Diary of John Hay: April 25, 1864

This morning Burnside came in with Foster, a fine handsome fellow who looks like a soldier at least. . . .  If I can get away during this campaign I think I will go either with Burnside or Gillmore.

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 183; Michael Burlingame and John R. Turner Ettlinger, Editors, Inside Lincoln’s White House,: the complete Civil War Diary of John Hay, p. 189.

Brigadier-General Robert Anderson to Edwin M. Stanton, December 1862

New York, December, 1862.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

Sir: Although by the strict advice of my medical advisers I am prevented from undertaking any correspondence, the subject upon which I now have the honor to address you is one involving so much that I am induced to incur a risk, in order to bring it to your notice. I have observed in published Orders No. 181 that the brevet of major for the distinguished part taken by him in the transfer of the garrison of Fort Moultrie to Sumter, South Carolina, has been conferred upon Captain John G. Foster, Engineer Corps, to date from December 26, 1860. It is proper that I should here refer to the part taken by the different officers in that move; the only part Captain Foster took in the removal was his compliance with my request in directing Lieutenants Snyder and Meade to report to me with their boats' crews to aid in the move. To Lieutenants Snyder and Meade we were greatly indebted for their active and laborious exertions in making the transfer. I regret more deeply that neither of those officers can receive the favorable notice of our Government; the former is dead, and the latter has left our service. Assistant Surgeon Crawford returned to Fort Moultrie on the 27th, and was very active in sending over some ammunition, which was of material and essential service to us during our fight; and articles which Lieutenant Hall, to whom I was greatly indebted for his activity and energy in sending off the greater part of the stores which I had been unable to take over. From this it will be seen that if the Department desires to reward any officers for this service, that Brevets should be conferred upon those just named.

In my letters to the Adjutant-General, whilst at Fort Sumter, numbered 43, 44, 45, 58, 62, 74, 54, 66, 83, 93, and 94, I make a special mention of the services of Captain Seymour, Dr. Crawford, Lieutenants Snyder and Meade; these officers, in addition to their appropriate duties, contributed in no small degree to the maintenance of our position at Fort Sumter, and whose service deserves a special mention from me. If the Government deems any brevets due, it is to these officers.

It will be seen by reference to my letters I have mentioned, I have in letter No. 83 given credit to Captain Doubleday for an important suggestion; I now take advantage of this occasion to renew the commendation thus made, and to respectfully recommend that as a measure of justice to the officers named, a brevet, to date from April 14, 1861, should be bestowed either upon those of whom a special mention is made, or, as an act of justice to all, each one of the officers under my command should alike receive a brevet; and I again implore the Department that the distinction now contemplated for one only of the officers shall not be bestowed alone, it being in my estimation neither deserved upon his part nor just to his brother officers. As this matter has become the subject of official notice, it renders it more important that I should, as soon as possible, undertake an official report of the closing scenes of the occupancy of that work, which I have been thus far prevented from complying with from the strict orders of my physician. As soon as I can write, with the assistance of my friends I will make the report.

Very respectfully,

Robert Anderson,

Brigadier-General.

Letter No. 54, thanks to Dr. Crawford, and to Lieutenant Snyder, and Lieutenant Meade.

SOURCE:  Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 471-2

Diary of John Hay: November 2, 1863

The President says Butler has been tendered Foster’s department, while Foster goes to relieve Burnside, who resigns. It is not yet known whether Butler will accept.

I asked about Rosecrans. The President says he sees no immediate prospect of assigning him to command; — that he had thought, when the trouble and row of this election in Missouri is over, and the matter will not be misconstrued, of sending Rosecrans to Missouri and Schofield into the field. He says that it was because of Grant’s  opposition that Rosecrans is not in the Army of the Cumberland. When it was decided to place Grant in command of the whole Military Division, two sets of orders were made out, one contemplating Rosecrans’s retention of the command of his own army, and the other his relief. Grant was to determine the question for himself. He said at once that he preferred Rosecrans should be relieved, — that he (Rosecrans) never would obey orders. This consideration of course involves a doubt as to whether Rosecrans should be placed in command of a district from which Grant must, to a certain extent, derive supplies and reinforcements on occasion.

To-night Schenck sent for copies of the correspondence between the President and Bradford. The Tycoon came into my room with the despatch in his hands, clad in an overcoat, pure and simple, reaching to his knees, and sleepily fumbled for the papers in his desk till he found them, and travelled back to bed. . . .

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 117-8; For the whole diary entry see Tyler Dennett, Editor, Lincoln and the Civil War in the Diaries and letters of John Hay, p. 114-5.

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: February 21, 1863

Major-Gen. Hood's division passed through the city to day, and crossed over the river. I hope an attack will be made at Suffolk. It is too menacing a position to allow the invader to occupy it longer.

No attack on Charleston yet, and there is a rumor that the command of the expedition is disputed by Foster and Hunter. If it hangs fire, it will be sure to miss the mark.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 262

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, April 10, 1863

The President has not yet returned. The Cabinet did not convene to-day. Affairs look uncomfortable in North Carolina. The army there needs reinforcing, and had we Charleston we would send more vessels into those waters.

Neither the War Department nor army men entertain an idea that the Rebels have withdrawn any of their forces from the Rappahannock to go into North Carolina, but I have apprehensions that such may be the case. From what quarter but that can they have collected the large force that is now pressing Foster?

We have more definite yet not wholly reliable rumors from Charleston. A contest took place on the afternoon of the 7th, Tuesday, of three hours, from two till five. Two of our vessels are reported injured, — the Keokuk, said to be sunk on Morris Island, and the Ironsides, disabled. Neither is a turret vessel. On the whole, this account, if not what we wish, is not very discouraging. The movement I judged to have been merely a reconnoissance, to feel and pioneer the way for the grand attack. Fox persists that the ironclads are invulnerable. I shall not be surprised if some are damaged, perhaps disabled. In fact, I have supposed that some of them would probably be sunk, and shall be satisfied if we lose several and get Charleston. I hope we shall not lose them and fail to get the city.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 265-6

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, February 16, 1863

General Foster was here yesterday, Sunday. Has let out the proposed attack on Charleston. This indicates what I have lately feared, —  that Du Pont shrinks, dreads, the conflict he has sought, yet is unwilling that any other should undertake it, is afraid the reputation of Du Pont will suffer. This jeopardizes the whole, — makes a botched thing of it. I am disappointed, but not wholly surprised. A mandate he will obey, but I cannot well give it, for there are preliminaries and contingencies which would influence his movements and of which he must judge. The President desires Fox to go down to Charleston with General Foster, and came with Fox to see me. Told him it was a time when the active force of the Department was most wanted, it being near the close of the session of Congress, when every variety of call was made and delays to answer are inadmissible, and some important bills were to be acted upon and engineered through; nevertheless, if it was indispensable, he must go, but the very fact that Fox was sent on such an errand as proposed would touch Du Pont's pride, which is great, and do perhaps more harm than good. The President comprehended my views, and it was thought best that Fox should not go, but Foster was informed of our ideas, — that the Navy could move independent of the army, and pass Sumter, not stop to batter it. Once in the rear of the fort and having the town under the guns of the ironclads, the military in the forts and on James Island would be compelled to come to terms. All is clear and well enough but Du Pont should have such a force as to inspire confidence in himself and men in order to insure a favorable result. Will and determination are necessary to success. While it is right that he should be circumspect and vigilant, I deplore the signs of misgiving and doubt which have recently come over him, — his shirking policy, getting in with the army, making approaches, etc. It is not what we have talked of, not what we expected of him; is not like the firm and impetuous but sagacious and resolute Farragut.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 236-7

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, December 23, 1862

It was announced yesterday morning that the President had requested Mr. Seward and Mr. Chase to withdraw their resignations and resume their duties. This took the public by surprise. Chase's resignation was scarcely known, and his friends, particularly those in the late movement, were a little disgusted when they found that he and Seward were in the same category.

Seward's influence has often been anything but salutary. Not that he was evil inclined, but he is meddlesome, fussy, has no fixed principles or policy. Chase has chafed under Seward's management, yet has tried to conceal any exhibition of irritated feelings. Seward, assuming to be helmsman, has, while affecting and believing in his own superiority, tried to be patronizing to all, especially soothing and conciliating to Chase, who sees and is annoyed by it. The President feels that he is under obligations to each, and that both are serviceable. He is friendly to both. He is fond of Seward, who is affable; he respects Chase, who is clumsy. Seward comforts him; Chase he deems a necessity.

On important questions, Blair is as potent with the President as either, and sometimes I think equal to both. With some egotism, Blair has great good sense, a better knowledge and estimate of military men than either or both the others, and, I think, is possessed of more solid, reliable administrative ability.

All the members were at the Cabinet-meeting to-day. Seward was feeling very happy. Chase was pale; said he was ill, had been for weeks. The subject principally discussed was the proposed division of Virginia and the creation of a new State to be called Western Virginia. Chase is strongly for it; Blair and Bates against it, the latter, however, declining to discuss it or give his reasons except in writing. Stanton is with Chase. Seward does not show his hand. My impressions are, under the existing state of things, decidedly adverse. It is a disturbance that might be avoided at this time and has constitutional difficulties.

We have news that General Foster has possession of Goldsborough, North Carolina.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 205-6

Captain John G. Foster to Brevet Brigadier-General Joseph G. Totten, April 8, 1861

Fort Sumter, S. C. April 8, 1861.

General Joseph G. Totten,

Chief Engineer U. S. Army, Washington, D. C:

General: The increased activity and vigilance of the investing force, as reported yesterday, still continues. Three large traverses are nearly completed on the front, from battery Nos. 3 to 5, on Morris Island, and traverses are also being erected in the interior of battery No. 5. Additions of sand-bags are being made to the covering of the magazine, between Nos. 2 and 3, and to the left flank of No. 1, where I think they are constructing a service magazine.

I am busily at work constructing splinter-proof shelters on the terreplein. I obtain timber by taking the gun-carriages to pieces, and form the covering of the 2-inch iron pieces for embrasures, as seen below. The plates are spiked on, so as to be securely retained in their places, even if struck by a shell, which I am confident it will turn.

Our supplies are entirely cut off from the city, and those on hand are very limited.

The besieging forces worked all day yesterday, whenever the intervals between the showers of rain would allow.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. G. Foster, Captain Engineers.

P. S. — I received yesterday a letter from the Secretary of War to Major Anderson, which, by mistake, had been enveloped to me. I handed it to Major Anderson without reading.

Respectfully, &c.,

J. G. Foster, Captain Engineers.

SOURCES: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 385-6

Opinions of Various Officers on Resupplying and Reinforcing Fort Sumter: Probably Presented to Lincoln and his Cabinet March 15, 1861

George W. Snyder, lieutenant of Engineers, February 28, 1861: 4 regiments, or 4,000 men; 4 vessels of war.

R. K. Meade, jr., second lieutenant of Engineers, February 28, 1861: 5,000 men, at least; supported by gunboats.

S. W. Crawford, February 28, 1861: 4,000 men, supported by the Navy.

Norman J. Hall, second lieutenant, First Artillery, February 28, 1861: 3,500 men; 7 war vessels.

J. C. Davis, first lieutenant, First Artillery, February 28, 1861: 3,000 men; 6 war vessels.

Theodore Talbot, first lieutenant, First Artillery, February 28, 1861: 3,000 men and naval vessels.

T. Seymour, brevet captain and lieutenant, First Artillery, February 28, 1864.*

A. Doubleday, captain, First Artillery, February 28, 1861:10,000 men and Navy.

J. G. Foster, captain of Engineers, February 28, 1861: 6,000 regulars or 20,000 volunteers to take them; 10,000 regulars or 30,000 volunteers to hold them.

Captain Ward, who came here believing it practicable, abandoned it after consultation with General Scott. General Scott and the Chief of the Coast Survey, Mr. Foster, evidently a man of sound sense and experience as a seaman, who is acquainted with the waters, having formerly been attached to the Coast Survey, proposed to make the attempt with cutters of light draught and large dimensions. He was in a measure sustained by Commodore Stringham, but did not suppose provisions for more than one or two months could be furnished at a time.

_______________

* See p. 197.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 202-3

Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott to Abraham Lincoln, March 12, 1861

The President has done me the honor to propose certain military questions, concerning Fort Sumter to which he desires replies.

“1st.” To what point of time can Major Anderson maintain his position at Fort Sumter without fresh supplies or reinforcements?

Answer. In respect to subsistence he has bread, flour, and rice for about 26 days, and salt meat (pork) for about forty eight days. Without additional supplies of provisions he may hold out some forty days without much suffering from hunger.

The besiegers are understood to be about 3,500 men, now somewhat disciplined, and they have four powerful batteries on land, and one floating battery, all mounting guns and mortars of large calibre and of the best patterns, bearing on Fort Sumter. Supposing Major Anderson not to be reinforced and the means of the assailants to be skilfully and vigorously employed – Fort Sumter being defended by less than 100 men, including common laborers and musicians – it might be taken, at any time, by a single assault, and easily, if previously harassed, perseveringly, for many days and nights; the assailants having the ability (by the force of numbers) of converting one out of every three or four of those demonstrations, into a real attack.

“2d.” Can you, with all the means now in your control, supply or reinforce Fort Sumter within the period you specify as the time, within which Major Anderson may hold out without fresh supplies?”

Answer. No, not within many months; But not to speak of October or November, when the proposition was first made, and repeated, in writing, the third time, December 30th – it would have been easy to reinforce Fort Sumter, with war vessels, down to about the 12th of February. In this long delay, twice that time, Fort Moultrie has been re-armed and greatly strengthened, in every way, and many powerful new land batteries (besides rafts) have been constructed. Hulks have also been sunk in the principal channel, so as to render access to Fort Sumter, from the sea, impractical, without first carrying all the batteries of the secessionists. The difficulty of reinforcing has thus, by delay, been increased 1[0] or 12 fold. First, the late President refused to allow any attempt to be made, because he was holding negotiations with South Carolina Commissioners. Afterwards, Secretary Holt and myself endeavored to obtain a ship of war for the purpose; but failing in this we were obliged to employ the steamer Star of the West. That vessel, but for the hesitation of the commander, might then have landed, it is generally believed, men and subsistence. That attempt having failed, I next, before the late Cabinet, submitted, orally, either that succor be sent by ships of war, fighting their way to the Fort, or, that Major Anderson should ameliorate his condition by the muzzles of his guns; that is, enforcing supplies by bombardment, and by bringing-to merchant vessels and helping himself (giving orders for payment) or else should be allowed to surrender, as, sooner or later, had then become inevitable.

But before any resolution was taken – the late Secretary of the Navy making difficulties about the want of suitable vessels; – another commissioner from South Carolina arrived, causing further delay. When that had passed away, Secretaries Holt & Toucy, Capt. Ward of the Navy and myself, with the knowledge of President Buchanan, settled upon the employment, under the Captain (who was eager for the expedition) of four or more small steamers belonging to the Coast Survey.- At that time, I have no doubt Captain Ward would have suceeded with all his vessels. But he was kept back by something like a truce established between the late President and a number of principal seceders, here, in the Senate, & from South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana &c., and this truce continued to the termination of that administration. That plan and all others like it, are now pronounced, from the change of circumstances, impracticable, by Major Anderson Captain Foster and all the other officers of the Fort, as well as by Brig. General Totten, Chief of the Corps of Engineers: and, in this opinion, I fully concur. The three or four steamers would have been obliged to attempt to make their way past the hostile batteries in an obstructed channel. Possibly one of them might have reached the fort, with (being small) a few days subsistence, but would, certainly probably, have been destroyed on arriving at the entrance (by the concentrated fire of three or four powerful batteries), before landing a man or a ration. In this opinion Captain Ward finally concurred.

“3d.” If I could not supply or reinforce Fort Sumter, within the time specified, with all the means in my control, then what amount of means and of what description, in addition to that already at my control, would enable me to supply and reinforce the fortress within that time.”

Answer. I should need a fleet of war vessels and transports which, in the scattered disposition of the Navy (as understood) could not be collected in less than four months; – 5,000 additional regular troops, and 20,000 volunteers – that is, a force sufficient to take all the batteries both in the harbour (including Ft. Moultrie) as well as in the approach or outer bay. To raise, organize and discipline such an army (not to speak of necessary legislation by Congress, not now in session) would require from six to eight months. As a practical military question, the time for succoring Fort Sumter, with any means at hand, had passed away nearly a month ago. Since then a surrender under assault, or from starvation, has been merely a question of time.

It is, therefore, my opinion and advice that Major Anderson be instructed to evacuate the Fort – so long gallantly held by him and his companions – immediately on procuring suitable water transportation, and that he embark, with his command, for New York.

I have the honor to return, herewith, the reports and communications of Major Anderson and his officers, submitted to me by the President. These papers of themselves demonstrate how the Fort has become untenable during the delays I have described above.

Respectfully Submitted.

Winfield Scott.

Head Qrs. of the Army

Washington, March 12, 1861.

SOURCE: Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Captain John G. Foster to Brevet Brigadier-General Joseph G. Totten, March 31, 1861

Fort Sumter, S. C, March 31, 1861.

General Jos. G. Totten,

Chief Engineer United States Army, Washington, D. C.:

General: Yesterday the members of the State Convention visited the batteries on Morris Island and Fort Moultrie, and from both places extensive firing took place in honor of the event. This gave me an opportunity of observing what batteries have been increased in strength since my last report on this subject.

The following is the present armament, very nearly, viz.:

Battery No. 1. — Four guns. Embrasures closed by sandbags. Not fired yesterday.

Mortar battery between Nos. 1 and 2. — Three mortars. Fired yesterday. These have practiced much lately, to obtain the range and length of fuse for this fort.

Battery No. 2, iron-clad. — Three heavy guns. Two of them fired yesterday.

Battery No. 3. — Three guns. Embrasures closed with sandbags. Did not fire.

Mortar battery between Nos. 3 and 4. — Two mortars. Fired yesterday.

Battery No. 4. — Three guns. Two fired.

Battery No. 5. — Four heavy guns, one Columbiad or 8-inch seacoast howitzer. Two fired yesterday. I think there are six guns in this battery, although only four have been seen to fire.

Star of the West battery. — Four heavy guns, one of them an 8-inch Columbiad or 8-inch seacoast howitzer. All fired yesterday.

Battery No. 7. — These guns are not all in the same battery, but are distributed along the beach apparently in three batteries. Eleven guns fired yesterday. All were very heavy guns except two, which I think were field-pieces in a sort of second tier.

Above these batteries, on the sand-hills, is a line of intrenchments surrounding a house, and also several tents. The fieldpieces are apparently capable of being used to defend the flanks of this intrenchment, and to fire on the channel. Their rear is covered, each with a traverse.

It was evident in this firing that not all the guns in position were fired.

At Fort Moultrie the firing exhibited the same complete armament as last reported.

The provisions that I laid in for my force having become exhausted, and the supplies of the command being too limited to spare me any more, I am obliged to discharge nearly all my men to-day. I retain only enough to man a boat.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. G. Foster,

Captain Engineers.

SOURCE: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 302-4

Captain John G. Foster to Brevet Brigadier-General Joseph G. Totten, March 6, 1861

Fort Sumter, S. C,

March 6, 1861.

General: I have the honor to report that during the day, and especially towards night, unusual activity was observed among the South Carolinians around us; several steamer loads of men were landed on Cummings Point. The number was greater than the arrangements for shelter, apparently, for I observe quite a large number grouped about their bivouac fires this morning. Their suffering must have been considerable during the night, for the weather suddenly changed from the warm temperature of the preceding days to a high degree of cold, for this climate, the wind blowing fresh from the north.

I learn that portable hot shot furnaces have been furnished to several, and probably all, of the batteries. The mortar battery on James Island, south of Fort Johnson, is armed, but the number of mortars is not ascertained. The magazine in the flank of this battery is also finished. The mortar battery on Sullivan's Island, west of Fort Moultrie, is also armed. All the batteries on Morris Island are armed. The guns range from 32pounders down, with the exception of the iron bomb-proof, which is (I think, from all reports and observations) armed with 8-inch Columbiads — three of them.

The raft does not meet expectations. It is being covered with railroad strap iron instead of the T rail. This has a crosssection of about three-fourths or one inch by two inches or two and a half inches.

They are now ironing the top portion, the front not being yet commenced. Two 8-inch Columbiads are lying on the wharf ready to be put on board. I do not think this floating battery will prove very formidable.

We have not yet received the inaugural address of President Lincoln, although it is reported from town that it is coercive in its character, and that much excitement prevails.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. G. Foster,

Captain Engineers.

General Jos. G. Totten,

Chief Engineer U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

SOURCE: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 280-1

Reverend Horace James, June 6, 1863

Office Of Superintendent Of Blacks,

Newbern, N. C., June 6th, 1863.

Respecting Teachers, I am ready to assure you, from General Foster himself, that he will afford them military protection, government rations, and as good a dwelling place as the circumstances will allow. We have but one Newbern in the department. Here they will have a good house to live in. At Beaufort it would be much the same. But on Roanoke Island, and perhaps at Plymouth and Washington, certainly at Hatteras, we could not supply them so comfortably. I am confident there will be no trouble on this point. Still I wish that those who are sent may share largely in a missionary spirit, and come out here expecting to teach and to live in a log shanty, or even in a tent, if we can do no better for them. Let them aspire to emulate their brothers in self-denial, who have preceded them here in the regiments, and with the sword have cut a passage for the army of Educators' to follow on.

Horace James.

SOURCE: New-England Educational Commission for Freedmen, Extracts from Letters of Teachers and Superintendents of the New-England Educational Commission for Freedmen, Fourth Series, January 1, 1864, p. 7

Diary of Salmon P. Chase: Monday, October 6, 1862

Maj. Garrard called to speak about North Carolina and Genl. Foster. Foster has now 3d. N. Y. Cav., and of Infantry, 17, 21 and 25 Mass, 9 N. J., 2 Md., and 5 R. I., supported by Albemarle and Pamlico Fleet, say ten gunboats. Foster wants reinforcements, — several regiments of Infantry and another Regiment of Cavalry. Maj. Garrard desires that if another regiment of Cavalry is sent, Col. Mix should be made Brigadier.

Genl. Keyes and Maj. Bannister, with Genl. Garfield and Maj. Garrard, formed our breakfast party. Genl. Keyes spoke of the disposition in the army (McClellan, etc.) to disfavor. Republican officers. Genl. Garfield mentioned the case of a young Republican officer ordered to Kansas in 1856, who was told by his Colonel that he would not allow him to remain in the Regiment if he remained Republican. Genl. Keyes spoke of the chaplain at West Point as the most perfect specimen of a Northern man with Southern principles he ever knew, and said that when the new Regiments were organizing under Jeff Davis, as Secretary of War to Pierce, eleven out of fifteen officers were appointed from the South, and when he remarked upon it he was challenged to select the eleven better men.

Went to Department, and with Gov. Morton to see the President about [furlough] to enable Indiana soldiers in camp to vote; which he promised. Left the Governor with the President. Saw Col. Hamilton and arranged interview for him. Met Wadsworth and Cochrane. Asked Cochrane to breakfast.

Genl. Cochrane breakfasted with me, and after breakfast conversed freely about McClellan. He said McClellan would like to retire from active command if he could do so without disgrace, which could be accomplished and a more active General secured by restoring him to chief command, where he would now act in unison with myself. I explained frankly my relations to McClellan — my original admiration and confidence—my disappointment in his inactivity and irresolution — my loss of confidence and conviction that another General should replace him — my constant endeavor to support him by supplies and reinforcements, notwithstanding my distrust, when the President determined to keep him in command — my present belief that I had not judged incorrectly, but my entire willingness, also, to receive any correction which facts would warrant; and my absolute freedom from personal ill will, and my entire readiness to do anything which would insure the earliest possible suppression of the rebellion. He said that Col. Key had often expressed his regret that MeClellan had not conferred with me and acted in concert with me. I replied that I thought, if he had, the rebellion would be ended now; but that I feared concert between us impossible, our views, dispositions, and principles harmonizing so little. He said he would talk with McClellan and write me. I answered that I should be glad to hear from him, and was quite willing he should report to McClellan what I had said.

At Cabinet, the President spoke of his visit to the Army at Sharpsburgh, and the battle fields of Antietam and South Mountain. He said he was fully satisfied that we had not over 60,000 men engaged; and he described the position of the enemy and our own — the enemy's being much the best, his wings and centre communicating easily by the Sharpsburgh road parallel with the stream. He expressed no opinion as to Generalship, nor of results.

Seward asked what news of the Expedition to Charleston? Secretary Welles [said] the necessary iron-clads could not be ready in less than a month. I was much disappointed by this statement, remembering that ten days of a month were up; and said at once that I hoped then we should not wait for the Navy but at once organize a land force sufficient to take the city from James Island. Mr. Stanton agreed in the importance of this, and proposed to order Mitchell's and Garfield's Brigades from the West — send Garfield at once to South Carolina with these Brigades and two more Regiments—and let Mitchell go to work immediately. He said also that he proposed at once to organize an Expedition to open the Mississippi, and give the command of it to McClernand. The President seemed much pleased with both movements—but Halleck remained to be consulted. Would he oppose the President and Stanton? I thought not.

I left the Cabinet with more hope than I have felt for months.

At the President's, I met W. H. Aspinwall and invited him to come and dine with me; which he did. In conversation, I enquired what he thought of the idea of selling some $50,000,000 of Five-twenties at about the market rate? He thought it should be done but doubted whether more than 97½ could be obtained. I said I hoped to get 99 or 99½. He then spoke of his visit to McClellan and seemed greatly to desire my cooperation with him. He mentioned that Burnside had heard that I blamed him for having Porter restored to command; but thinks I would not if I understood all the circumstances.

SOURCE: Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 101-4

Major-General John A. Dix to Major General Henry Halleck, Received July 18, 1863

HDQRS. DEPT. OF VIRGINIA, SEVENTH ARMY CORPS,

Fort Monroe, Va., July –, 1863.

(Received July 18.)

GENERAL: On the 14th of June, I received from you the following dispatch by telegraph:

Lee's army is in motion toward the Shenandoah Valley. All your available force should be concentrated to threaten Richmond by seizing and destroying their railroad bridges over the South and North Anna Rivers, and do them all the damage possible. If you cannot accomplish this, you can at least occupy a large force of the enemy. There can be no serious danger of an attack on Norfolk now.

I had at the time this dispatch was received a force of about 5,000 men moving up the Peninsula. The advance was near the left bank of the Chickahominy, above Diascund Bridge. I had also a considerable force on the Blackwater. These movements had been made to prevent the enemy from sending re-enforcements to General Lee from this department:

At the same time all the transports in the department had been ordered to Aquia Creek, to remove the sick and convalescent of the Army of the Potomac and the public property to Washington. On the 15th, I had not a single transport left. I went on the evening of the 14th to Suffolk, and ordered General Peck to have his command in readiness to move.

On the 17th, transports returned, and were sent to Norfolk to receive Wistar's brigade, which had been ordered there from Suffolk. I advised you on the 18th that part of this brigade went up the York River that morning. The transports came in very slowly, and when they were all here, they were only sufficient to move Colonel Spears regiment of cavalry from Norfolk to the White House.

From my inability to move a larger force at once, General Getty's division, Terry's and Wistar's brigades, were landed at Yorktown.

It was not until the 24th that I could send Colonel Spear with the Eleventh Pennsylvania Cavalry and about 200 men, mounted, of different regiments, under Lieutenant-Colonel Davis, of the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad bridge over the South Anna. He landed at the White House on the 25th, after constructing a wharf, for which I had ordered up materials from Fort Monroe. The same evening, on the return of the transports to Yorktown, I sent General Wistar with a part of his brigade and a battery of artillery to West Point. He pulled down two small buildings, built a wharf, and landed during the night.

On the 26th, in the evening, I reached the White House, General Getty having arrived immediately before me, and being then engaged in landing his division. Major-General Keyes, with Gordon's division and Terry's brigade, and some other troops, amounting to about 9,000 men, arrived at Cumberland on the same evening, and at the White House on the 27th.

Brigadier-General Foster's brigade arrived on the 28th, making an aggregate force at the White House for duty of 18,730.

Brigadier-General Spinola arrived two days afterward from North Carolina with 1,718 drafted Pennsylvania militia, whose term of service was about to expire, with directions that they be sent to Washington, if they would consent to serve until the insurgent forces were driven out of Pennsylvania and Maryland. They gave the requisite consent, and were embarked for Washington on the 7th July.

On the 27th June, in the morning, Colonel Spear returned from the South Anna, having destroyed the bridge of the Virginia Central Railroad over that river and the quartermaster's depot at Hanover Court-House, secured and brought away 700 animals, 35 army wagons, $15,000 in Confederate bonds, and other property, and captured Brig. Gen. W. H. F. Lee, a son Of the general-in-chief of the insurgent army. A detailed report of the movement was forwarded from the White House.

To facilitate anticipated movements at the White House, I ordered a light locomotive and half a dozen platform cars to be sent from Norfolk. They arrived on the 28th, and were landed on the 29th, and put in operation on the railroad. The railroad bridge over the Pamunkey at the White House was left uninjured, but the rails from that point to West Point had been taken up, probably to be laid down on other roads in the seceded States, where there was urgent need for them.

On Colonel Spear's return, I organized an expedition, under General Getty, to seize and destroy the bridge of the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad over the South Anna. It consisted of his division, excepting a regiment retained for provost duty at the White House, General Foster's brigade, a provisional brigade (part of Wistar's), under Colonel Wardrop, of the Ninety-ninth New York Volunteers, and the cavalry under Colonel Spear; in all, about 10,000 men. His artillery and wagons were passed over the river on platform cars, the time occupied for the passage of the entire column being fifteen hours – from 5 p.m. on the 30th June to 8 a.m. on the 1st of July.

A copy of my instructions to General Getty is annexed.* I advised you of the movement on the 29th June and 1st July.

On the day General Getty commenced his march (the 1st July), I received a dispatch from you, directing me, as soon as my forces returned from their present expedition, to report before sending out any more; and, on the 3d, another, with the following directions:

As soon as the expedition now out terminates, you will draw in all your forces to Yorktown, Fort Monroe, and the defenses of Norfolk, and send to this place (Washington) all the troops not absolutely required for the defense of those places.

To cover General Getty's movement and insure its success, I ordered Major-General Keyes, with Terry's and West's brigades and one of the brigades of Gordon's division, to advance on the Richmond road, and attack the enemy, who was understood to be in considerable force on the right bank of the Chickahominy, a short distance from Bottoms Bridge. General Keyes was to post his artillery in position so as to command the bridge, and open fire on the enemy. He was also directed to hold his position for two or three days, until there was reason to believe that General Getty had accomplished his object. Major-General Keyes was chosen to command the troops by which this demonstration was to be made on account of his rank, and more especially on account of his supposed familiar acquaintance with the country, gained with the Army of the Potomac during the campaign on the Chickahominy.

GENERAL GETTY'S EXPEDITION.

General Getty moved from the left bank of the Pamunkey, opposite the White House, at 8 a.m. on the 1st July. The weather was intensely hot, and, on his arrival at Littlepage's Bridge, near the junction of the South Anna with the Pamunkey, on the 4th of July, a large number of his men were found unfit for active duty. The road from Taylor's Ferry is very narrow, and difficult for artillery and heavy wagons. It passes over high hills, and is very unfavorable to the movements of troops.

Colonel Spear, agreeably to my orders, had destroyed all the bridges and ferry-boats below Littlepage's Bridge.

The column was crossed on the evening of the 4th, and the advance was immediately made to the bridge of the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad across the South Anna. It was found to be held by a very large force, covered by earthworks. From the best information, this force was believed to be about 8,000 men, with fourteen pieces of artillery. Three regiments had been brought down from Fredericksburg. From the evening of the 1st to the evening of the 4th, cars were coming from Richmond with troops inside and outside. Three trains passed up on the morning of the 4th with troops and with eight pieces of artillery. Believing that his own force would not justify an attack on the bridge, that he would sustain very heavy loss, and that success would be doubtful, he decided to destroy as much of the track as possible, and render the railroad unserviceable. General Foster was, therefore, directed to remove the rails, bend them, and burn the ties. This was accomplished from a point near the bridge to a road some 3 miles below.

Major Stratton was sent with a detachment of cavalry to Ashland Station, on the same railroad, about 11 miles from Richmond, where he destroyed the railroad depot, brought off the telegraph instrument, and tore up the track above and below the place, burning the ties and bending the rails. He also destroyed a trestle bridge a mile below Ashland, and a number of cars loaded with materials for the reconstruction of the railroad bridge over the South Anna destroyed by Colonel Spear. He also tore up the track and disabled the rails.

It is the opinion of Major Stratton, who is a very judicious man, and who was a railroad engineer before the rebellion, that the injury he did could not be repaired in less than a week, and it is the opinion of General Getty that, considering all the injuries done to the road, a fortnight will be necessary to put it in running order.

The position of General Getty on the right bank of the Pamunkey, with Richmond in his front, a large force on his right, and a narrow bridge to recross the river, was a critical one, and if he had been attacked by a superior force he would have been in great danger.

Having substantially accomplished the object of breaking up the direct railroad connection between Richmond and General Lee's army in Pennsylvania, he recrossed the Pamunkey, destroyed Littlepage's Bridge, and returned to the White House, bringing with him 21 prisoners, one a commissioned officer, and having lost 2 killed and 7 wounded. The information in regard to the strength of the enemy at the bridge is fully confirmed by the prisoners.

GENERAL KEYES' DEMONSTRATION.

General Keyes, agreeably to his orders to attack Bottom's Bridge, advanced on the 1st of July to Baltimore, or Crump's, Cross-Roads, where he halted for the night, sending his advance, under Colonel West, 3 or 4 miles farther on. Bottom's Bridge is but 13 miles from the White House, and it was expected that General Keyes would take, on the evening of the 1st, a position which should command it, and prevent the enemy from crossing. The correspondence forwarded to you on the 12th instant shows that he proposed to me the same night to fall back to the White House; that I directed him to hold his position, unless the enemy showed himself in such force as to make it necessary to fall back, and that at daybreak on the 2d he fell back to Baltimore Store, or Talley's, though no enemy had appeared, with the exception of some skirmishers on the 1st. His letter, No. 5,­** advising me of his intention, did not reach me till after daylight, when it was too late to arrest the movement.

On the afternoon of the 2d, the enemy advanced, with eight pieces of artillery and an infantry force, on Baltimore Cross-Roads, and Colonel West, who had been left there with the advance, fell back, to avoid being outflanked. The enemy's field pieces were brought within a mile of Baltimore Store, to which General Keyes had retired, and fired from 100 to 150 shots during the night, without doing any injury whatever. From information derived from Colonel West, who is an experienced officer and a man of cool judgment, the enemy's whole force could not at any time have exceeded 3,000 men. General Keyes had 6,000, and fourteen pieces of artillery.

After the night firing, which was manifestly intended for intimidation, the enemy withdrew nearly his whole force before daybreak, and there is little doubt that it was hurried back to Richmond, and sent up to the South Anna by railroad, to oppose General Getty.

From the morning of the 3d to the 7th, when General Getty returned, I am now satisfied that there was at no time more than a regiment of infantry and some small parties of cavalry between the Chickahominy and the White House.

On the correspondence between General Keyes and myself, I make no comment, but leave it to speak for itself. I desire, however, to say, that after the letter, No. 24,^† showing a concurrence of opinion and feeling on the part of General Keyes and his brigade commanders, I deemed it most prudent to suspend the movement, and leave his command where it was in no danger of molestation.

It is my opinion that if a prompt and vigorous attack had been made on the 1st July on Bottom's Bridge, it would have been regarded as a real movement and not a mere demonstration; that the enemy's troops would have been retained in Richmond, and that General Getty would have succeeded in destroying the railroad bridge over the South Anna. But when General Keyes fell back on the morning of the 2d without being attacked, and it became manifest that the movement was a mere feint, a large portion of the force in Richmond was sent against General Getty.

THE ENEMY'S FORCE IN RICHMOND.

On the 28th of June, the day the last of my force arrived at the White House, Jeff. Davis wrote to General Lee that there were three brigades in Richmond, and part of Hill's division, besides Wise's brigade, on the east side of the city. These different corps could not well have numbered less than 12,000 men. There were, in addition, a body of trained artillerists in the intrenchments, which are very strong; the Home Guard, embracing all males capable of bearing arms, a convalescent brigade, and the Home Guard called in from Petersburg. My information, corroborated from a variety of sources, is, that there were in Richmond on the 1st July not less than 20,000 persons under arms, a majority of whom were regularly organized and trained troops.

On the 2d July, Mr. Ould declared 1,800 paroled prisoners of war at Richmond exchanged, and they were no doubt immediately put in service there. My information that there were about 8,000 men at the South Anna, prepared for General Getty's attack, is, therefore, perfectly consistent with the letter of Jefferson Davis and corroborating intelligence from other sources.

In review, I beg leave to say that the objects in contemplation of your order of the 14th June were substantially accomplished; that the railroad connection between General Lee and Richmond was effectually broken; that a large force of the enemy was occupied, and that very severe injury was inflicted on him.

My position at the White House was one from which the enemy could have been greatly annoyed had the public necessities elsewhere allowed me to retain it. The time required to pass General Getty's column across the river led me to plank over the railroad for the passage of supply trains and artillery, and by means of this facility the whole country could have been controlled from the Pamunkey to the Rappahannock, either by holding the bridge and operating from the White House, or by crossing my whole force, destroying the bridge, making West Point the base of my movement, and avoiding the long and circuitous navigation of the Pamunkey below the White House. With the aid of a pontoon bridge, the Pamunkey can be crossed at New Castle Ferry or Hanovertown, each about 15 or 16 miles from Richmond, 8 or 9 miles nearer than the White House.

I inclose herewith the reports of Major-General Keyes and Brigadier-General Getty, giving a detailed account of their movements.

The loss of General Keyes was 25 killed, wounded, and missing, and of General Getty, 2 killed and 7 wounded.

I desire to acknowledge the zeal and promptitude of the officers and men under my command in the performance of all their duties.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

 JOHN A. DIX,

Major-General.

 General H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

_______________

* See Addenda to Getty’s report, p. 840.

** See p. 826.

^† See p. 832.

SOURCES: Morgan Dix, Memoirs of John Adams Dix, Volume 2, p. 57; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 2 (Serial No. 44), p. 820-4

Diary of 5th Sergeant Alexander G. Downing: Monday, January 30, 1865

We marched about three miles this morning and then went into bivouac to await further orders. The report is that we are now ready to make the grand raid through South Carolina. The Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps are to form the right wing, as in the campaign through Georgia, with General O. O. Howard in command. General Slocum is in command of the left wing, composed of the other two corps, the Fourteenth and Twentieth, while Kilpatrick's cavalry will take the flanks as rear guard. General Sherman is in chief command. General Foster, it is said, is either to remain here or move to Charleston.

Source: Alexander G. Downing, Edited by Olynthus B., Clark, Downing’s Civil War Diary, p. 249

Diary of 5th Sergeant Alexander G. Downing: Saturday, January 14, 1865

Our army commenced to move at 7 this morning and by 10 o'clock the last detachment had crossed Broad river. We moved on about ten miles, driving the rebels and skirmishing with them all the way. The Iowa Brigade lost one man killed, a lieutenant of Company A, Fifteenth Iowa. The expedition consists of the Seventeenth Army Corps with General Foster's command on our left.

Source: Alexander G. Downing, Edited by Olynthus B., Clark, Downing’s Civil War Diary, p. 246

Diary of 5th Sergeant Alexander G. Downing: Thursday, December 29, 1864

The weather continues pleasant but cool. The glorious old Seventeenth Army Corps was reviewed at 9 a. m. by Major-General Sherman. The corps performed nicely and looked fine considering the campaign through which they have gone, and also considering the fact that they have not yet drawn new clothing. We formed our lines in the streets down in the city and the general rode along the lines to inspect them. We then marched along Front Street, where the general was stationed to review us. General Foster was also present as we passed in review. We got back into camp at 2 o'clock, having had a fine day for the review. Things are very quiet and there is no news of any importance. Small boats come up the river every day to bring rations and other army stores.

Source: Alexander G. Downing, Edited by Olynthus B., Clark, Downing’s Civil War Diary, p. 242

Captain John G. Foster to Colonel René E. De Russy, December 22, 1860

sullivan's Island, S. C, December 22, 1860.

Col. R E. De Russy,

Commanding Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, Washington D.C.:

Colonel: I feel it my duty to inform you that on the last two nights steamers from town have remained in the close vicinity of Fort Sumter, apparently with the object of maintaining guard over the fort. On the first night, that of the 20th, only one came. She approached from the direction of town, as though running for the wharf, and her movements attracting the attention of the watchman, he awoke Lieutenant Snyder, who, when he went upon the ramparts, found her close under the west flank, apparently sounding. She afterwards moved off to a second position about six hundred yards from the fort, and remained during the night. She showed no lights. On the same night this or another steamer reconnoitred and remained around Castle Pinckney for some time, and when hailed by the night-watch on the Castle as to what she wanted, some one replied, “You will know in a week.” Last night two steamers kept watch around Fort Sumter.

These steamers are the small harbor or coast steamers, and one of them was named the Nina. Judging it best not to incur any risk of an unpleasant occurrence, I have not taken any steps to ascertain the object of this surveillance, nor of those in command of the steamers. The recent orders emanating from the War Department have given me the assurance that every cause that might irritate these people must be avoided. However mortifying it may be to know that there are no means for defense in Fort Sumter, and that the military men of the city have their eyes fixed upon it as the prize to obtain, I feel bound to carry out this idea in my every act.

I do not even feel authorized to vary my present plan of operations, either by a reduction or an increase of force, although my expenses are very heavy, and my present liabilities barely covered by my requisitions just made. Whenever the Department desires that I may make a change of operations, I beg that it may soon be communicated to me.

At Fort Moultrie I am still exerting myself to the utmost to make it so defensible as to discourage any attempts to take it . The wet ditch is now completed. The whole of the east front is now raised by solid merlons, two barrels high, and in three positions to a greater height, to serve for cavaliers. The guns are provided with good siege-battery embrasures, faced with green hides, and two of them 8-inch howitzers, one in addition furnished with musket-proof shutters working on an axis, elevated over the throat of the embrasure by supports on each side, and manœuvred by double bars extending back over the gun.

A field howitzer has been put in position on the parapet at the northeast salient by means of a palmetto stockade, so as to sweep the vicinity of that angle better than it was before. Traverses to intercept shot from the sand-hills have been placed on the parapet and upon the terrepleins.

The bridge connecting the barracks and guard-house is completed, the doors arranged with fastenings, doors cut through the partition walls of the barracks, trap-doors cut in the floors, and ladders made. The howitzers in the finished caponiere are put in good working order. The second caponiere was commenced yesterday morning, with a full force of masons, and by to-night was over six feet in height, with both embrasures completed. Major Anderson wanted me to adopt some more temporary construction, but I showed him that this would be far more valuable in the defense, and having the materials and masons ready, I could construct it just as quickly and cheaply. On Monday I shall erect a lookout tower, or sharpshooter stand, on top of the guard-house, at Major Anderson's request. I have stopped for the present the work upon the glacis in front of the sea front, and put all my force upon the above works. The glacis has, however, assumed fine proportions, and is in fact nearly completed. One-half of the interior slope is well sodded, and half of the glacis slope covered with muck six inches thick.

It will take very little work to complete the whole of it, as soon as the present pressing work is finished.

Very truly yours,

J. G. Foster,

Captain Engineers

[Endorsement No. I.]

Engineer Department, December 24, 1860.

Respectfully submitted to the honorable Secretary of War for his information, and with the earnest request that the instructions solicited by Captain Foster may be promptly given.

H. G. Wright,

Captain of Engineers, in charge.

[Endorsement No. 2.]

Engineer Department, December 26, 1860.

Respectfully referred to the honorable Secretary of War, and his attention urgently called to the within report as one of great importance.

H. G. Wright,

Captain of Engineers, in charge.

[Endorsement No. 3.]

engineer Office, December 26, i860.

Have just seen the Secretary of War, and read to him the within letter. His only remarks in regard to it were that it was very satisfactory, and that he hoped, or thought, I don't distinctly remember which, that we should get over these troubles without bloodshed. He further said he did not wish to retain the letter —this in answer to my question.

H. G. W.

SOURCE: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 97-9

Brigadier-General John A. Rawlins to Mary Emeline Hurlburt Rawlins, February 3, 1864

Nashville, Feb. 3, 1864.

. . . General Grant reached Louisville yesterday afternoon and despatched me he would not come on here till Friday unless it was absolutely necessary. I replied to him that important matters demanded his attention here, to which I have received no answer, and infer he is on his way. The train is behind time, and will not arrive before twelve o'clock to-night. Here is his proper place, and his country and friends may rest assured he will never be absent by any counseling of of mine, while I maintain my present official relations to him.

I received last evening an answer from the Honorable E. B. Washburne to my letter to him dated 20th ultimo, in which he says, after speaking of the efforts he made to see me while in New York: “It would have given me great pleasure to have made my congratulations to you and your wife personally. I communicate them to you now and through you to Mrs. Rawlins. I would always be willing to underwrite for a Connecticut girl at a very small rate of premium.” He adds: “The bill creating a Lieutenant Generalcy is sure to become a law and that General Grant will be the hero honored with the rank thus created.” If so, I may if I desire it no doubt obtain a prominent position in the army, but as I now view things I shall seek for no situation in that direction. To be at home with wife and children is the highest ambition of my life.

. . . Everything is quiet, no reports of alarm or threatened movements of the enemy from any part of our long-extended lines to-day. Major General Schofield, late of the Department of Missouri, has been assigned to command the Department of the Ohio. He relieved General Foster, and I hope he may prove competent for his new place. Knoxville is his headquarters and his position is the most difficult of any in the country. He went forward to-day.

Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas, whom you met at Vicksburg, and one of his sons, also passed on from here to-day for Knoxville. He did not congratulate me on my new relations. I suppose he is past the age of thinking of these civilities. He is, however, the first of many of my army acquaintances, who had had the pleasure of seeing you, that overlooked this civility. The General was very cordial in his greetings, however, and I have no doubt it was meeting so many here that caused him to neglect the matter alluded to.

SOURCE: James H. Wilson, The Life of John A. Rawlins, p. 394-5