Abraham Lincoln to Gustavus V. Fox, May 1, 1861

Washington, D. C.

May 1, 1861

Capt. G. V. Fox,

My dear Sir,

I sincerely regret that the failure of the late attempt to provision Fort Sumpter should be the source of any annoyance to you. The practicability of your plan was not, in fact, brought to a test. By reason of a gale, well known in advance to be possible, and not improbable, the tugs, an essential part of the plan, never reached the ground; while, by an accident, for which you were in no wise responsible, and possibly I to some extent was, you were deprived of a war vessel, with her men, which you deemed of great importance to the enterprize.

I most cheerfully and truly declare that the failure of the undertaking has not lowered you a particle, while the qualities you developed in the effort have greatly heightened you in my estimation. For a daring and dangerous enterprize, of a similar character you would to-day be the man, of all my acquaintances, whom I would select.

You and I both anticipated that the cause of the country would be advanced by making the attempt to provision Fort Sumpter, even if it should fail; and it is no small consolation now to feel that our anticipation is justified by the result.

Very truly your friend

A. LINCOLN

SOURCES: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 43-4; Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 420; Roy P. Basler, Editor, Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Volume 4, p. 350-1.

James Buchanan to the Commissioners of the State of South Carolina, December 30, 1860

Washington City, 30th December, 1860.

Gentlemen: I have the honor to receive your communication of 28th inst., together with a copy of your “full powers from the Convention of the People of South Carolina,” authorising you to treat with the Government of the United States on various important subjects therein mentioned, and also a copy of the Ordinance bearing date on the 20th instant, declaring that “the Union now subsisting between South Carolina and other States under the name of ‘the United States of America,’ is hereby dissolved.”

In answer to this communication, I have to say, that my position as President of the United States was clearly defined in the message to Congress of the 3d instant. In that I stated that, “apart from the execution of the laws, so far as this may be practicable, the Executive has no authority to decide what shall be the relations between the Federal Government and South Carolina. He has been invested with no such discretion. He possesses no power to change the relations heretofore existing between them, much less to acknowledge the independence of that State. This would be to invest a mere executive officer with the power of recognizing the dissolution of the Confederacy among our thirty-three sovereign States. It bears no resemblance to the recognition of a foreign de facto government — involving no such responsibility. Any attempt to do this would, on his part, be a naked act of usurpation. It is, therefore, my duty to submit to Congress the whole question, in all its bearings.”

Such is my opinion still. I could, therefore, meet you only as private gentlemen of the highest character, and was entirely willing to communicate to Congress any proposition you might have to make to that body upon the subject. Of this you were well aware. It was my earnest desire, that such a disposition might he made of the whole subject by Congress, who alone possess the power, as to prevent the inauguration of a civil war between the parties in regard to the possession of the Federal Forts in the harbor of Charleston; and I therefore deeply regret, that, in your opinion, “the events of the last twenty-four hours render this impossible.” In conclusion, you urge upon me “the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston,” stating that, “under present circumstances, they are a standing menace which renders negotiation impossible, and as our recent experience shows, threatens speedily to bring to a bloody issue, questions which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment.”

The reason for this change in your position is, that since your arrival in Washington, “an officer of the United States, acting as we (you) are assured, not only without, but against your (my) orders, has dismantled one fort and occupied another, thus altering, to a most important extent, the condition of affairs under which we (you) came.” You also allege that you came here “the representatives of an authority which could, at any time, within the past sixty days have taken possession of the forts in Charleston harbor, but which, upon pledges given in a manner that we (you) cannot doubt, determined to trust to your (my) honor  rather than to its own power.”

This brings me to a consideration of the nature of those alleged pledges, and in what manner they have been observed. In my message of the third of December last, I stated, in regard to the property of the United States in South Carolina, that it “has been purchased for a fair equivalent ‘by the consent of the Legislature of the State,’ ‘for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals,’ &c, and over these the authority ‘to exercise exclusive legislation’ has been expressly granted by the Constitution to Congress. It is not believed that any attempt will be made to expel the United States from this property by force; but if in this I should prove to be mistaken, the officer in command of the forts has received orders to act strictly on the defensive. In such a contingency, the responsibility for consequences would rightfully rest upon the heads of the assailants.” This being the condition of the parties, on Saturday, 8th December, four of the representatives from South Carolina called upon me and requested an interview. We had an earnest conversation on the subject of these forts, and the best means of preventing a collision between the parties for the purpose of sparing the effusion of blood. I suggested, for prudential reasons, that it would be best to put in writing what they said to me verbally. They did so accordingly, and on Monday morning, the 10th instant, three of them presented to me a paper signed by all the representatives from South Carolina, with a single exception, of which the following is a copy:

• Commissioners of the State of South Carolina to James Buchanan, December 9, 1860

And here I must, in justice to myself, remark, that at the time the paper was presented to me, I objected to the word “provided,” as it might be construed into an agreement, on my part, which I never would make. They said that nothing was farther from their intention — they did not so understand it, and I should not so consider it. It is evident they could enter into no reciprocal agreement with me on the subject. They did not profess to have authority to do this, and were acting in their individual character. I considered it as nothing more, in effect, than the promise of highly honorable gentlemen to exert their influence for the purpose expressed. The event has proven that they have faithfully kept this promise, although I have never since received a line from any one of them, or from any member of the Convention, on the subject. It is well known that it was my determination, and this I freely expressed, not to reinforce the forts in the harbor, and thus produce a collision, until they had been actually attacked, or until I had certain evidence that they were about to be attacked. This paper I received most cordially, and considered it as a happy omen that peace might still be preserved, and that time might thus be gained for reflection. This is the whole foundation for the alleged pledge.

But I acted in the same manner I would have done had I entered into a positive and formal agreement with parties capable of contracting, although such an agreement would have been, on my part, from the nature of my official duties, impossible.

The world knows that I have never sent any reinforcements to the forts in Charleston harbor, and I have certainly never authorized any change to be made “in their relative military status.”

Bearing upon this subject, I refer you to an order issued by the Secretary of War, on the 11th inst., to Major Anderson, but not brought to my notice until the 21st instant.' It is as follows:

Memorandum of verbal instructions to Major Anderson,

1st Artillery, Commanding Fort Moultrie, S. C.

You are aware of the great anxiety of the Secretary of War that a collision of the troops with the people of this State shall be avoided, and of his studied determination to pursue a course with reference to the military force and forts in this harbor, which shall guard against such a collision. He has, therefore, carefully abstained from increasing the force at this point, or taking any measures which might add to the present excited state of the public mind, or which would throw any doubt on the confidence he feels that South Carolina will not attempt by violence to obtain possession of the public works, or interfere with their occupancy. But as the counsel and acts of rash and impulsive persons may possibly disappoint these expectations of the Government, he deems it proper that you should be prepared with instructions to meet so unhappy a contingency. He has, therefore, directed me, verbally, to give you such instructions.

You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression; and, for that reason, you are not, without evident and imminent necessity, to take up any position which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile attitude; but you are to hold possession of the forts in this harbor, and, if attacked, you are to defend yourself to the last extremity. The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts; but an attack on, or attempt to take possession of either of them, will be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them which you may deem most proper, to increase its power of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar defensive steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act.

D. P. BUTLER, Assistant Adjutant General.

Fort Moultrie, S. C, Dec. 11, 1860.

This is in conformity to my instructions to Major Buell.

JOHN B. FLOYD, Secretary of War.

These were the last instructions transmitted to Major Anderson before his removal to Fort Sumter, with a single exception in regard to a particular which does not, in any degree, affect the present question. Under these circumstances, it is clear that Major Anderson acted upon his own responsibility, and without authority, unless, indeed, he had “tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act,” on the part of the authorities of South Carolina, which has not yet been alleged. Still, he is a brave and honorable officer; and justice requires that he should not be condemned without a fair hearing.

Be this as it may, when I learned that Major Anderson had left Fort Moultrie, and proceeded to Fort Sumter, my first promptings were to command him to return to his former position, and there to await the contingencies presented in his instructions. This could only have been done, with any degree of safety to the command, by the concurrence of the South Carolina authorities. But, before any steps could possibly have been taken in this direction, we received information, dated on the 28th instant, that “the Palmetto flag floated out to the breeze at Castle Pinckney, and a large military force went over last night (the 27th) to Fort Moultrie.” Thus the authorities of South Carolina, without waiting or asking for any explanation, and doubtless believing, as you have expressed it, that the officer had acted not only without, but against my orders, on the very next day after the night when the removal was made, seized, by a military force, two of the three federal forts in the harbor of Charleston, and have covered them under their own flag, instead of that of the United States. At this gloomy period of our history, startling events succeed each other rapidly. On the very day (the 27th instant) that possession of these two forts was taken, the Palmetto flag was raised over the federal Custom House and Post Office in Charleston; and, on the same day, every officer of the Customs — Collector, Naval Officers, Surveyor and Appraisers — resigned their offices. And this, although it was well known, from the language of my message, that, as an executive officer, I felt myself bound to collect the revenue at the port of Charleston under the existing laws. In the harbor of Charleston, we now find three forts confronting each other, over all of which the federal flag floated only four days ago; but now, over two of them, this flag has been supplanted, and the Palmetto flag has been substituted in its stead. It is, under all these circumstances, that I am urged immediately to withdraw the troops from the harbor of Charleston, and am informed that without this, negotiation is impossible. This I cannot do; this I will not do. Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible contingency. No allusion to it had ever been made in any communication between myself and any human being. But the inference is, that I am bound to withdraw the troops from the only fort remaining in the possession of the United States in the harbor of Charleston, because the officer then in command of all the forts thought proper, without instructions, to change his position from one of them to another. I cannot admit the justice of any such inference.

At this point of writing, I have received information, by telegram, from Captain Humphreys, in command of the Arsenal at Charleston, “that it has to-day (Sunday, the 30th) been taken by force of arms.” It is estimated that the munitions of war belonging to the United States in this Arsenal are worth half a million of dollars.

Comment is needless. After this information, I have only to add, that, whilst it is my duty to defend Fort Sumter, as a portion of the public property of the United States against hostile attacks from whatever quarter they may come, by such means as I may possess for this purpose, I do not perceive how such a defence can be construed into a menace against the City of Charleston.

With great personal regard, I remain

Yours, very respectfully,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

To Honorable

Robert W. Barnwell,

James H. Adams,

James L. Orr.

SOURCE: The Correspondence Between the Commissioners of the State of So. Ca. to the Government at Washington and the President of the United States, p. 5-11

Result Of Gustavus V. Fox's Plan For Reinforcing Fort Sumpter; In His Own Writing

My plan for reinforcing Fort Sumpter was this—

From the outer edge of the bar to Sumpter through the swash channel it is four miles in a straight line, with no shoal spots less than nine feet at high water. The batteries of the enemy on Morris and Sullivan Islands are one and one third of a mile distant from each other, between which the reinforcements must pass.

I proposed to anchor three small men of war at the entrance of the swash channel to afford a safe base of operations. The soldiers and provisions to be taken down in a large steamer, having on board boats for the whole, with three hundred sailors, and accompanied with three steam tugs having a draft of only six feet of water. The entrance to be effected at night with the tugs or boats as circumstances might dictate.

Rough weather would render the attempt impossible in boats but favorable for tugs. Whereas a fine clear night would be more favorable for the smaller objects — boats. This plan was brought to the Pres^ts notice early in March and its practicability assured by his own convictions and concurrent naval testimony.

The military authorities seemed to think it impossible to pass their batteries, but assured the Pres^t that if reinforcements and provisions were thrown in the fort it could not be taken.

I visited Major Anderson on the 21st of March under an open order from the War Dpt, which was shown to Govr Pickens who gave me a pass, without restriction, and I confined my conversation with Major Anderson entirely to objects embraced in that order. Notwithstanding the earnest desire of the Pres^t to reinforce and provision Fort Sumpter, Mr. Seward seems to have been under obligations to oppose the attempt, and his great influence over Genl Scott, brought the military power against the plan.

As Major Anderson's supplies would be utterly exhausted on the 15th of April every effort was made by some strong hand to delay the expedition until its supporters must give it up. The last card was to send for a Union man from the Virginia Convention and say to him that Sumpter would be evacuated at once if the Union people, who were in a majority in the Convention, would adjourn it. This Union man declined the proposition and made so many preposterous demands  that the Pres^t decided the expedition should go forward. The order was given to me late the night of April 4th. The 5th was consumed in getting to N. York, and I sailed the 8th, leaving only three days to get up and dispatch the expedition. Most of those who had favored the expedition and in whom I depended for assistance to fit it out, abandoned it at this period as too late.

Unwilling to mention to the Pres^t the misgivings of those around me I determined to go forward alone.

Instead of the 300 sailors I asked for on board the steamer, the Sec'y of the Navy proposed to send down the Powhatan stm'r of war with that number of men, which was satisfactory to me. Therefore I sailed in the Baltic the 8th inst. without the sailors. The Powhatan having sailed the 6th. The revenue cutter H. Lane, the 8th, the Pawnee the 9th and the Pocahontas the 10th. The Baltic and Pawnee arrived off Charleston the 12th inst. after hostilities had commenced. The H. Lane the evening previous, and the Pocahontas the 13th at the surrender of Sumpter. The passage to Charleston and the day and night of our arrival was severe weather, preventing the tugs reaching the rendezvous. The next day, the 13th inst, seeing no part of my proposed means of effecting an entrance had arrived, a schooner loaded with ice was captured and means undertaken to effect an entrance in her the following night, but at 8 A.M. the wood work of the fort was set on fire by hot shot and by 3 P.M. the place was rendered untenable, and consequently it was surrendered.

The defects of the fort, and its injuries, such as were never anticipated by the engineers, are such, that had the place been provisioned and reinforced, the final result would have been delayed but a few days. The Powhatan, with her sailors, was the whole strength of my proposed plan because both tugs and boats were to be manned by these sailors. Yet the Powhatan sailed from N. York the 6th two days before I did, with an officer who bore an order from the Pres^t of the U. S. to carry her directly to Pensacola. Her regular Captn having the orders of the Navy Dept to cooperate with me at Charleston. This order of the Pres^t was unknown to the war or navy departments and was signed by him in ignorance that the Powhatan was one of my vessels. She was sent off on an expedition got up by the Sec'y of State who thus interfered with the other depts as the last hope of preventing the reinforcing of Sumpter. And it did prevent it, and I had the mortification of witnessing the surrender of the Fort with no part of my proposed plan arrived, in fact deprived by treachery of all power of accomplishing it, and losing reputation with the general public for the failure because I cannot state the facts at this crisis of our affairs without injury to the Govt.

The Charleston people assumed that the merchant vessels detained outside of their bar were the various expeditions which had sailed from N. York about the period of our departure and therefore they concentrated a large force on the islands and abused us for not landing and attacking the batteries. But they were vessels detained by the bombardment. Our military force consisted of 200 recruits of no earthly use to Fort Sumpter in such an emergency because they were undrilled. The S. C. authorities had 13,000. I believe every officer of the army or navy present were entirely satisfied of the feasibility of either of my plans.

In fact their fire upon Sumpter was precipitated because they intercepted my plan and were assured by their best naval authority that it was perfectly practicable.

G. V. Fox.

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 38-41

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: October 2, 1863

Our 5000 prisoners taken at the battle of Chickamauga have arrived in this city, and it is ascertained that more are on the way hither. Gen. Bragg said he had 5000 besides the wounded, and as none of the wounded have arrived, more must have been taken since his dispatch. Every effort is being made on our part to capture the army of Rosecrans — and everything possible is done by the enemy to extricate him, and to reinforce him to such an extent that he may resume offensive operations. Without this be done, the campaign must close disastrously in the West, and then the peace party of the North will have a new inspiration of vitality.

It is now said that Gen. Lee, despairing of being attacked in his chosen position, has resolved to attack Meade, or at least to advance somewhere. It is possible (if Meade has really sent two corps of his army to the West) that he will cross the Potomac again — at least on a foraging expedition. If he meets with only conscripts and militia he may penetrate as far as Harrisburg, and then let Europe perpend! The Union will be as difficult of reconstruction, as would have been the celebrated Campo Formio vase shivered by Napoleon. It is much easier to destroy than to construct. The emancipation and confiscation measures rendered reconstruction impracticable — unless, indeed, at a future day, the Abolitionists of the United States should be annihilated and Abolitionism abolished.

To-day I got an excellent pair of winter shoes from a quartermaster here for $13 — the retail price for as good an article, in the stores, is $75; fine boots have risen to $200!

The enemy's batteries on Morris Island are firing away again at Sumter's ruins, and at Moultrie — but they have not yet opened on the city.

The newspapers continue to give accounts of the Chickamauga battle.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 59-60

Montgomery Blair to Gustavus V. Fox, April 26, 1861

Dear Fox

I have not written you because it was easy for you to understand what I thought of the Fort Sumpter business and not agreeable for me to express what I thought. We are now fairly launched in a big war and I think you can have a command if you want one. A proposition was made yesterday to convert some merchant vessels into armed ships and during the talk the President said he wanted you to have a command tho you did not get into Fort Sumpter. He thought very highly of you. We propose to take on naval volunteers as well as Soldier volunteers.

I am warring on fogyism of all kinds, I think the best thing now to be done is to disband both army and navy and reconstruct. We shall never get on I am afraid with the present officers.

Apl 26. I wrote the above some days ago and was disturbed and have not had an opportunity to resume till this moment. In the mean time last night I have yours of 20th. I shall mention its contents to Welles and Lincoln. I gave yrs from the Baltic both to Welles and Seward to read. Seward read a part of it and handed it back without remark. Welles said when he handed it back that you knew he supposed that he had nothing to do with the diversion of the Powhatan from her Charleston mission. But the President has never had an opportunity to read or talk about the affair, except on the occasion mentioned, and indeed events of such magnitude are crowding on us that Sumpter and Anderson are not thought of for the moment. I want you here very much to help us along, and must try and manage it. I see however that Com. Paulding is mightily set up himself and wants nobody in the Dept, but himself. I think I will fix his flint shortly.

Yrs truly

M. Blair     

Wash. Apl 26, 1861

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 37-8

Commissioners of the State of South Carolina to James Buchanan, December 28, 1860

Washington, 28th December, 1860.

Sir: We have the honor to transmit to you a copy of the full powers from the Convention of the People of South Carolina, under which we are “authorized and empowered to treat with the Government of the United States for the delivery of the forts, magazines, light houses and other real estate, with their appurtenances, within the limits of South Carolina, and also for an apportionment of the public debt and for a division of all other property held by the Government of the United States as agent of the confederated States, of which South Carolina was recently a member; and generally to negotiate as to all other measures and arrangements proper to be made and adopted in the existing relation of the parties, and for the continuance of peace and amity between this commonwealth and the Government at Washington.”

In the execution of this trust, it is our duty to furnish you, as we now do, with an official copy of the Ordinance of Secession, by which the State of South Carolina has resumed the powers she delegated to the Government of the United States and has declared her perfect sovereignty and independence.

It would also have been our duty to have informed you that we were ready to negotiate with you upon all such questions as are necessarily raised by the adoption of this ordinance, and that we were prepared to enter upon this negotiation with the earnest desire to avoid all unnecessary and hostile collision, and so to inaugurate our new relations as to secure mutual respect, general advantage and a future of good will and harmony beneficial to all the parties concerned.

But the events of the last twenty-four hours render such an assurance impossible. We came here the representatives of an authority which could, at any time within the past sixty days, have taken possession of the forts in Charleston harbor, but which, upon pledges given in a manner that, we cannot doubt, determined to trust to your honor rather than to its own power. Since our arrival here an officer of the United States, acting, as we are assured, not only without but against your orders, has dismantled one fort and occupied another, thus altering, to a most important extent, the condition of affairs under which we came.

Until these circumstances are explained in a manner which relieves us of all doubt as to the spirit in which these negotiations shall be conducted, we are forced to suspend all discussion as to any arrangements by which our mutual interests might be amicably adjusted.

And, in conclusion, we would urge upon you the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston. Under present circumstances, they are a standing menace which renders negotiation impossible, and, as our recent experience shews, threatens speedily to bring to a bloody issue questions which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment.

We have the honor, Sir, to be,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servants,

R. W. BARNWELL,

J. H. ADAMS,

JAMES L. ORR,

Commissioners.

To the President

of the United States.

SOURCE: The Correspondence Between the Commissioners of the State of So. Ca. to the Government at Washington and the President of the United States, p. 3-4

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, February 26, 1864

Only three of us were at the Cabinet council to-day. Some matters of interest were touched upon, but there was soon a discussion on recent political movements. The President has been advised of the steps taken to forward the Chase operations. Circulars were put in his hands before signed.

A spicy debate sprung up yesterday on the passage of the Navy Bill. Holman, a Copperhead partisan, made an attack on me, — sprawling, personally vituperative, and abusive. H. Winter Davis sustained him, but flung his vindictive spite more malignantly at Fox, whom he called a "cotton-spinner," than at me. He eulogized Du Pont, whom the Navy Department had withdrawn from the command of the South Atlantic Squadron, and denounced the Balaclavian order compelling him to attack Sumter, etc., etc. Kelly and Griswold defended the Department, but Frank Blair made the best points, and told Davis that, while he was active in getting up investigations against the Navy Department, he opposed all investigation of the Treasury. Things took such shape that I perceive the instructions to and correspondence with Du Pont will be called for.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 531

Gustavus V. Fox to Montgomery Blair, April 17, 1861

Baltic, 17th April

At Sea, 1861  

Dr Blair,

As I have no writing materials and wish to save tomorrow's mail I use a pencil.

Monday at 6 P.M. of the 8th we dropped down to Sandy Hook and anchored for the night, being too late for the tide. One of my tugs went to sea Sunday night, another one followed the Baltic, and the 3d I left in the hands of Russell Sturgis, to send on if he could charter her, the owner, like many others, being shaky at the last moment. At 8 A.M. of the 9th inst. we discharged the pilot and had constant steady bad weather and heavy sea. At 3 A.M. of the 12th reached the rendezvous 10 miles east of Charleston light — found only the H. Lane. At 6 A.M. saw the Pawnee coming in; boarded her and intimated to her Comdr that I was going in to offer to land provisions, asked him to stand in with me. He said his orders were to remain 10 miles east of the light and await the Powhatan. I took the H. Lane as an escort, and as we drew in saw that the forts had all opened fire upon Sumpter and that Major Anderson was replying gallantly. Seeing a stm'r off the bar, supposed to be the Isabel, I notified Capt. Faunce of the H. Lane and he started after her. It proved to be the Nashville from N. York.

I stood out in the Baltic to let Capt. Rowan of the Pawnee know that firing had commenced. I met him, however, coming in. Though he had expressed himself very averse to doing anything to commence the war, he now seemed willing to go in with his vessel if we had a pilot. I advised both vessels to go close in to the swash channel and anchor, which was done, and as the heavy sea and wind had moderated a little, I thought we had better attempt a couple of boats of provisions this night, the 12th, but as the Powhatan and Pocahontas had not arrived and the Pawnee and Lane were both short of hands and we had but one gun launch, the Pawnee's, I was overruled and consented upon the gallant promise of the officers that they would escort me in after daylight in the morning, defying their batteries. This was their proposition. The vessels of war remained at anchor at the Swash whilst I stood out to the rendezvous for the night in hopes of meeting the Powhatan and Pocahontas. It blew very heavy all night with a great swell and towards morning a thick fog. As Capt. Fletcher of the Baltic returned towards the anchorage, near daylight, he ran onto the Rattlesnake Shoal, but soon got off. The waves run so high that we were obliged to anchor some four miles outside of the war vessels, and having this sea it was impossible to load the boats. I took a boat at 8 A.M. 13th inst., and with the senior army officer Lt. Hudson, we pulled in to the Pawnee. As we drew near I saw, with horror, black volumes of smoke issuing from Sumpter. The barbarians, to their everlasting disgrace be it said, redoubled their fire, and through the flames and smoke the noble band of true men continued their response. The severe weather during the forenoon having prevented us using boats, Capt. Rowan captured an ice schooner and offered it to me to carry in the provisions and men. I accepted it and the night of the 13th I should certainly have gone in, and as certainly been knocked to pcs. My tug boats I knew could not have reached Charleston in the weather we had experienced since leaving N. York, and the Powhatan, I now learned, by a note from Capt. Mercer to Capt. Rowan, dated the 7th (I left the 8th, Rowan left the 9th, Gillis the 10th) that the Powhatan was “detached from duty off Charleston.” As she had the 300 sailors I asked for, and the howitzers and fighting launches, and the other ships of war were simply ordered to await her arrival 10 miles off, you will see that some one determined to utterly extinguish the expedition. I do not think I have deserved this treatment, and at present will not speak as I have felt, and now feel. At about 2 P.M. the Pocahontas arrived, just in time to witness the surrender of Fort Sumpter. I immediately suggested a flag of truce to be sent to offer a passage to Major A. and his command, which was done. Had the Powhatan arrived the 12th we should have had the men and provisions into Fort Sumpter, as I had everything ready, boats, muffled oars, small packages of provisions, in fact everything but the 300 sailors promised to me by the dept. A tug would have accomplished it, but with more risk alongside of the Fort. Capt. Foster the Eng. of Fort Sumpter says we would have got in and so does Hartstein of their navy. You know military people all told the Prest we could not get in, but if we did, the Fort was impregnable. In both instances were they wrong. Sumpter's fire had dispersed their naval preparations and they trusted entirely to their batteries and those light boats to illuminate the channel. What can be said of the builders of the fort? The burning of the officers' quarters has almost ruined the gorge wall, so that a few days more fire would have tumbled it all to pcs. One shot from Cummings point (where Cullum said it never could be breached) went entirely through the wall of the gorge. Another shot passed through an inside wall and struck below the door of the magazine, shattering the wall, so as to prevent the opening of the door, at the same time the flames nearly reached this door. In fact they all expected to be blown up. The coupe next to Cummings point is very severely handled and would soon have been a breach. So that this impregnable fort, with 33 guns and 17 mortars, playing upon it for only 34 hours, is injured $400,000 worth and actually burned as much as battered. I think these facts will make a stir, for not one was ever presented in all the discussion we had. The officers and men from the Major down have covered themselves with glory. A fort of 60 fighting men, surrounded by 9000 men, and a circle of fortifications kept up the first day gun for gun with them and on the 2 replied, though from 8 A.M. until 2 P.M. the fort was a mass of smoke through which, and in which, they fought.

I told the Major how anxious the Prest was that they (S.C.) should stand before the civilized world as having fired upon bread, yet they had made the case much worse for themselves as they knew the Major would leave the 15th at noon for want of provisions (see his correspondence), yet they opened upon 60 men and continued it whilst the fort was burning. The "World" (N. Y.) correspondent came down in the H. Lane and is now with us, and as he is the only reporter on board and is continually with the officers I imagine he will have a faithful account. As several ships brigs and schooners and one N. Y. stmr were detained at the bar by the conflict, it was believed to be a whole fleet for the relief of Sumpter with 9000 men on board. Whereas there was the Pawnee and H. Lane with one 12 lb. launch gun and on board the Baltic 200 RECRUITS only two or three of whom ever saw a gun, sent by the Gen1 in Chief, and the flag ship with her power and efficiency sent away without any intimation conveyed to the other vessels, all of which sailed subsequently to this change. Sunday the Major delivered up the fort after saluting his flag with 50 guns, which he intended to be 100, but a premature explosion killed two men and wounded three others, the only casualties of the whole battle. Monday, at noon, he and his command, and the flag (I enclose a pce) came off in the Isabel stmr and were transferred to this vessel when we sailed, all the vessels saluting. Excepting from the time of the surrender to the transfer, we have had a gale of wind just now abating (midnight).

The men in the fort, though on Pork and Rice, never flinched or grumbled, even when fire was added. I think the Prest will keenly approve the Major's course. As for our expedition, somebody's influence has made it ridiculous.

Very truly

G. V. FOX.

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 31-5

• See post script, April 18, 1861

Gustavus V. Fox to Montgomery Blair, Thursday, April 18, 1861 – 12:30 a.m.

You will see that the surrender came from them, not from the Major — a very important point.

Major A. felt hurt at what he thought was the neglect of Govt in not informing him of various matters. He also felt badly towards me, at not telling him everything when I visited the fort. Now, however, he appreciates my delicacy in not going beyond my written order. I also explained the reasons for holding the fort, far superior to any military ones, and told the Major that I thought the Govt would feel particularly gratified at the result.

I may not get my report off to-day to the Secy of War so you may read this to him if you think best.

I have just written Major Anderson's dispatch to the Secy of War and sent it to Sandy Hook to be forwarded by telegraph.

Thursday 18th inst.

12.30 A.M.     

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 36

Gustavus V. Fox to Virginia Woodbury Fox, April 6, 1861

Steam Ship Bath

Ap. 6th '61

My dearest V.

We have come to anchor just inside of Sandy Hook, being too late for the evening tide. We shall go over the bar at daylight in the morning. I feel deeply dearest wife the pain I cause you, but nevertheless I cannot shrink from a solemn duty, which, if successful is pregnant with great results for our beloved country. I am afraid we are too late, from no fault of mine, but I pray earnestly that I may be permitted to do something for a country dear to me above all others. There is no personal peril to those whom God selects to act a prominent part. I feel none, not the least. I confide completely in His great arm and the faithful prayers of a dear wife.

We have three officers and 200 men, I have instructions to them and the captn of the ship and shall not deliver them until the pilot leaves us, so no one has the least idea of the voyage though I think it will be in tomorrow's papers. One of my tugs went to sea last night, another came near us a few minutes since and I ordered her to make the best of her way to her destination. She immediately steamed out to sea.

Our three officers are cheerful and happy, true as steel, and anxious to do their duty.

Now do not brood over the dark picture my own sweet wife. What a picture of happiness God has framed for us "together" in the past. It will continue if we confide in Him. I feel my mother's sublime faith, that we have but to perform our duty, leaving the mysterious results to be worked out in his appointed time. And now farewell, only for a short time then back to answer your prayers and trust in Him.

Goodnight dearest,

Aff

Gus

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 26-7

Gideon Welles to Captain Samuel Mercer, April 5, 1861

Navy Department

April 5th, 1861.

Captain Samuel Mercer

Com'dg. U.S.S. Powhatan, New York.

The United States steamers “Powhatan,” “Pawnee,” “Pocahontas,” and "Harriet Lane" will compose a naval force under your command to be sent to the vicinity of Charleston S. C. for the purpose of aiding in carrying out the objects of an expedition of which the War Department has charge.

The primary object of the expedition is to provision Fort Sumter, for which purpose the War Department will furnish the necessary transports. Should the authorities of Charleston permit the Fort to be supplied, no further particular service will be required of the force under your command; and after being satisfied that supplies have been received at the Fort, the “Powhatan,” “Pocahontas” and “Harriet Lane” will return to New York and the “Pawnee” to Washington.

Should the authorities at Charleston, However, refuse to permit or attempt to prevent the vessel or vessels having supplies on board from entering the harbor, or from peaceably proceeding to Fort Sumter, you will protect the transports or boats of the expedition in the object of their mission, disposing of your force in such manner as to open the way for their ingress and afford, so far as practicable, security to the men and boats, and repelling by force, if necessary, all obstructions toward provisioning the Fort and reinforcing it; for in case of a resistance to the peaceable primary object of the expedition a reenforcement of the garrison will also be attempted. These purposes will be under the supervision of the War Department, which has charge of the expedition. The expedition has been intrusted to Captain G. V. Fox, with whom you will put yourself in communication and cooperate with him to accomplish and carry into effect its object.

You will leave New York with the “Powhatan” in time to be off Charleston bar, ten miles distant from and due east of the lighthouse, on the morning of the 11th inst., there to await the arrival of the transport or transports with troops and stores. The “Pawnee” and “Pocahontas” will be ordered to join you there at the time mentioned, and also the “Harriet Lane,” which latter vessel has been placed under the control of this department for this service.

On the termination of the expedition, whether it be peaceable or otherwise, the several vessels under your command will return to the respective ports as above directed, unless some unforeseen circumstances should prevent.

I am, resp'y, your ob't servt.

Gideon Welles

Secretary of the Navy.

Captain Mercer took this order with him when he turned over the command to Lieut. Porter. He sent no copy to the next senior officer of the Sumter expedition. [Note by G. V. F]

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 23-5

Brevet Lieutenant-General Scott to Lieutenant-Colonel Henry L. Scott, April 4, 1861

[Copy]

Headquarters of the Army,    

Washington April 4th, 1861.

Confidential.

Lieut.-Col. H. L. Scott,

Aid-de-Camp, etc. etc.

Sir:

This letter will be handed to you by Captain G. V. Fox, ex officer of the navy, and a gentleman of high standing as well as possessed of extraordinary nautical ability. He is charged by high authority here with the command of an expedition (under cover of certain ships of war) whose object is to reenforce Fort Sumter. To embark with Captain Fox you will cause a detachment of recruits, say about two hundred, to be immediately organized at Fort Columbus with a competent number of officers, army ammunition and subsistence; a large surplus of the latter, indeed, as great as the vessels of the expedition will take, with other necessaries will be needed for the augmented garrison of Fort Sumter. The subsistence and other supplies should be assorted like those which were provided by you and Captain Ward of the navy, for a former expedition. Consult Captain Fox and Major Eaton on the subject, and give all necessary orders in my name to fit out the expedition except that the hiring of the vessels will be left to others.

Some fuel must be shipped. All artillery implements, fuses, cordage, slow match, mechanical levers and guns, etc., etc. should also be put on board.

Consult also if necessary (confidentially) Colonel Tompkins and Major Thornton.

Respectfully yours,

WlNFIELD SCOTT

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 21-2

Diary of William Howard Russell: July 2, 1861

At early dawn this morning, looking out of the sleeping car, I saw through the mist a broad, placid river on the right, and on the left high wooded banks running sharply into the stream, against the base of which the rails were laid. West Point, which is celebrated for its picturesque scenery, as much as for its military school, could not be seen through the fog, and I regretted time did not allow me to stop and pay a visit to the academy. I was obliged to content myself with the handiwork of some of the ex-pupils. The only camaraderie I have witnessed in America exists among the West Point men. It is to Americans what our great public schools are to young Englishmen. To take a high place at West Point is to be a first-class man, or wrangler. The academy turns out a kind of military aristocracy, and I have heard complaints that the Irish and Germans are almost completely excluded, because the nominations to West Point are obtained by political influence; and the foreign element, though powerful at the ballot-box, has no enduring strength. The Murphies and Schmidts seldom succeed in shoving their sons into the American institution. North and South, I have observed, the old pupils refer everything military to West Point. “I was with Beauregard at West Point. He was three above me.” Or, “McDowell and I were in the same class.” An officer is measured by what he did there, and if professional jealousies date from the state of common pupilage, so do lasting friendships. I heard Beauregard, Lawton, Hardee, Bragg, and others, speak of McDowell, Lyon, McClellan, and other men of the academy, as their names turned up in the Northern papers, evidently judging of them by the old school standard. The number of men who have been educated there greatly exceeds the modest requirements of the army. But there is likelihood of their being all in full work very soon.

At about nine, A. M., the train reached New York, and in driving to the house of Mr. Duncan, who accompanied me from Niagara, the first thing which struck me was the changed aspect of the streets. Instead of peaceful citizens, men in military uniforms thronged the pathways, and such multitudes of United States flags floated from the windows and roofs of the houses as to convey the impression that it was a great holiday festival. The appearance of New York when I first saw it was very different. For one day, indeed, after my arrival, there were men in uniform to be seen in the streets, but they disappeared after St. Patrick had been duly honored, and it was very rarely I ever saw a man in soldier's clothes during the rest of my stay. Now, fully a third of the people carried arms, and were dressed in some kind of martial garb.

The walls are covered with placards from military companies offering inducements to recruits. An outburst of military tailors has taken place in the streets; shops are devoted to militia equipments; rifles, pistols, swords, plumes, long boots, saddle, bridle, camp belts, canteens, tents, knapsacks, have usurped the place of the ordinary articles of traffic. Pictures and engravings — bad, and very bad — of the “battles” of Big Bethel and Vienna, full of furious charges, smoke and dismembered bodies, have driven the French prints out of the windows. Innumerable "General Scott's" glower at you from every turn, making the General look wiser than he or any man ever was. Ellsworths in almost equal proportion, Grebles and Winthrops — the Union martyrs — and Tompkins, the temporary hero of Fairfax court-house.

The “flag of our country” is represented in a colored engraving, the original of which was not destitute of poetical feeling, as an angry blue sky through which meteors fly streaked by the winds, whilst between the red stripes the stars just shine out from the heavens, the flag-staff being typified by a forest tree bending to the force of the blast. The Americans like this idea — to my mind it is significant of bloodshed and disaster. And why not! What would become of all these pseudo-Zouaves who have come out like an eruption over the States, and are in no respect, not even in their baggy breeches, like their great originals, if this war were not to go on? I thought I had had enough of Zouaves in New Orleans, but dȋs aliter visum.

They are overrunning society, and the streets here, and the dress which becomes the broad-chested, stumpy, short-legged Celt, who seems specially intended for it, is singularly unbecoming to the tall and slightly-built American. Songs “On to glory,” “Our country,” new versions of “Hail Columbia,” which certainly cannot be considered by even American complacency a “happy land” when its inhabitants are preparing to cut each other's throats; of the “star-spangled banner,” are displayed in booksellers’ and music-shop windows, and patriotic sentences emblazoned on flags float from many houses. The ridiculous habit of dressing up children and young people up to ten and twelve years of age as Zouaves and vivandières has been caught up by the old people, and Mars would die with laughter if he saw some of the abdominous, be-spectacled light infantry men who are hobbling along the pavement.

There has been indeed a change in New York; externally it is most remarkable, but I cannot at all admit that the abuse with which I was assailed for describing the indifference which prevailed on my arrival was in the least degree justified. I was desirous of learning how far the tone of conversation “in the city” had altered, and soon after breakfast I went down Broadway to Pine Street and Wall Street. The street in all its length was almost draped with flags — the warlike character of the shops was intensified. In front of one shop window there was a large crowd gazing with interest at some object which I at last succeeded in feasting my eyes upon. A gray cap with a tinsel badge in front, and the cloth stained with blood was displayed, with the words, “Cap of Secession officer killed in action.” On my way I observed another crowd of women, some with children in their arms standing in front of a large house and gazing up earnestly and angrily at the windows. I found they were wives, mothers, and sisters, and daughters of volunteers who had gone off and left them destitute.

The misery thus caused has been so great that the citizens of New York have raised a fund to provide food, clothes, and a little money — a poor relief, in fact, for them, and it was plain they were much needed, though some of the applicants did not seem to belong to a class accustomed to seek aid from the public. This already! But Wall Street and Pine Street are bent on battle. And so this day, hot from the South and impressed with the firm resolve of the people, and finding that the North has been lashing itself into fury, I sit down and write to England, on my return from the city. “At present dismiss entirely the idea, no matter how it may originate, that there will be, or can be, peace, compromise, union, or secession, till war has determined the issue.”

As long as there was a chance that the struggle might not take place, the merchants of New York were silent, fearful of offending their Southern friends and connections, but inflicting infinite damage on their own government and misleading both sides. Their sentiments, sympathies, and business bound them with the South; and, indeed, till “the glorious uprising” the South believed New York was with them, as might be credited from the tone of some organs in the press, and I remember hearing it said by Southerners in Washington, that it was very likely New York would go out of the Union! When the merchants, however, saw the South was determined to quit the Union, they resolved to avert the permanent loss of the great profits derived from their connection with the South by some present sacrifices. They rushed to the platforms — the battle-cry was sounded from almost every pulpit — flag-raisings took place in every square, like the planting of the tree of liberty in France in 1848, and the oath was taken to trample Secession under foot, and to quench the fire of the Southern heart forever.

The change in manner, in tone, in argument, is most remarkable. I met men to-day who last March argued coolly and philosophically about the right of Secession. They are now furious at the idea of such wickedness — furious with England, because she does not deny their own famous doctrine of the sacred right of insurrection. “We must maintain our glorious Union, sir.” “We must have a country.” “We cannot allow two nations to grow up on this Continent, sir.” “We must possess the entire control of the Mississippi.” These “musts,” and can’ts,” and “won'ts,” are the angry utterances of a spirited people who have had their will so long that they at last believe it is omnipotent. Assuredly, they will not have it over the South without a tremendous and long-sustained contest, in which they must put forth every exertion, and use all the resources and superior means they so abundantly possess.

It is absurd to assert, as do the New York people, to give some semblance of reason to their sudden outburst, that it was caused by the insult to the flag at Sumter. Why, the flag had been fired on long before Sumter was attacked by the Charleston batteries! It had been torn down from United States arsenals and forts all over the South; and but for the accident which placed Major Anderson in a position from which he could not retire, there would have been no bombardment of the fort, and it would, when evacuated, have shared the fate of all the other Federal works on the Southern coast. Some of the gentlemen who are now so patriotic and Unionistic, were last March prepared to maintain that if the President attempted to reenforce Sumter or Pickens, he would be responsible for the destruction of the Union. Many journals in New York and out of it held the same doctrine.

One word to these gentlemen. I am pretty well satisfied that if they had always spoken, written, and acted as they do now, the people of Charleston would not have attacked Sumter so readily. The abrupt outburst of the North and the demonstration at New York filled the South, first with astonishment, and then with something like fear, which was rapidly fanned into anger by the press and the politicians, as well as by the pride inherent in slaveholders.

I wonder what Mr. Seward will say when I get back to Washington. Before I left, he was of opinion — at all events, he stated — that all the States would come back, at the rate of one a month. The nature of the process was not stated; but we are told there are 250,000 Federal troops now under arms, prepared to try a new one.

Combined with the feeling of animosity to the rebels, there is, I perceive, a good deal of ill-feeling towards Great Britain. The Southern papers are so angry with us for the Order in Council closing British ports against privateers and their prizes, that they advise Mr. Rust and Mr. Yancey to leave Europe. We are in evil case between North and South. I met a reverend doctor, who is most bitter in his expressions towards us; and I dare say, Bishop and General Leonidas Polk, down South, would not be much better disposed. The clergy are active on both sides; and their flocks approve of their holy violence. One journal tells, with much gusto, of a blasphemous chaplain, a remarkably good rifle shot, who went into one of the skirmishes lately, and killed a number of rebels — the joke being, in fact, that each time he' fired and brought down his man, he exclaimed, piously, “May Heaven have mercy on your soul!” One Father Mooney, who performed the novel act, for a clergyman, of “christening” a big gun at Washington the other day, wound up the speech he made on the occasion, by declaring “the echo of its voice would be sweet music, inviting the children of Columbia to share the comforts of his father's home.” Can impiety and folly and bad taste go further?

SOURCE: William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South, Vol. 1, p. 367-72

Simon Cameron to Captain Gustavus V. Fox, April 4, 1861

War Department        

Washington, April 4, 1861

Sir,

It having been determined to succor Fort Sumter, you have been selected for this important duty. Accordingly you will take charge of the transports provided in New York, having the troops and supplies on board, to the entrance of Charleston Harbor, and endeavor, in the first instance, to deliver the subsistence. If you are opposed in this you are directed to report the fact to the Senior Naval officer off the harbor, who will be instructed by the Secretary of the Navy to use his entire force to open a passage, when you will, if possible, effect an entrance and place both the troops and supplies in Fort Sumter.

I am sir,

Very Respectfully

Your obt. servt.

Simon Cameron

Sec'y of War.

Capt. G. V. Fox

Washington D. C.

SOURCES: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 20-1

Diary of William Howard Russell: Chapter XLII

I shall here briefly recapitulate what has occurred since the last mention of political events.

In the first place the South has been developing every day greater energy in widening the breach between it and the North, and preparing to fill it with dead; and the North, so far as I can judge, has been busy in raising up the Union as a nationality, and making out the crime of treason from the act of Secession. The South has been using conscription in Virginia, and is entering upon the conflict with unsurpassable determination. The North is availing itself of its greater resources and its foreign vagabondage and destitution to swell the ranks of its volunteers, and boasts of its enormous armies, as if it supposed conscripts well led do not fight better than volunteers badly officered. Virginia has been invaded on three points, one below and two above Washington, and passports are now issued on both sides.

The career open to the Southern privateers is effectually closed by the Duke of Newcastle's notification that the British Government will not permit the cruisers of either side to bring their prizes into or condemn them in English ports; but, strange to say, the Northerners feel indignant against Great Britain for an act which deprives their enemy of an enormous advantage, and which must reduce their privateering to the mere work of plunder and destruction on the high seas. In the same way the North affects to consider the declaration of neutrality, and the concession of limited belligerent rights to the seceding States, as deeply injurious and insulting; whereas our course has, in fact, removed the greatest difficulty from the path of the Washington Cabinet, and saved us from inconsistencies and serious risks in our course of action.

It is commonly said, “What would Great Britain have done if we had declared ourselves neutral during the Canadian rebellion, or had conceded limited belligerent rights to the Sepoys?” as if Canada and Hindostan have the same relation to the British Crown that the seceding States had to the Northern States. But if Canada, with its parliament, judges, courts of law, and its people, declared it was independent of Great Britain; and if the Government of Great Britain, months after that declaration was made and acted upon, permitted the new State to go free, whilst a large number of her Statesmen agreed that Canada was perfectly right, we could find little fault with the United States Government for issuing a proclamation of neutrality the same as our own, when after a long interval of quiescence a war broke out between the two countries.

Secession was an accomplished fact months before Mr. Lincoln came into office, but we heard no talk of rebels and pirates till Sumter had fallen, and the North was perfectly quiescent — not only that — the people of wealth in New York were calmly considering the results of Secession as an accomplished fact, and seeking to make the best of it; nay, more, when I arrived in Washington some members of the Cabinet were perfectly ready to let the South go.

One of the first questions put to me by Mr. Chase in my first interview with him, was whether I thought a very injurious effect would be produced to the prestige of the Federal Government in Europe if the Northern States let the South have its own way, and told them to go in peace. “For my own part,” said he, “I should not be averse to let them try it, for I believe they would soon find out their mistake.” Mr. Chase may be finding out his mistake just now. (When I left England the prevalent opinion, as far as I could judge, was, that a family quarrel, in which the South was in the wrong, had taken place, and that it would be better to stand by and let the Government put forth its [strength] to chastise rebellious children. But now we see the house is divided against itself, and that the family are determined to set up two separate establishments. These remarks occur to me with the more force because I see the New York papers are attacking me because I described a calm in a sea which was afterwards agitated by a storm. “What a false witness is this,” they cry; “see how angry and how vexed is our Bermoothes, and. yet the fellow says it was quite placid.”

I have already seen so many statements respecting my sayings, my doings, and my opinions, in the American papers, that I have resolved to follow a general rule, with few exceptions indeed, which prescribes as the best course to pursue, not so much an indifference to these remarks as a fixed purpose to abstain from the hopeless task of correcting them. The “Quicklys” of the press are incorrigible. Commerce may well be proud of Chicago. I am not going to reiterate what every Crispinus from the old country has said again and again concerning this wonderful place — not one word of statistics, of corn elevators, of shipping, or of the piles of buildings raised-from the foundation by ingenious applications of screws. Nor am I going to enlarge on the splendid future of that which has so much present prosperity, or on the benefits to mankind opened up by the Illinois Central Railway. It is enough to say that by the borders of this lake there has sprung up in thirty years a wonderful city of fine streets, luxurious hotels, handsome shops, magnificent stores, great warehouses, extensive quays, capacious docks; and that as long as corn holds its own, and the mouths of Europe are open, and her hands full, Chicago will acquire greater importance, size, and wealth with every year. The only drawback, perhaps, to the comfort of the money-making inhabitants, and of the stranger within the gates, is to be found in the clouds of dust and in the unpaved streets and thoroughfares, which give anguish to horse and man.

I spent three days here writing my letters and repairing the wear and tear of my Southern expedition; and although it was hot enough, the breeze from the lake carried health and vigor to the frame, enervated by the sun of Louisiana and Mississippi. No need now to wipe the large drops of moisture from the languid brow lest they blind the eyes, nor to sit in a state of semi-clothing, worn out and exhausted, and tracing with moist hand imperfect characters on the paper.

I could not satisfy myself whether there was, as I have been told, a peculiar state of feeling in Chicago, which induced many people to support the Government of Mr. Lincoln because they believed it necessary for their own interest to obtain decided advantages over the South in the field, whilst they were opposed totis viribus to the genius of emancipation and to the views of the Black Republicans. But the genius and eloquence of the Little Giant have left their impress on the facile mould of democratic thought; and he who argued with such acuteness and ability last March in Washington, in his own study, against the possibility, or at least the constitutional legality, of using the national forces, and the militia and volunteers of the Northern States, to subjugate the Southern people, carried away by the great bore which rushed through the placid North when Sumter fell, or perceiving his inability to resist its force, sprung to the crest of the wave, and carried to excess, the violence of the Union reaction.

Whilst I was in the South I had seen his name in Northern papers with sensation headings and descriptions of his magnificent crusade for the Union in the West. I had heard his name reviled by those who had once been his warm political allies, and his untimely death did not seem to satisfy their hatred. His old foes in the North admired and applauded the sudden apostasy of their eloquent opponent, and were loud in lamentations over his loss. Imagine, then, how I felt when visiting his grave at Chicago, seeing his bust in many houses, or his portrait in all the shop-windows, I was told that the enormously wealthy community of which he was the idol were permitting his widow to live in a state not far removed from penury.

“Senator Douglas, sir,” observed one of his friends to me, “died of bad whiskey. He killed himself with it while he was stumping for the Union all over the country.” “Well,” I said, “I suppose, sir, the abstraction called the Union, for which by your own account he killed himself, will give a pension to his widow,” Virtue is its own reward, and so is patriotism, unless it takes the form of contracts.

As far as all considerations of wife, children, or family are concerned, let a man serve a decent despot, or even a constitutional country with an economizing House of Commons, if he wants anything more substantial than lip-service. The history of the great men of America is full of instances of national ingratitude. They give more praise and less peace to their benefactors than any nation on the face of the earth. Washington got little, though the plundering scouts who captured Andre were well rewarded; and the men who fought during the War of Independence were long left in neglect and poverty, sitting in sackcloth and ashes at the doorsteps of the temple of liberty, whilst the crowd rushed inside to worship Plutus.

If a native of the British Isles, of the natural ignorance of his own imperfections which should characterize him, desires to be subjected to a series of moral shower-baths, douches, and shampooing with a rough glove, let him come to the United States. In Chicago he will be told that the English people are fed by the beneficence of the United States, and that all the trade and commerce of England are simply directed to the one end of obtaining gold enough to pay the Western States for the breadstuffs exported for our population. We know what the South think of our dependence on cotton. The people of the East think they are striking a great blow at their enemy by the Morrill tariff and I was told by a patriot in North Carolina, “Why, creation! if you let the Yankees shut up our ports, the whole of your darned ships will go to rot. Where will you get your naval stores from? Why, I guess in a year you could not scrape up enough of tarpentine in the whole of your country for Queen Victoria to paint her nursery-door with.”

Nearly one half of the various companies enrolled in this district are Germans, or are the descendants of German parents, and speak only the language of the old country; two-thirds of the remainder are Irish, or of immediate Irish descent; but it is said that a grand reserve of Americans born lies behind this avant garde, who will come into the battle should there ever be need for their services.

Indeed so long as the Northern people furnish the means of paying and equipping armies perfectly competent to do their work, and equal in numbers to any demands made for men, they may rest satisfied with the accomplishment of that duty, and with contributing from their ranks the great majority of the superior and even of the subaltern officers; but with the South it is far different. Their institutions have repelled immigration; the black slave has barred the door to the white free settler. Only on the seaboard and in the large cities are. German and Irish to be found, and they to a man have come forward to fight for the South; but the proportion they bear to the native-born Americans who have rushed to arms in defence of their menaced borders, is of course far less than it is as yet to the number of Americans in the Northern States who have volunteered to fight for the Union.

I was invited before I left to visit the camp of a Colonel Turchin, who was described to me as a Russian officer of great ability and experience in European warfare, in command of a regiment consisting of Poles, Hungarians, and Germans, who were about to start for the seat of war; but I was only able to walk through his tents, where I was astonished at the amalgam of nations that constituted his battalion; though, on inspection, I am bound to say there proved to be an American element in the ranks which did not appear to have coalesced with the bulk of the rude, and, I fear, predatory Cossacks of the Union. Many young men of good position have gone to the wars, although there was no complaint, as in Southern cities, that merchants' offices have been deserted, and great establishments left destitute of clerks and working hands. In warlike operations, however, Chicago, with its communication open to the sea, its access to the head waters of the Mississippi, its intercourse with the marts of commerce and of manufacture, may be considered to possess greater belligerent power and strength than the great city of New Orleans; and there is much greater probability of Chicago sending its contingent to attack the Crescent City than there is of the latter being able to despatch a soldier within five hundred miles of its streets.

SOURCE: William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South, Vol. 1, p. 354-9

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: September 10, 1863

A Mr. J. C. Jones has addressed a letter to the President asking permission to run the blockade to confer with Mr. Bates, of President Lincoln's cabinet, on terms of peace, with, I believe, authority to assure him that none of the Northwestern States, or any other free States, will be admitted into the Confederacy. Mr. J. says he has been on intimate terms with Mr. B., and has conceived the idea that the United States would cease the war, and acknowledge the independence of the South, if it were not for the apprehension of the Northwestern States seceding from the Union. If his request be not granted, he intends to enter the army immediately. He is a refugee from Missouri. He assures the President he is his friend, and that a “concentration of power” in his hands is essential, etc. The President refers this paper, with a gracious indorsement, to the Secretary of War, recommending him either to see Mr. Jones, or else to institute inquiries, etc.

S. Wyatt, Augusta, Ga., writes in favor of appeals to the patriotism of the people to counteract what Mr. Toombs has done. What has he done? But he advises the President, to whom he professes to be very friendly, to order a discontinuance of seizures, etc.

A. Cohen (Jew name), purser of the blockade-running steamer “Arabia” at Wilmington, has submitted a notable scheme to Gen. Winder, who submits it to the Secretary of War, establishing a police agency at Nassau. Gen. W. to send some of his detectives thither to examine persons coming into the Confederate States, and if found “all right,” to give them passports. It was only yesterday that a letter was received from Gen. Whiting, asking authority to send out a secret agent on the “Arabia,” to see what disposition would be made of her cargo, having strong suspicions of the loyalty of the owners and officers of that vessel.

Gov. Z. B. Vance complains indignantly of Marylanders and Virginians appointed to office in that State, to the exclusion of natives; he says they have not yet been recalled, as he had a right to expect, after his recent interview with the President. He says he is disgusted with such treatment, both of his State and of himself. Alas I what is behind?

Night before last some thirty of the enemy's barges, filled with men, attempted to take the ruins of Sumter by assault. This had been anticipated by Beauregard, and every preparation had been made accordingly. So the batteries at Forts Moultrie, Bee, etc. opened terrifically with shell and grape; the amount of execution by them is not ascertained: but a number of the barges reached the debris of Sumter, where a battalion of infantry awaited them, and where 115 of the Yankees, including more than a dozen officers, begged for quarters and were taken prisoners. No doubt the casualties on the side of the assailants must have been many, while the garrison sustained no loss. This is substantially the purport of a dispatch from Beauregard to Gen. Cooper, which, however, was published very, awkwardly — without any of the niceties of punctuation a fastidious general would have desired. Nevertheless, Beauregard's name-is on every tongue.

The clerks in the departments were startled to-day by having read to them an order from Brig.-Gen. Custis Lee (son of Gen. R. E. Lee), an order to the captains of companies to imprison or otherwise punish all who failed to be present at the drills. These young gentlemen, not being removable, according to the Constitution, and exempted from conscription by an act of Congress, volunteered some months ago for “local defense and special service,” never supposing that regular drilling would be obligatory except when called into actual service by the direction of the President, in the terms of an act of Congress, which provided that such organizations were not to receive pay for military service, unless summoned to the field by the President in an emergency. They receive no pay now—but yet the impression prevails that this order has the approbation of the President, as Gen. G. W. Custis Lee is one of his special aids, with the rank and pay of a colonel of cavalry. As an aid of the President, he signs himself colonel; as commander of the city brigade, he signs himself brigadier-general, and has been so commissioned by the President. How it can be compatible to hold both positions and commissions, I do not understand — but perhaps the President does, as he is well versed in the rules and regulations of the service. Some of the clerks, it is said, regard the threat as unauthorized by law, and will resist what they deem a usurpation, at the hazard of suffering its penalties. I know not what the result will be, but I fear “no good will come of it.” They are all willing to fight, when the enemy comes (a probable thing); but they dislike being forced out to drill, under threats of “punishment.” This measure will not add to the popularity of Col. (or Gen.) Lee.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 39-41