James Buchanan to the Commissioners of the State of South Carolina, December 30, 1860

Washington City, 30th December, 1860.

Gentlemen: I have the honor to receive your communication of 28th inst., together with a copy of your “full powers from the Convention of the People of South Carolina,” authorising you to treat with the Government of the United States on various important subjects therein mentioned, and also a copy of the Ordinance bearing date on the 20th instant, declaring that “the Union now subsisting between South Carolina and other States under the name of ‘the United States of America,’ is hereby dissolved.”

In answer to this communication, I have to say, that my position as President of the United States was clearly defined in the message to Congress of the 3d instant. In that I stated that, “apart from the execution of the laws, so far as this may be practicable, the Executive has no authority to decide what shall be the relations between the Federal Government and South Carolina. He has been invested with no such discretion. He possesses no power to change the relations heretofore existing between them, much less to acknowledge the independence of that State. This would be to invest a mere executive officer with the power of recognizing the dissolution of the Confederacy among our thirty-three sovereign States. It bears no resemblance to the recognition of a foreign de facto government — involving no such responsibility. Any attempt to do this would, on his part, be a naked act of usurpation. It is, therefore, my duty to submit to Congress the whole question, in all its bearings.”

Such is my opinion still. I could, therefore, meet you only as private gentlemen of the highest character, and was entirely willing to communicate to Congress any proposition you might have to make to that body upon the subject. Of this you were well aware. It was my earnest desire, that such a disposition might he made of the whole subject by Congress, who alone possess the power, as to prevent the inauguration of a civil war between the parties in regard to the possession of the Federal Forts in the harbor of Charleston; and I therefore deeply regret, that, in your opinion, “the events of the last twenty-four hours render this impossible.” In conclusion, you urge upon me “the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston,” stating that, “under present circumstances, they are a standing menace which renders negotiation impossible, and as our recent experience shows, threatens speedily to bring to a bloody issue, questions which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment.”

The reason for this change in your position is, that since your arrival in Washington, “an officer of the United States, acting as we (you) are assured, not only without, but against your (my) orders, has dismantled one fort and occupied another, thus altering, to a most important extent, the condition of affairs under which we (you) came.” You also allege that you came here “the representatives of an authority which could, at any time, within the past sixty days have taken possession of the forts in Charleston harbor, but which, upon pledges given in a manner that we (you) cannot doubt, determined to trust to your (my) honor  rather than to its own power.”

This brings me to a consideration of the nature of those alleged pledges, and in what manner they have been observed. In my message of the third of December last, I stated, in regard to the property of the United States in South Carolina, that it “has been purchased for a fair equivalent ‘by the consent of the Legislature of the State,’ ‘for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals,’ &c, and over these the authority ‘to exercise exclusive legislation’ has been expressly granted by the Constitution to Congress. It is not believed that any attempt will be made to expel the United States from this property by force; but if in this I should prove to be mistaken, the officer in command of the forts has received orders to act strictly on the defensive. In such a contingency, the responsibility for consequences would rightfully rest upon the heads of the assailants.” This being the condition of the parties, on Saturday, 8th December, four of the representatives from South Carolina called upon me and requested an interview. We had an earnest conversation on the subject of these forts, and the best means of preventing a collision between the parties for the purpose of sparing the effusion of blood. I suggested, for prudential reasons, that it would be best to put in writing what they said to me verbally. They did so accordingly, and on Monday morning, the 10th instant, three of them presented to me a paper signed by all the representatives from South Carolina, with a single exception, of which the following is a copy:

• Commissioners of the State of South Carolina to James Buchanan, December 9, 1860

And here I must, in justice to myself, remark, that at the time the paper was presented to me, I objected to the word “provided,” as it might be construed into an agreement, on my part, which I never would make. They said that nothing was farther from their intention — they did not so understand it, and I should not so consider it. It is evident they could enter into no reciprocal agreement with me on the subject. They did not profess to have authority to do this, and were acting in their individual character. I considered it as nothing more, in effect, than the promise of highly honorable gentlemen to exert their influence for the purpose expressed. The event has proven that they have faithfully kept this promise, although I have never since received a line from any one of them, or from any member of the Convention, on the subject. It is well known that it was my determination, and this I freely expressed, not to reinforce the forts in the harbor, and thus produce a collision, until they had been actually attacked, or until I had certain evidence that they were about to be attacked. This paper I received most cordially, and considered it as a happy omen that peace might still be preserved, and that time might thus be gained for reflection. This is the whole foundation for the alleged pledge.

But I acted in the same manner I would have done had I entered into a positive and formal agreement with parties capable of contracting, although such an agreement would have been, on my part, from the nature of my official duties, impossible.

The world knows that I have never sent any reinforcements to the forts in Charleston harbor, and I have certainly never authorized any change to be made “in their relative military status.”

Bearing upon this subject, I refer you to an order issued by the Secretary of War, on the 11th inst., to Major Anderson, but not brought to my notice until the 21st instant.' It is as follows:

Memorandum of verbal instructions to Major Anderson,

1st Artillery, Commanding Fort Moultrie, S. C.

You are aware of the great anxiety of the Secretary of War that a collision of the troops with the people of this State shall be avoided, and of his studied determination to pursue a course with reference to the military force and forts in this harbor, which shall guard against such a collision. He has, therefore, carefully abstained from increasing the force at this point, or taking any measures which might add to the present excited state of the public mind, or which would throw any doubt on the confidence he feels that South Carolina will not attempt by violence to obtain possession of the public works, or interfere with their occupancy. But as the counsel and acts of rash and impulsive persons may possibly disappoint these expectations of the Government, he deems it proper that you should be prepared with instructions to meet so unhappy a contingency. He has, therefore, directed me, verbally, to give you such instructions.

You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression; and, for that reason, you are not, without evident and imminent necessity, to take up any position which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile attitude; but you are to hold possession of the forts in this harbor, and, if attacked, you are to defend yourself to the last extremity. The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts; but an attack on, or attempt to take possession of either of them, will be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them which you may deem most proper, to increase its power of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar defensive steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act.

D. P. BUTLER, Assistant Adjutant General.

Fort Moultrie, S. C, Dec. 11, 1860.

This is in conformity to my instructions to Major Buell.

JOHN B. FLOYD, Secretary of War.

These were the last instructions transmitted to Major Anderson before his removal to Fort Sumter, with a single exception in regard to a particular which does not, in any degree, affect the present question. Under these circumstances, it is clear that Major Anderson acted upon his own responsibility, and without authority, unless, indeed, he had “tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act,” on the part of the authorities of South Carolina, which has not yet been alleged. Still, he is a brave and honorable officer; and justice requires that he should not be condemned without a fair hearing.

Be this as it may, when I learned that Major Anderson had left Fort Moultrie, and proceeded to Fort Sumter, my first promptings were to command him to return to his former position, and there to await the contingencies presented in his instructions. This could only have been done, with any degree of safety to the command, by the concurrence of the South Carolina authorities. But, before any steps could possibly have been taken in this direction, we received information, dated on the 28th instant, that “the Palmetto flag floated out to the breeze at Castle Pinckney, and a large military force went over last night (the 27th) to Fort Moultrie.” Thus the authorities of South Carolina, without waiting or asking for any explanation, and doubtless believing, as you have expressed it, that the officer had acted not only without, but against my orders, on the very next day after the night when the removal was made, seized, by a military force, two of the three federal forts in the harbor of Charleston, and have covered them under their own flag, instead of that of the United States. At this gloomy period of our history, startling events succeed each other rapidly. On the very day (the 27th instant) that possession of these two forts was taken, the Palmetto flag was raised over the federal Custom House and Post Office in Charleston; and, on the same day, every officer of the Customs — Collector, Naval Officers, Surveyor and Appraisers — resigned their offices. And this, although it was well known, from the language of my message, that, as an executive officer, I felt myself bound to collect the revenue at the port of Charleston under the existing laws. In the harbor of Charleston, we now find three forts confronting each other, over all of which the federal flag floated only four days ago; but now, over two of them, this flag has been supplanted, and the Palmetto flag has been substituted in its stead. It is, under all these circumstances, that I am urged immediately to withdraw the troops from the harbor of Charleston, and am informed that without this, negotiation is impossible. This I cannot do; this I will not do. Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible contingency. No allusion to it had ever been made in any communication between myself and any human being. But the inference is, that I am bound to withdraw the troops from the only fort remaining in the possession of the United States in the harbor of Charleston, because the officer then in command of all the forts thought proper, without instructions, to change his position from one of them to another. I cannot admit the justice of any such inference.

At this point of writing, I have received information, by telegram, from Captain Humphreys, in command of the Arsenal at Charleston, “that it has to-day (Sunday, the 30th) been taken by force of arms.” It is estimated that the munitions of war belonging to the United States in this Arsenal are worth half a million of dollars.

Comment is needless. After this information, I have only to add, that, whilst it is my duty to defend Fort Sumter, as a portion of the public property of the United States against hostile attacks from whatever quarter they may come, by such means as I may possess for this purpose, I do not perceive how such a defence can be construed into a menace against the City of Charleston.

With great personal regard, I remain

Yours, very respectfully,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

To Honorable

Robert W. Barnwell,

James H. Adams,

James L. Orr.

SOURCE: The Correspondence Between the Commissioners of the State of So. Ca. to the Government at Washington and the President of the United States, p. 5-11

Memorandum of Verbal Instructions to Major Anderson, First Artillery, Commanding Fort Moultrie, South Carolina, December 11, 1860

FORT MOULTRIE, S.C., December 11, 1860.

Memorandum of verbal instructions to Major Anderson, First Artillery, commanding at Fort Moultrie, S.C.

You are aware of the great anxiety of the Secretary of War that a collision-of the troops with the people of this State shall be avoided, and of his studied determination to pursue a course with reference to the military force and forts in this harbor which shall guard against such a collision. He has therefore carefully abstained from increasing the force at this point, or taking any measures which might add to the present excited state of the public mind, or which would throw any doubt on the confidence he feels that South Carolina will not attempt, by violence, to obtain possession of the public works or interfere with their occupancy. But as the counsel and acts of rash and impulsive persons may possibly disappoint those expectations of the Government, he deems it proper that you should be prepared with instructions to meet so unhappy a contingency. He has therefore directed me verbally to give you such instructions.*

You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression; and for that reason you are not, without evident and imminent necessity, to take up any position which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile attitude. But you are to hold possession of the forts in this harbor, and if attacked you are to defend yourself to the last extremity. The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts, but an attack on or attempt to take possession of any one of them will be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them which you may deem most proper to increase its power of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act.

 D.C. BUELL,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

_______________

* See also Floyd to Anderson, December 21, 1860, and Holt to Anderson, February 23, 1860, post.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 89-90;  Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 73; The Correspondence Between the Commissioners of the State of So. Ca. to the Government at Washington and the President of the United States, p. 8-9

Result Of Gustavus V. Fox's Plan For Reinforcing Fort Sumpter; In His Own Writing

My plan for reinforcing Fort Sumpter was this—

From the outer edge of the bar to Sumpter through the swash channel it is four miles in a straight line, with no shoal spots less than nine feet at high water. The batteries of the enemy on Morris and Sullivan Islands are one and one third of a mile distant from each other, between which the reinforcements must pass.

I proposed to anchor three small men of war at the entrance of the swash channel to afford a safe base of operations. The soldiers and provisions to be taken down in a large steamer, having on board boats for the whole, with three hundred sailors, and accompanied with three steam tugs having a draft of only six feet of water. The entrance to be effected at night with the tugs or boats as circumstances might dictate.

Rough weather would render the attempt impossible in boats but favorable for tugs. Whereas a fine clear night would be more favorable for the smaller objects — boats. This plan was brought to the Pres^ts notice early in March and its practicability assured by his own convictions and concurrent naval testimony.

The military authorities seemed to think it impossible to pass their batteries, but assured the Pres^t that if reinforcements and provisions were thrown in the fort it could not be taken.

I visited Major Anderson on the 21st of March under an open order from the War Dpt, which was shown to Govr Pickens who gave me a pass, without restriction, and I confined my conversation with Major Anderson entirely to objects embraced in that order. Notwithstanding the earnest desire of the Pres^t to reinforce and provision Fort Sumpter, Mr. Seward seems to have been under obligations to oppose the attempt, and his great influence over Genl Scott, brought the military power against the plan.

As Major Anderson's supplies would be utterly exhausted on the 15th of April every effort was made by some strong hand to delay the expedition until its supporters must give it up. The last card was to send for a Union man from the Virginia Convention and say to him that Sumpter would be evacuated at once if the Union people, who were in a majority in the Convention, would adjourn it. This Union man declined the proposition and made so many preposterous demands  that the Pres^t decided the expedition should go forward. The order was given to me late the night of April 4th. The 5th was consumed in getting to N. York, and I sailed the 8th, leaving only three days to get up and dispatch the expedition. Most of those who had favored the expedition and in whom I depended for assistance to fit it out, abandoned it at this period as too late.

Unwilling to mention to the Pres^t the misgivings of those around me I determined to go forward alone.

Instead of the 300 sailors I asked for on board the steamer, the Sec'y of the Navy proposed to send down the Powhatan stm'r of war with that number of men, which was satisfactory to me. Therefore I sailed in the Baltic the 8th inst. without the sailors. The Powhatan having sailed the 6th. The revenue cutter H. Lane, the 8th, the Pawnee the 9th and the Pocahontas the 10th. The Baltic and Pawnee arrived off Charleston the 12th inst. after hostilities had commenced. The H. Lane the evening previous, and the Pocahontas the 13th at the surrender of Sumpter. The passage to Charleston and the day and night of our arrival was severe weather, preventing the tugs reaching the rendezvous. The next day, the 13th inst, seeing no part of my proposed means of effecting an entrance had arrived, a schooner loaded with ice was captured and means undertaken to effect an entrance in her the following night, but at 8 A.M. the wood work of the fort was set on fire by hot shot and by 3 P.M. the place was rendered untenable, and consequently it was surrendered.

The defects of the fort, and its injuries, such as were never anticipated by the engineers, are such, that had the place been provisioned and reinforced, the final result would have been delayed but a few days. The Powhatan, with her sailors, was the whole strength of my proposed plan because both tugs and boats were to be manned by these sailors. Yet the Powhatan sailed from N. York the 6th two days before I did, with an officer who bore an order from the Pres^t of the U. S. to carry her directly to Pensacola. Her regular Captn having the orders of the Navy Dept to cooperate with me at Charleston. This order of the Pres^t was unknown to the war or navy departments and was signed by him in ignorance that the Powhatan was one of my vessels. She was sent off on an expedition got up by the Sec'y of State who thus interfered with the other depts as the last hope of preventing the reinforcing of Sumpter. And it did prevent it, and I had the mortification of witnessing the surrender of the Fort with no part of my proposed plan arrived, in fact deprived by treachery of all power of accomplishing it, and losing reputation with the general public for the failure because I cannot state the facts at this crisis of our affairs without injury to the Govt.

The Charleston people assumed that the merchant vessels detained outside of their bar were the various expeditions which had sailed from N. York about the period of our departure and therefore they concentrated a large force on the islands and abused us for not landing and attacking the batteries. But they were vessels detained by the bombardment. Our military force consisted of 200 recruits of no earthly use to Fort Sumpter in such an emergency because they were undrilled. The S. C. authorities had 13,000. I believe every officer of the army or navy present were entirely satisfied of the feasibility of either of my plans.

In fact their fire upon Sumpter was precipitated because they intercepted my plan and were assured by their best naval authority that it was perfectly practicable.

G. V. Fox.

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 38-41

Montgomery Blair to Gustavus V. Fox, April 26, 1861

Dear Fox

I have not written you because it was easy for you to understand what I thought of the Fort Sumpter business and not agreeable for me to express what I thought. We are now fairly launched in a big war and I think you can have a command if you want one. A proposition was made yesterday to convert some merchant vessels into armed ships and during the talk the President said he wanted you to have a command tho you did not get into Fort Sumpter. He thought very highly of you. We propose to take on naval volunteers as well as Soldier volunteers.

I am warring on fogyism of all kinds, I think the best thing now to be done is to disband both army and navy and reconstruct. We shall never get on I am afraid with the present officers.

Apl 26. I wrote the above some days ago and was disturbed and have not had an opportunity to resume till this moment. In the mean time last night I have yours of 20th. I shall mention its contents to Welles and Lincoln. I gave yrs from the Baltic both to Welles and Seward to read. Seward read a part of it and handed it back without remark. Welles said when he handed it back that you knew he supposed that he had nothing to do with the diversion of the Powhatan from her Charleston mission. But the President has never had an opportunity to read or talk about the affair, except on the occasion mentioned, and indeed events of such magnitude are crowding on us that Sumpter and Anderson are not thought of for the moment. I want you here very much to help us along, and must try and manage it. I see however that Com. Paulding is mightily set up himself and wants nobody in the Dept, but himself. I think I will fix his flint shortly.

Yrs truly

M. Blair     

Wash. Apl 26, 1861

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 37-8

Commissioners of the State of South Carolina to James Buchanan, December 28, 1860

Washington, 28th December, 1860.

Sir: We have the honor to transmit to you a copy of the full powers from the Convention of the People of South Carolina, under which we are “authorized and empowered to treat with the Government of the United States for the delivery of the forts, magazines, light houses and other real estate, with their appurtenances, within the limits of South Carolina, and also for an apportionment of the public debt and for a division of all other property held by the Government of the United States as agent of the confederated States, of which South Carolina was recently a member; and generally to negotiate as to all other measures and arrangements proper to be made and adopted in the existing relation of the parties, and for the continuance of peace and amity between this commonwealth and the Government at Washington.”

In the execution of this trust, it is our duty to furnish you, as we now do, with an official copy of the Ordinance of Secession, by which the State of South Carolina has resumed the powers she delegated to the Government of the United States and has declared her perfect sovereignty and independence.

It would also have been our duty to have informed you that we were ready to negotiate with you upon all such questions as are necessarily raised by the adoption of this ordinance, and that we were prepared to enter upon this negotiation with the earnest desire to avoid all unnecessary and hostile collision, and so to inaugurate our new relations as to secure mutual respect, general advantage and a future of good will and harmony beneficial to all the parties concerned.

But the events of the last twenty-four hours render such an assurance impossible. We came here the representatives of an authority which could, at any time within the past sixty days, have taken possession of the forts in Charleston harbor, but which, upon pledges given in a manner that, we cannot doubt, determined to trust to your honor rather than to its own power. Since our arrival here an officer of the United States, acting, as we are assured, not only without but against your orders, has dismantled one fort and occupied another, thus altering, to a most important extent, the condition of affairs under which we came.

Until these circumstances are explained in a manner which relieves us of all doubt as to the spirit in which these negotiations shall be conducted, we are forced to suspend all discussion as to any arrangements by which our mutual interests might be amicably adjusted.

And, in conclusion, we would urge upon you the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston. Under present circumstances, they are a standing menace which renders negotiation impossible, and, as our recent experience shews, threatens speedily to bring to a bloody issue questions which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment.

We have the honor, Sir, to be,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servants,

R. W. BARNWELL,

J. H. ADAMS,

JAMES L. ORR,

Commissioners.

To the President

of the United States.

SOURCE: The Correspondence Between the Commissioners of the State of So. Ca. to the Government at Washington and the President of the United States, p. 3-4

Gustavus V. Fox to Montgomery Blair, April 17, 1861

Baltic, 17th April

At Sea, 1861  

Dr Blair,

As I have no writing materials and wish to save tomorrow's mail I use a pencil.

Monday at 6 P.M. of the 8th we dropped down to Sandy Hook and anchored for the night, being too late for the tide. One of my tugs went to sea Sunday night, another one followed the Baltic, and the 3d I left in the hands of Russell Sturgis, to send on if he could charter her, the owner, like many others, being shaky at the last moment. At 8 A.M. of the 9th inst. we discharged the pilot and had constant steady bad weather and heavy sea. At 3 A.M. of the 12th reached the rendezvous 10 miles east of Charleston light — found only the H. Lane. At 6 A.M. saw the Pawnee coming in; boarded her and intimated to her Comdr that I was going in to offer to land provisions, asked him to stand in with me. He said his orders were to remain 10 miles east of the light and await the Powhatan. I took the H. Lane as an escort, and as we drew in saw that the forts had all opened fire upon Sumpter and that Major Anderson was replying gallantly. Seeing a stm'r off the bar, supposed to be the Isabel, I notified Capt. Faunce of the H. Lane and he started after her. It proved to be the Nashville from N. York.

I stood out in the Baltic to let Capt. Rowan of the Pawnee know that firing had commenced. I met him, however, coming in. Though he had expressed himself very averse to doing anything to commence the war, he now seemed willing to go in with his vessel if we had a pilot. I advised both vessels to go close in to the swash channel and anchor, which was done, and as the heavy sea and wind had moderated a little, I thought we had better attempt a couple of boats of provisions this night, the 12th, but as the Powhatan and Pocahontas had not arrived and the Pawnee and Lane were both short of hands and we had but one gun launch, the Pawnee's, I was overruled and consented upon the gallant promise of the officers that they would escort me in after daylight in the morning, defying their batteries. This was their proposition. The vessels of war remained at anchor at the Swash whilst I stood out to the rendezvous for the night in hopes of meeting the Powhatan and Pocahontas. It blew very heavy all night with a great swell and towards morning a thick fog. As Capt. Fletcher of the Baltic returned towards the anchorage, near daylight, he ran onto the Rattlesnake Shoal, but soon got off. The waves run so high that we were obliged to anchor some four miles outside of the war vessels, and having this sea it was impossible to load the boats. I took a boat at 8 A.M. 13th inst., and with the senior army officer Lt. Hudson, we pulled in to the Pawnee. As we drew near I saw, with horror, black volumes of smoke issuing from Sumpter. The barbarians, to their everlasting disgrace be it said, redoubled their fire, and through the flames and smoke the noble band of true men continued their response. The severe weather during the forenoon having prevented us using boats, Capt. Rowan captured an ice schooner and offered it to me to carry in the provisions and men. I accepted it and the night of the 13th I should certainly have gone in, and as certainly been knocked to pcs. My tug boats I knew could not have reached Charleston in the weather we had experienced since leaving N. York, and the Powhatan, I now learned, by a note from Capt. Mercer to Capt. Rowan, dated the 7th (I left the 8th, Rowan left the 9th, Gillis the 10th) that the Powhatan was “detached from duty off Charleston.” As she had the 300 sailors I asked for, and the howitzers and fighting launches, and the other ships of war were simply ordered to await her arrival 10 miles off, you will see that some one determined to utterly extinguish the expedition. I do not think I have deserved this treatment, and at present will not speak as I have felt, and now feel. At about 2 P.M. the Pocahontas arrived, just in time to witness the surrender of Fort Sumpter. I immediately suggested a flag of truce to be sent to offer a passage to Major A. and his command, which was done. Had the Powhatan arrived the 12th we should have had the men and provisions into Fort Sumpter, as I had everything ready, boats, muffled oars, small packages of provisions, in fact everything but the 300 sailors promised to me by the dept. A tug would have accomplished it, but with more risk alongside of the Fort. Capt. Foster the Eng. of Fort Sumpter says we would have got in and so does Hartstein of their navy. You know military people all told the Prest we could not get in, but if we did, the Fort was impregnable. In both instances were they wrong. Sumpter's fire had dispersed their naval preparations and they trusted entirely to their batteries and those light boats to illuminate the channel. What can be said of the builders of the fort? The burning of the officers' quarters has almost ruined the gorge wall, so that a few days more fire would have tumbled it all to pcs. One shot from Cummings point (where Cullum said it never could be breached) went entirely through the wall of the gorge. Another shot passed through an inside wall and struck below the door of the magazine, shattering the wall, so as to prevent the opening of the door, at the same time the flames nearly reached this door. In fact they all expected to be blown up. The coupe next to Cummings point is very severely handled and would soon have been a breach. So that this impregnable fort, with 33 guns and 17 mortars, playing upon it for only 34 hours, is injured $400,000 worth and actually burned as much as battered. I think these facts will make a stir, for not one was ever presented in all the discussion we had. The officers and men from the Major down have covered themselves with glory. A fort of 60 fighting men, surrounded by 9000 men, and a circle of fortifications kept up the first day gun for gun with them and on the 2 replied, though from 8 A.M. until 2 P.M. the fort was a mass of smoke through which, and in which, they fought.

I told the Major how anxious the Prest was that they (S.C.) should stand before the civilized world as having fired upon bread, yet they had made the case much worse for themselves as they knew the Major would leave the 15th at noon for want of provisions (see his correspondence), yet they opened upon 60 men and continued it whilst the fort was burning. The "World" (N. Y.) correspondent came down in the H. Lane and is now with us, and as he is the only reporter on board and is continually with the officers I imagine he will have a faithful account. As several ships brigs and schooners and one N. Y. stmr were detained at the bar by the conflict, it was believed to be a whole fleet for the relief of Sumpter with 9000 men on board. Whereas there was the Pawnee and H. Lane with one 12 lb. launch gun and on board the Baltic 200 RECRUITS only two or three of whom ever saw a gun, sent by the Gen1 in Chief, and the flag ship with her power and efficiency sent away without any intimation conveyed to the other vessels, all of which sailed subsequently to this change. Sunday the Major delivered up the fort after saluting his flag with 50 guns, which he intended to be 100, but a premature explosion killed two men and wounded three others, the only casualties of the whole battle. Monday, at noon, he and his command, and the flag (I enclose a pce) came off in the Isabel stmr and were transferred to this vessel when we sailed, all the vessels saluting. Excepting from the time of the surrender to the transfer, we have had a gale of wind just now abating (midnight).

The men in the fort, though on Pork and Rice, never flinched or grumbled, even when fire was added. I think the Prest will keenly approve the Major's course. As for our expedition, somebody's influence has made it ridiculous.

Very truly

G. V. FOX.

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 31-5

• See post script, April 18, 1861

Gustavus V. Fox to Montgomery Blair, Thursday, April 18, 1861 – 12:30 a.m.

You will see that the surrender came from them, not from the Major — a very important point.

Major A. felt hurt at what he thought was the neglect of Govt in not informing him of various matters. He also felt badly towards me, at not telling him everything when I visited the fort. Now, however, he appreciates my delicacy in not going beyond my written order. I also explained the reasons for holding the fort, far superior to any military ones, and told the Major that I thought the Govt would feel particularly gratified at the result.

I may not get my report off to-day to the Secy of War so you may read this to him if you think best.

I have just written Major Anderson's dispatch to the Secy of War and sent it to Sandy Hook to be forwarded by telegraph.

Thursday 18th inst.

12.30 A.M.     

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 36

Diary of William Howard Russell: July 2, 1861

At early dawn this morning, looking out of the sleeping car, I saw through the mist a broad, placid river on the right, and on the left high wooded banks running sharply into the stream, against the base of which the rails were laid. West Point, which is celebrated for its picturesque scenery, as much as for its military school, could not be seen through the fog, and I regretted time did not allow me to stop and pay a visit to the academy. I was obliged to content myself with the handiwork of some of the ex-pupils. The only camaraderie I have witnessed in America exists among the West Point men. It is to Americans what our great public schools are to young Englishmen. To take a high place at West Point is to be a first-class man, or wrangler. The academy turns out a kind of military aristocracy, and I have heard complaints that the Irish and Germans are almost completely excluded, because the nominations to West Point are obtained by political influence; and the foreign element, though powerful at the ballot-box, has no enduring strength. The Murphies and Schmidts seldom succeed in shoving their sons into the American institution. North and South, I have observed, the old pupils refer everything military to West Point. “I was with Beauregard at West Point. He was three above me.” Or, “McDowell and I were in the same class.” An officer is measured by what he did there, and if professional jealousies date from the state of common pupilage, so do lasting friendships. I heard Beauregard, Lawton, Hardee, Bragg, and others, speak of McDowell, Lyon, McClellan, and other men of the academy, as their names turned up in the Northern papers, evidently judging of them by the old school standard. The number of men who have been educated there greatly exceeds the modest requirements of the army. But there is likelihood of their being all in full work very soon.

At about nine, A. M., the train reached New York, and in driving to the house of Mr. Duncan, who accompanied me from Niagara, the first thing which struck me was the changed aspect of the streets. Instead of peaceful citizens, men in military uniforms thronged the pathways, and such multitudes of United States flags floated from the windows and roofs of the houses as to convey the impression that it was a great holiday festival. The appearance of New York when I first saw it was very different. For one day, indeed, after my arrival, there were men in uniform to be seen in the streets, but they disappeared after St. Patrick had been duly honored, and it was very rarely I ever saw a man in soldier's clothes during the rest of my stay. Now, fully a third of the people carried arms, and were dressed in some kind of martial garb.

The walls are covered with placards from military companies offering inducements to recruits. An outburst of military tailors has taken place in the streets; shops are devoted to militia equipments; rifles, pistols, swords, plumes, long boots, saddle, bridle, camp belts, canteens, tents, knapsacks, have usurped the place of the ordinary articles of traffic. Pictures and engravings — bad, and very bad — of the “battles” of Big Bethel and Vienna, full of furious charges, smoke and dismembered bodies, have driven the French prints out of the windows. Innumerable "General Scott's" glower at you from every turn, making the General look wiser than he or any man ever was. Ellsworths in almost equal proportion, Grebles and Winthrops — the Union martyrs — and Tompkins, the temporary hero of Fairfax court-house.

The “flag of our country” is represented in a colored engraving, the original of which was not destitute of poetical feeling, as an angry blue sky through which meteors fly streaked by the winds, whilst between the red stripes the stars just shine out from the heavens, the flag-staff being typified by a forest tree bending to the force of the blast. The Americans like this idea — to my mind it is significant of bloodshed and disaster. And why not! What would become of all these pseudo-Zouaves who have come out like an eruption over the States, and are in no respect, not even in their baggy breeches, like their great originals, if this war were not to go on? I thought I had had enough of Zouaves in New Orleans, but dȋs aliter visum.

They are overrunning society, and the streets here, and the dress which becomes the broad-chested, stumpy, short-legged Celt, who seems specially intended for it, is singularly unbecoming to the tall and slightly-built American. Songs “On to glory,” “Our country,” new versions of “Hail Columbia,” which certainly cannot be considered by even American complacency a “happy land” when its inhabitants are preparing to cut each other's throats; of the “star-spangled banner,” are displayed in booksellers’ and music-shop windows, and patriotic sentences emblazoned on flags float from many houses. The ridiculous habit of dressing up children and young people up to ten and twelve years of age as Zouaves and vivandières has been caught up by the old people, and Mars would die with laughter if he saw some of the abdominous, be-spectacled light infantry men who are hobbling along the pavement.

There has been indeed a change in New York; externally it is most remarkable, but I cannot at all admit that the abuse with which I was assailed for describing the indifference which prevailed on my arrival was in the least degree justified. I was desirous of learning how far the tone of conversation “in the city” had altered, and soon after breakfast I went down Broadway to Pine Street and Wall Street. The street in all its length was almost draped with flags — the warlike character of the shops was intensified. In front of one shop window there was a large crowd gazing with interest at some object which I at last succeeded in feasting my eyes upon. A gray cap with a tinsel badge in front, and the cloth stained with blood was displayed, with the words, “Cap of Secession officer killed in action.” On my way I observed another crowd of women, some with children in their arms standing in front of a large house and gazing up earnestly and angrily at the windows. I found they were wives, mothers, and sisters, and daughters of volunteers who had gone off and left them destitute.

The misery thus caused has been so great that the citizens of New York have raised a fund to provide food, clothes, and a little money — a poor relief, in fact, for them, and it was plain they were much needed, though some of the applicants did not seem to belong to a class accustomed to seek aid from the public. This already! But Wall Street and Pine Street are bent on battle. And so this day, hot from the South and impressed with the firm resolve of the people, and finding that the North has been lashing itself into fury, I sit down and write to England, on my return from the city. “At present dismiss entirely the idea, no matter how it may originate, that there will be, or can be, peace, compromise, union, or secession, till war has determined the issue.”

As long as there was a chance that the struggle might not take place, the merchants of New York were silent, fearful of offending their Southern friends and connections, but inflicting infinite damage on their own government and misleading both sides. Their sentiments, sympathies, and business bound them with the South; and, indeed, till “the glorious uprising” the South believed New York was with them, as might be credited from the tone of some organs in the press, and I remember hearing it said by Southerners in Washington, that it was very likely New York would go out of the Union! When the merchants, however, saw the South was determined to quit the Union, they resolved to avert the permanent loss of the great profits derived from their connection with the South by some present sacrifices. They rushed to the platforms — the battle-cry was sounded from almost every pulpit — flag-raisings took place in every square, like the planting of the tree of liberty in France in 1848, and the oath was taken to trample Secession under foot, and to quench the fire of the Southern heart forever.

The change in manner, in tone, in argument, is most remarkable. I met men to-day who last March argued coolly and philosophically about the right of Secession. They are now furious at the idea of such wickedness — furious with England, because she does not deny their own famous doctrine of the sacred right of insurrection. “We must maintain our glorious Union, sir.” “We must have a country.” “We cannot allow two nations to grow up on this Continent, sir.” “We must possess the entire control of the Mississippi.” These “musts,” and can’ts,” and “won'ts,” are the angry utterances of a spirited people who have had their will so long that they at last believe it is omnipotent. Assuredly, they will not have it over the South without a tremendous and long-sustained contest, in which they must put forth every exertion, and use all the resources and superior means they so abundantly possess.

It is absurd to assert, as do the New York people, to give some semblance of reason to their sudden outburst, that it was caused by the insult to the flag at Sumter. Why, the flag had been fired on long before Sumter was attacked by the Charleston batteries! It had been torn down from United States arsenals and forts all over the South; and but for the accident which placed Major Anderson in a position from which he could not retire, there would have been no bombardment of the fort, and it would, when evacuated, have shared the fate of all the other Federal works on the Southern coast. Some of the gentlemen who are now so patriotic and Unionistic, were last March prepared to maintain that if the President attempted to reenforce Sumter or Pickens, he would be responsible for the destruction of the Union. Many journals in New York and out of it held the same doctrine.

One word to these gentlemen. I am pretty well satisfied that if they had always spoken, written, and acted as they do now, the people of Charleston would not have attacked Sumter so readily. The abrupt outburst of the North and the demonstration at New York filled the South, first with astonishment, and then with something like fear, which was rapidly fanned into anger by the press and the politicians, as well as by the pride inherent in slaveholders.

I wonder what Mr. Seward will say when I get back to Washington. Before I left, he was of opinion — at all events, he stated — that all the States would come back, at the rate of one a month. The nature of the process was not stated; but we are told there are 250,000 Federal troops now under arms, prepared to try a new one.

Combined with the feeling of animosity to the rebels, there is, I perceive, a good deal of ill-feeling towards Great Britain. The Southern papers are so angry with us for the Order in Council closing British ports against privateers and their prizes, that they advise Mr. Rust and Mr. Yancey to leave Europe. We are in evil case between North and South. I met a reverend doctor, who is most bitter in his expressions towards us; and I dare say, Bishop and General Leonidas Polk, down South, would not be much better disposed. The clergy are active on both sides; and their flocks approve of their holy violence. One journal tells, with much gusto, of a blasphemous chaplain, a remarkably good rifle shot, who went into one of the skirmishes lately, and killed a number of rebels — the joke being, in fact, that each time he' fired and brought down his man, he exclaimed, piously, “May Heaven have mercy on your soul!” One Father Mooney, who performed the novel act, for a clergyman, of “christening” a big gun at Washington the other day, wound up the speech he made on the occasion, by declaring “the echo of its voice would be sweet music, inviting the children of Columbia to share the comforts of his father's home.” Can impiety and folly and bad taste go further?

SOURCE: William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South, Vol. 1, p. 367-72

Gustavus V. Fox to Governor Francis W. Pickens, April 12, 1861

[April 12, 1861]

F. W. Pickens, Gov. S. C.

Sir,

The U. S. Gov^t has directed me to deliver a quantity of provisions to Major Anderson at Fort Sumpter, due notice of which has probably been given to you by special messenger from Washington.

Accordingly I send herewith the first load. If your batteries open fire it will be upon an unarmed boat, and unarmed men performing an act of duty and humanity.

G. V. Fox

In charge of Transport

Herewith I commence sending you the subsistence entrusted to my charge to be delivered at Fort Sumpter.

SOURCES: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 18

Gustavus V. Fox to Captain Daniel Jackson, April 12, 1861

Capt. Daniel Jackson

Pilot—

Sir—

I send you to Fort Sumpter with a load of provisions to be delivered with a letter to Major A. when you will immediately return. If you are fired upon going in, turn back at once. If any one opposes your entrance deliver to that person the letter addressed to Gov. Pickens and return — if your entrance is still opposed.

Very truly,

G. V. Fox

SOURCES: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 18

Gustavus V. Fox to Montgomery Blair, Sunday, March 31, 1861, p.m.

Sunday, P.M.

31 Mch. '61

D^r Judge.

I am writing this at Mr. Aspinwall's house. He has just had an interview with Capt. Marshall who declines to have anything to do with the matter. This is serious as he was expected to obtain all the provisions in what is called the desiccated form. These would occupy only half the space of others, could all be carried in bags, in the boats, facilitating the landing and giving the garrison, always, fresh provisions. Ships out of N. Y. now use them. Mr. Aspinwall says we can have the Baltic but he is evidently very averse to the movement. He is now writing and will send on a special messenger who takes this. I also wrote you by mail this morning. Mr. A. and Capt. M. say the loan would not be taken if this news leaked out which it will not here. Verbal orders having been given to me, which cannot be carried out, now Marshall declines, without placing me in immediate prominence. I give you the earliest information, that the War Dept. may give the necessary orders, which they can give Tuesday noon after the loan bids are received. All the desiccated meats &c are put into a size that will allow them to be bagged in common gunny bags of 2½  bushel size. We can also put coal into bags as we go down.

The Baltic's ten boats will hold all the men and the Provisions, in this form, — but in the ordinary form, i.e. salt, not one half. No flour should be sent, only bread. So we could use tugs or boats. Perhaps both.

The arguments of opposition to this act of solemn duty are all political. Capt. Marshall has been in Washington for two weeks and wishes to know if Mr. Seward goes for it. His only fear of success is the impossibility of getting their tugs out of the way — not difficult with an efficient naval force. Then the whole thing is child's play. I feel like abandoning my country, moving off somewhere. I am sick down to my heel.

The Baltic can be got ready in three days. Be particular about the provisions — desiccated and to go in bags, which can be done in the Baltic on the way down.

Has Major A. a range for burning wood or coal at the fort. This is important. I expect to hear from you at the earliest moment. Mr. A has written to the Pres^t advising no movement until the loan is taken and sends it with this note.

Very sincerely

G. V. Fox

SOURCES: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 13-14

Gustavus V. Fox to Montgomery Blair, March 31, 1861

N. York

31 Mch. '61

D^r Judge,

I saw Mr. Aspinwall yesterday and in the evening met him and Capt. Marshall. From being for a long time most earnest in this matter, they are now astonished at the idea of Govt attempting it declaring that the time has past and that the people are reconciled to leaving this position and making the stand on Pickens &c. &c. &c. We argued the point till midnight. They propose making no move till Tuesday on account of the loan, promising that they can get me ready in time after that. I really think they doubt my word in the matter. I hope orders to the proper party for making the contracts will be sent at once. I had no chance to say to Mr. Welles that the heaviest howitzers must be put on the men of war for use in the tugs. The vital point in my opinion is a naval force that can destroy their naval preparations. All else is easy. Com^o Stringham is the person for the Sec'y to consult. The tugs may be obliged to go in and grapple with the enemy and the naval force must be sufficient, beyond a doubt, to accomplish it. I only suggested the three vessels as being all that were available. The navy will answer that this force is all right. I am sure of all else. I shall take ten boats in the Baltic so as to use either them or the tugs, as circumstances may require. I wish copies of the latest letters from Major Anderson, say since my visit, may be sent me, where there is any reference to matters. You have no idea of the fears existing with these gentlemen and I am not sure that they will decline all participation. So fall away, in the hour of peril, hands and hearts that should stand by our Govt. I am real heart sick, not discouraged, at the delays, obstacles and brief time allowed for a vital measure that should have had months' careful preparations.

I called upon Mrs. Anderson. She showed me a private letter from her husband where he writes, “I have just rec^d a letter from Gen^l Beauregard wherein he says Col Lamon told Gov. Pickens that in a few days I (Major A) would be transferred to another place."

Write or telegraph me at once, 77 Nassau St. care of Lowery.

Sincerely yrs

G. V. Fox.

SOURCES: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 12-13

Gustavus V. Fox to Virginia Woodbury Fox, March 19, 1861

Washington D.C.

Mch 19, ’61

D^r V.

I am real homesick for the kind company of the dearest wife in the world — the best and the sweetest. But our Uncle Abe Lincoln has taken a high esteem for me and wishes me to take dispatches to Major Anderson at Fort Sumpter with regard to its final evacuation and to obtain a clear statement of his condition which his letters, probably guarded, do not fully exhibit. I have really great curiosity to see the famous Fort and several of my naval intimates are there in command. Gov. Pickens may turn me back but I think not. I leave this eve and ought to return here Sunday and N. Y. Tuesday or Wednesday. Minna thinks I am going to N. Y. and knows nothing of my visit here, though very inquisitive: be careful in all your letters. Write me Friday or Sat. and tell me how you are and all about the D^r and where you are.

Aff

GUS

SOURCES: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 9-10

Captain Gustavus V. Fox: Memorandum for the Relief of Fort Sumter, February 6, 1861

ST. GERMAIN HOTEL,

New York, February 6, 1861.

Since the repulse of the steamer Star of the West at Charleston it may be assumed that all the channels over the bar are obstructed, but as the bar is more than four miles in length the spaces between these channels are too extensive to be closed. Therefore at high water and smooth sea the bar is perfectly accessible to vessels drawing say seven feet of water. The U. S. has no steamers of this draft. The skillfull officers at Charleston, aware of this fact, will conclude that relief must go in at high water in boats or light draft steamers incapable of bearing a very offensive armament. They will be perfectly prepared for such attempts by arming, and heavily manning all the steamers they possess and at the critical moment will throw themselves alongside the relief vessels and thus jeopardise the movement by the very detention of the conflict. To elude their vigilance or attempt a strategem however ingenious I consider too liable to failure.

I propose to put the troops on board of a large, comfortable sea steamer and hire two powerful light draft New York tug boats, having the necessary stores on board. These to be convoyed by the U.S.S. Pawnee, now at Philadelphia, and the revenue cutter Harriet Lane. (The Pawnee is the only available steam vessel of war north of the Gulf of Mexico; draws twelve feet of water and has seven heavy guns. As a steamer she seems to be a failure, but may be got ready for this emergency — at least she is, unfortunately, our only resource.) The Harriet Lane I understand to be an excellent and efficient vessel, but either of these steamers alone may be liable to capture, by an overwhelming force.

Arriving off the bar, I propose to examine by day the naval preparations and obstructions. If their vessels determine to oppose our entrance, and a feint or flag of truce would ascertain this, the armed ships must approach the bar and destroy or drive them on shore. Major Anderson would do the same upon any vessels within the range of his guns and would also prevent any naval succor being sent down from the city.

Having dispersed this force, the only obstacles are the forts on Cummings point, and Fort Moultrie, and whatever adjacent batteries they may have, distant on either hand from mid channel about three-quarters of a mile. Two hours before high water, at night, with half the force on board of each tug, within relieving distance of each other, should run in to Fort Sumpter.

[Endorsement:]

Proposition of Relief of Fort Sumpter Accepted by the Govt. Mch, 1861.

SOURCES: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume 4, p. 223-4; Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 8-9

Memorandum of Capt. Gustavus V. Fox to Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott, February 8, 1861

Feb. 8, 1861

The proposition which I had the honor to submit to you fully in person is herewith presented in writing.

Lt. Hall and myself have had several free conferences and if he is permitted by the South C. authorities to reenter Fort Sumpter, Major Anderson will comprehend the plan for his relief.

I consider myself very fortunate in having proposed a project which meets the approval of the Genl in Chief and I ask no reward but the entire conduct of the part exclusive of the armed vessels. The Commander of these should be ordered to cooperate with me by affording protection and destroying their naval preparations near the bar, leaving to me as the author of the plan the actual operations of relief.

I suggest that the Pawnee be immediately sent to the Delaware breakwater to await orders. The H. Lane to be ready for sea, and some arrangement entered into by which the requisite stmr and tugs should be engaged, at least so far as not to excite suspicion.

I should prefer one of the Collins stmrs. They are now being prepared for sea and one of such a size and power as to be able fearlessly to run down any vessels which might attempt to capture us outside by coup de main. I could quickly engage one & have her ready to start on 24 hours notice without exciting suspicion.

I shall leave for N. York at 3 P.M. to-day and any communication previous will find me at Judge Blairs.

G. V. F.

P.S. If the Pawnee Pivot gun is landed it should certainly be remounted.

Address Lowe & Blunt

F

SOURCES: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 7-8; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 203

Gustavus V. Fox to Virginia Woodbury Fox, February 6, 1861

Washington, D. C. 6th Feb. 61

D^r V.

I arrived safely last night and had an interview with the Genl who treated me very kindly and spoke of all your Pa's family with great affection. To-day I was to meet the Sec'y at 11 am, but he wrote a note deferring it until 1 P.M. the hour of closing the mail so I write to my little Y.f. Blair says Anderson's fame will be nothing to mine if I succeed.

All are well here and happy. Min knows nothing of my object but thinks it connected with my steam boating. If your ma don't want me shot she must keep mum. There are spies everywhere and upon every body.

The show baby is really good deal of an institution and looks very much like Woody. Nell and Miss Betty went to a Republican party at Speaker Penningtons. N. dressed in red, looked bravely. Mrs. B. looks better than I ever saw her. Chas is here saving the Union.

I shall leave to-morrow night and reach N. Y. next morning unless I write you to the contrary.

Love to all.

Aff.

Gus

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 5-6

Major-General Henry W. Halleck to Major-General William T. Sherman, December 18, 1864

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,         

Washington, December 18, 1864. (Via Hilton Head.)

Maj. Gen. W. T. SHERMAN,

Savannah:

My DEAR GENERAL: Yours of the 13th, by Major Anderson, is just received. I congratulate you on your splendid success, and shall very soon expect to hear of the crowning work of your new campaign in the capture of Savannah. Your march will stand out prominently as the great one of this great war. When Savannah falls, then for another raid south through the center of the Confederacy. But I will not anticipate. General Grant is expected here this morning, and will probably write you his own views. I do not learn from your letter or from Major Anderson that you are in want of anything which we have not provided at Hilton Head. Thinking it possible that you might want more field artillery, I had prepared several batteries, but the great difficulty of foraging horses on the coast will prevent our sending any unless you actually need them. The hay crop this year is short, and the Quartermaster's Department has great difficulty in procuring a supply for our animals. General Thomas has defeated Hood near Nashville, and it is hoped that he will completely crush his army. Breckinridge, at last accounts, was trying to form a junction near Murfreesborough; but as Thomas is between them Breckinridge must either retreat or be defeated. General Rosecrans made very bad work of it in Missouri, allowing Price with a small force to overrun the State and destroy millions of property. Orders have been issued for all officers and detachments having three months or more to serve to rejoin your army via Savannah; those having less than three months to serve will be retained by General Thomas. Should you capture Charleston, I hope that by some accident the place may be destroyed, and if a little salt should be sown upon its site it may prevent the growth of future crops of nullification and secession.

Yours, truly,

 H. W. HALLECK,   

 Major-General and Chief of Staff.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 44 (Serial No. 92), p. 741

Salmon P. Chase to John Townsend Trowbridge of Somerville, Massachusetts, March 21, 1864

WASHINGTON, March 21, 1864.

. . . . IMMEDIATELY after the organization of the cabinet, the question of what should be the policy of the Government toward the seceded States, demanded the most serious attention. Anderson, with his little company of soldiers, was holding Fort Sumter, and the first question was, “Shall he be relieved?” General Scott declared that complete relief was impracticable with a less force than 20,000 men. He thought, however, that the fort might be defended for several months if reënforced and provisioned; but that reënforcements and provisioning were impracticable, as the fire of the enemy's batteries would be concentrated upon any vessel which might make the attempt, both while entering the harbor, and especially when endeavoring to land men and cargoes at the fort. The President finally determined to make the attempt to send provisions to the garrison.

Information that the attempt would be made was transmitted to the Governor of South Carolina, and its receipt was promptly followed by an order from the rebel authorities to reduce the fort. How this was accomplished is historical, and it is also historical how the country was aroused by the rebel guns which opened on the fort. The call for 75,000 men immediately followed. It soon became evident that nothing beyond the mere defense of Washington was to be accomplished by this force.

I took the liberty of urging upon General Scott to occupy Manassas and compel the rebels to evacuate Harper's Ferry and the Valley of the Shenandoah. It has since become evident that this might have been then done, and it is even probable that a vigorous use of the force then at the disposal of the Government might have driven the rebels from Richmond. The notion proposed, however, was thought to involve too much risk. The rebels were suffered for weeks to occupy Alexandria with an insignificant force, to incite insurrection in Baltimore, and to destroy the national property at Norfolk, except that which was destroyed under orders by ourselves. At last, after long delays, Baltimore was recovered, Alexandria was occupied by national troops, and the rebels were driven from Harper's Ferry. Meanwhile, it had become evident that the 75,000 men originally called for would be insufficient. To replace them I took the liberty to prepare a call for 65,000 volunteers. This proposition, after having been modified so as to include an increase of the regular army, was sanctioned by the President, who, with the consent of the Secretary of War, directed me to prepare also the necessary orders. I invited to my assistance Colonel Thomas, Major McDowell, and Captain W. B. Franklin. After a good deal of consideration the orders since known as Nos. 15 and 16 were framed; one for the enlistment of volunteers and the other for regular regiments. Major McDowell contributed the largest amount of information and suggestion, while the other two officers were by no means wanting in both. It was my part to decide between different opinions, and put the whole in form.

The object I had in view in all this was — as there was no law authorizing the raising of the force required — to prepare to make a regular system and plan in conformity with which all new enlistments should be made clear and intelligible in itself, and capable of being laid before Congress in a form which would be likely to receive its sanction. These orders were promulgated in May, 1861.

There were wide departures from this plan, however. Great irregularities prevailed. Regiments were raised under verbal authority from the President and Secretary of War, and under written memoranda of which no record was preserved. So that the orders failed to secure the objects I had in view — beyond the simple provision of force — which were, order and system, and through these efficiency and accountability.

During this time great efforts were made in Kentucky and in Missouri to precipitate those States into rebellion, and I was called on to take a very considerable part in the measures adopted to prevent their success. The President and Secretary of War, indeed, committed to me for a time the principal charge of what related to Kentucky and Tennessee, and I was very active also in promoting the measures deemed necessary for the safety of Missouri. When Rousseau, then a Union Senator in the Kentucky Legislature from Louisville, came to Washington to seek means of raising men for the defense of the Union, I took his matters in charge; obtained for him a colonel's commission and an order, which I drew up myself, authorizing him to raise twenty companies. I was also charged with the care of Nelson's work; drew most of the orders under which he acted; and provided the necessary means to meet expenses. So, also, I was called on to frame the orders under which Andrew Johnson was authorized to raise regiments in Tennessee. These duties brought me into intimate relations with those officers; particularly with the first two. They were worthy of the confidence reposed in them by the President. I doubt if more valuable work has been done with so much activity, economy and practical benefit in raising men, by almost any others. Nelson's movement into the interior of Kentucky and the establishment of the Camp Dick Robinson, was especially most opportune. I think that this movement saved Kentucky from secession. I am quite sure that, without the organization of Nelson and Rousseau, the State would not have been saved from that calamity.

While he was Secretary of War, General Cameron conferred much with me. I never undertook to do any thing in his department, except when asked to give my help, and then I gave it willingly. In addition to Western Border-State matters, the principal subjects of conference between General Cameron and myself were slavery and the employment of colored troops. We agreed very early that the necessity of arming them was inevitable; but we were alone in that opinion. At least no other member of the Administration gave open support, while the President and Mr. Blair, as least, were decidedly averse to it. The question of the employment of the colored people who sought refuge within our lines soon became one of practical importance. General Butler wrote from Fortress Monroe in May, 1861, asking what disposition should be made of such persons. The Secretary of War conferred with me, and I submitted my suggestions to him in the form of a letter, which he adopted with some slight modification. General Butler wrote again in July, and being again consulted, I again submitted suggestions which were adopted. In the first of these letters, General Butler was directed to refrain from surrendering alleged fugitives from service to alleged masters. In the second he was directed to employ them under such organizations and in such occupations as circumstances might suggest or require.

It will be observed by the reader of those letters that at the time they were written it was expected the rebellion would be suppressed without any radical interference with the domestic institutions or internal affairs of any State, and that the directions to General Butler contemplated only such measures as seemed then necessary to suppression. Hc was not to interfere with laborers whether slaves or free, in houses or on farms. He was to receive only such as came to him, and, regarding all laws for reclamation as temporarily suspended, was to employ them in the service of the United States, keeping such accounts as would enable loyal owners to seek compensation from Congress. . . .

SOURCES: Jacob William Schuckers, The Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase, p. 418-20; see John Niven, Editor, The Salmon P. Chase Papers, Volume 4: Correspondence, April 1863-1864, p. 335-50 for the entire letter.