James C. Dobbin* to Howell Cobb, June 15, 1848

Fayetteville [N. C], June 15th, 1848.

My Dear Sir: Your esteemed favour in reply to my first communication was duly received, and its perusal gave me no little pleasure, awakening, as it did, pleasing recollections of incidents during my brief political career in Washington.

I think, my dear sir, I am not deceived in inferring from the spirit and tenor of your letter that an occasional correspondence will not be unacceptable, and will serve but to keep alive that kindly attachment which I trust neither time nor separation will extinguish. Still, plunged as I have been for many months in the laborious practice of the law, I cannot but occasionally abandon the courthouse and stroll into the avenue of politics. They have rather forced me to consent to become a candidate for our Legislature. I have no opposition, and of course will have a quiet time, and a little dish of Legislative politics may not be disagreeable. Well, the agony is over and Cass and Butler are nominated, and Taylor and Fillmore; and although it has produced some sensation, the tickets seem to have been anticipated by the popular mind. We have had a large Democratic meeting here and responded very zealously to the nomination of Cass and Butler. Judge Strange and myself addressed them. The meeting was large, enthusiastic, and everything passed off well.

I struggled hard to prove Cass orthodox on the slavery question, and I would not have done [so] had I suspected him. And his letter to Nicholson is certainly liberal and magnanimous for a Northern man. I was provoked at Yancey's conduct in the convention. The introduction of his resolution¹ was unnecessary. The resolution reported by the committee was comprehensive. There was no evidence that Cass had wrong views, and the adoption of Yancey's resolution squinted very much towards a suspicion of Cass and looked too much like pressing nice, hair-spliting distinctions on the subject upon our Northern democratic friends, whose liberality should be appreciated but not abused. My own notion is that the Territorial Legislature while legislating as such and for the Territory and for territorial purposes has no right to pass a law to prohibit slavery. Because if we adopt that doctrine we at once practically exclude the slaveholder forever. The Territory acquired is filled at the time of acquisition with non-slaveholders. The Legislature meets and a law excluding slavery is enacted. This will exclude the slaveholder, for he can't get there to repeal the law. I regard the Territory as the common property of the States. And the people of each State have a right to enjoy it with or without their peculiar property. But when the people are meeting to pass a fundamental law, to adopt a Constitution and to ask admission into the Union as a State, then the prohibition or establishment of slavery becomes a subject for legitimate action. It will not do for us to admit that the first Legislature in New Mexico can pass a law immediately and exclude every slaveholder from the territory — if we do, are we not admitting that it is not the property of each and all the States? But I do not think Cass has publicly — certainly not in his Nicholson letter — expressed any opinion contravening my position. He says “leave to the people affected by the question” its regulation. He does not say that he thinks the Territorial Legislature can prohibit it. I hope he will not say so. Because it may never in all probability become a practical question on which he as President could act. Yet the expression of such an opinion would prejudice him in the South with many, very many.

But enough of this. When you write me give me your views. I can not express to you my feelings about the Whigs' nomination. If they succeed, my confidence in popular virtue and intelligence will be a little shaken. I know much virtue and much intelligence will vote the ticket. I regard it as evidence that the Whigs are afraid of their principles. They know the people are against them. They put up “Old Zac” and surround him with a blaze of military glory, and just behind him is Fillmore lurking, holding ready to fasten upon the country all the odious and rejected measures of the Whig Party. Can they succeed? What do our friends think of it? I was pleased to see that yourself and distingue were on the tour, lionizing. That is right. I have given up South Carolina and am afraid of Georgia and Louisiana. Massachusetts will bolt. Ohio will vote for Cass, so likewise Pennsylvania. But for those miserable Barnburners, New York would be all right. The South will have a hard fight. The slavery question and “Old Zac” being a slaveholder may for a moment shake some of the faithful — but I have faith in our Principles and in Providence.

I can't say much to please you about North Carolina. Reid is doing his best. I don't think he will succeed, although he has sprung up a suffrage question which is taking well. I do think we will carry the legislature. There is a strong probability of it.

But enough of politics. Tell Stephens I heartily appreciate his remembering me so kindly and assure him that the feeling is cordially reciprocated. I like Stephens. With all his bad politics he is a generous hearted fellow and of brilliant genius.

By the by, lest I forget it, in confidence, a friend of mine wishes to go abroad. Do you know of a vacancy — Naples, Rome, Belgium, etc., etc. Remember this when you write . . .

­­­­_______________

* Member of Congress from North Carolina, 1845-1847.

¹ Proclaiming the doctrine of congressional non-intervention with slavery in the Territories. See footnote 1, p. Ill, infra.

SOURCE: Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, Editor, The Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1911, Volume 2: The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb, p. 107-9

Speech of Alexander H. Stephens, February 10, 1861

GENTLEMEN AND FELLOW-CITIZENS, for though we met as strangers from different and independent States, we are once more citizens of a common country. [Applause] Allow me briefly and sincerely to return you my unfeigned thanks for this compliment. The state of my health, my voice and the night air, apart from all other considerations, will prevent me from doing more. This is not the time or the place to discuss those great questions which are now pressing upon our public counsels. We are in a transition condition — in the process of a new formation.

Sufficient to say, that this day a new republic has been born — the Confederate States of America has been ushered into existence, to take its place amongst the nations of the earth — [cheers] — under a temporary or provisional government, it is true; but soon to be followed by one of a permanent character, which, while it surrenders none of our ancient rights and liberties, will secure more perfectly, we trust, the peace, security, and domestic tranquillity that should be the objects of all governments. [Applause.]

What is to be the future of this new government — the fate of this new republic — will depend upon ourselves. Six States only, at present, constitute it — but six stars, as yet, appear in our constellation — more, we trust, will soon be added. By the time of the adoption of the constitution of the permanent government, we may have a number greater than the original thirteen — of the original Union, and with more than three times their population, wealth, and power. [Applause] With such a beginning, the prospect of the future presents strong hopes to the patriot’s heart, for a bright and prosperous career. But what that future shall be, depends, I say, upon ourselves and those who shall come after us. Ours is a republic. And all republics, to be permanent and prosperous, must be supported by the virtue, intelligence, integrity, and patriotism of the people. These are the corner-stones upon which the temple of popular liberty must be constructed, to stand securely and permanently. Resting ours upon these, we need fear nothing from without or from within. With a climate unsurpassed by any on earth; with staples and productions which control the commerce of the world; with institutions, so far as regards our organic and social policy, in strict conformity to nature and the laws of the Creator, whether read in the Book of Inspiration or in the great book of manifestations around us, we have all the natural elements essential to the attainment of the highest degree of honor, glory, and renown. [Applause]

These institutions have been much assailed. It is our mission to vindicate the great truths on which they rest — and with them to exhibit the highest type of civilization which it is possible for human society to reach. In doing this, our policy should be marked by a desire to preserve and maintain peace with all other States and peoples. If this cannot be done, let not the fault lie at our door. While we should make aggressions on none, we should be prepared to repel them if made by others; let it come from whatever quarter it may. [Applause] We ask of all others simply to be let alone, and to be permitted to work after our own safety, security, and happiness, in our own way, without molesting or giving offence to any other people.

Let then peace, fraternity, and liberal commercial relations with all the world, be our motto. [Cheers] With these principles, without any envy toward other States in the line of policy they may mark out for themselves, we will rather invite them to a generous rivalship in all that develops the highest qualities of our nature. [Applause]

With best wishes for you, gentlemen, and the success of our common government, this day announced, I bid you goodnight.

SOURCE: Henry Whitney Cleveland, Alexander H. Stephens, in Public and Private, p. 157-9

James F. Cooper* to Howell Cobb, July 8, 1846

Dahlonega, Ga., July 8,1846.

My Dear Sir: Since I wrote you last I have not heard a syllable further relative to Wofford's pretensions . . . Since we published the call for our meeting on the 4th, I have conversed freely with the rank and file of the Democracy on the subject, and find that they are entirely undivided in your favor, showing that there has been no tampering with them as yet. They have heard of no other claims, and of course I did not mention them. It were a pity to destroy such a blessed unanimity. On the 4th we clinched the thing in Lumpkin.¹ A great many people were here to attend a muster and there was no dissenting voice. You will glide in again without, I think, the slightest opposition. The Whigs are doing nothing that I hear of.

If those disaffected Buckeyes and Hooziers sacrifice McKay's Bill on the altar of Oregon, it will be ruinous to us at the next general election — say the governor's. We cannot elect a governor unless you reduce the tariff. We shall moreover lose all the closely contested congressional districts — Jones's, Towns's, etc. Stephens and Toombs will be immovable in their places.

I am now keeping house at the mint, and when you visit Lumpkin this fall we will be glad to see you and your family with us. You might make this a depot of your family from which you could branch off to Union, Habersham, etc.

_______________

* Superintendent of the United States branch mint at Dahlonega, Ga.

¹ Lumpkin County, whose county seat was Dahlonega.

SOURCE: Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, Editor, The Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1911, Volume 2: The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb, p. 85-6

Congressman Robert Toombs to Governor George W. Crawford, February 16, 1846

Washington, D. C, Ho. or Reps., Feb. 6, 1846.

Dear Crawford, I received your letter of the 31st ult. last night. Lest you may not receive the speech I first sent, I send you another by this mail. The authorities on the Galphin claim to [which] you refer I will consult in a few days. I think from your statement of the case it is “in pint.” This is a very bad body before which to argue such a question, but if it can be got through the Senate and is backed by a strong report in this House I think it could be got through without much difficulty. A majority report favourable would certainly settle it, but the committees of this House are very badly constituted for any just purpose. They [are] nearly as rabid against all sorts of claims as the Locos in the Georgia legislature. They have promised a good deal in the way of reform, and instead of honestly retrenching actual abuses, which they have neither the honesty or the firmness to do, they desire to retrench by defeating all sort of claims, honest as well as dishonest, against the government.

I suppose you have the defective receipts sent you by Mr. Stephens. You will perceive from the nature of the objections that it [is] impossible ever to settle with the government without legislation, and I am decidedly of opinion that a gross appropriation for a full settlement will be the very best we can do, if we can carry it. If you can get the Secretary of War to recommend or acquiesce in it, it can I think be carried, and I very much wish you could bring him to that point. Without it I see little or no chance of ever getting any considerable portion of the remaining claim, if indeed we can get anything more.

I am glad to hear from you that you will not be obliged “to stop” during your administration. I had supposed your only resource against such a calamity would be in the act of 1843 authorizing you to raise money to pay off that debt by new 6 per cents. You will probably recollect at that time I favoured that policy in any event. I don't care to pay that debt. I would much prefer letting it remain the 25 or 30 years, when I doubt not its interest and much of the principal can be paid from the road,¹ and the experience of the last five years is very conclusive that all railroads judiciously located will pay, and I think ours will be one of the very best in the South. I perceive from the newspapers that you are adopting the policy of raising the wind by means of the 6 per cents. If they are pressed gradually on the market they will rise, unless we have war.

I do not think a war in the least probable. Mr. Polk never dreamed of any other war than a war upon the Whigs. He is playing a low grog-shop politician's trick, nothing more. He would be as much surprised and astonished and frightened at getting into war with England as if the Devil were to rise up before him at his bidding. The Democratic Party had declared our title to “all Oregon” “clear and unquestionable.” Mr. Polk adopted and asserted the same thing in his inaugural speech. Both moves were political blunders. It became necessary to retrieve them. He was bound to offer 49°. He supposed as the British Gov[ernment] had refused that proposition when made with more advantageous additions than were embraced in his proposition that that Gov[ernment] would do so again. It was an affectation of moderation when he knew that it was the best we could ever get. He withdraws the proposition and begins his game of “bluster,” with the full conviction that the Whig Party, true to their fatality to blunders, would raise the shout of peace, peace, and which would make him, the vilest poltroon that ever disgraced our Government, the head of the war party. His party were already committed to him to 54° 40', they would stand by him, and he expected finally to be forced by the British Whigs and Southern Calhoun men to compromise; but he greatly hoped that he would not be forced even to this alternative until he had “all Oregon” on every Democratic banner in the Union for his “second heat.” I have not the least doubt but that he fully calculated that the “notice” would be rejected by a combination between the Whigs and Calhoun men of this Congress, and then he could have kept it open for a new presidential campaign. That these were the objects of the Administration I have not the least doubt. Hence I urged the Whigs to stand up and give him the power to give the notice whenever he thought proper, which would have “blocked” him. But they would save themselves and their party for the same reason that the lad did in scripture, “because” their friends “had much goods.” Wall street howled, old Gales was frightened into fits at the possibility of war, and the Whig press throughout the country screamed in piteous accents peace, peace, with the vain foolish hope of gaining popular confidence by their very fears, and like the magnetic needle, they expected to tremble into peace. Nothing could be more absurd. If we have peace they are disarmed, and whatever may be the terms of accommodation they will be stopped from uttering a word of complaint. If war comes, no people were ever foolish enough to trust its conduct to a “peace party,” for very good sufficient reasons. If the country should be beaten and dishonored they will be called upon to patch up a dishonorable peace, but in no other event.

There is another view of this question, purely sectional, which our people don't seem to understand. Some of our Southern papers seem to think we are very foolish to risk a war to secure anti-slave power. They look only at the surface of things. If we had control of the government and could control this question, I have not the least doubt that Calhoun is right in saying that his “masterly inactivity” policy is the only one which ever could acquire “all Oregon”. It can never be done in any other way except to give the notice and stand still, which would effect the same object rightfully; but notice and action never will secure all Oregon. Mark the prediction. Notice will force an early settlement. That settlement will be upon or near the basis of 49°, and therefore a loss of half the country. Now one of the strongest private reasons which governs me is that I don't [care] a fig about any of Oregon, and would gladly get ridd of the controversy by giving it all to anybody else but the British if I could with honor. The country is too large now, and I don't want a foot of Oregon or an acre of any other country, especially without “niggers.” These are some of my reasons for my course which don't appear in print.

I deeply regret that the Whigs, especially of the Senate, have given and will give a different direction to the question. If Polk wants war he can make it in spite of any let or hindrance from them. If he does not want [it], he will not need their aid to keep out of it; but they “gabble” and “chatter” about the peace of the country and the horrors of war as if they had any real power over either question. . . .

P. S. — We are still on Oregon. The question will be taken on Monday. “Notice” will pass this time, in what form is doubtful, but I think unqualified. Negotiations are undoubtedly renewed and are now pending on the subject.

_______________

¹ The Western & Atlantic Railroad.

SOURCE: Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, Editor, The Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1911, Volume 2: The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb, p. 72-5

Congressman Alexander H. Stephens to Governor George W. Crawford,* February 3, 1846

Washington, D. C., Feb. 3,1846.

Dear Crawford, Yours in relation to the Galphin claim came to hand last night and I will examine the case you cite. I turned over the papers relating to the claim to Judge Berrien some weeks ago who I think likewise turned them over to Mr. McDuffie who is to bring the subject before the Senate. This I think the better course. They have more time in the Senate, and being a smaller body are more disposed to attend to the real merits of the case. If a favourable report can be got through that body it will stand a much better chance in our House. And should it come there I would do all that labour, research and investigation can do to effect its passage. I have bestowed a good deal of attention to the subject and am clearly of opinion that it is founded in right and justice and ought to be passed. Our time however for some weeks, as you see from the papers, has been taken up almost exclusively with the Oregon debate, and when we will bring that to a close I am wholly unable to conjecture. Every one in the House I believe (myself alone excepted) is desirous of making a speech upon the subject. Even those who have spoken are anxious many of them to make another. But I suppose the debate will be ended in the House when it is taken up in the Senate, which will take place next week. It is a subject I feel no disposition to speak upon in its present shape and condition, and I partake very little of that excitement in relation to it which seems to prevail amongst others. I am for our rights as far as they are clear, and in maintaining them thus far I should not suffer myself to be influenced by any considerations growing out of a fear or apprehension of war. Nor do I conceive that the questions of peace or war are at all involved in terminating the joint occupancy under the convention of 1818. It seems to me that such a measure would only bring about a settlement of our boundary, which ought to be done, as our people are new going there in large companies for the purpose of colonizing. Whether this will lead to a rupture with England or not I cannot pretend to say. It ought not, and will not if properly managed. But one thing is certain, our government will have to recede from the position of Mr. Polk that our "title to the whole of the territory is clear and unquestionable ", or war will be inevitable unless I greatly mistake the temper of the British Government. The war however will not be the result of the giving the notice but subsequent legislation taking possession of the whole of the country. And this I am not prepared to do, and will not do, for I do not think our rights clear to that extent. And I moreover think that the whole subject is proper for negotiation and settlement upon terms of mutual compromise. And if I may go a step further I think this will be the result of the whole matter. If the notice is given, negotiations (if the President does his duty) will be opened, he will recede from his position, and the controversy will ultimately be ended in some sort of amicable adjustment. I can not bring myself to the belief that war will result. But enough of this. I am doing what I can to facilitate the settlement of the amount of our state at the Treasury Department, but my progress is slow. I sent you some papers upon this subject a few days ago.

P. S. — My health is good, much better than it has been for several years.

_______________

* Governor of Georgia, 1843-1847, Secretary of War in Taylor's Cabinet, 1849-1850. He was for many years attorney for the Galphin claimants.

SOURCE: Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, Editor, The Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1911, Volume 2: The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb, p. 71-2

Alexander H. Stephens to Howell Cobb, February 27, 1845

Steamboat Wilmington                   

(near Charleston Harbour,        

Thursday Morning) , 27 Feb. 1845.

Dear Cobb, According to promise I drop you a line, though I write on the boat where I am rocked and shaken so I fear you can not read it. I have had a fine and comfortable travel so far, and expect soon to take leave of the sea and its dangers. I never had a smoother passage from Wilmington to Charleston. The wind was perfectly calm and the sea at rest. Touching the stages, I ascertained that there is a daily line from Raleigh to Columbia — two horse, I was told. It leaves Raleigh at 2 p. m., and after being out two nights arrives at Columbia at 8 p. m. the third night. Another line leaves the Wilmington railroad at the breakfast house Warsaw, for Fayetteville and Columbia. That is the best route, and it gives you an opportunity of judging of the probable state of the weather — as you can pay to that place, and then if the weather threatens to be bad you can take that line. It leaves the railroad 45 miles from Wilmington; is a four horse coach, but did not look to me as if it could carry more than six. It is a small and slender looking North Carolina affair. But I can say no more.

SOURCE: Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, Editor, The Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1911, Volume 2: The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb, p. 68

Robert Toombs to Alexander H. Stephens, February 16, 1845

Washington [ga.,] Feb. 16th, 1845.

[dear S]tephens,¹ I received your letter of 9th and hardly know [what to] write you about my prospects of getting to Taliaferro. [ I tell m]yself every five or six days that I am getting well [but the] slightest exercise or labour brings back the pains [in] my shoulders, arms and legs. I hope to get there but I fear I shall not be able, tho' I should dislike to be able and not have you there. Therefore unless very inconvenient I wish you would come. My physician thinks that I am clear of rheumatism and that my present pains are the result of spinal irritation which he says frequently succeeds as severe attacks as mine. I doubt he is right about it. I am generally free from pain when at rest but the slightest motion even writing a letter is accompanied with pain. I am thus particular that you may judge somewhat for yourself.

I have not answered the Times because I am wholly unequal to the labour. Except my letters to you I have not written as much as a sheet of paper since I was taken sick, until day before yesterday I wrote about half that amount to Berrien. As soon as I am able I shall give him a touch. The Whigs generally, indeed universally except Jenkins, as far as I have seen or heard from them, are satisfied with the course of yourself and Clinch on the Texas question. My means of knowing their opinions are of course limited. I have heard of no single man who objects to the terms of annexation embraced in the resolutions. A good man[y differ] with you as to the mode, but you are a sufficient judge] of the popular mind that the mode [exerts] no influence upon the people generally. Man[y who dif]fer with you as to the mode think that y[our own] course will have a good effect upon the state [of opinion] here by killing it off as a party question. It [may] have that effect, but I am not without my misgiving[s.] If Berrien could have voted with you I think such would likely have been the case, but his voting the other way, connected with the fact that the measure will be lost by the votes of slaveholding Senators will I think prevent that result. From that state of facts I fear it will still be a party question in the South. In that event the divisions of the Whig party even on the mode of annexation must needs be an element of weakness and not of strength. The terms of annexation are certainly very favourable to the South, better than I ever supposed could pass either branch of Congress; and I deeply regret that the form in which they come up prevents their passage through the Senate. I see nothing but evil to our party and the country that can come out of this question in future. You ought to send copies of your speech to all of our editors for immediate publication. It will put you right before the country. Your speech is a good one, tho' I have rarely found myself differing with [you on] so many points. I concur with you in but one of [your re]asons for desiring annexation and that is that [it will] give power to the slave states. I firmly believe [that in] every other respect it will be an unmixed evil to us [        ] and not without natural disadvantages as well as [advanta]ges. Tho' I can not bring myself to concur with [you] on the constitutional question, I shall not commit myself publicly on that point without further time and a more full investigation. It strikes me that a satisfactory answer to your argument drawn from the admission of N. Carolina and R. Island is to be found in the Constitution itself. Altho' the government was to go into operation on the ratification of nine states the other states could by the very terms of the Constitution come in at any time afterwards. I hope and trust the question will take such a direction in the Senate as not to bring our friends even in apparent collision. Archer's report² gave me the backache to read it. Its style is really ridiculous. It is either a long ways behind or before the age. He “writes bombast and calls it a style.” Write me as soon as you get this whether you will come to T. Court. Come if you can and let us talk over these matters. For I can not write. We must commence the spring campaign early and vigorously.

_______________

¹ Corner of the original letter mouse-eaten.

² William S. Archer, of Virginia, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, had presented a report, Feb. 4, 1845, contending that Texas could be annexed only by treaty, and not by act of Congress.

SOURCE: Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, Editor, The Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1911, Volume 2: The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb, p. 63-5

Alexander H. Stephens to James Thomas, February 11, 1845

Washington, D. C., Feb. 11, 1845.

Dear Thomas, Let me know what you think of my speech upon Texas and what the Whigs of Hancock think of my vote upon the same. From the Chronicle and Sentinel¹ I infer that they do not sustain it; but certainly they forget the true position of the Whigs of Georgia last year upon that subject. I haven't time to say more. No news here. Benton it is thought will defeat the measure in the Senate. He wishes it kept open. Polk has not got here yet, and nobody knows who will be in his cabinet.

_______________

¹ The Chronicle and Sentinel of Augusta was a leading Whig organ in Georgia.

SOURCE: Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, Editor, The Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1911, Volume 2: The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb, p. 62

J. W. Burney to Congressman Howell Cobb, January 31, 1845

Monticello [ga.,] 31st Jany., 1845.

Dear Sir: Many of our citizens had assembled at the Post office this morning to hear the Texas news. When we saw the measure had passed the H. of R., and that Messrs. Stephens and Clinch had voted with the rest of our delegation there was a general exclamation of “well done good and faithful servant”. Our Whig friends joined in the expression of their joy. I beg you to tender to Mr. Stephens (to whom I am not known) my sincere thanks for this vote. The question is vital to us. His superior love of country to party entitles him to great credit. Can it be that Judge Berrien¹ will not pursue a like course? Now is the time for him to show himself to be above party influence. Do all, all work to carry this great question through the Senate. We are satisfied here with the Resolutions as they passed the House, tho we would have preferred the Missouri Compromise being stricken out. But concessions must be made, and the people of Georgia will agree to any thing reasonable on the subject to get the country.

I have troubled you too much already, but felt as if it was my duty to say this much.

We shall now look with great anxiety to the other end of the Capitol for favorable action.

_______________

¹ John McPherson Berrien, Senator from Georgia, 1825-1829, Attorney General in Jackson's Cabinet, 1820-1831; Senator again (as a Whig), 1841-1852.

SOURCE: Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, Editor, The Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1911, Volume 2: The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb, p. 62

Robert Toombs to Congressman Alexander H. Stephens, January 24, 1845

Washington [ga.], Jany. 24th, 1845.

Dear Stephens, . . . I can hear nothing of local politics. There is a dead calm. The report of the Finance Committee is doing us much good. It has struck the Locos dumb. Crawford's administration has certainly been eminently successfull and has made him very popular. If we can get him to run again we can carry the State and retrieve our fortunes in Georgia. The course of the Democracy in Congress on Texas and the tariff is doing them mischief in this State, and if our local press would handle those questions now in the present calm of the public mind much could be made out of them; but very few of our papers are worth a straw. As soon as I get able I shall open upon them in several of the papers. Now is the proper time to affect the public mind. I did not see how you voted on that Rail Road iron question. That duty ought to be repealed or greatly reduced. It should be a low revenue duty only. 1st. Because it is greatly to the interest of the country to encourage internal improvements and thereby cheapen internal transportation which benefits all classes and especially the agricultural classes. 2ondly. R. R. iron not being an article of general consumption, competition is not likely to become sufficient within a reasonable time to cheapen the article and compensate for the duty. Hence the duty will continue to be a bounty to the manufacturer, and under that state of facts no article ought to be protected. I am able only to suggest my objections and not enforce them. The most foolish thing Mr. Clay did during the campaign was to write that foolish letter to Pennsylvania pledging his opposition to any modification of the tariff of 1842. It is a good law but it is not perfect; nor did human ingenuity ever make a perfect revenue law. It never will. His letter to Bronson and his N. Carolina speech contained the true doctrine on the tariff. I am unwilling to go an inch further. I care not a fig for the clamors of that American Beotia (Pennsylvania). If the whole duty on R. R. iron was repealed her agonies would give me no pain. Annexation by Congress gives me considerable trouble. I am in great doubt about it. The words of the Constitution ex vi termini are sufficient to embrace the case, and I am clear from the action of the Convention that the Convention did not intend to limit the power to the admission of States from the then territory of the United States. I think the Convention were then looking to the acquisition of Louisiana. It was absolutely necessary to our western States. I am therefore clear in the opinion, nothwithstanding Mr. Jefferson's opinion to the contrary, that the acquisition of Louisiana by treaty and then its admission was perfectly constitutional; but I am not clear that it would have been constitutional without such previous acquisition by treaty. But from the best reflection I can give it, it being a question of doubt, I would decide it in favour of the popular will and, I therefore honestly believe, the public safety and the safety of the Union, and go for Foster's plan. Benton's division of the territory will not answer. I would yield nothing upon [the] slavery question below 36½ degrees latitude — and I don't like that. Congress has no right to interfere with the social relations of the inhabitants of any State. And the Missouri Compromise was all wrong and could only be defended because it practically yielded nothing.

SOURCE: Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, Editor, The Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1911, Volume 2: The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb, p. 60-2

Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant to Edwin M. Stanton, February 1, 1865 – 10:30 p.m.

CITY POINT, VA., February 1, 1865 — 10.30 p.m.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

Now that the interview between Major Eckert, under his written instructions, and Mr. Stephens and party has ended, I will state confidentially, but not officially to become a matter of record, that I am convinced, upon conversation with Messrs. Stephens and Hunter, that their intentions are good and their desire sincere to restore peace and union. I have not felt myself at liberty to express even views of my own or to account for my reticency. This has placed me in an awkward position, which I could have avoided by not seeing them in the first instance. I fear now their going back without any expression from any one in authority will have a bad influence. At the same time I recognize the difficulties in the way of receiving these informal commissioners at this time, and do not know what to recommend. I am sorry, however, that Mr. Lincoln cannot have an interview with the two named in this dispatch, if not all three now within our lines. Their letter to me was all that the President's instructions contemplated, to secure their safe conduct, if they had used the same language to Major Eckert.

U.S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I Volume 46, Part 2 (Serial No. 96), p. 342-3

Senator Charles Sumner to John Bright, February 15, 1865

[February 15, 1865.]

I am glad of your assurance, in harmony with Mr. Cobden's, that intervention is played out. I am glad also of your speech. It amuses me to read the criticisms, which I can appreciate at their value, as I have been exposed to the same. For years it was said I was governed by hatred for the slave-masters, and did not care at all for the slaves. Oh, no! not at all.

You will read the report of the conferences.¹ It appears that the President was drawn into them by the assurances of General Grant, who was led to expect something.² Perhaps the country sees now more clearly than ever that the war must be pushed to the entire overthrow of the rebel armies. The interview was pleasant. Seward sent the commissioners on their arrival three bottles of choice whiskey, which it was reported they drank thirstily. As they were leaving, he gave them a couple of bottles of champagne for their dinner. Hunter, who is a very experienced politician, and had been all his life down to the rebellion, in Washington, said, after the discussions were closed, “Governor, how is the Capitol? Is it finished?^” This gave Seward an opportunity of picturing the present admired state of the works, with the dome completed, and the whole constituting one of the most magnificent edifices of the world. Campbell, formerly of the Supreme Court of the United States, and reputed the ablest lawyer in the slave States, began the conference by suggesting peace on the basis of a Zollverein, and continued free-trade between the two sections, which he thought might pave the way to something hereafter; but he could not promise anything. This was also the theory of the French minister here, M. Mercier, now at Madrid, who insisted that the war must end in that way. It was remarked that the men had nothing of the haughty and defiant way which they had in Washington formerly. Mr. Blair, who visited Richmond, still insists that peace is near. He says that the war cannot go on another month on their side unless they have help from Louis Napoleon. But here the question of a monarchical government may arise. Jefferson Davis, whom he describes as so emaciated and altered as not to be recognized, sets his face against it. He said to Mr. Blair that “there was a Brutus who would brook the eternal devil as easily as a king in Rome;” and he was that Brutus in Richmond.

Meanwhile the war goes on with converging forces. Mr. Stanton was with me yesterday, and gave me fully his expectations. He thinks that peace can be had only when Lee's army is beaten, captured, or dispersed , and there I agree with him. To that end all our military energies are now directed. Lee’s army is sixty-five thousand men. Against him is Grant at Petersburg, a corps now demonstrating at Wilmington, and Sherman marching from Georgia. The latter will not turn aside for Augusta or Charleston, or any fortified place, but will traverse the Carolinas until he is able to co-operate with Grant. You will see from this statement something of the nature of the campaign. Mr. Stanton thinks it ought to be finished before May. I have for a long time been sanguine that after Lee’s army is out of the way the whole rebellion will disappear. While that is in a fighting condition there is still a hope for the rebels, and the Unionist of the South are afraid to show themselves.

I am sorry that so great and good a man as Goldwin Smith, who has done so much for us, should fall into what Mr. Canning would call “cantanker.” He rushed too swiftly to his conclusion;³ but I hope that we shall not lose his powerful support for the good cause. I have felt it my duty to say to the British charge here that nothing could be done to provide for British claims on our government arising out of the war, which are very numerous, until Lord Russell took a different course with regard to ours. He tosses ours aside haughtily. I am sorry, for my system is peace and good-will, which I shall try in my sphere to cultivate, but there must be reciprocity.

P. S. Did I mention, as showing the good nature of the peace conferences, that after the serious discussions were over, including allusions on the part of the rebels to what was gently called “the continental question.” Mr. Stephens asked the President to send back a nephew of his, a young lieutenant, who was a prisoner in the North! The President said at once, “Stephens, I’ll do it, if you will send back one of our young lieutenants.” It was agreed; and Mr. Stephens handed the President on a slip of paper the name of his nephew, and the President handed Mr. Stephens the name of an officer of corresponding rank. This was the only stipulation on that occasion; and the President tells me it has been carried out on each side. Mr. Schleiden, the new minister of the Hanse Towns to London, has been long in Washington, and knows us well. Few foreigners have ever studied us more. I commend him to you and Mr. Cobden.

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¹ At Hampton Roads, February 3, between Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward on the one side, and Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell on the other.

² Nicolay and Hay's “Life of Lincoln,” vol. x. p. 127.

³ Reply of Goldwin Smith in Boston “ Advertiser," January 28, to his critics, — Theophilus Parsons and George Bemis.

SOURCE: Edward Lillie Pierce, Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner, Volume 4, p. 205-6

Senator Salmon P. Chase to Charles Sumner, August 13, 1850

Washington Aug. 13, 1850.

MY Dear Sumner: I heard of the death of your brother with real sorrow and with a true sympathy for you. It was a sad aggravation of the calamity that he perished so near the end of his voyage, just as he was about to step on threshold of his home. I have been taught the great lesson of sympathy in the school of bereavement. Often and often has the blow fallen upon me — so often indeed that now, at length, I live like Damocles, with a visible sword suspended over my head. It is not two weeks since my youngest child, of one single year, co-changed mortality for immortality, and the health of Mrs. Chase is so precarious that I have no respite from intense solicitude. You may well suppose that under the circumstances public life is irksome to me. Gladly would I retire and leave its duties and distinctions — the latter as worthless as the former are august and important — to others. But I seem to myself to have no choice. So few are faithful to Freedom — so few seem to have any real heartiness in the service of the country — that I feel as if it would be criminal in me to think of retiring so long as those who have the power have the will also to keep me at my post. This piece of egotism is but a preface to somewhat I have to say further. I see you have been nominated for Congress by the Free Democracy of the Suffolk District. I know your innate aversion to an election contest and I can well understand how this aversion must be enhanced by your present circumstances. But, my dear friend, you must not decline, nor even show any repugnance to acceptance. It is a time of trial for the Friends of Freedom. The short-lived zeal of many has waxed cold. Hunkerism everywhere rallies its forces, and joins them to those of slavery. Our side needs encouragement — inspiriting. You are looked to as a leader. You know it though your modesty would fain disclaim the title and shun the position. Your face must now be set as a flint and your voice sound like a clarion. You must not say “Go”! but “Follow”! Take the position assigned to you; and if Websterism must prevail in the Capital of Massachusetts — if Boston is to be yoked in with Slavehunters and their apologists, let no part of the sin lie at your door.

Here we are getting on as usual. We have ordered the Bill for the admission of California to be engrossed for a third reading to-day and should have passed it but for the yielding of Douglas, who, as chairman of the Committee on Territories has charge of the bill, to a motion for adjournment. It will probably pass before this reaches Boston. This is some compensation for the disgraceful surrender to Texas sealed by the passage of Pearce's bill which gives ten millions of dollars and half of New Mexico for a relinquishment by Texas of her “claim” —that is the word in the bill — to the other half. This is the first fruit of the Compromise Administration. This is their first measure.

Poor Chaplin.¹ You have seen the story of his arrest and imprisonment. I am very sorry for him, for he is a brave and true man, though I cannot approve of his course of action. Write me soon and believe me, faithfully and cordially your friend

[SALMON P. CHASE.]

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¹ William L. Chaplin, while in Washington as the correspondent of his paper, The Albany Patriot, had been arrested for assisting two slaves, the property of Robert Toombs and A. H. Stephens, respectively, to escape. Later, on the advice and with the help of his friends, he forfeited his bail and escaped trial. W. H. Siebert, The Underground Railroad, 175-176; H. Wilson, The Slave Power, II, 80-82.

SOURCE: Diary and correspondence of Salmon P. Chase, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 214-6

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: July 2, 1863

The President is unwell again; to what extent I have not learned. But the Vice-President is ready, no doubt, to take his place in the event of a fatal result; and some would rejoice at it. Such is the mutability of political affairs!

The Attorney-General Watts, being referred to, sends in a written opinion that foreigners sojourning here, under the protection of the Confederate States, are liable to military duty, in defense of their homes, against any government but the one to which they claim to owe allegiance. This I sent in to the Secretary of War, and I hope he will act on it; but the Assistant Secretary and Mr. Benjamin were busy to-day — perhaps combating the Attorney-General's opinion. Will Mr. Seddon have the nerve to act? It is a trying time, and every man is needed for defense.

The enemy were drawn up in line of battle this morning below the fortifications. The Department Guard (my son Custis among them) were ordered out, and marched away; and so with the second class militia. A battle is looked for to-morrow; and there has been skirmishing to-day. A dispatch from Hanover Court House says the enemy is approaching likewise from the north in large force — and 15 guns. This is his great blunder. He cannot take Richmond, nor draw back Lee, and the detachment of so many of his men may endanger Baltimore and Washington, and perhaps Philadelphia.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 367

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, July 14, 1863

We have accounts of mobs, riots, and disturbances in New York and other places in consequence of the Conscription Act. Our information is very meagre; two or three mails are due; the telegraph is interrupted. There have been powerful rains which have caused great damage to the railroads and interrupted all land communication between this and Baltimore.

There are, I think, indubitable evidences of concert in these riotous movements, beyond the accidental and impulsive outbreak of a mob, or mobs. Lee's march into Pennsylvania, the appearance of several Rebel steamers off the coast, the mission of A. H. Stephens to Washington, seem to be parts of one movement, have one origin, are all concerted schemes between the Rebel leaders and Northern sympathizing friends, — the whole put in operation when the Government is enforcing the conscription. This conjunction is not all accidental, but parts of a great plan. In the midst of all this and as a climax comes word that Lee's army has succeeded in recrossing the Potomac. If there had been an understanding between the mob conspirators, the Rebels, and our own officers, the combination of incidents could not have been more advantageous to the Rebels.

The Cabinet-meeting was not full to-day. Two or three of us were there, when Stanton came in with some haste and asked to see the President alone. The two were absent about three minutes in the library. When they returned, the President's countenance indicated trouble and distress; Stanton was disturbed, disconcerted. Usher asked Stanton if he had bad news. He said, “No.” Something was said of the report that Lee had crossed the river. Stanton said abruptly and curtly he knew nothing of Lee's crossing. “I do,” said the President emphatically, with a look of painful rebuke to Stanton. “If he has not got all of his men across, he soon will.”

The President said he did not believe we could take up anything in Cabinet to-day. Probably none of us were in a right frame of mind for deliberation; he was not. He wanted to see General Halleck at once. Stanton left abruptly. I retired slowly. The President hurried and overtook me. We walked together across the lawn to the Departments and stopped and conversed a few moments at the gate. He said, with a voice and countenance which I shall never forget, that he had dreaded yet expected this; that there has seemed to him for a full week a determination that Lee, though we had him in our hands, should escape with his force and plunder. “And that, my God, is the last of this Army of the Potomac! There is bad faith somewhere. Meade has been pressed and urged, but only one of his generals was for an immediate attack, was ready to pounce on Lee; the rest held back. What does it mean, Mr. Welles? Great God! what does it mean?” I asked what orders had gone from him, while our troops had been quiet with a defeated and broken army in front, almost destitute of ammunition, and an impassable river to prevent their escape. He could not say that anything positive had been done, but both Stanton and Halleck professed to agree with him and he thought Stanton did. Halleck was all the time wanting to hear from Meade. “Why,” said I, “he is within four hours of Meade. Is it not strange that he has not been up there to advise and encourage him?” I stated I had observed the inertness, if not incapacity, of the General-in-Chief, and had hoped that he, who had better and more correct views, would issue peremptory orders. The President immediately softened his tone and said: “Halleck knows better than I what to do. He is a military man, has had a military education. I brought him here to give me military advice. His views and mine are widely different. It is better that I, who am not a military man, should defer to him, rather than he to me.” I told the President I did not profess to be a military man, but there were some things on which I could form perhaps as correct an opinion as General Halleck, and I believed that he, the President, could more correctly, certainly more energetically, direct military movements than Halleck, who, it appeared to me, could originate nothing, and was, as now, all the time waiting to hear from Meade, or whoever was in command.

I can see that the shadows which have crossed my mind have clouded the President's also. On only one or two occasions have I ever seen the President so troubled, so dejected and discouraged.

Two hours later I went to the War Department. The President lay upon a sofa in Stanton's room, completely absorbed, overwhelmed with the news. He was, however, though subdued and sad, calm and resolute. Stanton had asked me to come over and read Dana's¹ report of the materials found at Vicksburg. The amount is very great, and the force was large. Thirty-one thousand two hundred prisoners have been paroled. Had Meade attacked and captured the army above us, as I verily believe he might have done, the Rebellion would have been ended. He was disposed to attack, I am told, but yielded to his generals, who were opposed. If the war were over, those generals would drop into subordinate positions.

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¹ Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 369-71

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, July 6, 1863

There was a special Cabinet-meeting at 9 A.M. on the subject of A. H. Stephens's mission. Seward came prepared with a brief telegram, which the President had advised, to the effect that Stephens's request to come to W. was inadmissible, but any military communication should be made through the prescribed military channel. A copy of this answer was to be sent to the military officer in command at Fortress Monroe by the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy was to send a copy to Admiral Lee. The President directed Mr. Seward to go to the telegraph office and see that they were correctly transmitted. All this was plainly prearranged by Seward, who has twice changed his ground, differing with the President when Chase and Stanton differed, but he is finally commissioned to carry out the little details which could be done by an errand boy or clerk.

The army news continues to be favorable. Lee is on the retreat, and Meade in hot pursuit, each striving to get possession of the passes of the Potomac.

A note from Wilkes stating he had reached home, and would have reported in person but had received an injury. A letter is published in one of the papers, purporting to be from him at Havana, written by himself or at his instigation, expressing a hope that Lardner, his successor, will be furnished with men and more efficient vessels. I hope so too. Wilkes has not had so large a force as I wished; he could not under any circumstances have had so large a squadron as he desired. To say nothing of the extensive blockade, Farragut's detention through the winter and spring before Vicksburg was unexpected, and the operations before Charleston have been long and protracted.

The papers this evening bring us the speeches of the two Seymours, Horatio and Thomas Henry, on the Fourth at New York. A couple of partisan patriots, neither of whom is elated by Meade's success, and whose regrets are over Rebel reverses.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 362-3

Diary of Gideon Welles: Sunday, July 5, 1863

A Cabinet-meeting to-day at 11 A.M. The principal topic was the mission of Alexander H. Stephens. The President read a letter from Colonel Ludlow, United States Agent for exchange of prisoners, to Secretary Stanton, stating that Stephens had made a communication to Admiral Lee, which the Admiral had sent to the Secretary of the Navy. After reading them, the President said he was at first disposed to put this matter aside without many words, or much thought, but a night's reflection and some remarks yesterday had modified his views. While he was opposed to having Stephens and his vessel come here, he thought it would be well to send some one —perhaps go himself — to Fortress Monroe. Both Seward and Stanton were startled when this remark was made. Seward did not think it advisable the President should go, nor any one else; he considered Stephens a dangerous man, who would make mischief anywhere. The most he (Seward) would do would be to allow Stephens to forward any communication through General Dix. Seward passes by Admiral Lee and the Navy Department, through whom the communication originally came. Stanton was earnest and emphatic against having anything to do with Stephens, or Jeff Davis, or their communication. Chase was decided against having any intercourse with them. Blair took a different view. He would not permit Stephens to come here with his staff, but would receive any communication he bore, and in such a case as this, he would not cavil about words. Something more important was involved.

While this discussion was going on, I wrote a brief answer to Lee, and said to the President I knew not why Colonel Ludlow was intruded as the medium of communication, or General Dix, — that neither of them was in any way connected with this transaction. Admiral Lee, in command of the blockading force, received a communication from Mr. Stephens, and had made known to the Navy Department, under whose orders he is acting, the application of the gentleman who had a mission to perform, and was now with Admiral Lee waiting an answer. In this stage of the proceeding, the Secretary of State proposes that Admiral Lee should be ignored, and the subject transferred from the Navy to some military officer, or one of his staff. Was it because Admiral Lee was incompetent, or not to be trusted? Admiral Lee has informed Stephens he cannot be permitted to pass until he has instructions from the Navy Department. Nothing definite has yet been suggested in reply. He and the parties are waiting to hear from me, and I propose to take some notice of his application, and, unless the President objects, send an answer as follows to Admiral Lee: —

“The object of the communication borne by Mr. Stephens is not stated or intimated. It is not expedient from this indefinite information that you should permit that gentleman to pass the blockade with the Torpedo.”

None of the gentlemen adopted or assented to this, nor did they approximate to unity or anything definite on any point. After half an hour's discussion and disagreement, I read what I had pencilled to the President, who sat by me on the sofa. Under the impression that I took the same view as Chase and Stanton, he did not adopt it. Seward, in the mean time, had reconsidered his proposition that the communication should be received, and thought with Stanton it would be best to have nothing to do with the mission in any way. The President was apprehensive my letter had that tendency. Mr. Blair thought my suggestion the most practical of anything submitted. Chase said he should be satisfied with it. Stanton the same. Seward thought that both Stanton and myself had better write, each separate answers, Stanton to Ludlow and I to Lee, but to pretty much the same effect.

The President said my letter did not dispose of the communication which Stephens bore. I told him the dispatch did not exclude it. Though objection was made to any communication, an answer must be sent Admiral Lee. Everything was purposely left open, so that Stephens could, if he chose, state or intimate his object. I left the dispatch indefinite in consequence of the diversity of opinion among ourselves, but that I had not the least objection, and should for myself prefer to add, “I am directed by the President to say that any communication which Mr. Stephens may have can be forwarded.”

This addendum did not, as I knew it would not, meet the views entertained by some of the gentlemen. The President prefers that a special messenger should be sent to meet Stephens, to which I see no serious objection, but which no one favors. I do not anticipate anything frank, manly, or practical in this mission, though I do not think Stephens so dangerous a man as Mr. Seward represents him. It is a scheme without doubt, — possibly for good, perhaps for evil, — but I would meet it in a manner not offensive, nor by a rude refusal would I give the Rebels and their sympathizers an opportunity to make friends at our expense or to our injury. This, I think, is the President's purpose. Mr. Blair would perhaps go farther than myself, the others not so far. We must not put ourselves in the wrong by refusing to communicate with these people. On the other hand, there is difficulty in meeting and treating with men who have violated their duty, disregarded their obligations, and who lack sincerity.

I ought to answer Lee, and, because I have not, Ludlow and Dix have been applied to. Seward will make the Secretary of War or himself the medium and not the Secretary of the Navy, — Ludlow or Dix, not Admiral Lee. I proposed to inform Admiral Lee that his communication should be answered to-morrow, it having been decided we would not reply to-day. Seward said the subject would not spoil by keeping. The President thought it best to send no word until we gave a conclusive answer to-morrow.

At 5 P.M. I received a telegram that the Torpedo with Mr. Stephens had gone up the river. Another telegram at eight said she had returned.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 359-62

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, July 4, 1863

I was called up at midnight precisely by a messenger with telegram from Byington, dated at Hanover Station, stating that the most terrific battle of the War was being fought at or near Gettysburg, that he left the field at half-past 6 P.M. with tidings, and that everything looked hopeful. The President was at the War Department, where this dispatch, which is addressed to me, was received. It was the first word of the great conflict. Nothing had come to the War Department. There seems to have been no system, no arrangement, for prompt, constant, and speedy intelligence. I had remained at the War Department for news until about eleven. Some half an hour later the dispatch from Byington to me came over the wires, but nothing from any one to Stanton or Halleek. The operator in the War Department gave the dispatch to the President, who remained. He asked, “Who is Byington?” None in the Department knew anything of him, and the President telegraphed to Hanover Station, asking, “Who is Byington?” The operator replied, “Ask the Secretary of the Navy.” I informed the President that the telegram was reliable. Byington is the editor and proprietor of a weekly paper in Norwalk, Connecticut, active and stirring; is sometimes employed by the New York Tribune, and is doubtless so employed now.

The information this morning and dispatches from General Meade confirm Byington's telegram. There is much confusion in the intelligence received. The information is not explicit. A great and bloody battle was fought, and our army has the best of it, but the end is not yet. Everything, however, looks encouraging.

Later in the day dispatches from Haupt and others state that Lee with his army commenced a retreat this A.M. at three o'clock. Our army is waiting for supplies to come up before following, — a little of the old lagging infirmity. Couch is said to be dilatory; has not left Harrisburg; his force has not pushed forward with alacrity. Meade sent him word, “The sound of my guns should have prompted your movement.” Lee and the Rebels may escape in consequence. If they are driven back, Halleck will be satisfied. That has been his great anxiety, and too many of our officers think it sufficient if the Rebels quit and go off, — that it is unnecessary to capture, disperse, and annihilate them.

Extreme partisans fear that the success of our arms will be success to the Administration. Governor Curtin is in trepidation, lest, if our troops leave Harrisburg to join Meade, the Rebels will rush in behind them and seize the Pennsylvania capital. On the other hand, Stanton and Halleck ridicule the sensitiveness of the Governor, and are indifferent to his wishes and responsibilities. Of course, matters do not work well.

Received this evening a dispatch from Admiral Lee, stating he had a communication from A. H. Stephens,¹ who wishes to go to Washington with a companion as military commissioner from Jefferson Davis, Commanding General of Confederate forces, to Abraham Lincoln, President and Commanding General of the Army and Navy of the United States, and desires permission to pass the blockade in the steamer Torpedo on this mission, with Mr. Olds, his private secretary. Showed the dispatch to Blair, whom I met. He made no comment. Saw Stanton directly after, who swore and growled indignantly. The President was at the Soldiers' Home and not expected for an hour or two. Consulted Seward, who was emphatic against having anything to do with Stephens or Davis. Did not see the President till late. In the mean time Stanton and others had seen him, and made known their feelings and views. The President treats the subject as not very serious nor very important, and proposes to take it up to-morrow. My own impression is that not much good is intended in this proposition, yet it is to be met and considered. It is not necessary that the vessel should pass the blockade, or that Stephens should come here, but I would not repel advances, or refuse to receive Davis's communication.

I learn from Admiral Lee that General Keyes with 12,000 men has moved forward from the “White House” towards Richmond, and other demonstrations are being made.

Two intercepted dispatches were received, captured by Captain Dahlgren. One was from Jeff Davis, the other from Adjutant-General Cooper, both addressed to General Lee. They disclose trouble and differences among the Rebel leaders. Lee, it seems, had an understanding with Cooper that Beauregard should concentrate a force of 40,000 at Culpeper for a demonstration, or something more, on Washington, when the place became uncovered by the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac in pursuit of Lee. Davis appears not to have been informed of this military arrangement, nor satisfied with the programme when informed of it. Lee is told of the difficulty of defending Richmond and other places, and that he must defend his own lines, instead of relying upon its being done from Richmond.

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¹ Vice-President of the Confederacy.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 357-9

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: May 3, 1863

We have no further news from the army, except the usual skirmishing. A number of our wounded arrived last evening. An officer reports that, from what he could see of the enemy's conduct, the soldiers do not come to the point with alacrity. He thinks they fight with reluctance, and are liable to be routed any hour by inferior numbers.

Troops were sent up in special trains last night, and also this morning. These are some of the regiments which Gen. D. P. [sic] Hill had in North Carolina; and hence the complaints of Gov. Vance, that his State did not have its just proportion of the protection of the government. Of Longstreet's movements, I am not advised. But there will be news enough in a few days.

The President's health is still precarious, and he is still threatened with the loss of his remaining eye.

The Vice-President was in my office yesterday, and told me his health is quite as good as usual. One would suppose him to be afflicted with all manner of diseases, and doomed to speedy dissolution; but, then, he has worn this appearance during the last twenty years. His eyes are magnificent, and his mind is in the meridian of intellectual vigor.

There has been some commotion in the city this afternoon and evening, but no painful alarm, produced by intelligence that the enemy's cavalry, that cut the road at Trevillian's depot, had reached Ashland and destroyed the depot. Subsequent rumors brought them within eight miles of the city; and we have no force of any consequence here. The account was brought from Ashland by Mr. Davis, who killed his horse in riding eighteen miles in one hour and a half.

Later in the day a young man, sixteen years old (Shelton), reached the city from Hanover on a United States horse, the enemy having foraged on his father's farm and taken his blooded steed. He says, when he escaped from them (having been taken prisoner this morning) 1500 were at his father's place, and three times as many more, being 6000 in all, were resting a short distance apart on another farm; but such ideas of numbers are generally erroneous. They told him they had been in the saddle five days, and had burnt all the bridges behind them to prevent pursuit. It was after this that they cut the road at Ashland. They professed to have fresh horses taken from our people, leaving their own. I think they will disappear down the Pamunky, and of course will cut the Central and York River Roads, and the wires. Thus communication with Lee's army is interrupted!

The Fredericksburg train, of course, failed to arrive to-day at 6 P.M.; and it is rumored there were 700 of our wounded in it, and that a great battle was fought yesterday by Lee. These are rumors.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 306-7

Alexander Stephens to J. Henly Smith, July 10, 1860

Crawfordville [ga.] , July 10th, 1860.

Dear Smith, Your letter of the 6th inst. was received last night. The paper came by the same mail. The point in your historical narrative I referred to was in part corrected by yourself. The word have instead of protect covered the idea. Besides this, one other. My opposition to the Clayton Compromise was not entirely or solely because it did not protect but because it perpetuated the existing status of the country at the time of acquisition, which was antislavery. I wished that status changed either by Congress or that authority might be given to the territorial legislatures to change it. That bill tied the hands of both Congress and the territorial legislatures forever. This however does not amount to much so far as your letter is concerned. I now mention it that you may know the whole facts of the case. You would do well to read that speech, the one I made on the Clayton Compromise, if you write on that subject. What is to become of the country in case of Lincoln's election I do not know. For one I can only give you my own opinion. As at present advised I should not be for disunion on the grounds of his election. It may be that his election will be attended with events that will change my present opinion, but his bare election would not be sufficient cause in my judgment to warrant a disruption — particularly as his election will be the result if it occurs at all of the folly and madness of our own people. If they do these things in the green tree what will they not do in the dry? If without cause they destroy the present Govt., the best in the world, what hopes would I have that they would not bring untold hardships upon the people in their efforts to give us one of their modelling. All I can therefore say in response to your question is that I would not advocate disunion on that ground. Let events shape their own course. “Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.” In point of merit as a man I have no doubt Lincoln is just as good, safe and sound a man as Mr. Buchanan, and would administer the Government so far as he is individually concerned just as safely for the South and as honestly and faithfully in every particular. I know the man well. He is not a bad man. He will make as good a President as Fillmore did and better too in my opinion. He has a great deal more practical common sense. Still his party may do mischief. If so it will be a great misfortune, but a misfortune that our own people brought upon us. This is my judgment — this is the way I look upon it at present. I have not lime now to go more into detail, but I will say this, that I consider slavery much more secure in the Union than out of it if our people were but wise. And if they are not this fact adds no additional grounds to hope for more security out of the Union under the head of those who now control our destinies, than in it. We have nothing to fear from anything so much as unnecessary changes and revolutions in government. The institution is based on conservatism. Everything that weakens this has a tendency to weaken the institution. But I will stop.

P. S. — I see some of our papers are disputing about my position. I shall vote for Douglas; but I do not intend to take any active part in the canvass. I am out of politicks and intend to stay out. This it seems hard to make the people understand.

SOURCE: Ulrich Bonnell Phillips,Editor, The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb, p. 486-7