Edwin M. Stanton to Reverend Heman Dyer, May 18, 1862

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.]

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1862.

Rev. HEMAN DYER:

MY DEAR FRIEND: Yours of the 16th is welcomed as an evidence of the continued regard of one whose esteem I have always been anxious to possess. I have been very well aware of the calumnies busily circulated against me in New York and elsewhere respecting my relations to General McClellan, but am compelled, from public considerations, to withhold the proofs that would stamp the falsehood of the accusations and the base motives of the accusers, who belong to two classes:

1st. Plunderers, who have been driven from the Department, where they were gorging millions.

2d. Scheming politicians, whose designs are endangered by an earnest, resolute, uncompromising prosecution of this war, as a war against rebels and traitors.

A brief statement of facts — an official record — which I can make to you confidentially, will be sufficient to satisfy yourself that your confidence in me has not been misplaced.

1. When I entered the Cabinet I was, and for months had been, the sincere and devoted friend of General McClellan, and to support him, and, so far as I might, aid and assist him in bringing the war to a close, was a chief inducement for me to sacrifice my personal happiness to a sense of public duty. I had studied him earnestly, with an anxious desire to discover the military and patriotic virtue that might save the country; and if in any degree disappointed, I hoped on, and waited for time to develop. I went into the Cabinet about the 20th of January. On the 27th, the President made his War Order, No. 1, requiring the Army of the Potomac to move. It is not necessary, or perhaps proper, to state all the causes that led to that order, but it is enough to know that the Government was on the verge of bankruptcy, and, at the rate of expenditure, the armies must move or the Government perish. The 22d of February was the day fixed for movement, and when it arrived there was no more sign of movement on the Potomac than there had been for three months before. Many, very many, earnest conversations I had held with General McClellan, to impress him with the absolute necessity of active operations, or that the Government would fail because of foreign intervention and enormous debt.

Between the 22d of February and the 8th of March, the President had again interfered, and a movement on Winchester and to clear the blockade of the Potomac was promised, commenced, and abandoned. The circumstances cannot at present be revealed.

On the 6th of March, the President again interfered, ordered the Army of the Potomac to be organized into army corps, and that operations should commence immediately.

Two lines of operations were open. First. One moving directly on the enemy by Manassas, and forcing him back on Richmond, beating and destroying him by superior force, and all the time keeping the capital secure by being between it and the enemy. This was the plan favored by the President. Second. The other plan was to transfer the troops by water to some point on the Lower Chesapeake, and thence advance on Richmond. This was General McClellan's plan. The President reluctantly yielded his own views, although they were supported by some of the best military men in the country, and consented that the general should pursue his own plan. But, by a written order, he imposed the special condition that the army should not be moved without leaving a sufficient force in and around Washington to make the capital perfectly secure against all danger, and that the force required should be determined by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps.

In order to enable General McClellan to devote his whole energy to the movement of his own army (which was quite enough to tax the ability of the ablest commander in the world), he was relieved from the charge of the other military departments, it being supposed that their respective commanders were competent to direct the operations in their own departments. To enable General McClellan to transport his force, every means and power of the Government was placed at his disposal and unsparingly used.

When a large part of his force had been transferred to Fortress Monroe, and the whole of it about to go in a few days, information was given to me by various persons that there was great reason to fear that no adequate force had been left to defend the capital in case of a sudden attack; that the enemy might detach a large force, and seize it at a time when it would be impossible for General McClellan to render any assistance. Serious alarm was expressed by many persons, and many warnings given me, which I could not neglect. I ordered a report of the force left to defend Washington. It was reported by the commander to be less than 20,000 raw recruits, with not a single organized brigade! A dash, like that made a short time before at Winchester, would at any time take the capital of the nation. The report of the force left to defend Washington, and the order of the President, were referred to Major-General Hitchcock and Adjutant-General Thomas to report—

1st. Whether the President's orders had been complied with.

2d. Whether the force left to defend this city was sufficient.

They reported in the negative on both points. These reports were submitted to the President, who also consulted General Totten, General Taylor, General Meigs, and General Ripley. They agreed in opinion that the capital was not safe.

The President then, by written order, directed me to retain one of the army corps for the defense of Washington, either Sumner's or McDowell's. As part of Sumner's corps had already embarked, I directed McDowell to remain with his command, and the reasons were approved by the President.

Down to this period there had never been a shadow of difference between General McClellan and myself. It is true that I thought his plan of operations objectionable, as the most expensive, the most hazardous, and most protracted that could have been chosen, but I was not a military man, and, while he was in command, I would not interfere with his plan, and gave him every aid to execute it. But when the case assumed the form it had done by his disregard of the President's order, and by leaving the capital exposed to seizure by the enemy, I was bound to act, even if I had not been required by the specific written order of the President. Will any man question that such was my duty?

When this order was communicated to General McClellan, it of course provoked his wrath, and the wrath of his friends was directed upon me because I was the agent of its execution. If the force had gone forward, as he had designed, I believe that Washington would this day be in the hands of the rebels. Down to this point, moreover, there was never the slightest difference between the President and myself. But the entreaties of General McClellan induced the President to modify his order to the extent that Franklin's division (being part of McDowell's corps that had been retained) was detached and sent forward by boat to McClellan. This was against my judgment, because I thought the whole force of McDowell should be kept together and sent forward by land on the shortest route to Richmond, thus aiding McClellan, but at the same time covering and protecting Washington by keeping between it and the enemy. In this opinion Major-General Hitchcock, General Meigs, and Adjutant-General Thomas agreed. But the President was so anxious that General McClellan should have no cause of complaint, that he ordered the force to be sent by water, although that route was then threatened by the Merrimac. I yielded my opinion to the President's order; but between him and me there has never been the slightest shadow since I entered the Cabinet. And excepting the retention of the force under McDowell by the President's order, for the reasons mentioned, General McClellan had never made a request or expressed a wish that had not been promptly complied with, if in the power of the Government. To me personally he has repeatedly expressed his confidence and his thanks in the dispatches sent me.

Now, one word as to political motives. What motive can I have to thwart General McClellan? I am not now, never have been, and never will be a candidate for any office. I hold my present post at the request of a President who knew me personally, but to whom I had not spoken from the 4th of March, 1861, until the day he handed me my commission. I knew that everything I cherished and held dear would be sacrificed by accepting office. But I thought I might help to save the country, and for that I was willing to perish. If I wanted to be a politician or a candidate for any office, would I stand between the Treasury and the robbers that are howling around me? Would I provoke and stand against the whole newspaper gang in this country, of every party, who, to sell news, would imperil a battle? I was never taken for a fool, but there could be no greater madness than for a man to encounter what I do for anything else than motives that overleap time and look forward to eternity. I believe that God Almighty founded this Government, and for my acts in the effort to maintain it I expect to stand before Him in judgment.

You will pardon this long explanation, which has been made to no one else. It is due to you, who was my friend when I was a poor boy at school, and had no claim upon your confidence or kindness. It cannot be made public for obvious reasons. General McClellan is at the head of our chief army; he must have every confidence and support; and I am willing that the whole world should revile me rather than diminish one grain of the strength needed to conquer the rebels. In a struggle like this, justice or credit to individuals is but dust in the balance. Desiring no office nor honor, and anxious only for the peace and quiet of my home, I suffer no inconvenience beyond that which arises from the trouble and anxiety suffered by worthy friends like yourself, who are naturally disturbed by the clamors and calumny of those whose interest or feeling is hostile to me.

The official records will, at the proper time, fully prove—

1st. That I have employed the whole power of the Government un-sparingly to support General McClellan's operations in preference to every other general.

2d. That I have not interfered with or thwarted them in any particular.

3d. That the force retained from his expedition was not needed, and could not have been employed by him; that it was retained by express orders of the President, upon military investigation, and upon the best military advice in the country; that its retention was required to save the capital from the danger to which it was exposed by a disregard of the President's positive order of the 6th of March.

4th. That between the President and myself there has never been any, the slightest, shadow of difference upon any point, save the detachment of Franklin's force, and that was a point of no significance, but in which I was sustained by Generals Hitchcock, Meigs, Thomas, and Ripley, while the President yielded only to an anxious desire to avoid complaint, declaring at the same time his belief that the force was not needed by General McClellan.

You will, of course, regard this explanation as being in the strictest confidence, designed only for your information upon matters wherein you express concern for me. The confidence of yourself, and men like you, is more than a full equivalent for all the railing that has been or can be expressed against me, and in the magnitude of the cause all merely individual questions are swallowed up.

I shall always rejoice to hear from you, and am, as ever, truly yours,

EDWIN M. STANTON.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 19, Part 2 (Serial No. 28), p. 725-8

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, July 16, 1863

It is represented that the mob in New York is about subdued. Why it was permitted to continue so long and commit such excess has not been explained. Governor Seymour, whose partisans constituted the rioters, and whose partisanship encouraged them, has been in New York talking namby-pamby. This Sir Forcible Feeble is himself chiefly responsible for the outrage.

General Wool, unfitted by age for such duties, though patriotic and well-disposed, has been continued in command there at a time when a younger and more vigorous mind was required. In many respects General Butler would at this time have best filled that position. As a municipal and police officer he has audacity and certain other qualities in which most military men are deficient, while as a general in the field he is likely to accomplish but little. He, or any one else, would need martial law at such a time, and with such element, in a crowded and disorderly city like New York. Chase tells me there will probably be a change and that General Dix will succeed General Wool. The selection is not a good one, but the influences that bring it about are evident. Seward and Stanton have arranged it. Chase thinks McDowell should have the position. He is as good, perhaps, as any of the army officers for this mixed municipal military duty.

Lee's army has recrossed the Potomac, unmolested, carrying off all its artillery and the property stolen in Pennsylvania. When I ask why such an escape was permitted, I am told that the generals opposed an attack. What generals? None are named. Meade is in command there; Halleck is General-in-Chief here. They should be held responsible. There are generals who, no doubt, will acquiesce without any regrets in having this war prolonged.

In this whole summer's campaign I have been unable to see, hear, or obtain evidence of power, or will, or talent, or originality on the part of General Halleck. He has suggested nothing, decided nothing, done nothing but scold and smoke and scratch his elbows. Is it possible the energies of the nation should be wasted by the incapacity of such a man?

John Rodgers of the Weehawken was here to-day. He is, I think, getting from under the shadow of Du Pont's influence.

Mr. Hooper and Mr. Gooch have possessed themselves of the belief — not a new one in that locality — that the Representatives of the Boston and Charlestown districts are entitled to the custody, management, and keeping of the Boston Navy Yard, and that all rules, regulations, and management of that yard must be made to conform to certain party views of theirs and their party friends.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 372-4

Diary of Gideon Welles: Sunday, June 28, 1863

The President convened the Cabinet at 10 A.M. and submitted his reply to the Vallandigham committee. Save giving too much notoriety and consequence to a graceless traitor who loves notoriety and office, and making the factious party men who are using him for the meanest purposes that could influence men in such a crisis conspicuous, the letter is well enough, and well conceived.

After disposing of this subject, the President drew from his pocket a telegram from General Hooker asking to be relieved. The President said he had, for several days as the conflict became imminent, observed in Hooker the same failings that were witnessed in McClellan after the Battle of Antietam, — a want of alacrity to obey, and a greedy call for more troops which could not, and ought not to be taken from other points. He would, said the President, strip Washington bare, had demanded the force at Harper's Ferry, which Halleck said could not be complied with; he (Halleck) was opposed to abandoning our position at Harper's Ferry. Hooker had taken umbrage at the refusal, or at all events had thought it best to give up the command.

Some discussion followed in regard to a successor. The names of Meade, Sedgwick, and Couch were introduced. I soon saw this review of names was merely a feeler to get an expression of opinion — a committal — or to make it appear that all were consulted. It shortly became obvious, however, that the matter had already been settled, and the President finally remarked he supposed General Halleck had issued the orders. He asked Stanton if it was not so. Stanton replied affirmatively, that Hooker had been ordered to Baltimore and Meade to succeed him. We were consulted after the fact.

Chase was disturbed more than he cared should appear. Seward and Stanton were obviously cognizant of what had been ordered before the meeting of the Cabinet took place, — had been consulted. Perhaps they had advised proceedings, but, doubtful of results, wished the rest to confirm their act. Blair and Bates were not present with us.

Instead of being disturbed, like Chase, I experienced a feeling of relief, and only regretted that Hooker, who I think has good parts, but is said to be intemperate at times, had not been relieved immediately after the Battle of Chancellorsville. No explanation has ever been made of the sudden paralysis which befell the army at that time. It was then reported, by those who should have known, that it was liquor. I apprehend from what has been told me it was the principal cause. It was so intimated, but not distinctly asserted, in Cabinet.

Nothing has been communicated by the War Department, directly, but there has been an obvious dislike of Hooker, and no denial or refutation of the prevalent rumors. I have once or twice made inquiries of Stanton, but could get no satisfactory reply of any kind. . . . The War Department has been aware of these accusations, but has taken no pains to disprove or deny them, — perhaps because they could not be, perhaps because the War Department did not want to. The President has been partial to Hooker in all this time and has manifested no disposition to give him up, except a casual remark at the last Cabinet-meeting.

Whether the refusal to give him the troops at Harper's Ferry was intended to drive him to abandon the command of the army, or is in pursuance of any intention on the part of Halleck to control army movements, and to overrule the general in the field, is not apparent. The President has been drawn into the measure, as he was into withholding McDowell from McClellan, by being made to believe it was necessary for the security of Washington. In that instance, Stanton was the moving spirit, Seward assenting. It is much the same now, only Halleck is the forward spirit, prompted perhaps by Stanton.

Of Meade I know very little. He is not great. His brother officers speak well of him, but he is considered rather a “smooth bore” than a rifle. It is unfortunate that a change could not have been made earlier.

Chase immediately interested himself for the future of Hooker. Made a special request that he should be sent to Fortress Monroe to take charge of a demonstration upon Richmond via James River. The President did not give much attention to the suggestion. I inquired what was done, or doing, with Dix's command, — whether that considerable force was coming here, going to Richmond, or to remain inactive. The President thought a blow might at this time be struck at Richmond; had not, however, faith much could be accomplished by Dix, but though not much of a general, there were reasons why he did not like to supersede him. Foster he looked to as a rising general who had maintained himself creditably at Washington, North Carolina. Chase admitted F. was deserving of credit, but claimed credit was due Sisson,¹ who relieved him, also.

Had two or three telegrams last night from Portland in relation to pirate privateers, which are cleared up to-day by information that Reed had seized the revenue cutter Calhoun, and was himself soon after captured.

The city is full of strange, wild rumors of Rebel raids in the vicinity and of trains seized in sight of the Capitol. They are doubtless exaggerations, yet I think not without some foundation. I am assured from men of truth that a Rebel scouting party was seen this morning in the rear of Georgetown. Just at sunset, the Blairs rode past my house to their city residence, not caring to remain at Silver Spring until the crisis is past.

A large portion of the Rebel army is unquestionably on this side the Potomac. The main body is, I think, in the Cumberland Valley, pressing on toward Harrisburg, but a small force has advanced toward Washington. The War Department is wholly unprepared for an irruption here, and J. E. B. Stuart might have dashed into the city to-day with impunity. In the mean time, Philadelphians and the Pennsylvanians are inert and inactive, indisposed to volunteer to defend even their own capital. Part of this I attribute to the incompetency of General Halleck to concentrate effort, acquire intelligence, or inspire confidence; part is due to the excitable Governor, who is easily alarmed and calls aloud for help on the remotest prospect of danger. He is very vigilant, — almost too vigilant for calm consideration and wise conclusion, or to have a commanding influence. Is not only anxious but susceptible, impressible, scary.

_______________

¹ Colonel Henry T. Sisson, with his Fifth Rhode Island Volunteers, reinforced General Foster in the siege of Washington, North Carolina.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 347-51

Lieutenant-Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes to Lucy Webb Hayes, September 6, 1862

Washington City, September 6, 1862.

Dearest: — We have had a very hot, dusty, and oppressive march from our camp at Upton's Hill. Some of McDowell's demoralized men are thought good enough to take care of the fieldworks out there, and General Cox's six regiments of Ohio men are now attached to General Burnside's Corps. What is to be our duty and where, we do not yet know. We suppose we are to meet the invasion threatened by the Rebels into Maryland. We may be destined for other service; but you will hear from us often. We all hear favorable impressions of General Burnside, and are glad to be assigned to his corps.

You will not allow yourself to be too anxious, I trust, on my account. Rejoice when it rains or gets cold. We are victimized by the drouth. Well, good-bye. Love to the dear boys. I thought of them often today; little fellows very like them followed us as we marched through the streets today.

Affectionately, ever your

R.

Mrs. Hayes.

SOURCE: Charles Richard Williams, editor, Diary and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes, Volume 2, p. 345

Alexander Hamilton Jr. to Abraham Lincoln, May 26, 1862

New York May 26. 62

My Dear Sir

In the present embarrassed situation of our affairs, I feel it to be a duty to make the following suggestions, with the remark, that what has occurred, in the Shenandoah Valley, has not come to me unanticipated, and, when, a full development shall be made of the movements of the enemy, you will find there exists more reason to apprehend an attack on the federal city, than you imagine—

That there has been the greatest mismanagement in the War Department, there can be no question, and none, more so, than was exhibited, in the subdivision of the command of General McClellan, whereby he lost all control and supervision of the important wing, the right of his operations, while the forces under McDowel were pushed to a position, worse than useless, from which they cannot retreat, without a positive demonstration of extreme weakness—

In the stupid ignorance, which has been shown, in withdrawing the main strength from Banks, himself a military failure, there would seem to be almost sufficient grounds for the suspicion of disloyalty somewhere, at all event, the mischief occasioned is irrepareable, a disgraceful route, paralyzing to our efforts and confidence every where.

It would appear, that your telegraphic communications have been so cut off, that you have no reliable information with regard to the onward progress of the enemies forces from Front Royal, either down the Shenandoah to Harpers Ferry, or to Leesburg, or by the Manassas Gap railroad, cutting off the supplies proceeding to our army on the Rappahanoc—

In this dilemma, and pregnant uncertainty, the course of the War Department should exercise no other discretion, than an instant call for an overwhelming militia army from the North, a few regiments in small detachments, or in any thing, but in army divisions, with pious boys play—

If Washington should be fall, the great object and aim of the present strategical movements of the South, the whole financial operations of the government would come to a deplorable stand still, carrying with the default, the most fatal consequences to all future movements of troops or supplies, every thing, every where, would be reduced to a state of complete abeyance—

I may speculate too far in supposing that you have no efficient military strength in front of Washington, still, I fear, the luck is sadly against any estimate of reliable security, especially, in the panic condition which surrounds you, seriously intensified, with the extraordinary imbecility which has recently brought into collision, the civil with the military authorities, the end of which, may open a vista, too serious to be portrayed, too dangerous to be contemplated, as the inevitable overthrow of our republican institutions, a revolution which may carry the government of Washington into precipitate retirement—

If the enemy should reach Harpers Ferry they will command the Canal and Railroad along the entire line of the Potomac, where they will not only cut off your supplies, but by a rapid movement, from the river to the interior of Maryland, the remnant of the fighting army of Banks may be caught, the distance to past, to effect that object, cannot exceed fifteen miles. It will open the whole route to Baltimore and Washington, by canal and railroad, the City of Frederick will of course be taken on the way, through a slight detour of about three miles, it is therefore all important, that a sufficient force should be dispatched from Baltimore to resist the torrent, and that instant measures be taken to prepare for the necessary obstructions on both lines of conveyance—

Within a few miles of the Frederick I ascertain, there is a heavy bridge structure crossing the Monocacy, the waters of which is entirely too deep to be forded, this ought to be looked to, so along the whole line of the road to the Riley House—

A short distance above Ellecotts Mills, there is a short and easy way to the rear of Baltimore, affording a most convenient opportunity for a surprise, especially, as along that approach, a strong secession force of sympathizers would be very likely to congregate—

In the present distresses of the government I should be happy to lend any aid and counsel, and, as I have had military experience in the United States services, if the president will send me a commission as Brigadier General, I will lose no time in presenting myself at Washington

With great regard

Your Ob Sevt

A Hamilton.

To Abraham Lincoln

President

SOURCE: The Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Washington D.C.

Lieutenant-Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes to Lucy Webb Hayes, September 4, 1862

Upton's Hill, Fairfax County, Virginia,

September 4, (P. M.), 1862.

Dearest: — I received your good letter of the 29th yesterday. Our situation now is this: Washington is surrounded for a distance of from seven to fifteen miles by defensive works, placed on all the commanding points. For the present the thing to be done is to keep the enemy out of the capital until our new army is prepared for the field and the old one is somewhat recruited. We (that is General Cox's Division, viz.: Eleventh, Twelfth, Twenty-third, Twenty-eighth, Thirtieth, and Thirtysixth regiments of infantry, Captains McMullen's and Simmond's Batteries, Gilmore's, West's, and Schaumbeck's Cavalry, all from western Virginia) are placed to guard important roads and points of which Upton's Hill and Munson's Hill, Forts Ramsay, Buffalo, and "Skedaddle," all in the same vicinity, are the chief. We are about seven miles from Washington, in sight of the capitol, and eight miles from Alexandria.

For a few days after the retreat of our forces from Centreville and Bull Run, these were points of peril. In case of an advance of the Rebels we would be first attacked. I slept in boots and spurs with my horse saddled. But now all the forts are manned and I do not expect to see the enemy approach in this direction. They could easily storm our positions with a strong force, but it would cost so many lives to storm all the works between here and Washington that they would be ruined to attempt it.

I therefore look for quiet camp life for some time to come, unless the enemy makes such advances to Washington from other directions as will make these works worthless, when we should probably go to Washington. This I do not anticipate. We shall drill, brush and burnish up, sleep and get fat.

Things have had a bad turn lately, but I don't give it up. Something far more damaging than anything which has yet happened must occur, or these attempts to carry the war into our territory must recoil heavily on the Rebels. Failing to hold their advanced conquests, they must go back vastly weakened and disheartened, while our following wave will be a growing and resistless one. It will be a few weeks yet before the evil time and the occurrence of sinister events will cease. But frosts and rains are coming and when they come will be our day. We can only hope to get off as easily as possible until that time.

The Kentucky disaster I fear injured many of your friends; but if not made permanent, it will do good.

Well, this is talk about public affairs. I sent my trunk today via Washington to Platt. If not intercepted (no unlikely event) I will mail one key to Mother and the other to you.

An old gentleman — too old to stand this "biz"— named Kugler, called to see me just now, saying that my commission in the Seventy-ninth was made out; that he was a captain in the Seventy-ninth and was trying to get the War Department to let me go. I said "nix" either way. At present I prefer to stay here, but no odds. While he was talking, the enemy began to fire on one of our cavalry pickets with shell. He said to me: “When do you start in such a case?” I told him, “When I got orders.” He seemed much astonished at the quiet reigning in camp, while the teamsters were tearing in like mad. He is a wealthy distiller at Milford who gave twenty-five hundred dollars to raise a company which he intends to turn over to a son or nephew. He seems determined to get permission for me to join the regiment and may possibly succeed.

A lovely sunset on a most animating scene. Troops are getting into shape and things look better. McClellan is indeed a great favorite with the army. He is no doubt the best man to take the defense of the capital in hand. He is the only man who can get good fighting out of the Potomac Army. McDowell is detested by them. Pope coldly regarded. McClellan is loved. Not thinking him a first-class commander, I yet in view of this feeling, think him the best man now available.

There, darling, is a long letter and yet not a word of love in it. But I do you love so much, dearest. You may emphasize every word of that sentence.

I hope they will whip Kirby Smith and his Rebel horde. But, at any rate, he will soon get to the end of that rope.

Affectionately,

R.

Mrs. Hayes.

SOURCE: Charles Richard Williams, editor, Diary and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes, Volume 2, p. 343-5

Lieutant-Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes to Sardis Birchard, September 3, 1862

Eight Miles West Of Washington,

Upton’s Hill, September 3, 1862.

Dear Uncle: — The fighting at and near Bull Run battlefield is finished and our army has withdrawn to the fortifications near Washington, leaving General Cox's force here on the outposts. The general result I figure up as follows: We lose ten to fifteen cannon, five thousand to eight thousand killed, wounded, or prisoners, a large amount of army stores, railroad stock, etc., destroyed, and the position. The enemy lose a few cannon, about the same or a greater number killed and wounded, not so many prisoners by about half, and hold the position. It is not a decided thing either way. We had decidedly the advantage in the fighting of Thursday and Friday, 28th and 29th. At the close of the 29th Jackson was heavily reinforced, and worsted us on Saturday. Saturday evening our reinforcements reached General Pope and we were about equal in the subsequent skirmishing. I get some notions of the troops here, as I look on and listen, not very different from those I have had before.

The enemy here has a large force of gallant and efficient cavalry. Our cavalry is much inferior. The Rebel infantry is superior to ours gathered from the cities and manufacturing villages of the old States. The Western troops, are, I think, superior to either. The Rebels have as much good artillery as we have. We have largely more than they have, but the excess is of poor quality. In generalship and officers they are superior to us. The result is we must conquer in land warfare by superior numbers. On the water we have splendid artillery, and are masters. High water, deep rivers, heavy rains, are our friends.

General Sigel is a favorite with troops. General Banks and Schenck are praised by them. General McDowell is universally denounced. General Pope is coldly spoken of. General McClellan is undoubtedly a great favorite with men under him. Last night it was announced that he was again in command at this the critical region now. Everywhere the joy was great, and was spontaneously and uproariously expressed. It was a happy army again.

There is nothing of the defeated or disheartened among the men. They are vexed and angry — say they ought to have had a great victory, but not at all demoralized. I speak, of course, only of those I see, and I have seen some of the most unfortunate regiments. Everyone now recognizes the policy of standing on the defensive until the new levies are organized and ready. All that we can save is clear gain. Unless the enemy gets decided and damaging advantages during the next fortnight or so, it is believed we can push them back with heavy loss and with a fair prospect of crushing them. I see you are having another demonstration at Cincinnati and Louisville. I can't think it can end successfully. The great number of new troops must be able to hold them in check until they will be compelled to fall back. Once let the enemy now begin a retrograde movement with our great wave after them and I think they must go under.

We are here a good deal exposed. Anything that shall happen to me, you will know at once. I feel very contented with my personal situation. Your certain aid to my family relieves me from anxiety on their account. It is an immense relief to be here away from the petty but dangerous warfare of west Virginia.

Direct General Cox's Division, via Washington. I already get the Sentinel here of late date — the last published.

P. M. — Since writing the foregoing I received your letter of the 28th inst. [ult] Your letters will come to me with great certainty, I do not doubt, and quicker than when I was in west Virginia.

We see that a strong Rebel force occupies Lexington, Kentucky. All the river towns are threatened. This is our dark hour. We will [shall] weather it, I think. Generalship is our great need.

Glad you will write often. — I shall stay with the Twenty-third. — I saw Haynes and told him I supposed we were cut out by the orders. I care nothing about it. Haynes was looking thin.

Sincerely,

R. B. Hayes.

Since writing I have been in a caucus of the major-generals. It is curious, but a large number of truthful men say Sigel is an accomplished military scholar, but such a coward that he is of no account on the battle-field! Funny! We don't know all about things and men from the newspapers.

S. Birchard.

SOURCE: Charles Richard Williams, editor, Diary and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes, Volume 2, p. 340-2

Diary of Lieutant-Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes: Wednesday, September 3, 1862

No alarm last night. Enemy quiet in front. A little firing near [the] chain bridge, supposed to be feeling of our position. It is rumored that the main body is going up the Potomac to cross. Many men last evening in the retreating ranks were ready to hiss McDowell.

P. M. After supper. I am tonight discouraged — more so than ever before. The disaster in Kentucky is something, but the conduct of men, officers, generals and all, in the late battles near Bull Run is more discouraging than aught else. The Eastern troops don't fight like the Western. If the enemy is now energetic and wise, they can take great advantages of us. Well, well, I can but do my, duty as I see it.

SOURCE: Charles Richard Williams, editor, Diary and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes, Volume 2, p. 339-40

Diary of Lieutant-Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes: Tuesday, September 2, 1862

Upton's. — A clear, cold, windy day; bracing and Northern. No news except a rumor that the armies are both busy gathering up wounded and burying dead; that the enemy hold rather more of the battlefield than we do.

12:30 P. M. — I have seen several accounts of the late battles, with details more or less accurate. The impression I get is that we have rather the worst of it, by reason of superior generalship on the part of the Rebels.

9:30 P. M. — New and interesting scenes this P. M. The great army is retreating, coming back. It passes before us and in our rear. We are to cover the retreat if they are pursued. They do not look or act like beaten men; they are in good spirits and orderly. They are ready to hiss McDowell. When General Given announced that General McClellan was again leader, the cheering was hearty and spontaneous. The camps around us are numerous. The signal corps telegraphs by waving lights to the camps on all the heights. The scene is wild and glorious this fine night. Colonel White of the Twelfth and I have arranged our plans in case of an attack tonight. So to bed. Let the morrow provide for itself.

SOURCE: Charles Richard Williams, editor, Diary and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes, Volume 2, p. 339

Diary of Lieutant-Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes: September 1, 1862

A coolish, cloudy day. Wrote letters to Mother and Lucy. Nothing definite from the battlefield. Rumors of good and bad. Many complaints of McDowell; that he let Jackson slip off by withdrawing a division from an important point. On the whole, the result seems to be a draw yet. Our army in great strength, rumor says two hundred thousand, is on this side of the old Bull Run battlefield; the enemy one hundred and eighty thousand strong on the identical ground. No firing today until about 5:30 or 6 o'clock when there was a grand uproar until after dark near the old place, possibly further north; rumored or conjectured to be an attempt to our right. A thunderstorm came on about the same time when there was a fierce rivalry between the artillery of earth and heaven, the former having a decided advantage. A fierce storm of wind and rain all night, blowing down some tents and shaking all in a threatening way. About 9 P. M. received orders from brigade headquarters to be especially vigilant and to have the men ready to form line of battle without confusion. All which was done.

SOURCE: Charles Richard Williams, editor, Diary and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes, Volume 2, p. 335

Diary of Lieutant-Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes: August 31, 1862

Upton's Hill (near Washington). — Mustered the men for July and August. A rainy, cool day. The great battle of yesterday and the day before, so near here that we heard the roar distinctly, is supposed to have resulted favorably to our arms. How decisively is not yet known here. We hear all sorts of rumors, such as the capture of Jackson and sixteen thousand men and the like; but nothing definite is known. The appearances are favorable. We inquire of every one to get facts and get only vague rumors.

This Sunday evening the reports from the battlefield are less favorable than the morning rumors. There is talk of “no result,” a “drawn battle,” and the like; that our army has fallen back four miles to Centreville. Another [report] says McDowell withdrew a division from one outlet and let Jackson escape. A report says our loss is ten thousand; the enemy's much heavier. No firing all day today. This evening after dark firing of heavy guns was heard for a few minutes, apparently in the same place as before.

Received a dear letter from Lucy dated August 13 and directed to Flat Top. She says she is happy in the thought that we are doing our duty. This is good. Darling wife, how this painful separation is made a blessing by the fine character it develops, or brings to view! How; I love her more and more!

SOURCE: Charles Richard Williams, editor, Diary and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes, Volume 2, p. 334-5

Diary of John Hay: Sunday, November 12, 1863

. . . In the evening Miss Chase and Gov. Sprague’s wedding. A very brilliantlooking party. Kate looked tired out and languid, especially at the close of the evening, when I went into the bridal chamber to say good night. She had lost her old severity and formal stiffness of manner, and seemed to think she had arrived. McDowell , Stahel , Schenck , Stoneman , Cameron and others present. The President came for a few minutes.

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 120; For the whole diary entry see Tyler Dennett, Editor, Lincoln and the Civil War in the Diaries and letters of John Hay, p. 118-9.

Diary of Lieutenant-Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes: Friday, June 27, 1862

Camp Jones, Flat Top Mountain . — Took the men to Glade Creek to wash. Water getting scarce in this quarter. The men danced to the fiddle, marched to music, and had a good time generally. Rode, walked, and read "Seven Sons of Mammon."

Read the account of the disaster on White River, Arkansas, to the gunboat, Mound City. The enemy sent a forty-two-pound ball through her boiler and a horrible slaughter followed, scalding and drowning one hundred and fifty men!

General Pope appointed to "the Army of Virginia" — being the combined forces of Fremont, Shields, Banks, and McDowell, now in the Valley of Virginia. Sorry to see Fremont passed over but glad the concentration under one man has taken place. General Pope is impulsive and hasty, but energetic, and, what is of most importance, patriotic and sound — perfectly sound. I look for good results. — Rained in the evening.

SOURCE: Charles Richard Williams, editor, Diary and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes, Volume 2, p. 293-4

Diary of John Hay: After March 11, 1862

On the 27th of January the President issued his General War Order No. 1, to those whose direction it was to be. He wrote it without any consultation, and read it to the Cabinet, not for their sanction but for their information. From that time he influenced actively the operations of the campaign. He stopped going to McClellan’s, and sent for the General to come to him. Everything grew busy and animated after this Order. It was not fully carried out in its details. Some of the Corps anticipated, others delayed action. Fort Henry and Fort Donaldson showed that Halleck was doing his share. The Army of the Potomac still was sluggish. His next Order was issued after a consultation with all the Generals of the Potomac Army in which, as Stanton told me next morning, “we saw ten Generals afraid to fight.” The fighting Generals were McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman and Keys, and Banks. These were placed next day at the head of the Army Corps.

So things began to look vigorous. Sunday morning, the 9th of March, the news of the Merrimac's frolic came here. Stanton was fearfully stampeded. He said they would capture our fleet, take Fort Monroe, be in Washington before night. The Tycoon thought it was a great bore, but blew less than Stanton. As the day went on, the news grew better. And at four o'clock the telegraph was completed, and we heard of the splendid performance of the Monitor. That evening we heard also of the evacuation of the Potomac batteries, the luckiest of all possible chances, as the worst thing about the Merrimac's damages was the fact that they would impede the enterprise of taking those batteries. This was McDowell’s explanation to me when I told him of it.

At evening came the news of Manassas being evacuated; this came through contrabands. McClellan started instantly over the river. The next day the news was confirmed and the next night Manassas was occupied. People said a great deal about it, and thought a great deal more.

On the evening of the 11th of March, the President requested me to call together the heads of the Departments of War, State and Treasury. Seward came first. The President read to him General Order No. 3. He approved it thoroughly. He agreed with the President when the Pres^t said that though the duty of relieving General McClellan was a most painful one, he yet thought he was doing Gen. McC. a very great kindness in permitting him to retain command of the Army of the Potomac, and giving him an opportunity to retrieve his errors. Seward spoke very bitterly of the imbecility which had characterised the General's operations on the upper Potomac. The Secretary of State urged that the War Order go out in the name of Stanton. He said it would strengthen the hands of the Secretary, and he needed public confidence. While he was urging this, Stanton came in, and at once insisted that it go in the President's name. He said that a row had grown up between him and McC.’s friends, and he feared it would be thought to spring from personal feeling. The President decided to take the responsibility.

Blair was not consulted. The President knew that he would object to the disposition of Frémont, and preferred to have no words about it.  Blair and the President continued on very good terms in spite of the publication of Blair’s letter to Frémont. Blair came to explain it to the President, but he told him that he was too busy to quarrel with him. If he (Blair) didn't show him the letter, he would probably never see it. He retained his old status in Cabinet councils. . . .

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 53-6; Tyler Dennett, Lincoln and the Civil War in the Diaries and Letters of John Hay, p. 36-8.

Diary of John Hay: August 22, 1861

A long hiatus! The nights have been too busy for jottings.

. . . . We went over to Seward’s, found him comfortably slippered, and after talking about consular nuisances, went over to McClellan’s. Everything seems going right. Discipline is perfecting. The Dry Tortugas have squelched mutiny. The drills and reviews keep the men alive. Hunter is soon to go to Illinois as they need a head. At first he wanted to take McDowell but Scott objected. Regiments are constantly coming in, and arms for them. McClellan is growing jolly. Seward is in better humor than I have lately seen him.

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 40; Tyler Dennett, Lincoln and the Civil War in the Diaries and Letters of John Hay, p. 25.

Diary of William Howard Russell: June 7, 1861

The Confederate issue of ten millions sterling, in bonds payable in twenty years is not sufficient to meet the demands of Government; and the four millions of small Treasury notes, without interest, issued by Congress, are being rapidly absorbed. Whilst the Richmond papers demand an immediate movement on Washington, the journals of New York are clamoring for an advance upon Richmond. The planters are called upon to accept the Confederate bonds in payment of the cotton to be contributed by the States.

Extraordinary delusions prevail on both sides. The North believe that battalions of scalping Indian savages are actually stationed at Harper's Ferry. One of the most important movements has been made by Major-General McClellan, who has marched a force into Western Virginia from Cincinnati, has occupied a portion of the line of the Baltimore and Ohio railway, which was threatened with destruction by the Secessionists; and has already advanced as far as Grafton. Gen. McDowell has been appointed to the command of the Federal forces in Virginia. Every day regiments are pouring down from the North to Washington. General Butler, who is in command at Fortress Monroe, has determined to employ negro fugitives, whom he has called “Contrabands,” in the works about the fort, feeding them, and charging the cost of their keep against the worth of their services; and Mr. Cameron, the Secretary of War, has ordered him to refrain from surrendering such slaves to their masters, whilst he is to permit no interference by his soldiers with the relations of persons held to service under the laws of the States in which they are in.

Mr. Jefferson Davis has arrived at Richmond. At sea the Federal steamers have captured a number of Southern vessels; and some small retaliations have been made by the Confederate privateers. The largest mass of the Confederate troops have assembled at a place called Manassas Junction, on the railway from Western Virginia to Alexandria.

The Northern papers are filled with an account of a battle at Philippi, and a great victory, in which no less than two of their men were wounded and two were reported missing as the whole casualties; but Napoleon scarcely expended so much ink over Austerlitz as is absorbed on this glory in the sensation headings of the New York papers.

After breakfast I accompanied a party of Mr. Burnside's friends to visit the plantations of Governor Manning, close at hand. One plantation is as like another as two peas. We had the same paths through tasselling corn, high above our heads, or through wastes of rising sugar-cane; but the slave quarters on Governor Manning's were larger, better built, and more comfortable-looking than any I have seen.

Mr. Bateman, the overseer, a dour strong man, with spectacles on nose, and a quid in his cheek, led us over the ground. As he saw my eye resting on a large knife in a leather case stuck in his belt, he thought it necessary to say, “I keep this to cut my way through the cane-brakes about; they are so plaguey thick.”

All the surface water upon the estate is carried into a large open drain, with a reservoir in which the fans of a large wheel, driven by steam-power, are worked so as to throw the water over to a cut below the level of the plantation, which carries it into a bayou connected with the lower Mississippi.

In this drain one of my companions saw a prodigious frog, about the size of a tortoise, on which he pounced with alacrity; and on carrying his prize to land he was much congratulated by his friend. “What on earth will you do with the horrid reptile?” “Do with it! why, eat it to be sure.” And it is actually true, that on our return the monster “crapaud” was handed over to the old cook, and presently appeared on the breakfast-table, looking very like an uncommonly fine spatch-cock, and was partaken of with enthusiasm by all the company.

From the draining-wheel we proceeded to visit the forest, where negroes were engaged in clearing the trees, turning up the soil between the stumps, which marked where the mighty sycamore, live oak, gum-trees, and pines had lately shaded the rich earth. In some places the Indian corn was already waving its head and tassels above the black gnarled roots ; in other spots the trees, girdled by the axe, but not yet down, rose up from thick crops of maize; and still deeper in the wood negroes were guiding the ploughs, dragged with pain and difficulty by mules, three abreast, through the tangled roots and rigid earth, which will next year be fit for sowing. There were one hundred and twenty negroes at work; and these, with an adequate number of mules, will clear four hundred and fifty acres of land this year. “But it's death on niggers and mules,” said Mr. Bateman. “We generally do it with Irish, as well as the hedging and ditching; but we can't get them now, as they are all off to the wars.”

Although the profits of sugar are large, the cost of erecting the machinery, the consumption of wood in the boiler, and the scientific apparatus, demand a far larger capital than is required by the cotton planter, who, when he has got land, may procure negroes on credit, and only requires food and clothing till he can realize the proceeds of their labor, and make a certain fortune. Cotton will keep where sugar spoils. The prices are far more variable in the latter, although it has a protective tariff of twenty per cent.

The whole of the half million of hogsheads of the sugar grown in the South is consumed in the United States, whereas most of the cotton is sent abroad; but in the event of a blockade the South can use its sugar ad nauseam, whilst the cotton is all but useless in consequence of the want of manufacturers in the South.

When I got back, Mr. Burnside was seated in his veranda, gazing with anxiety, but not with apprehension, on the marching columns of black clouds, which were lighted up from time to time by heavy flashes, and shaken by rolls of thunder. Day after day the planters have been looking for rain, tapping glasses, scrutinizing aneroids, consulting negro weather prophets, and now and then their expectations were excited by clouds moving down the river, only to be disappointed by their departure into space, or, worse than all, their favoring more distant plantations with a shower that brought gold to many a coffer. “Did you ever see such luck? Kenner has got it again! That's the third shower Bringier has had in the last two days.”

But it was now the turn of all our friends to envy us a tremendous thunder-storm, with a heavy, even downfall of rain, which was sucked up by the thirsty earth almost as fast as it fell, and filled the lusty young corn with growing pains, imparting such vigor to the cane that we literally saw it sprouting up, and could mark the increase in height of the stems from hour to hour.

My good host is rather uneasy about his prospects this year, owing to the war; and no wonder. He reckoned on an income of £100,000 for his sugar alone; but if he cannot send it North it is impossible to estimate the diminution of his profits. I fancy, indeed, he more and more regrets that he embarked his capital in these great sugar-swamps, and that he would gladly now invest it at a loss in the old country, of which he is yet a subject; for he has never been naturalized in the United States. Nevertheless, he rejoices in the finest clarets, and in wines of fabulous price, which are tended by an old white-headed negro, who takes as much care of the fluid as if he was accustomed to drink it every day.

SOURCE: William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South, p. 280-3

Edwin M. Stanton to Major-General Irvin McDowell, April 11, 1862, 9:36 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR,

Washington, D. C., April 11, 1862 — 9.36 a.m.

Major-General McDOWELL,

Comdg. Department of the Rappahannock, Hdqrs. Manassas:

SIR: For the present and until further orders from this Department, you will consider the national capital as especially under your protection, and make no movement throwing your force out of position for the discharge of this primary duty.

EDWIN M. STANTON,

Secretary of War.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 12, Part 3 (Serial No. 18), p. 66

Major-General Philip Kearny to Oliver S. Halsted Jr., August 4, 1862

HARRISON’S LANDING, 4th August, 1862.

DEAR PET: I thank you for your kind, long letter. You extend me hope.  You suggest withdrawing me and my division out of this ignoble position.  With Pope’s army I would breathe again.

We have no generals.  McClellan is the failure I ever proclaimed him.  He has been punished, just as I at once comprehended the moves of the parties. He will only get us in more follies, more waste of blood, fighting by driblets.  He has lost the confidence of all.  Nor has he a single officer about him capable of bettering us.  Sumner is a “bull in a china shop,” and a sure enough blunderer.  ––– lost his corps gratuitously at Fair Oaks.  He is not now in his right place, and will be much worse.  ––– is a small brain, ossified in a ‘4 company’ garrison on the frontier.  He was not ‘of us’ in Mexico, but in a rear column once saw a distant flash in a guerilla fight.  His skill is a myth, a poetical version of his own part at Bull’s Run. Porter is good in nature, but weak as water – the apparent of all this disaster for his want of generalship on the Chickahominy. ––– and Franklin are talented engineers.  They might make good generals if they understood the value of elements in their calculations; as it is, they are dangerous failures.

When ––– was drunk, he had some few men drowned before Yorktown.  I know of no other feat of his.  Franklin’s battle of West Point was a most runaway picket fight of our.  His part on the Chickahominy was unpardonable.  He sent over a division, (his own,) was present on that side out of fire, and never interfered to prevent them from being sacrificed by driblets and rendered prey to their false position.  I was horrified at it, as described by Gen. Taylor, and all others.  Is it surprising that I want to get out of this mess?  Besides, they have sent me a major generalship, like all these others, dating from 4th July, muddled in a batch of new and very ordinary junior officers.  Do they forget that I was appointed twelfth on the original list?  That I, on the heels of Bull’s Run, faced the enemy with a Jersey brigade in advance of all others, McClellan, McDowell, et id omne genus, nearly forcing me to come back of the “Seminary.”  Do they forget me at Manassas?  My Jersey brigade, that infected with panic the retiring enemy?  Has Williamsburg never come to their ears?  Oh, no!  I really feel aggravated beyond endurance.  Discipline becomes degradation if not wielded with justice.  Patriotism cannot amid all her sacrifices, claim that of self respect.  Generals, victorious in the past are not called on to expose their troops, unless those brave men are acknowledged.  Their identity in their chief’s promotion, claims a date of their own high acts.  Oh, No, I am nearer returning to the home I have given up, to the interests I have sacrificed, to my cherished wife, whose anxiety oppresses me, than I ever dreamt of in a war for the union.  But if the infatuated North are weak enough to let this crisis be managed by ‘small men of small motives,’ I am not willing to be their puppet.

My dear Pet, I am too lazy, and too little interested, to give into the future of this ‘little box of heresies,’ so do tell me – what do the people at the North look forward to in the future?  I fear lest the war will die out in rapid imbecility.

For McClellan, he is burnt out.  Never once on a battlefield, you have nothing to hope from him as a leader of a column.  How do they expect Pope to beat, with a very inferior force, the veterans of Ewell and Jackson?  But these are episodes.  We deceive ourselves.  There was a people of old – it was the warrior Spartan, with his Helot of the field.  The South have realized it.  There was an ambitious people of recent times, and a conscription pandered to her invasions .  At this moment the South exemplifies them both.  “Peace, peace,” but there is no peace.  No, not even with a disruptured Union.  Let the North cast away that delusion.

Draft we must, or the disciplined THOUSANDS of the South will redeem scrip in Philadelphia, and yet the true North must accept it, and quickly, to a man, or the moment it draggles in debate, Maryland, Tennessee, and Kentucky will cast past victories to the winds and rise with their nearly allied rebel kin.  My dear Pet, I shall be delighted when Henry can come on.  As to Col. Halstead, I think that his case is a type of the insane and unnecessary despotism introduced into the army, under the auspices of McClellan and his very weak aids.  It is now too late, but why was not the cavalry put in my charge at the commencement?  Two nights ago the rebel batteries fired across the river, and killed and wounded some thirty men.  Last night Hooker started out on a crude expedition to Malvern Hills.  He went out four miles and came back again.  Still a “false fuss” injures the whole army.  McClellan is dangerous, from the want of digesting his plans.  He positively has no talents.  Adieu.  Get me and my “fighting division” with Pope.  With best regards,

Yours,

KEARNY.

To Mr. O. S. HALSTEAD, JR., Newark, N. J.

SOURCES: George Congdon Gorham, Life and Public Services of Edwin M. Stanton, Volume 2, p. 21; Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 172-4; “A Letter from Gen. Kearney,” National Republican, Washington, DC, Thursday, October 16, 1862, p. 2; “Letter From General Kearny,” The Liberator, Boston, Massachusetts, Friday, October 24, 1862, p. 1; “Letter From General Kearney,” Alexandria Gazette, Alexandria, Virginia, October 16, 1862, p. 4; “The Famous Criticism of the late General Kearny on M'Clellan,” Richmond Times Dispatch, Richmond, Virginia, October 21, 1862;

Diary of Salmon P. Chase: Friday, October 10, 1862

Went to Cabinet, taking Mr. Whittlesey to Department. Found the President reading telegrams from Kentucky. McCook's division engaged with Bragg's Army on the 8th, and hard pressed, but was reinforced and the enemy repulsed. All the corps up at night and in position. Slight engagement with enemy's rear guard yesterday, but main body retreated to Harrodsburg. This from Buell at Perryville yesterday morning. Stager P. Cleveland telegraphs another great battle yesterday, and no mistake about victory this time. This came this morning at ten. So we hope the best.

Nothing of much importance was discussed except Norfolk. I favored opening the port. Nothing was decided. Asked Stanton what he had done about McClernand's Army for clearing the Mississippi, and he replied “Nothing.” Seward said he thought something had been done, and the President that something had been agreed on. It turned out that orders for the organization of the expedition had been given but that nothing of importance was yet done.

Home. Signed official letters and Warrants — Directed Regulations of Trade with open ports to be sent to Secretary of War.

In the evening, Genl. Hunter, Maj. Halpin, Mr. Cowan, Judge and Mr. Maxwell of N. J., Genl. McDowell, Maj. D. Taylor and others called. Before dinner, Bannister came about Col. A. J. Hamilton, of Texas, going to Ohio. Urged him to have him go if possible.

Directed 10,000 Postage Currency sent to Cincinnati.

SOURCE: Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 104

Diary of Salmon P. Chase: Thursday, September 25, 1862

At Department as usual. The President sent for me to meet the Secretary of War. Found he had nothing to talk about except the supply of an additional sum to Gov. Gamble, of Missouri, to be used in defending the State against invasion and guerillaism. Agreed to confer with the Secretary of War on the subject. Enquired as to progress of the War. No information, and nothing satisfactory as to what is to be expected. Coming out Stanton told me that McClellan wants bridges built across the Potomac and Shenandoah, as preliminaries to movement; to which Halleck wont consent. Dan helps Zeke doing nothing.¹

Delighted this morning by news of Gen. Wadsworth's nomination for Governor of New York, on the first ballot.

In the afternoon, went with Garfield to see Hooker, who was very free in his expressions about McClellan. He said it was not true that either the army or the officers were specially attached to him; that only two corps, whose commanders were special favorites and whose troops had special indulgences, could be said to care anything about him; that other officers — he himself certainly — thought him not fit to lead a great army; that he is timid and hesitating when decision is necessary; that the battle of Antietam was near being lost by his way of fighting it, whereas, had the attack been simultaneous and vigorous on the enemy's right, center and left, the rout would have been complete; that our force in the battle exceeded the enemy's by 30,000 men, and that the defeat of the enemy should have been final. He said also, that when Pope had drawn off a large part of the rebel force from Richmond and orders came to McClellan to withdraw, he urged him to give, on the contrary, orders for advance; that the orders were actually given and then revoked, much to his chagrin. This recalled to my mind a conversation with Gen. Halleck at that time. I said to him, that it seemed to me our people could now certainly take Richmond by a vigorous push, as Pope had 60,000 of the rebels before him, and at least half of the remaining 60,000 were south of the James, leaving only 30,000 with the fortifications on the north side; to which Gen. Halleck replied, that it was too dangerous an undertaking. I said, “If this cannot be done, why not return to Fredericksburgh, leaving Richmond on the left?” “This,” he said, “would be quite as dangerous — a flank movement, in which our army would be exposed to being cut off and totally lost.” Gen. Hooker said that the movement I suggested could have been executed with safety and success. He said, also, that he was somewhat reconciled to leaving the Peninsula by being told that it was a plan for getting rid of McClellan, and the only one which it was thought safe to adopt. This he thought so essential, that anything necessary to it was to be accepted.

Returning from Gen. Hooker's, as well as going, Gen. Garfield gave me some very interesting portions of his own experience. This fine officer was a laborer on a canal in his younger days. Inspired by a noble ambition, he had availed himself of all means to acquire knowledge — became a Preacher of the Baptist Church — was made the President of a flourishing Literary Institution on the Reserve — was elected to the Ohio Senate, and took a conspicuous part as a Republican leader. On the breaking out of the War he became a Colonel — led his regiment into Eastern Kentucky — fought Humphrey Marshall near Prestonburgh — gained position rapidly — was made at my instance, a Brigadier — fought under Buell at Shiloh — and was now in Washington by direction of the Secretary of War, who proposes to give him the Department of Florida. A large portion of his regiment, he said, was composed of students from his college.

Went to Seward's to dinner, where I met the Marquis of Cavendish, and his brother, Col. Leslie of the British Army; Mr. Stuart and Mr. Kennedy of the British Legation; Genl. Banks, and Mr. Everett. Gen. Banks earnest against more separation of forces until the rebel army is crushed.

Home. Found there Genl. and Mrs. McDowell. Soon after, Capt. and Mrs. Loomis came in. Could not help the Captain who wished to be Quartermaster of Genl. Sigel's Corps.

To bed tired and unwell

________________

¹ A reference to the familiar story of Daniel Webster's boyhood.

SOURCE: Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 94-6