Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: July 29, 1863

Still raining! The great fear is that the crops will be ruined, and famine, which we have long been verging upon, will be complete. Is Providence frowning upon us for our sins, or upon our cause?

Another battle between Lee and Meade is looked for on the Upper Rappahannock.

Gov. Harris, in response to the President's call for 6000 men, says Western and Middle Tennessee are in the hands of the enemy, and that about half the people in East Tennessee sympathize with the North!

Some two or three hundred of Morgan's men have reached Lynchburg, and they believe Morgan himself will get off, with many more of his men.

The New York Herald's correspondent, writing from Washington on the 24th inst., says the United States ministers in England and France have informed the government of the intention of those powers to intervene immediately in our behalf; and that they will send iron-clad fleets to this country without delay. Whereupon the Herald says Mr. Seward is in favor of making peace with us, and reconstructing the Union — pardoning us — but keeping the slaves captured, etc. It is a cock-and-bull story, perhaps, without foundation.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 390

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, September 25, 1863

The President was not with us to-day at the Cabinet-meeting, being at the War Department with Stanton. All were present but them. Little known of army movements, but anxiety on the part of each. The English Government has interposed to prevent the armored rams built by the Lairds from coming out. Seward announced the fact, and also that he had placed me under injunctions of secrecy. This was the reason why no explanation had been given for my non-action, for which I have been much blamed.

Things look a little threatening from France, but Louis Napoleon may not persist when he learns that England has changed her policy. Should we meet with defeat at Chattanooga, it is by no means certain England will not again assume unfriendly airs, and refer the question of the departure of the armored ships to the “law officers of the Crown.” Our own ironclads and the fear of privateers which would ruin her commerce are, however, the best law, and our best safeguards.

The Russian fleet has come out of the Baltic and are now in New York, or a large number of the vessels have arrived. They are not to be confined in the Baltic by a northern winter. In sending them to this country at this time there is something significant. What will be its effect on France and the French policy we shall learn in due time. It may moderate; it may exasperate. God bless the Russians.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 443

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, September 17, 1863

Unpleasant rumors of a disagreement between Dahlgren and Gillmore and that the latter had requested to be relieved of his present command. This, I think, must be a mischievous rumor, — perhaps a speculative one.

A new panic is rising respecting the ironclads in England, and some of our sensation journals fan the excitement. It does not surprise me that the New York Times, Raymond's paper, controlled by Thurlow Weed, and all papers influenced by Seward should be alarmed. The latter knows those vessels are to be detained, yet will not come out and state the fact, but is not unwilling to have apprehension excited. It will glorify him if it is said they are detained through protest from our minister. If he does not prompt the Times, he could check its loud apprehensions. I am under restrictions which prevent me from making known facts that would dissipate this alarm. The Evening Post, I am sorry to see, falls in with the Times and its managers, and unwittingly assists those whom it does not admire. Both these journals are importunate, and insist that the Roanoke shall be returned to New York. But the Navy Department is not under newspaper control, though they have the cooperation of distinguished men. To station a steam frigate in New York would involve the necessity of stationing one also in the Delaware, and another at Boston. There would be no limit to the demand for naval defenses, yet it is claimed the coast defenses belong exclusively to the military.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 434-5

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, August 17, 1863

Wrote Dahlgren, who has serious apprehensions about Laird's ironclad steamers, which troubled Du Pont, that I thought he might feel assured they would not disturb him. Seward says Mr. Adams has made a vigorous protest, and informed the British Government if the Rebel ironclads are permitted to come out it will be casus belli. If he has taken that position, which I have always urged, and we persist in it, all will be well.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 406

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, August 12, 1863

The President addressed me a letter, directing additional instructions and of a more explicit character to our naval officers in relation to their conduct at neutral ports. In doing this, the President takes occasion to compliment the administration of the Navy in terms most commendatory and gratifying.

The proposed instructions are in language almost identical with certain letters which have passed between Mr. Seward and Lord Lyons, which the former submitted to me and requested me to adopt. My answer was not what the Secretary and Minister had agreed between themselves should be my policy and action. The President has therefore been privately interviewed and persuaded to write me, — an unusual course with him and which he was evidently reluctant to do. He earnestly desires to keep on terms of peace with England and, as he says to me in his letter, to sustain the present Ministry, which the Secretary of State assures him is a difficult matter, requiring all his dexterity and ability, — hence constant derogatory concessions.

In all of this Mr. Seward's subservient policy, or want of a policy, is perceptible. He has no convictions, no fixed principles, no rule of action, but is governed and moved by impulse, fancied expediency, and temporary circumstances. We injure neither ourselves nor Great Britain by an honest and firm maintenance of our rights, but Mr. Seward is in constant trepidation lest the Navy Department or some naval officer shall embroil us in a war, or make trouble with England. Lord Lyons is cool and sagacious, and is well aware of our premier's infirmities, who in his fears yields everything almost before it is asked. Hence the remark of Historicus (Sir Vernon Harcourt) that “the fear of England is not that the Americans will yield too little but that we shall take too much.” That able writer has the sagacity to see, and the frankness to say, that the time will come when England will have a war on her hands and Americans will be neutrals.

The President has a brief reply to Governor Seymour's rejoinder, which is very well. Stanton said to me he wished the President would stop letter-writing, for which he has a liking and particularly when he feels he has facts and right [on his side]. I might not disagree with Stanton as regards some correspondence, but I think the President has been more successful with Seymour than some others. His own letters and writings are generally unpretending and abound in good sense.

Seward informs me in confidence that he has, through Mr. Adams, made an energetic protest to Great Britain against permitting the ironclads to leave England, distinctly informing the Ministry that it would be considered by us as a declaration of war. The result is, he says, the ironclads will not leave England. I have uniformly insisted that such would be the case if we took decided ground and the Ministry were satisfied we were in earnest.

Spain, Seward says, had been seduced with schemes to help the Rebels, and was to have taken an active part in intervention, or acknowledging the independence of the Confederates, but on learning the course of Roebuck, and after the discussion in the British Parliament, Spain had hastened to say she should not interfere in behalf of the Rebels. But Tassara, the Spanish Minister, under positive instructions, had on the 9th inst. given our government formal notice that after sixty days Spain would insist that her jurisdiction over Cuba extended six miles instead of the marine league from low-water mark. To this Seward said he replied we should not assent; that we could not submit to a menace, especially at such a time as this; that the subject of marine jurisdiction is a question of international law in which all maritime nations have an interest, and it was not for Spain or any one or two countries to set it aside.

He says Lord Lyons has been to him with a complaint that a British vessel having Rebel property on board had been seized in violation of the admitted principle that free ships made free goods. But he advised Lord L. to get all the facts and submit them, etc.

From some cause Seward sought this interview and was unusually communicative. Whether the President's letter, which originated with him, as he must be aware I fully understand, had an influence in opening his mouth and heart I know not. His confidential communication to me should have been said in full Cabinet. In the course of our conversation, Seward said “some of the facts had leaked out through the President, who was apt to be communicative.

The condition of the country and the future of the Rebel States and of slavery are rising questions on which there are floating opinions. No clear, distinct, and well-defined line of policy has as yet been indicated by the Administration. I have no doubt there is, and will be, diversity of views in the Cabinet whenever the subject is brought up. A letter from Whiting, Solicitor of the War Department, has been recently published, quite characteristic of the man. Not unlikely Stanton may have suggested, or assented to, this document, by which some are already swearing their political faith. Mr. Whiting is in high favor at the War and State Departments, and on one occasion the President endorsed him to me. I think little of him. He is ready with expedients but not profound in his opinions; is a plausible advocate rather than a correct thinker, more of a patent lawyer than a statesman. His elaborate letter does not in my estimation add one inch to his stature.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 398-400

Gideon Welles to John A. Andrew, July 11, 1863

Navy Department, July 11, 1863.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 1st instant. The alarm created by the reckless depredations of the Tacony is not surprising. Similar dangers may not be immediate, but the Navy Department has, as you probably are informed, taken measures with a view to guard against a repetition.

Two steamers — the Aries and the Iron Age — and two sailing cruisers with formidable batteries — the brig Perry and the Ethan Allen — with perhaps one armed schooner, have been, or will be, ordered to the protection of the commerce and fisheries and coasts of New England. These vessels will have orders for permanent service on that coast during the fishing season, and other cruisers will be specially detailed in cases of emergency.

The shore defenses of the towns mentioned by you and of other places on the coast belong, perhaps, strictly to a Department other than this, but any aid that the demands will allow us to extend we desire to give, and the fact that there are cruisers on coast naval service will doubtless operate to some extent as a preventive against such craft, and also afford a sense of security. The necessity of additional cruisers on the seas, the demands of our squadrons for additional vessels, and the want of seamen to man them prevent the detailing of a larger force. It is deemed best that but one of the steamers detached should be stationed at an available point where intelligence can be promptly communicated and received in order to be at any moment available. I had thought that Boston would be the best place to be selected for this purpose, but if Provincetown, in the opinion of yourself and others, is a more suitable location, I certainly should be disposed to consult your views and wishes.

I regret to learn that some of the places enumerated by you have not a single gun for their defense. Although it is not strictly within the province of this Department to supply these wants, I shall, as you are already advised, be desirous to assist you, as we have done to some extent, with such naval ordnance as we can spare for temporary batteries to protect the points exposed. Besides the legitimate duties of blockading and cruising, the Navy has been efficient in capturing forts and batteries and protecting many places, until there seems to be a reliance upon and a demand for gunboats and ironclads that can not be met and is wholly incompatible with the imperative requirements of the service in its proper element.

I need not assure you that it will be, as it has ever been, my duty to render whatever assistance is in the power of the Department, consistent with other duties, to our fellow-citizens in Massachusetts, and to respond promptly at all times to impending danger. It was therefore with surprise and regret I read your statement that vessels “were not sent until the Tacony had rioted along the Vineyard Sound for four days.”

To this very extraordinary statement in an official paper from the chief magistrate of Massachusetts I shall respond by stating the facts.

The Tacony was captured by Read and his crew on the 12th of June. Information of the fact was communicated to the Department on the evening of the 13th of June. Within thirty minutes thereafter orders were dispatched to send public vessels immediately after the Tacony, and additional orders were given the next morning (Sunday), as also subsequently, to charter and, if necessary, to seize vessels for that purpose.

Before 12 o'clock Saturday night, the 13th of June, the steamers Young Rover, Commodore Jones, and Western World had sailed from Hampton Roads in search of the Tacony. On the following day the Seminole, Tuscarora, Dai Citing, Adela, and Virginia, all steamers, left New York, and many others,, naval and chartered vessels, followed on the 15th and 16th.

On the 15th (Monday) three chartered steamers left Philadelphia, and the next day a chartered schooner followed in pursuit of the Tacony. On the 16th five chartered vessels, and on the 17th the steamer Montgomery and bark Trinity left Boston on the same errand. The steamer Cherokee also left the same day, but from some derangement in her compass returned again and departed the next day.

I have not the means of knowing what day the Tacony entered the Vineyard Sound, but on the 20th of June she captured the Isaac Webb, bound for New York, the first capture in that vicinity reported to the Department. But the Department had sent out more than twenty vessels in pursuit of the Tacony prior to the capture of the Webb. Many had been then six days cruising for her.

Within two days from the time the Tacony was captured and appropriated to piratical purposes the Department had issued orders to send vessels in pursuit, and those orders were promptly carried into effect. Not only public vessels were dispatched, but private vessels were chartered, and orders were given to seize vessels, if necessary, for this service.

Yet your Excellency has thought proper to say no vessels were sent until the “Tacony had rioted along the Vineyard Sound for four days.” It is not for me to reconcile your statement with these facts. I am unwilling to believe that you would have made the assertion had yon known what measures the Department had taken, and regret that you did not ascertain the facts before making it. It is not often that I devote a moment to controvert or correct even undeserved censure or misrepresentation, but this, in an official communication, seemed so wholly gratuitous and unjust that I could not, when answering your letter, omit some allusion to it.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Gideon Welles,

Secretary of the Navy.

His Excellency Jno. A. Andrew,

Governor of Massachusetts, Boston.

SOURCE: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebelion, Series I, Volume 2, p. 345-6

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, July 17, 1863

At the Cabinet council Seward expressed great apprehension of a break-up of the British Ministry. I see in the papers an intimation that should Roebuck's motion for a recognition of the Confederacy prevail, Earl Russell would resign. I have no fears that the motion will prevail. The English, though mischievously inclined, are not demented. I wish the policy of our Secretary of State, who assumes to be wise, was as discreet as theirs. He handed me consular dispatches from Mr. Dudley at Liverpool and is exceedingly alarmed; fears England will let all the ironclads and rovers go out, and that the sea robbers will plunder and destroy our commerce. Mr. Dudley is an excellent consul, vigilant, but somewhat, and excusably, nervous, and he naturally presents the facts which he gets in a form that will not do injustice to the activity and zeal of the consul. Seward gives, and always has given, the fullest credit to the wildest rumors.

Some remarks on the great error of General Meade in permitting Lee and the Rebel army with all their plunder to escape led the President to say he would not yet give up that officer. “He has committed,” said the President, “a terrible mistake, but we will try him farther.” No one expressed his approval, but Seward said, “Excepting the escape of Lee, Meade has shown ability.” It was evident that the retention of Meade had been decided.

In a conversation with General Wadsworth, who called on me, I learned that at the council of the general officers, Meade was disposed to make an attack, and was supported by Wadsworth, Howard, and Pleasonton, but Sedgwick, Sykes, and the older regular officers dissented. Meade, rightly disposed but timid and irresolute, hesitated and delayed until too late. Want of decision and self-reliance in an emergency has cost him and the country dear, for had he fallen upon Lee it could hardly have been otherwise than the capture of most of the Rebel army.

The surrender of Port Hudson is undoubtedly a fact. It could not hold out after the fall of Vicksburg. We have information also that Sherman has caught up with and beaten Johnston.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 374-5

Diary of Gideon Welles: Sunday, June 21, 1863

I have three telegrams from Dr. Whelan to-day, all of the same tenor. The last, at 4 p.m., says Admiral Foote continues much the same, — insensible and slowly sinking. Dahlgren, who left New York yesterday, says the case is hopeless, that Foote told him it was the last of this world and he was prepared for the event.

We have pretty authentic reports of a protracted fight at Aldie. The War Department is not communicative, and I apprehend for the reason that it is not better advised than the rest of us, as yet. A train of ambulances passed this evening, going, I doubt not, for the wounded.

The Richmond papers speak of the capture of the steamer Fingal by our ironclads. This is important, and I am inclined to credit it. John Rodgers has written his family that he was in Nassau Sound, having been ordered there to watch the Fingal. The Richmond report corresponds with this, and states she was captured after a fight of thirty minutes with the monitors.

I had to-day a full and unreserved talk with Dahlgren. Told him it was now evident Foote could not go on the service to which he was ordered, — at all events, if he survived, not for the present; I should therefore designate him to relieve Du Pont. This would, to some extent, involve the selection of a new staff, for it was not likely that Foote's confidants were his confidants. [I remarked] that not unlikely some of the elder officers who had seen great sea service would feel disinclined to remain on the station under him; that in giving him this command I was consulting the wishes of the President; that to supersede Du Pont, under any circumstances, involved some risk and responsibility to both the Department and the recipient; that he could not be unaware his promotion had caused some discontent, and that it would not be lessened by this command. If any of his seniors in past times desired to be transferred, they must be permitted to do so, without prejudice.

I stated that this appointment was a specialty, imposed upon the Department by Admiral Foote's affliction when on his way to assume these duties; that this interruption made prompt action necessary; that he had sought the privilege of leading in the assault on Sumter under Du Pont; that I had proposed him as an assistant and second to Foote; that he was to go for a particular purpose, and his absence from the Bureau would therefore be temporary. In the mean time, Commander Wise, the assistant who had been associated with him, could take charge of and go forward with the ordnance duties as well as, and perhaps better than, any one else. To all this he assented, but expressed a strong wish that a new appointment might be made, and he entirely relieved from the Bureau. I replied that I could not for a moment think of relieving him of charge of the ordnance, nor ought he to ask, or be willing, to relinquish it; that was his place, to which he had been educated and for which he had aptitude, and it was my wish he should retain his position as Chief of the Ordnance Bureau during my connection with the Department.

As related to any demonstration on Charleston, should any be made, he was to consider himself clothed with full powers, and to prescribe details, communicating at all times and without reserve to the Department; to let me have not only all the good news but any bad news, and to tell me frankly at any time of embarrassments, change of views, or difficulties of any kind.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 336-8

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, June 9, 1863

Admiral Foote arrived this A.M. Is ardent and earnest for his new duties. Is fully possessed of my views. Left this evening for New York. Will sail next Monday. In the mean time, Du Pont must hold on. Had a carefully prepared and characteristic letter from Du Pont, inclosing one from the commanders of the ironclads, which he has prompted and secured. This is for the future, and to make a record for himself.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 326

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: April 13, 1863

The Federal monitors, gun-boats, and transports no more menace the City of Charleston! The fleet has sailed away, several of the iron-clads towed out of the harbor being badly damaged. But before leaving that part of the coast, the Yankees succeeded in intercepting and sinking the merchant steamer Leopard, having 40,000 pairs of shoes, etc. on board for our soldiers. It is supposed they will reappear before Wilmington; our batteries there are ready for them.

Gen. Wise assailed the enemy on Saturday, at Williamsburg, captured the town, and drove the Federals into their fort — Magruder.

The President was ill and nervous on Saturday. His wife, who lost her parent at Montgomery, Ala., a month ago, and who repaired thither, is still absent.

Congress still refuses to clothe the President with dictatorial powers.

Senator Oldham, of Texas, made a furious assault on the Secretary of War, last Saturday. He says Senators, on the most urgent public business, are subjected to the necessity of writing their names on a slate, and then awaiting the pleasure of some lackey for permission to enter the Secretary's office. He was quite severe in his remarks, and moved a call on the President for certain information he desired.

The Sentinel abuses Congress for differing with the President in regard to the retention of diplomatic agents in London, etc. And the Enquirer, edited by John Mitchcl, the fugitive Irishman, opens its batteries on the Sentinel. So we go.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 291-2

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: April 9, 1863

Nothing additional has occurred at Charleston, the enemy not having renewed the attack. At Vicksburg all was quiet, and the enemy abandoning their canal. Such news must have a depressing effect upon the North. They will see that their monitors and iron-clads have lost their terrors. They have lost some twenty war steamers within the last few months; and how many of their merchantmen have been destroyed on the ocean, we have no means of knowing.

British and French capitalists have taken a cotton loan of $15,000,000, which is now selling at a premium of four per cent, in those countries, Our government can, if it will, soon have a navy of Alabamas and Floridas.

But we are in danger of being sold to the enemy by the blockade-runners in this city. High officers, civil and military, are said, perhaps maliciously, to be engaged in the unlawful trade hitherto carried on by the Jews. It is said that the flag of truce boats serve as a medium of negotiations between official dignitaries here and those at Washington; and I have no doubt many of the Federal officers at Washington, for the sake of lucre, make no scruple to participate in the profits of this treasonable traffic. They can beat us at this game: cheat us in bargaining, and excel us in obtaining information as to the number and position of troops, fortifications, etc.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 289

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: April 8, 1863

We learn to-day that the enemy bombarded our forts at Charleston, yesterday, two hours and a half. But few of our men were injured, and the forts sustained no damage of consequence. On the other hand, several of the iron-clads and monitors of the enemy were badly crippled; one of the latter, supposed to be the Keokuk, was sunk. Since then the bombardment has not been renewed. But no doubt the enemy will make other efforts to reduce a city which is the particular object of their vengeance. Every one is on the qui vive for further news from Charleston. Success there will make Beauregard the most popular man in the Confederacy, Lee excepted.

Speculation is running wild in this city; and the highest civil and military officers are said to be engaged, directly or indirectly, in the disgraceful business of smuggling. Mr. Memminger cannot be ignorant of this; and yet these men are allowed to retain their places.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 288

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: April 7, 1863

Nothing definite has transpired at Charleston, or if so, we have not received information of it yet.

From the West, we have accounts, from Northern papers, of the failure of the Yankee Yazoo expedition. That must have its effect.

Judge Campbell, Assistant Secretary of War, has decided in one instance (page 125, E. B. Conscript Bureau), that a paroled political prisoner, returning to the South, is not subject to conscription. This is in violation of an act of Congress, and general orders. It appears that grave judges are not all inflexibly just, and immaculately legal in their decisions. Col. Lay ordered the commandant of conscripts (Col. Shields) to give the man a protection, without any reason therefor.

It is now said large depots of provisions are being formed on the Rappahannock. This does not look like an indication of a retrograde movement on the part of Gen. Lee. Perhaps he will advance.

This afternoon dispatches were received from Charleston. Notwithstanding all the rumors relative to the hostile fleet being elsewhere, it is now certain that all the monitors, iron-clads, and transports have succeeded in passing the bar, and at the last accounts were in readiness to begin the attack. And Beauregard was prepared to receive it. To-morrow we shall have exciting intelligence. If we are to believe what we hear from South Carolinians, recently from Charleston (I do believe it), Charleston will not be taken. If the ground be taken, it will not be Charleston. If the forts fall, and our two rams be taken or destroyed, the defenders will still resist. Rifle-pits have been dug in the streets; and if driven from these, there are batteries beyond to sweep the streets, thus involving the enemy and the city in one common ruin.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 287-8

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, May 27, 1863

No decisive news from Vicksburg. The public mind is uneasy at the delay, yet I am glad to see blame attaches to no one because the place was not taken at once. There have been strange evidences of an unreasonable people on many occasions during the War. Had Halleck shown half the earnestness and ability of Farragut, we should have had Vicksburg in our possession a year ago.

Admiral Foote handed me a letter from Thomas Turner, in command of the Ironsides off Charleston. Turner anticipates the withdrawal of Du Pont from the command, and thinks Foote or Dahlgren will succeed him. Is willing to continue under Foote, but not under D., who is his junior and has been promoted for his scientific attainments, and not for nautical experience or ability. These views are natural and proper enough to an old naval and social companion. But he proceeds to comment on the ironclads; speaks of the “miserable monitors,” though he admits they are admirably adapted for harbor defense; is astonished the Department should build so many; says it is to fill the pockets of the speculators. These are Du Pont's tactics. If true, the Secretary is a knave, or a blockhead the tool of knaves, and so of others connected with the Department. But the fact is, Tom Turner is a simple dupe, and merely echoes the insinuations of another, who moulds him at pleasure and is demoralizing that entire command.

Had some talk with Admiral Foote respecting Charleston. He believes the place may be taken, but does not express himself with confidence. Has great respect for Du Pont, who, I fear, will exercise a bad influence upon him, should he be given the command. Admiral Gregory is too old and has some ailments. I have great faith in the old man, but the country would not forgive me the experiment, were he selected and to fail. There would be bitter opposition to Dahlgren from some good officers as well as the Tom Turners, were he given the squadron. Could he and Foote act together, it would be the best arrangement I could make.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 314-5

Diary of Gideon Welles: Sunday, May 25, 1863

Received a long dispatch from Admiral Porter at Haines Bluff, Yazoo River, giving details of successful fights and operations for several preceding days in that vicinity.

Am anxious in relation to the South Atlantic Squadron and feel daily the necessity of selecting a new commander. Du Pont is determined Charleston shall not be captured by the Navy, and that the Navy shall not attempt it; thinks it dangerous for the vessels to remain in Charleston Harbor, and prefers to occupy his palace ship, the Wabash, at Port Royal to roughing it in a smaller vessel off the port. His prize money would doubtless be greater without any risk. All officers under him are becoming affected by his feelings, adopt his tone, think inactivity best, — that the ironclads are mere batteries, not naval vessels, and that outside blockade is the true and only policy. Du Pont feels that he is strong in the Navy, strong in Congress, and strong in the country, and not without reason. There is not a more accomplished or shrewder gentleman in the service. Since Barron and others left, no officer has gathered a formidable clique in the Navy. He has studied with some effect to create one for himself, and has in his personal interest a number of excellent officers who I had hoped would not be inveigled. Good officers have warned me against him as a shrewd intriguer, but I have hoped to get along with him, for I valued his general intelligence, critical abilities, and advice. But I perceive that in all things he never forgets Du Pont. His success at Port Royal has made him feel that he is indispensable to the service. The modern changes in naval warfare and in naval vessels are repugnant to him; and to the turret vessels he has a declared aversion. He has been active in schemes to retire officers; he is now at work to retire ironclads and impair confidence in them. As yet he professes respect and high regard for me personally, but he is not an admirer of the President, and has got greatly out with Fox, who has been his too partial friend. An attack is, however, to be made on the Department by opposing its policy and condemning its vessels. This will raise a party to attack and a party to defend. The monitors are to be pronounced failures, and the Department, which introduced, adopted, and patronized them, is to be held responsible, and not Du Pont, for the abortive attempt to reach Charleston. Drayton, who is his best friend, says to me in confidence that Du Pont has been too long confined on shipboard, that his system, mentally and physically, is affected, and I have no doubt thinks, but does not say, he ought to be relieved for his own good as well as that of the service. Du Pont is proud and will not willingly relinquish his command, although he has in a half-defiant way said if his course was not approved I must find another.

I look upon it, however, as a fixed fact that he will leave that squadron, but he is a favorite and I am at a loss as to his successor. Farragut, if not employed elsewhere, would be the man, and the country would accept the change with favor. The age and standing of D. D. Porter would be deemed objectionable by many, yet he has some good points for that duty. Foote would be a good man for the place in many respects, but he is somewhat overshadowed by Du Pont, with whom he has been associated and to whom he greatly defers. Dahlgren earnestly wants the position, and is the choice of the President, but there would be general discontent were he selected. Older officers who have had vastly greater sea service would feel aggrieved at the selection of Dahlgren and find ready sympathizers among the juniors. I have thought of Admiral Gregory, whom I was originally inclined to designate as commander of the Gulf Blockading Squadron at the beginning of the war, but was overpersuaded by Paulding to take Mervine. A mistake but a lesson. It taught me not to yield my deliberate convictions in appointments and matters of this kind to the mere advice and opinion of another without a reason. Both Fox and Foote indorse Gregory. His age is against him for such active service, and would give the partisans of Du Pont opportunity to cavil.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 311-3

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, May 20, 1863

Admiral Lee has been here for two or three days consulting in regard to Wilmington. The blockade of Cape Fear is difficult and gives infinite trouble, but the War Department has manifested no desire to relieve us and prevent that means of Rebel communication. To-day we had a long conference. Lee has seen General Totten, and the conclusion is that the army must capture the place, assisted by the Navy, which will cover the landing. The practice of relying upon the Navy to do the principal fighting when forts or batteries are to be taken has had a bad effect in some respects and is vitiating the army.

Admiral Du Pont sends forward charges against Chief Engineer Stimers, who, on his passage from Charleston to New York after the late demonstration, expressed an opinion that Sumter might have been passed or taken. Du Pont requested Stimers to be sent to Port Royal for trial. Every officer under Du Pont has expressed a different opinion from Stimers and they would constitute the court. It is a strange request, and it would be quite as strange were I to comply with it. I would not trust Stimers, or any one whom Du Pont wished to make a victim, in his power. If not a little deranged, D. is a shrewd and selfish man. I think he is morbidly diseased. Drayton expresses this opinion. His conduct and influence have been unfortunate in many respects on his subordinates. Instead of sending Stimers to Port Royal to be sacrificed, I will order a court of inquiry at New York, where the facts may be elicited without prejudice or partiality. The alleged offense hardly justifies an inquiry in form, but nothing less will satisfy Du Pont, who wants a victim. More than this, he wants to lay his failure at Charleston on the ironclads, and with such a court as he would organize, and such witnesses as he has already trained, he would procure both Stimers and vessels to be condemned. It would be best for the ends of truth and justice to have an inquiry away from all partisanship, and from all unfair influences and management.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 306-7

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, May 14, 1863

I wrote, two or three weeks since, a letter to Admiral Du Pont of affairs at Charleston and his reports, but have delayed sending it, partly in hopes I should have something suggestive and encouraging, partly because Fox requested me to wait, in the belief we should have additional information. Du Pont is morbidly sensitive, and to vindicate himself wants to publish every defect and weakness of the ironclads and to disparage them, regardless of its effect in inspiring the Rebels to resist them, and impairing the confidence of our own men in their invulnerability. I have tried to be kind and frank in my letter, but shall very likely give offense.

Had a little conversation to-day with Chase and Bates on two or three matters, but the principal subject was Earl Russell's speech.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 302

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: March 4, 1863

The enemy bombarded Fort McAlister again yesterday, several gun-boats opening fire on it. It lasted all day; during winch one of the iron-clads retired, perhaps injured. We had only two men wounded and one gun (8 in. columbiad) dismounted. The fort was but little injured.

Recent Northern papers assert that their gun-boats have all passed through the canal opposite Vicksburg. This is not true yet.

Lincoln is now Dictator, his Congress having given him power to call out all the male population between the ages of twenty and thirty-five years, and authority to declare martial law whenever he pleases. The Herald shouts for Lincoln — of course. We must fight and pray, and hope for revolution and civil war in the North, which may occur any day.

Our cavalry, under Gen. Jones, has done some brilliant skirmishing recently in the vicinity of Winchester; and as soon as the March winds dry the earth a little, I suppose Hooker will recommence the “On to Richmond.” We shall be weaker the next campaign, but our men are brave.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 267

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, April 21, 1863

Have another dispatch from Du Pont in answer to one I sent him on the 11th enjoining upon him to continue to menace Charleston, that the Rebel troops on that station might be detained for the present to defend the place. In some respects this dispatch is not worthy of Du Pont. He says he never advised the attack and complains of a telegram from the President more than of the dispatch from the Department. If he never advised the attack, he certainly never discouraged it, and, until since that attack, I had supposed no man in the country was more earnest on the subject than he. How have I been thus mistaken? It has been his great study for many months, the subject of his visit, of his conversation, his correspondence. When Du Pont was here last fall, Dahlgren sought, as a special favor, the privilege of taking command, under Du Pont, of the attack on Charleston, — to lead in the assault. But it was denied, for the reason that Du Pont claimed the right to perform this great work in which the whole country took so deep an interest. His correspondence since has been of this tenor, wanting more ironclads and reinforcements. Once there were indications of faltering last winter, and I promptly told him it was not required of him to go forward against his judgment. No doubtful expression has since been heard. His third dispatch since the battle brings me the first intelligence he has thought proper to communicate of an adverse character.

Only some light matters came before the Cabinet. Chase and Blair were absent. The President requested Seward and myself to remain. As soon as the others left, he said his object was to get the right of the question in relation to the seizure of foreign mails. There had evidently been an interview between him and Seward since I read my letter to him on Saturday, and he had also seen Seward's reply. But he was not satisfied. The subject was novel to him.

Mr. Seward began by stating some of the embarrassments of the present peculiar contest in which we were engaged, — the unfriendly feeling of foreign governments, the difficulty of preventing England and France from taking part with the Rebels. He dwelt at length on the subject of mail communications and mails generally, the changes which had taken place during the last fifty years; spoke of the affair of the Trent, a mail packet, of the necessity of keeping on the best terms we could with England. Said his arrangement with Mr. Stuart, who was in charge of the British Legation, had been made with the approval of the President, though he had not communicated that fact to me, etc., etc.

I stated that this whole subject belonged to the courts, which had, by law, the possession of the mail; that I knew of no right which he or even the Executive had to interfere; that I had not regarded the note of the 31st of October as more than a mere suggestion, without examination or consideration, for there had been no Cabinet consultation; that it was an abandonment of our rights and an entire subversion of the policy of our own and of all other governments, which I had not supposed any one who had looked into the matter would seriously attempt to set aside without consultation with the proper Department and advisement, indeed, with the whole Cabinet; that had there been such consultation the subject would, I was convinced, have gone no farther, for it was in conflict with our stated law and the law of nations; that this arrangement, as the Secretary of State called it, was a sort of post-treaty, by which our rights were surrendered without an equivalent, a treaty which he was not in my opinion authorized to make.

Mr. Seward said he considered the arrangement reciprocal, and if it was not expressed in words or by interchange, it was to be inferred to be the policy of England, for she would not require of us what she would not give.

I declined to discuss the question of what might be inferred would be the future policy of England on a subject where she had been strenuous beyond any other government. I would not trust her generosity in any respect. I had no faith that she would give beyond what was stipulated in legible characters, nor did I believe she would, by any arrangement her Chargé might make, consent to abandon the principle recognized among nations and which she had always maintained. If this arrangement or treaty was reciprocal, it should be so stated, recorded, and universally understood. So important a change ought not and could not be made except by legislation or treaty; and if by treaty, the Senate must confirm it; if by legislation, the parliamentary bodies of both countries. There had been no such legislation, no such treaty, and I could not admit that any one Department, or the President even, could assume to make such a change.

The President thought that perhaps the Executive had some rights on this subject, but was not certain what they were, what the practice had been, what was the law, national or international. The Trent case he did not consider analogous in several respects. I had said in reply to Seward that the Trent was not a blockade-runner, but a regular mail packet, had a semi-official character, with a government officer on board in charge of the mails. The President said he wished to know the usage, — whether the public official seals or mail-bags of a neutral power were ever violated. Seward said certainly not. I maintained that the question had never been raised in regard to a captured legal prize — not a doubt expressed — and the very fact that Stuart had applied to him for mail exemption was evidence that he so understood the subject. Where was the necessity of this arrangement, or treaty, if that were not the usage? The case was plain. Our only present difficulty grew out of the unfortunate letter of the 31st of October,—the more unfortunate from the fact that it had been communicated to the British Government as the policy of our Government, while never, by any word or letter have they ever admitted it was their policy. It is not the policy of our Government, nor is it the law of our country. Our naval commanders know of no such policy, no such usage, no such law; they have never been so instructed, nor have our district attorneys. The President, although he had affixed his name to the word “approved” in Seward's late letter, and although he neither admitted nor controverted the statement that the letter of the 31st of October was with his knowledge and approval, was a good deal “obfusticated” in regard to the merits of the question, and the proceedings of Seward, who appeared to be greatly alarmed lest we should offend England, but was nevertheless unwilling to commit himself without farther examination. He said, after frankly declaring his ignorance and that he had no recollection of the question until recently called to his notice, that he would address us interrogatories. Mr. Seward declared, under some excitement and alarm, there was not time; that Lord Lyons was importunate in his demands, claiming that the arrangement should be fulfilled in good faith. I replied that Lord Lyons, nor the British Government, had no claim whatever except the concession made by him (Seward) in his letter of the 31st of October, while there was no concession or equivalent from England.

The two letters of Seward and myself which brought about this interview, of the 18th and 20th instant respectively, are as follows: —

• Gideon Welles to William H. Seward, April 18, 1863
• William H. Seward to Gideon Welles, April 20, 1863

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 277-80

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: February 26, 1863

We have good news from Vicksburg to-day. The Queen of the West, lately captured by us, and another gunboat, attacked the Indianola, the iron-clad Federal gun-boat which got past our batteries the other day, and, after an engagement, sunk her. We captured all the officers and men.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 264