey.- At that time, I have no doubt Captain Ward would have suceeded with all his vessels. But he was kept back by something like a truce established between the late President and a number of principal seceders, here, in the Senate, & from South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana &c., and this truce continued to the termination of that administration. That plan and all others like it, are now pronounced, from the change of circumstances, impracticable, by Major Anderson Captain Foster and all the other officers of the Fort, as well as by Brig. General Totten, Chief of the Corps of Engineers: and, in this opinion, I fully concur. The three or four steamers would have been obliged to attempt to make their way past the hostile batteries in an obstructed channel. Possibly one of them might have reached the fort, with (being small) a few days subsistence, but would, certainly probably, have been destroyed on arriving at the entrance (by the concentrated fire of three or four powerful batteries), before landing a man or a ration. In this opinion Captain Ward finally concurred.

“3d.” If I could not supply or reinforce Fort Sumter, within the time specified, with all the means in my control, then what amount of means and of what description, in addition to that already at my control, would enable me to supply and reinforce the fortress within that time.”

Answer. I should need a fleet of war vessels and transports which, in the scattered disposition of the Navy (as understood) could not be collected in less than four months; – 5,000 additional regular troops, and 20,000 volunteers – that is, a force sufficient to take all the batteries both in the harbour (including Ft. Moultrie) as well as in the approach or outer bay. To raise, organize and discipline such an army (not to speak of necessary legislation by Congress, not now in session) would require from six to eight months. As a practical military question, the time for succoring Fort Sumter, with any means at hand, had passed away nearly a month ago. Since then a surrender under assault, or from starvation, has been merely a question of time.

It is, therefore, my opinion and advice that Major Anderson be instructed to evacuate the Fort – so long gallantly held by him and his companions – immediately on procuring suitable water transportation, and that he embark, with his command, for New York.

I have the honor to return, herewith, the reports and communications of Major Anderson and his officers, submitted to me by the President. These papers of themselves demonstrate how the Fort has become untenable during the delays I have described above.

Respectfully Submitted.

Winfield Scott.

Head Qrs. of the Army

Washington, March 12, 1861.

SOURCE: Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Jeremiah S. Black to James Buchanan, January 22, 1861

Franklin Row, January 22, 1861.

my Dear Mr. President: A slight attack of rheumatism will prevent me from leaving my room to-day, and of course I shall not be at the Cabinet meeting. But the deep interest I feel in the result of your deliberations induces me to write this note, not to be laid before the heads of Departments, but for your own eye alone. If I am wrong in my interpretation of the past or in my expectations concerning the future, you can correct me as well as anybody else, and if I am right the suggestions I make may possibly be of some value.

You must be aware that the possession of this city is absolutely essential to the ultimate designs of the Secessionists. They can establish a Southern Confederacy with the Capital of the Union in their hands, and without it all the more important part of their scheme is bound to fail. If they can take it and do not take it, they are fools. Knowing them, as I do, to be men of ability and practical good sense, not likely to omit that which is necessary to forward the ends which they are aiming at, I take it for granted that they have their eye fixed upon Washington. To prove their desire to take it requires no evidence at all beyond the intrinsic probability of the fact itself. The affirmative presumption is so strong that he who denies it is bound to establish the negative. But there are additional and very numerous circumstances tending to show that a conspiracy to that effect has been actually formed, and that large numbers of persons are deeply and busily engaged in bringing the plot to a head at what they conceive to be the proper time. I do not mean now to enumerate all the facts. They form a body of circumstantial evidence that is overwhelming and irresistible. I know that you do not believe this, or did not when I saw you last. Your incredulity seemed then to be founded upon the assurances of certain outside persons in whom you confided, that nothing of that kind was in contemplation. The mere opinion of those persons is worth nothing apart from their own personal knowledge. They can have no personal knowledge unless they are themselves apart of the conspiracy. In the latter case fidelity to their fellows makes treachery to you a sort of moral necessity. In short, the mere declarations of uninformed persons who are not in the secrets of the Secessionists amount to very little, and well informed persons who are admitted to their counsels can hardly be expected to communicate their schemes to the head of the nation.

Suppose it to be doubtful whether any hostile intentions against the Capital are entertained, what is the duty of the administration? Shall we be prepared for the worst, or leave the public interests unguarded, so that the “logic of events” may demonstrate our folly? Preparation can do no possible harm in any event, and in the event which to me seems most likely, it is the country's only chance of salvation.

Let us not forget the lessons we have learned in the past three months. The gross impostures practiced upon us recently ought to make us very slow about believing assurances or taking advice which comes from the enemies of the Union. Timeo Danaos. They told us that civil war would be the result of manning the forts at Charleston. Now they laugh at all who believed that prophecy. They told us about the eight regiments of artillery in South Carolina; the twenty thousand other troops; the battery that could take Castle Pinckney; the impossibility of occupying Fort Sumter; that the Brooklyn was the only ship of war fit to be sent down there, and that she could not cross the bar; that the little battery on Morris Island would prevent a ship from going up the channel; that South Carolina would not make war upon us if we were weak, but would if we should make ourselves strong — all these things were taken for true, and you know how disastrous the consequences were, not merely to the credit of the administration, but to the Union itself,

“Upon whose property and most dear life a damn'd defeat was made.”

I understand that the Secretary of the Navy has promised the Secessionists that he will withdraw the ships from the Florida and Alabama harbors. I hope and believe that he has no authority from you to make such promise: and if he has done it of his own head, I am sure he will receive a signal rebuke. You know how much I honor and respect Toucey, but I confess I find it a little difficult to forgive him for letting it be understood that the Brooklyn could not get into the harbor of Charleston; and the order which he gave to that ship, by which her commander felt himself compelled, after he was in sight of Fort Sumter, not to go in, is making this Government the laughter and derision of the world.

I hope it will soon be decided what our policy is to be, with reference to the relief of Major Anderson. There certainly would be no hurry about it, if it were not for the fact that the South Carolinians are increasing their means of resistance every day, and this increase may be such as to make delay fatal to his safety. But how that is I do not pretend to know at present. Certainly, however, the facts ought to be ascertained.

In the forty days and forty nights yet remaining to this administration, responsibilities may be crowded greater than those which are usually incident to four years in more quiet times. I solemnly believe that you can hold this revolution in check, and so completely put the calculations of its leaders out of joint that it will subside after a time into peace and harmony. On the other hand, by leaving the Government an easy prey, the spoilers will be tempted beyond their power of resistance, and they will get such an advantage as will bring upon the country a whole illiad of woes. The short official race which yet remains to us, must be run before a cloud of witnesses, and to win we must cast aside every weight, and the sin of state-craft which doth so easily beset us, and look simply upon our duty and the performance of it as the only prize of our high calling.

I am free to admit that in this hasty note I may have been much mistaken. I do not claim to be more zealous in the public service nor more patriotic than my neighbors; certainly not wiser than my colleagues. To your better judgment I defer implicitly. But my absence from the Council to-day annoyed me, supposing, as I did, that some of the matters here referred to might be discussed in it. I took this mode of saying what I probably would have said if I had been with you.

I am, most respectfully yours, etc.

The President.

SOURCE: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 241-3

James Buchanan to Jacob Thompson, January 9, 1861

Washington, 9th January, 1861.

Sir: I have received and accepted your resignation on yesterday of the office of Secretary of the Interior.

On Monday evening, 31 December, 1860, I suspended the orders which had been issued by the War and Navy Departments to send the Brooklyn with reinforcements to Fort Sumter. Of this I informed you on the same evening. I stated to you my reason for this suspension, which you knew, from its nature, would be speedily removed. In consequence of your request, however, I promised that these orders should not be renewed “without being previously considered and decided in Cabinet.”

This promise was faithfully observed on my part. In order to carry it into effect, I called a special Cabinet meeting on Wednesday, 2 January, 1861, in which the question of sending reinforcements to Fort Sumter was amply discussed both by yourself and others. The decided majority of opinions was against you. At this moment the answer of the South Carolina “Commissioners” to my communication to them of the 31st December was received and read. It produced much indignation among the members of the Cabinet. After a further brief conversation I employed the following language: “It is now all over, and reinforcements must be sent.” Judge Black said, at the moment of my decision, that after this letter the Cabinet would be unanimous, and I heard no dissenting voice. Indeed, the spirit and tone of the letter left no doubt on my mind that Fort Sumter would be immediately attacked, and hence the necessity of sending reinforcements thither without delay.

Whilst you admit “that on Wednesday, January 2d, this subject was again discussed in Cabinet,” you say, “but certainly no conclusion was reached, and the War Department was not justified in ordering reinforcements without something [more] than was then said.” You are certainly mistaken in alleging that “no conclusion was reached.” In this your recollection is entirely different from that of your four oldest colleagues in the Cabinet. Indeed, my language was so unmistakable, that the Secretaries of War and the Navy proceeded to act upon it without any further intercourse with myself than what you heard or might have heard me say. You had been so emphatic in opposing these reinforcements, that I thought you would resign in consequence of my decision. I deeply regret that you have been mistaken in point of fact, though I firmly believe honestly mistaken. Still, it is certain you have not the less been mistaken.

Yours very respectfully,

James Buchanan.

Hon. JACOB THOMPSON.

SOURCE: John Bassett More, Editor, The Works of James Buchanan, Volume 11, p. 100-1; Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 181-2

James Buchanan to Lewis Cass, December 15, 1860*

Washington, December 15, 1860.

Sir:

I have received your resignation of the office of Secretary of State with surprise and regret. After we had passed through nearly the whole term of the administration with mutual and cordial friendship and regard, I had cherished the earnest hope that nothing might occur to disturb our official relations until its end. You have decided differently; and I have no right to complain.

I must express my gratification at your concurrence with the general principles laid down in my late message, and your appreciation, “with warm sympathy, of its patriotic appeals and suggestions.” This I value very highly; and I rejoice that we concur in the opinion that Congress does not possess the power under the Constitution to coerce a State by force of arms to remain in the Confederacy.

The question on which we unfortunately differ is that of ordering a detachment of the army and navy to Charleston, and is correctly stated in your letter of resignation. I do not intend to argue this question. Suffice it to say that your remarks upon the subject were heard by myself and the Cabinet with all the respect due to your high position, your long experience, and your unblemished character; but they failed to convince us of the necessity and propriety, under existing circumstances, of adopting such a measure. The Secretaries of War and of the Navy, through whom the orders must have issued to reinforce the forts, did not concur in your views; and whilst the whole responsibility for the refusal rested upon myself, they were the members of the Cabinet more directly interested. You may have judged correctly on this important question, and your opinion is entitled to grave consideration; but, under my convictions of duty, and believing as I do that no present necessity exists for a resort to force for the protection of the public property, it was impossible for me to have risked a collision of arms in the harbor of Charleston, and thereby defeated the reasonable hopes which I cherish of the final triumph of the Constitution and the Union.

I have only to add that you will take with you into retirement my heartfelt wishes that the evening of your days may be prosperous and happy.

Very respectfully yours,

James Buchanan.

Hon. Lewis Cass.

_______________

* Buchanan Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania; S. Ex. Doc. 7, 41 Cong. 1 Sess. 2; Curtis's Buchanan, II. 398.

SOURCES: John Bassett More, Editor, The Works of James Buchanan, Volume 11, p. 60-1; Cass Canfield, General Lewis Cass 1782-1866, p. 37-41

Diary of Edward Bates, April 22, 1862

Judge Black⁶ dined with me today. Talked very freely about the latter weeks of Buchanan's adm[inistratio]n. Cobb,⁷ Floyd,⁸ Thompson⁹ &c[.]  Thinks "Jake Thompson" as honest a man as he ever knew — Was very slow to believe in F[loyd]'s rascality but had finally to come to it.

Prest. B.[uchanan] said he would rather suffer death by torture than suffer S.[outh] C.[arolina] to take the Forts in Charleston harbor — and ordered them to be supplied — Floyd pretended to agree to it, but did not do it.

Trescott¹⁰ (Asst. Secy of state) gave information that Floyd had promised the Carolinians that it should no[t] be done. B.[uchanan]  insisted, F.[loyd] flew into arage [sic] and spoke violently and went out in a huff. The Prest then asked Black to go and tell F.[loyd] that he must resign. He, Black, refused — Then some other, Toucey,¹¹ bore the message, and F. [loyd] resigned giving for reason, that he could, no longer, consistently with his honor, serve with such an adm[inistratio]n.! Mr. Black agreed with me that old Buck ought to have kicked him out — Black call[e]d it "spitting in the Presfs face and then resigning^ " Still the Prest. did not strengthen the Forts, and sunk [sic] so low as to assign the reason that he had given the Carolinians reason to think that he wd. not,¹² and because he feared that  war wd. come in his time, if he did —

At night at Senator Wade's¹³ met i. a. Mr. Gurley¹⁴ of Ohio, who is proud of a speech he made some time ago denouncing Genl. McClellan's tardiness. The speech, it seems, has been printed both in England and France, and (as Mr. G[urley] thinks) had great influence in preventing the Govts, both of England and France from acknowledging the C.[onfederate] S.[tates of] A[merica].

Mr. G.[urley] is very open in denouncing Genl. McClellan, believes him a traitor and that he will continue to have his own army beaten, if possible — Says that just before his appointment to command he declared, in presence of his Physician (Dr. [  ] — the famous Homeopath) that the South was right and he wd. never fight against it — that the Southern Democracy had always governed the country and ought to govern it[.]  Gu[r]ley evidently believe[s] him a traitor[.]

__________

⁶ Supra, Oct. 28, 1859, note 22.

⁷ Supra, Sept. 4, 1860, note 86.

⁸ Supra, Dec. 3, 1859, note 11.

⁹ Jacob Thompson of Mississippi: Democratic congressman, 1839-1851; secretary of the Interior, 1857-1861; governor of Mississippi, 1862-1864; inspector-general of the Confederate Army, 1864; confidential agent in Canada, 1864-1865.

¹⁰ William H. Trescot of Charleston, South Carolina: secretary of Legation in London, 1852-1860; assistant secretary of State, 1860-1861; member of the South Carolina Legislature; officer in the Confederate Army; holder of various minor diplomatic posts, 1876-1889.

¹¹ Isaac Toucey of Hartford, Connecticut: Democratic congressman, 1835-1839; governor of Connecticut, 1847 ; U. S. attorney-general, 1848-1849 ; U. S. senator, 1852-1857; secretary of the Navy under Buchanan, 1857-1861.

¹² On December 8 and 10, 1860, Buchanan had had two interviews with McQueen, Miles, and Bonham, representatives of South Carolina, in which they had assured him that Sumter would not be fired upon so long as Buchanan did not alter the status quo. The President apparently promised nothing, but none the less regarded this interview as creating a tacit understanding between him and the South Carolinians.

¹³ Supra, Aug. 10, 1859, note 77.

¹⁴ John A. Gurley: Universalist minister, 1835-1838; editor of the Cincinnati Star and Sentinel later called the Star in the West, 1838-1854; now a Republican congressman, 1859-1863, who was defeated for reelection in 1862.

SOURCE: Howard K. Beale, Editor, The Diary of Edward Bates, published in The Annual Report Of The American Historical Association For The Year 1930 Volume 4, p. 252-3